area handbook series 

Ethiopia 

a country study 



<3> 



IBM 



II 

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Ethiopia 

a country study 



c. 



IBM 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Thomas P. Ofcansky 
and LaVerle Berry 
Research Completed 
July 1991 



ifimi, 

I l! 




On the cover: Largest of the standing obelisks at Aksum, capi- 
tal of the ancient Aksumite state 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Ethiopia : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 

Congress ; edited by Thomas P. Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry. — 
4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA pam ; 550-28) 

"Supersedes the 1981 edition of Ethiopia: a country study, 
edited by Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan" — T.p. verso. 

"Research completed July 1991." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 347-376) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0739-9 

1. Ethiopia. I. Ofcansky, Thomas P., 1947- . II. Berry, 
LaVerle, 1942- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research 
Division. IV. Area handbook for Ethiopia. V. Series. VI. Series: 
DA pam ; 550-28. 
DT373.E83 1993 92-507 
963— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-28 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of 
information in the 1981 edition of Ethiopia: A Country Study, edited 
by Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan. The authors are also 
grateful to numerous individuals in various government agencies 
and private institutions who generously shared their time, exper- 
tise, and knowledge about Ethiopia. These people include Paul B. 
Henze, The Rand Corporation; Thomas L. Kane, Department 
of Defense; Thomas Collelo, Department of Defense; Carol Boger, 
Department of Defense; Major Dale R. Endreson, United States 
Army; and Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies/ 
Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. None 
of these individuals is in any way responsible for the work of the 
authors, however. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. 
Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials and served 
as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Marilyn Majeska, who 
managed the editing; Vincent Ercolano, who edited the chapters; 
Joshua Sinai, who helped prepare the manuscript for prepublica- 
tion review; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella 
Watson, who did the word processing. Andrea T. Merrill performed 
the final prepublication editorial review and managed production. 
Joan C. Cook compiled the index. Malinda B. Neale of the Library 
of Congress Printing and Processing Section performed the photo- 
typesetting, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto provided invaluable graphics support. Harriett 
R. Blood and Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the maps, which 
were drafted by Tim Merrill and reviewed by David P. Cabitto. 
The charts were prepared by David P. Cabitto and Greenhorne 
and O'Mara. Wayne Home deserves special thanks for designing 
the illustration for the book's cover. Deborah A.V. Clement de- 
signed the illustrations for the chapter title pages. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals 
and public and private agencies who allowed their photographs to 
be used in this study. They are indebted especially to those who 
contributed work not previously published. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword Hi 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction XXV 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

John W. Turner 

ORIGINS AND THE EARLY PERIODS 6 

Early Populations and Neighboring States 6 

The Aksumite State 7 

Ethiopia and the Early Islamic Period 10 

The Zagwe Dynasty 11 

The "Restoration" of the "Solomonic" Line 13 

Amhara Ascendancy 15 

THE TRIALS OF THE CHRISTIAN KINGDOM 

AND THE DECLINE OF IMPERIAL POWER 17 

Growth of Regional Muslim States 17 

Oromo Migrations and Their Impact 20 

Contact with European Christendom 21 

The Gonder State and the Ascendancy 

of the Nobility 22 

THE MAKING OF MODERN ETHIOPIA 24 

The Reestablishment of the Ethiopian Monarchy .... 25 

From Tewodros II to Menelik II, 1855-89 27 

The Reign of Menelik II, 1889-1913 29 

The Interregnum 33 

Haile Selassie: The Prewar Period, 1930-36 35 

ITALIAN RULE AND WORLD WAR II 36 

Italian Administration in Eritrea 36 

Mussolini's Invasion and the Italian Occupation .... 36 

Ethiopia in World War II 39 

THE POSTWAR PERIOD, 1945-60: REFORM 

AND OPPOSITION 42 

Change and Resistance 42 

Administrative Change and the 1955 Constitution ... 43 

The Attempted Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath .... 45 



vii 



GROWTH OF SECESSIONIST THREATS 45 

The Liberation Struggle in Eritrea 46 

Discontent in Tigray 48 

The Ogaden and the Haud 49 

REVOLUTION AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 50 

Background to Revolution, 1960-74 50 

The Establishment of the Derg 51 

The Struggle for Power, 1974-77 54 

Ethiopia's Road to Socialism 57 

THE MENGISTU REGIME AND ITS IMPACT 58 

Political Struggles Within the Government 58 

War in the Ogaden and the Turn to the 

Soviet Union 59 

Eritrean and Tigrayan Insurgencies 60 

Social and Political Changes 62 

ETHIOPIA IN CRISIS: FAMINE AND ITS 

AFTERMATH, 1984-88 63 

Famine and Economic Collapse 63 

Government Defeats in Eritrea and Tigray 64 

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 65 

Changes in Soviet Policy and New International 

Horizons 65 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 69 

Yohannis Abate 

PHYSICAL SETTING 72 

Boundaries: International and Administrative 73 

Topography and Drainage 73 

Climate 77 

POPULATION 78 

Size, Distribution, and Growth 78 

Urbanization 82 

Resettlement and Villagization 83 

REFUGEES, DROUGHT, AND FAMINE 87 

ETHIOPIA'S PEOPLES 90 

Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language 91 

Ethnic and Social Relations 100 

SOCIAL SYSTEM 105 

Rural Society 106 

Urban Society Ill 

The Role of Women 114 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 115 

Demography and Geography of Religious 

Affiliation 116 



vni 



Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity 116 

Islam 120 

Indigenous Religions 124 

Foreign Missions 124 

EDUCATION 126 

Education During Imperial Rule 126 

Primary and Secondary Education since 1975 129 

Higher and Vocational Education since 1975 132 

Literacy 134 

Foreign Educational Assistance 135 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 135 

Chapter 3. The Economy 143 

Mulatu Wubneh 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 146 

Developments up to 1974 146 

Postrevolution Period 149 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 151 

The Budgetary Process 153 

Revenue and Expenditures 154 

Banking and Monetary Policy . 155 

LABOR FORCE 156 

Unemployment 157 

Labor Unions 160 

Wages and Prices 161 

AGRICULTURE 162 

Land Use and Land Reform 165 

Government Rural Programs 170 

Agricultural Production 176 

INDUSTRY AND ENERGY 185 

Manufacturing 185 

Industrial Development Policy 187 

Energy Resources 190 

Mining 192 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 193 

Roads . . 193 

Railroads 194 

Ports 197 

Air Transport 198 

Telecommunications 199 

FOREIGN TRADE 200 

Exports 200 

Imports 202 

Balance of Payments and Foreign Assistance 202 



ix 



ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 204 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 207 

Edmond J. Keller 

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF ETHIOPIA 211 

Toward Party Formation 211 

The Vanguard Party 213 

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION 214 

The Social Order 216 

Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and Duties 217 

National Shengo (National Assembly) 218 

Council of State 218 

The President 219 

Council of Ministers 220 

Judicial System 221 

REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 222 

Regional Administration 222 

Peasant Associations 223 

Kebeles 226 

CIVIL SERVICE 227 

THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 229 

The Politics of Drought and Famine 230 

The Politics of Resettlement 232 

The Politics of Villagization 233 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 235 

Political Participation and Repression 235 

The Eritrean Movement 239 

The Tigrayan Movement 244 

Other Movements and Fronts 246 

Regime Stability and Peace Negotiations 249 

MASS MEDIA 253 

FOREIGN POLICY 253 

Diplomacy and State Building in Imperial Ethiopia . . 254 

The Foreign Policy of the Derg 254 

The Derg, the Soviet Union, and the Communist 

World 256 

The Derg and the West 258 

Ethiopia's Border Politics 258 

Addis Ababa and the Middle East 262 

THE DEMISE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT 262 

Chapter 5. National Security 267 

Thomas P. Ofcansky 

MILITARY TRADITION IN NATIONAL LIFE 270 



x 



THE ARMED FORCES 276 

The 1987 Constitution and the Armed Forces 276 

Command and Force Structure 277 

Army 278 

Air Force 279 

Navy 280 

People's Militia 281 

Training 282 

Morale and Discipline 285 

Manpower Considerations 288 

Defense Costs 291 

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 291 

United States 291 

Soviet Union 294 

Cuba 296 

East Germany 298 

North Korea 299 

Israel j 300 

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OPPONENTS 301 

The Eritreans 301 

The Tigray 307 

The Oromo 310 

The Somali 311 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 315 

The National Police 315 

People's Protection Brigades 318 

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 319 

The Legal System 319 

Prisons 322 

HUMAN RIGHTS 326 

Appendix. Tables 331 

Bibliography 347 

Glossary 377 

Contributors 383 

Index 385 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Ethiopia, 1974 xxii 

2 Administrative Divisions of Ethiopia, 1987-91 xxiii 

3 The Early Period, Thirteenth to Seventeenth Centuries .... 16 

4 Colonization of the Horn of Africa and Southwest 

Arabia, 1820-ca. 1900 30 



XI 



5 The Horn of Africa and Southwest Arabia, Mid-1930s .... 38 

6 Topography and Drainage 74 

7 Population by Age and Sex, 1989 80 

8 Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups, 1991 92 

9 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Ethiopian 

Fiscal Year 1984/85 164 

10 Transportation System, 1991 196 

11 The Ogaden War, 1977-78 312 



xii 



Preface 



This study replaces Ethiopia: A Country Study, which was com- 
pleted in 1980 — six years after a group of military officers over- 
threw Emperor Haile Selassie I and eventually established a 
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. In May 1991, this regime, led by 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, collapsed, largely because of its inabil- 
ity to defeat two insurgencies in the northern part of the country. 

This edition of Ethiopia: A Country Study examines the revolution- 
ary government's record from 1974 through the fall of the regime 
in mid- 1991 . Subsequent events are discussed in the Introduction. 
Like its predecessor, this study investigates the historical, social, 
economic, political, and national security forces that helped deter- 
mine the nature of Ethiopian society. Sources of information used 
in the study's preparation included scholarly books, journals, and 
monographs; official reports of governments and international or- 
ganizations; numerous periodicals; the authors' previous research 
and observations; and interviews with individuals who have spe- 
cial competence in Ethiopian and African affairs. Chapter biblio- 
graphies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on sources 
recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. 

The available materials on Ethiopia frequently presented prob- 
lems because of the different transliterations of place-names and 
personal names used by scholars and other writers. No standardized 
and universally accepted system has been developed for the trans- 
literation of Amharic (the most widely used language in the coun- 
try), and even the Ethiopian government's official publications vary 
in their English renderings of proper names. Insofar as possible, 
the authors have attempted to reduce the confusion with regard 
to place-names by adhering to the system adopted by the United 
States Board on Geographic Names (BGN), except that diacriti- 
cal markings are eliminated in this study. With regard to personal 
names, the authors have attempted to use the most common En- 
glish spellings. The authors also have followed the Amharic tradi- 
tion of referring only to the first element of a name when using 
it in a second reference. Thus, Mengistu Haile Mariam becomes 
Mengistu after the first use. 

The reader should exercise caution with regard to dates cited 
in relation to Ethiopia. Dates used in this book generally are ac- 
cording to the standard, Gregorian (Western) calendar. But life 
in Ethiopia is actually governed by the Ethiopian calendar, which 
consists of twelve months of thirty days each and one month of 



Xlll 



five days (six in leap years) running from September 1 1 to Sep- 
tember 10 according to the Gregorian calendar. The sequence of 
years in the Ethiopian calendar also differs from the Gregorian 
calendar, running seven years behind the Gregorian calendar at 
the beginning of an Ethiopian year and seven years behind at its 
end. 

The reader will note the frequent use in this book of double years, 
such as 1989/90 or 1990/91, especially in Chapters 2 and 3. These 
dates do not mean that a two-year period is covered. Rather, they 
reflect the conversion of Ethiopian calendar years to the Gregor- 
ian system. When 1990/91 is used, for example, the date refers 
to September 11, 1990, to September 10, 1991, or the equivalent 
of the Ethiopian calendar year of 1983. Some economic data are 
based on the Ethiopian fiscal year, which runs from July 8 to the 
following July 7 in the Gregorian calendar, but seven years be- 
hind the Gregorian year (eight years behind after December 31). 
Hence, Ethiopian fiscal year 1990/91 (also seen as EFY 1990/91) 
corresponds to July 11, 1990, to July 10, 1991, or the equivalent 
of Ethiopian fiscal year 1983. Concerning economic data in general, 
it must be noted that there has been a dearth of reliable statistics 
since 1988, reflecting the state of affairs within the Ethiopian govern- 
ment since that date. 

All measurements in this study are presented in the metric sys- 
tem. A conversion table is provided to assist those readers who may 
not be familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix). 
The book also includes a Glossary to explain terms with which the 
reader may not be familiar. 

Finally, readers will note that the body of the text reflects infor- 
mation available as of July 1991 . Certain other portions of the text, 
however, have been updated: the Introduction discusses signifi- 
cant events that have occurred since the information cutoff date; 
the Country Profile includes updated information as available; and 
the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be par- 
ticularly helpful to the reader. 



xiv 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Ethiopia. 
Short Form: Ethiopia. 
Term for Citizens: Ethiopian(s). 
Capital: Addis Ababa. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XV 



Geography 



Size: About 1,221,900 square kilometers; major portion of eastern- 
most African landmass known as Horn of Africa. 

Topography: Massive highland complex of mountains and dis- 
sected plateaus divided by Great Rift Valley running generally 
southwest to northeast and surrounded by lowlands, steppes, or 
semidesert; northeastern coastline of about 960 kilometers along 
Red Sea. Great terrain diversity determines wide variations in cli- 
mate, soils, natural vegetation, and settlement patterns. 

Climate: Elevation and geographic location produce three climatic 
zones: cool zone above 2,400 meters where temperatures range from 
near freezing to 16°C; temperate zone at elevations of 1,500 to 
2,400 meters with temperatures from 16°C to 30°C; and hot zone 
below 1 ,500 meters with both tropical and arid conditions and day- 
time temperatures ranging from 27°C to 50°C. Normal rainy sea- 
son from mid-June to mid- September (longer in the southern 
highlands) preceded by intermittent showers from February or 
March; remainder of year generally dry. 

Society 

Population: Mid- 1992 population estimated at 54 million, with 
a 3 percent or higher annual growth rate. Urban population esti- 
mated at about 11 percent of total population. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages: Distinguishable ethnolinguistic 
entities, some speaking the same language, estimated at more than 
100; at least seventy languages spoken as mother tongues. Largest 
group is the Oromo, with about 40 percent of total population. 
Roughly 30 percent of total population consists of the Amhara, 
whose native language — Amharic — is also spoken by additional 20 
percent of population as second tongue. Amharic is Ethiopia's offi- 
cial language. The Tigray, speaking Tigrinya, constitute 12 to 15 
percent of total population. Large number of smaller groups in- 
clude Somali, Gurage, Awi, Afar, Welamo, Sidama, and Beja. 

Religion: About 50 percent of population Ethiopian Orthodox; 
Orthodoxy identified mainly with Amhara and Tigray peoples but 
accepted by other groups as well. About 2 percent Protestant and 
Roman Catholic combined. Approximately 40 percent adherents 
of Islam. Remainder of population practiced various indigenous 
religions. 

Education: In 1985/86 (Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary), 
3.1 million children were enrolled in grades one through twelve. 



xvi 



Nearly 2.5 million, or 42 percent of primary school-age children, 
enrolled in 7,900 primary schools (grades one through six); 363,000 
students enrolled in 964 junior secondary schools (grades seven and 
eight); more than 292,000, or 5.3 percent of secondary school-age 
children, enrolled in 245 secondary schools (grades nine through 
twelve). Vocational schools emphasized technical education; in 
1985/86 more than 4,200 attended nine technical schools. Intense 
competition for admission to approximately twelve colleges and 
universities; more than 18,400 students in various institutions of 
higher education. 

Literacy: Less than 10 percent during imperial regime; had in- 
creased to 63 percent by 1984, according to Ethiopian government. 
Revolutionary government undertook major national literacy cam- 
paign, which made significant gains, especially among women. 

Health: Malaria and tuberculosis major endemic diseases; also 
health problems from parasitic and gastroenteritis infections, lep- 
rosy, venereal diseases, typhus, typhoid, trachoma, conjunctivi- 
tis, and childhood diseases. All complicated by insufficient health 
facilities, shortage of medical personnel, unsanitary practices, and 
nutritional deficiencies. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) becoming a greater problem. 

Life Expectancy: Fifty years for males and fifty-three for females 
in 1992. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Socialist oriented after 1974 revolution, with 
strong state controls. Thereafter, large part of economy transferred 
to public sector, including most modern industry and large-scale 
commercial agriculture, all agricultural land and urban rental 
property, and all financial institutions; some private enterprise and 
capital participation permitted in certain sectors. Since mid- 1991, 
a decentralized, market-oriented economy emphasizing individual 
initiative, designed to reverse a decade of economic decline. In 1993 
gradual privatization of business, industry, banking, agriculture, 
trade, and commerce under way. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$6 billion in 1990; per capi- 
ta GDP about US$120. Economy grew during late 1970s but 
declined in early 1980s and stagnated thereafter. GDP in Ethiopi- 
an fiscal year (EFY — see Glossary) 1990/91 fell by 5 to 6 percent 
in real terms, after a 1 percent decline in EFY 1989/90. Agricul- 
ture registered modest gains after 1989. 



xvn 



Agriculture and Livestock: Accounted for approximately 40 per- 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP), 80 percent of exports, and 
80 percent of labor force in 1991 ; other activities dependent on mar- 
keting, processing, and exporting of agricultural products. Produc- 
tion overwhelmingly of subsistence nature with large portion of 
commodity exports provided by small agricultural monetized sec- 
tor. Principal crops coffee, pulses, oilseeds, cereals, potatoes, sugar- 
cane, and vegetables. Livestock population believed largest in 
Africa. Livestock alone accounted for about 15 percent of GDP 
in 1987. 

Industry: Manufacturing severely affected by economic disloca- 
tion following revolution. Growth of sector low after 1 975. Primary 
subsectors cement, textiles, food processing, and oil refining. In 
1993 smaller enterprises being privatized; larger ones still under 
state control. Most industry functioning well below capacity. 

Energy Sources: Hydroelectric power most important developed 
and potential source of energy. Domestic mineral fuel resources 
in 1993 included low-grade lignite and traces of petroleum and 
natural gas. Potentially important geothermal power exists in Great 
Rift Valley. 

Foreign Trade: Little foreign trade by international standards. 
Exports almost entirely agricultural commodities; coffee largest for- 
eign exchange earner. Value of imports regularly greater than ex- 
port receipts. Wide range of trading partners, but most important 
in 1992 included United States, Germany, Britain, and Japan. 

Currency: Birr (pi., birr; no symbol). Prior to October 1, 1992, 
US$1 equaled 2.07 birr. After devaluation on that date, US$1 
equaled 4.94 birr. Significant parallel currency market existed be- 
fore devaluation. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Roads: Construction of adequate road system greatly hampered 
by rugged terrain of highlands and normally heavy seasonal rain- 
fall. Approximately 18,000 kilometers of roads in 1991, of which 
13,000 kilometers were all-weather roads. Road density lowest in 
Africa; perhaps three-fourths of farms more than one-half day's 
walk from an all-weather road. 

Railroads: One line operating in 1993 from Addis Ababa to city 
of Djibouti. Second line from Akordat to Mitsiwa discontinued 
operation in 1976 because of unprofltability and partly destroyed 
in later fighting. 



xvin 



Ports: Two major ports — Aseb and Mitsiwa — both in Eritrea; fur- 
ther access to ocean transport through port of Djibouti; all usable 
by deep-sea vessels. 

Civil Aviation: Important in domestic communications because 
of underdeveloped state of other means of transportation. Inter- 
national airports at Addis Ababa, Asmera, and Dire Dawa; major 
airports at a few other towns; remaining airfields little more than 
landing strips. In 1993 Ethiopian Airlines provided domestic service 
to some forty-five destinations and international service to Africa, 
western Europe, India, and China. 

Telecommunications: Minimal system. Radio-relay links con- 
nected Addis Ababa with Nairobi and Djibouti; other international 
service via Atlantic Ocean satellite of International Telecommu- 
nications Satellite Organization (Intelsat). Limited local telephone 
service and equipment; four AM radio stations, one shortwave 
transmitter; television service in ten cities. 

Government and Politics 

Party and Government: Until 1974 revolution, ruled by an im- 
perial regime whose last emperor was Haile Selassie I. Following 
revolution, a socialist state based on principles of Marxism- 
Leninism, led by Workers' Party of Ethiopia. Constitution promul- 
gated in 1987 created People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
In theory, National Shengo (National Assembly) highest organ of 
political power, but real power centered in hands of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, president and commander in chief of armed forces. 

In May 1991 , Mengistu regime overthrown by coalition of forces 
led by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF). A National Conference in July 1991 created Transi- 
tional Government of Ethiopia, consisting of a president and a prime 
minister, a seventeen-member Council of Ministers, and an eighty- 
seven-member Council of Representatives. Transitional govern- 
ment to last not longer than two-and-one-half years. Meles Zenawi, 
former head of EPRDF, elected president by Council of Represen- 
tatives. In mid- 1993 new constitution being drafted to come into 
force not later than early 1994. 

After May 1991, Eritrea controlled by Eritrean People's Liber- 
ation Front (EPLF). EPLF set up Provisional Government of 
Eritrea under its leader, Issaias Afwerki. In a referendum held April 
23-25, 1993, more than 98 percent of registered voters favored in- 
dependence from Ethiopia. In May 1993, Government of Eritrea 
was formed, consisting of a National Assembly with supreme 



xix 



authority, a State Council with executive powers, and a president. 
Issaias Afwerki elected president by National Assembly. New 
government to last not longer than four years, during which a 
democratic constitution is to be written. 

Judicial System: As of mid-1993, new judicial system being es- 
tablished in Ethiopia; judicial system functioning in Eritrea. 

Administrative Divisions: In mid- 1991 Transitional Government 
of Ethiopia created twelve autonomous regions on basis of ethnic 
identity, plus two multiethnic chartered cities (Addis Ababa and 
Harer). Each region broken into districts (weredas), the basic unit 
of administration. On June 21, 1992, elections were held to fill seats 
on wereda and regional councils. 

Foreign Relations: In late 1980s, Ethiopia relied on Soviet Union, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Israel, and 
various East European countries for military assistance and on 
Western nations for humanitarian aid and small amounts of eco- 
nomic assistance. After mid- 1991, transitional government re- 
oriented Ethiopia's foreign relations from East to West, establishing 
warm relations with United States and Western Europe and seek- 
ing substantial economic aid from Western countries and World 
Bank. Ethiopia also active in attempts to mediate the civil war in 
Somalia. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Numerous, includ- 
ing Organization of African Unity and United Nations and a num- 
ber of its specialized agencies, such as World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid- 1991, combined strength of Ethiopian 
armed forces about 438,000. Ground forces estimated at 430,000 
(including about 200,000 members of People's Militia). Air force 
estimated at 4,500. Navy estimated at 3,500. After downfall of Men- 
gistu regime, armed forces collapsed and were dismantled by 
EPRDF. In mid-1993, EPRDF had 100,000 to 120,000 guerrillas 
under arms; EPLF had between 85,000 and 100,000. Both planned 
to transform their forces into conventional armies and also to or- 
ganize air forces and navies. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment: Before mid- 1991, ground 
forces organized into five revolutionary armies comprising thirty- 
one infantry divisions supported by thirty- two tank battalions, forty 



xx 



artillery battalions, twelve air defense battalions, and eight com- 
mando brigades. Major weapons systems included T-54/55 and 
T-62 tanks, various caliber howitzers and guns, antiaircraft guns, 
and surface-to-air missiles. Air force organized into seven fighter- 
ground attack squadrons, one transport squadron, and one train- 
ing squadron. Equipment included 150 combat aircraft. Navy 
equipment included two frigates and twenty-four patrol and coastal 
craft. 

After downfall of Mengistu government, several insurgent 
groups, including EPRDF, EPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front, 
captured a considerable amount of ground equipment; former sol- 
diers sold an unknown quantity of small arms and light equipment 
throughout Horn of Africa. Naval crews with their vessels and an 
unknown number of pilots with their aircraft scattered to neigh- 
boring countries. Information on military organization, person- 
nel strength, and equipment types and numbers in both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea unavailable as of mid- 1993. 

Defense Budget: Estimated at US$472 million in United States 
fiscal year 1987-88. No figures available for defense expenditures 
for Ethiopia or Eritrea as of mid- 1993. 

Police Agencies and Paramilitary Forces: National police in- 
cluded paramilitary Mobile Emergency Police Force, estimated at 
9,000. Paramilitary frontier guards. Local law enforcement dele- 
gated to civilian paramilitary People's Protection Brigades. As of 
mid- 1993, a national police force functioned throughout Ethiopia. 
EPLF personnel performed police duties throughout Eritrea. 



xxi 




GOJAM 



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Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Ethiopia, 1974 



xxn 



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Administrative 
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Regional boundary 

^SSil Autonomous region 

National capital 

Regional center 

Special administrative 
subregional center 

75 150 Kilometers 



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, m . CADDIS 16 .-J 

14 / WW® / ^19 

- A ® W ®/' J i 

® r 23^ f 
r .a. 






REGIONS 


CENTERS 




REGIONS 


CENTERS 




REGIONS 


CENTERS 


1. 


North Eritrea 


Akordat 


13. 


Asosa 


Asosa 


25. 


East Harerge 


Harer 


2. 


West Eritrea 


Barentu 


14. 


Welega 


Nekemte 


26. 


llubabor 


Mizan Teferi 


3. 


South Eritrea 


Asmera 


15. 


West Shewa 


Giyon 


27. 


South Omo 


Jinka 


4. 


North Gonder 


Gonder 


16. 


North Shewa 


Debre Birhan 


28. 


North Omo 


Arba Minch 


5. 


Tigray 


Mekele 


17. 


Addis Ababa 


Addis Ababa 


29. 


Sidamo 


Awasa 


6. 


Aseb 


Aseb 


18. 


East Shewa 


Nazret 


30. 


Bale 


Goba 


7. 


Metekel 


Pawe 


19. 


West Harerge 


Asbe Teferi 


31. 


Borana 


Negele 


8. 


West Gojam 


Bahir Dar 


20. 


Dire Dawa 


Dire Dawa 


32. 


Ogaden 


Gode 


9. 


South Gonder 


Debre Tabor 


21. 


Gambela 


Gambela 








10. 


North Welo 


Weldiya 


22. 


Kefa 


Jima Note- 


-North Eritrea, West Eritrea, 


11. 


East Gojam 


Debre Markos 


23. 


South Shewa 


Ziway and South Eritrea are subregions 


12. 


South Welo 


Dese 


24. 


Arsi 


Asela of Eritrea Autonomous Region. 



Source: Based on information from Paul B. Henze, Ethiopia in 1990: The Revolution Unraveling, 
Santa Monica, California, 1991, 7. 



Figure 2. Administrative Divisions of Ethiopia, 1987-91 



xxiii 



Introduction 



FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES have had such a long, varied, and 
troubled history as Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state originated in the 
Aksumite kingdom, a trading state that emerged about the first 
century A.D. The Askumites perfected a written language; main- 
tained relations with the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, and the Arabs; 
and, in the mid-fourth century, embraced Christianity. After the 
rise of Islam in the seventh century, the Aksumite kingdom be- 
came internationally isolated as Arabs gradually gained control of 
maritime trade in the Red Sea. By the early twelfth century, the 
successors of the Aksumites had expanded southward and had es- 
tablished a new capital and a line of kings called the Zagwe. A new 
dynasty, the so-called "Solomonic" line, which came to power 
about 1270, continued this territorial expansion and pursued a more 
aggressive foreign policy. In addition, this Christian state, with the 
help of Portuguese soldiers, repelled a near-overpowering Islamic 
invasion. 

Starting about the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo people, 
migrating from the southwest, gradually forced their way into the 
kingdom, most often by warfare. The Oromo, who eventually con- 
stituted about 40 percent of Ethiopia's population, possessed their 
own culture, religion, and political institutions. As the largest na- 
tional group in Ethiopia, the Oromo significantly influenced the 
course of the country's history by becoming part of the royal family 
and the nobility and by joining the army or the imperial govern- 
ment. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, religious 
and regional rivalries gradually weakened the imperial state until 
it was little more than a collection of independent and competing 
fiefdoms. 

Ethiopia's modern period (1855 to the present) — represented by 
the reigns of Tewodros II, Yohannis IV, Menelik II, Zawditu, and 
Haile Selassie I; by the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam; 
and, since mid- 1991 , by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
under Meles Zenawi — has been characterized by nation-building 
as well as by warfare. Tewodros II started the process of recreat- 
ing a cohesive Ethiopian state by incorporating Shewa into his em- 
pire and by suppressing revolts in the country's other provinces. 
Yohannis IV battled to keep Ethiopia free from foreign domina- 
tion and to retard the growing power of the Shewan king, Menelik. 
Eventually, Menelik became emperor and used military force 



xxv 



to more than double Ethiopia's size. He also defeated an Italian 
invasion force that sought to colonize the country. 

Struggles over succession to the throne characterized the reign 
of Zawditu — struggles won by Haile Selassie, the next ruler. After 
becoming emperor in 1930, Haile Selassie embarked on a nation- 
wide modernization program. However, the 1935-36 Italo-Ethiopian 
war halted his efforts and forced him into exile. After returning 
to Addis Ababa in 1941, Haile Selassie undertook further military 
and political changes and sought to encourage social and economic 
development. Although he did initiate a number of fundamental 
reforms, the emperor was essentially an autocrat, who to a great 
extent relied on political manipulation and military force to remain 
in power and to preserve the Ethiopian state. Even after an un- 
successful 1960 coup attempt led by the Imperial Bodyguard, Haile 
Selassie failed to pursue the political and economic policies neces- 
sary to improve the lives of most Ethiopians. 

In 1974 a group of disgruntled military personnel overthrew the 
Ethiopian monarchy. Eventually, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who par- 
ticipated in the coup against Haile Selassie, emerged at the head 
of a Marxist military dictatorship. Almost immediately, the Mengistu 
regime unleashed a military and political reign of terror against 
its real and imagined opponents. It also pursued socialist economic 
policies that reduced agricultural productivity and helped bring on 
famine, resulting in the deaths of untold tens of thousands of peo- 
ple. Thousands more fled or perished as a result of government 
schemes to villagize the peasantry and to relocate peasants from 
drought-prone areas of the north to better-watered lands in the south 
and southwest. 

Aside from internal dissent, which was harshly suppressed, the 
regime faced armed insurgencies in the northern part of the coun- 
try. The longest-running of these was in Eritrea, where the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and its predecessors had been 
fighting control by the central government since 1961. In the 
mid-1970s, a second major insurgency arose in Tigray, where the 
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), a Marxist-Leninist or- 
ganization under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, opposed not only 
the policies of the military government but also the very existence 
of the government itself. 

In foreign affairs, the regime aligned itself with the Soviet Union. 
As long as the Soviet Union and its allies provided support to Ethio- 
pia' s armed forces, the Mengistu government remained secure. 
In the late 1980s, however, Soviet support waned, a major factor 
in undermining the ability of government forces to prosecute the 
wars against the Eritreans and the Tigray. Gradually, the insurgent 



xxvi 



movements gained the upper hand. By May 1991, the EPLF con- 
trolled almost all of Eritrea, and the TPLF, operating as the chief 
member of a coalition called the Ethiopian People's Revolution- 
ary Democratic Front (EPRDF), had overrun much of the center 
of the country. Faced with impending defeat, on May 21 Mengistu 
fled into exile in Zimbabwe; the caretaker government he left be- 
hind collapsed a week later. The EPLF completed its sweep of 
Eritrea on May 24 and 25, and a few days later EPLF chairman 
Issaias Afwerki announced the formation of the Provisional Govern- 
ment of Eritrea (PGE). Meanwhile, on May 27-28, EPRDF forces 
marched into Addis Ababa and assumed control of the national 
government. 

After seizing power, Tigrayan and Eritrean leaders confronted 
an array of political, economic, and security problems that threat- 
ened to overwhelm both new governments. Meles Zenawi and 
Issaias Afwerki committed themselves to resolving these problems 
and to remaking their respective societies. To achieve these goals, 
both governments adopted similar strategies, which concentrated 
on national reconciliation, eventual democratization, good rela- 
tions with the West, and social and economic development. Each 
leader, however, pursued different tactics to implement his respec- 
tive strategy. 

The first task facing the new rulers in Addis Ababa was the cre- 
ation of an interim government. To this end, a so-called National 
Conference was convened in Addis Ababa from July 1 to July 5. 
Many political groups from across a broad spectrum were invited 
to attend, but the EPRDF barred those identified with the former 
military regime, such as the Workers' Party of Ethiopia and the 
All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement, as well as those that were op- 
posed to the EPRDF, such as the Ethiopian People's Revolution- 
ary Party and the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces. A 
number of international observers also attended, including dele- 
gations from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United 
Nations (UN). 

Although it received accolades for running an open conference, 
the EPRDF tightly controlled the proceedings. The conference 
adopted a National Charter, which was signed by representatives 
of some thirty-one political groups; it established the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE), consisting of executive and legis- 
lative branches; and it sanctioned an EPLF-EPRDF agreement 
that converted Aseb into a free port in exchange for a referendum 
on Eritrean self-determination to be held within two years. The 
transitional government was to consist of the offices of president 
and prime minister and a seventeen-member multiethnic Council 



xxvii 



of Ministers. To ensure broad political representation, an eighty- 
seven member Council of Representatives was created, which was 
to select the new president, draft a new constitution, and oversee 
a transition to a new national government. The EPRDF occupied 
thirty-two of the eighty-seven council seats. The Oromo Libera- 
tion Front (OLF) received twelve seats, and the TPLF, the Oromo 
People's Democratic Organization, and the Ethiopian People's 
Democratic Movement each occupied ten seats. Twenty-seven other 
groups shared the remaining seats. 

The National Charter enshrined the guiding principles for what 
was expected to be a two-and-one-half-year transitional period. The 
charter called for creation of a commission to draft a new constitu- 
tion to come into effect by early 1994. It also committed the tran- 
sitional government to conduct itself in accordance with the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to pursue a foreign 
policy based on noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring 
states. Perhaps its most significant provisions concerned a new sys- 
tem of internal administration in which the principle of ethnicity 
was to constitute the basis of local and regional government. The 
charter recognized the right of all of Ethiopia's nationalities to self- 
determination, a right that was to be exercised within the context 
of a federated Ethiopia, and called for creation of district and re- 
gional councils on the basis of nationality. 

Essentially, the National Conference was a first, basic step in 
the reconstruction of a viable, legitimate central government. With 
the end of civil wars all over the country, the aim was to create 
a balance of competing ethnic and political groups at the center 
of the state that would allow the wounds of war to heal and eco- 
nomic recovery to begin. Additionally, there was the task of recon- 
ciling some segments of the population to the impending loss of 
Eritrea and of Ethiopia's Red Sea ports. 

As the new order got under way, the Council of Representa- 
tives elected Meles Zenawi president of the TGE. Then, in order 
to implement the administrative provisions of the National Charter, 
the TGE drew up twelve autonomous regions based on ethnic iden- 
tification and recognized two multiethnic chartered cities — Addis 
Ababa and Harer. The largest nationalities — the Amhara, Oromo, 
Somali, and Tigray — were grouped into their own regions, while 
an attempt was made to put culturally related smaller groups 
together. Each region was composed of a number of districts 
{weredas), intended to be the basic administrative unit. The largest 
region — that of the Oromo — contained some 220 weredas; the next 
largest region — that of the Amhara — contained 126, out of a total 
of 600 weredas in all of Ethiopia. Under this system, each wereda 

xxviii 



An election official in Dembi Dolo, in Welega, explains procedures 
as voters register for district and regional elections, June 1992. 

Courtesy LaVerle Berry 

exercised executive, legislative, and judicial authority over local 
communities, while the central government remained supreme in 
matters of defense, foreign affairs, economic policy, citizenship re- 
quirements, and currency. 

In order to staff these new administrative units, the TGE sched- 
uled national elections. Originally foreseen for later 1991, these 
elections were postponed for administrative and political reasons 
into 1992. By then, the authorities had registered almost 200 po- 
litical parties; few of them, however, had a significant member- 
ship or any real influence in shaping government policies. The TGE 
held preliminary elections for local governing committees begin- 
ning in April and for wereda and regional councils on June 21 , 1992. 

Security problems prevented elections from being held in some 
areas, notably among the Afar and the Somali and in Harer. More 
important, a corps of some 250 UN observers concluded that the 
June elections suffered from a number of serious shortcomings, 
including an absence of genuine competition, intimidation of non- 
government parties and candidates, closure of political party offices, 
and jailing and even shooting of candidates. Numerous observers 
also claimed that various administrative and logistical problems 
impaired the electoral process and that many Ethiopians failed to 



xxix 



understand the nature of multiparty politics. As a result, several 
political parties, including the OLF, the All-Amhara People's Or- 
ganization, and the Gideo People's Democratic Organization, with- 
drew a few days before the elections. On June 22, the OLF withdrew 
from the government and prepared to take up arms once again. 
Nonetheless, the TGE accepted the results of the elections, although 
it appointed a commission to investigate irregularities and to take 
corrective steps. 

In the economic arena, the TGE inherited a shattered country. 
In his first public speech after the EPRDF had captured Addis 
Ababa, Meles Zenawi indicated that Ethiopia's coffers were empty; 
moreover, some 7 million people were threatened with starvation 
because of drought and civil war. Economic performance statis- 
tics reflected this gloomy assessment. In Ethiopian fiscal year 
(EFY — see Glossary) 1990/91, for example, the gross domestic 
product (GDP — see Glossary) declined by 5.6 percent, the greatest 
fall since the 1984-85 drought. Preliminary figures indicated a fur- 
ther decline in GDP in EFY 1991/92, although some gains were 
registered for agriculture. 

To resolve these problems, the TGE abandoned the failed poli- 
cies of the Mengistu regime. It began dismantling the country's 
command economic system and shifted toward a market-oriented 
economy with emphasis on private initiative. In December 1992, 
it adopted a new economic policy whereby the government would 
maintain control over essential economic sectors such as banking, 
insurance, petroleum, mining, and chemical industries. However, 
retail trade, road transport, and a portion of foreign trade were placed 
in private hands; and farmers could sell their produce at free-market 
prices, although land remained under government control. While 
smaller businesses were to be privatized, agriculture was to receive 
the most attention and investment. By 1993 the state farms of the 
Mengistu era were being dismantled and turned over to private 
farmers; similarly, the agricultural cooperatives of prior years had 
almost all disappeared. A major effort was also being made to steer 
large numbers of ex-soldiers into farming as a way of increasing 
production and of providing much-needed employment. 

Meanwhile, on October 1, 1992, the TGE devalued Ethiopia's 
currency to encourage exports and to aid in correcting a chronic 
balance of payments deficit. The country had in addition begun 
to receive economic aid from several sources, including the Euro- 
pean Community, the World Bank (see Glossary), Japan, Canada, 
and the United States. Developments such as these provided a solid 
foundation for future economic improvement — gains that in 
mid- 1993 were still very much in the realm of anticipation. It 



xxx 



seemed clear that Ethiopia would remain one of the world's poorest 
nations for the foreseeable future. 

Since the downfall of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia's human 
rights record has improved. At the same time, the TGE has failed 
to end human rights abuses. In the absence of a police force, the 
TGE delegated policing functions to the EPRDF and to so-called 
Peace and Stability Committees. On occasion, personnel belong- 
ing to these organizations were alleged to have killed, wounded, 
or tortured criminal suspects. There were also allegations of extra- 
judicial killings in many areas of the country. 

Several incidents in early 1993 raised further questions about 
human rights in Ethiopia. On January 4, security forces opened 
fire on university students protesting UN and EPRDF policies 
toward Eritrea and the upcoming independence referendum. At 
least one person, and possibly several others, died during the fracas. 
In early April, the Council of Representatives suspended five 
southern political parties from council membership for having at- 
tended a conference in Paris at which the parties criticized the secu- 
rity situation in the country and the entire transitional process. A 
few days later, on April 9, more than forty instructors at Addis 
Ababa University were summarily dismissed. The TGE alleged 
lack of attention to teaching duties as the reason for its action, but 
the instructors asserted that they were being punished for having 
spoken out against TGE policies. These developments came on top 
of United States Department of State allegations that more than 
2,000 officials of the Mengistu regime remained in detention without 
having been charged after almost twenty months. 

One of the most serious dilemmas confronting the TGE con- 
cerned its inability to restore security throughout Ethiopia. After 
the EPRDF assumed power, it dismantled the 440,000-member 
Ethiopian armed forces. As a result, several hundred thousand ex- 
military personnel had to fend for themselves. The government's 
inability to fmd jobs for these soldiers forced many of them to resort 
to crime as a way of life. Many of these ex- soldiers contributed 
to the instability in Addis Ababa and parts of southern, eastern, 
and western Ethiopia. 

To help resolve these problems, the TGE created the Commis- 
sion for the Rehabilitation of Ex- Soldiers and War Veterans. By 
mid- 1993 this organization claimed that it had assisted in the re- 
habilitation of more than 159,000 ex-soldiers in various rural areas. 
Additionally, commission officials maintained that they were con- 
tinuing to provide aid to 157,000 ex-soldiers who lived in various 
urban centers. 



xxxi 



Apart from the difficulties caused by former soldiers and crimi- 
nal elements, several insurgent groups hampered the TGE's abil- 
ity to maintain stability in eastern and western Ethiopia. The 
situation was particularly troublesome with the OLF. For exam- 
ple, in mid- 1991 government forces clashed with OLF units south- 
west of Dire Dawa over the rights to collect qat revenues. (Qat is 
a plant that produces a mild narcotic intoxication when chewed 
and that is consumed throughout the eastern Horn of Africa and 
in Yemen.) Although the two groups signed a peace agreement 
in August, tensions still existed, and fighting continued around Dire 
Dawa and Harer at year's end. In early 1992, EPRDF-OLF rela- 
tions continued to deteriorate, with armed clashes occurring at 
several locations throughout eastern and western Ethiopia. After 
the OLF withdrew from the elections and the government in late 
June, full-scale fighting broke out in the south and southwest, but 
OLF forces were too weak to sustain the effort for more than a 
few weeks. Even so, in April 1993 the OLF announced that it was 
once again expanding its operations, but many observers doubted 
this claim and the OLF's ability to launch effective military cam- 
paigns against government forces. 

The TGE also experienced problems with the Afar pastoralists 
who inhabit the lowlands along Ethiopia's Red Sea coast, particu- 
larly during its first year in power. In early September 1991, some 
Afar attacked a food relief truck column near the town of Mile on 
the Addis Ababa- Aseb road and killed at least seven drivers. The 
EPRDF restored security in this region by shooting armed Afar on 
sight. Since then, EPRDF- Afar relations have remained tense. Some 
Afar have associated themselves with the OLF, but many others 
joined the Afar Liberation Front, which by early 1993 claimed to 
have 2,500 members under arms. 

Elsewhere in eastern Ethiopia, the TGE experienced problems 
with the Isa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF). On October 4, 
1991, clashes between government forces and IGLF rebels resulted 
in the temporary closure of the Addis Ababa- Djibouti railroad near 
Dire Dawa and the disruption of trade between the two countries. 
The fighting also disrupted famine relief distribution to nearly 1 
million refugees in eastern Ethiopia. By early 1992, the IGLF still 
had refused to recognize the EPRDF 's right to maintain security 
in the Isa-populated area around Dire Dawa. By 1993, nonethe- 
less, improved conditions allowed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti rail- 
road to operate on a fairly regular basis. 

In western Ethiopia, during the July-September 1991 period, 
the EPRDF engaged in several battles in Gojam and Gonder with 
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, the only major political 



xxxn 



group excluded from power. Additionally, in Gambela, the EPRDF 
battled the Gambela People's Liberation Front, which claimed the 
right to administer Gambela without EPRDF interference. The 
downfall of the Mengistu regime also created a crisis for approxi- 
mately 500,000 southern Sudanese who lived in refugee camps in 
and around Gambela. Although the new government claimed they 
could remain in Ethiopia, nearly all of the refugees, fearing reprisals 
for belonging to or supporting southern Sudanese insurgents that 
the EPRDF opposed, fled toward southern Sudan. As a result, by 
early 1992 fewer than 15,000 Sudanese refugees remained in 
western Ethiopia. 

In southern Ethiopia, crime was the main security problem. In 
late March 1992, EPRDF troops reportedly arrested 1,705 armed 
bandits and captured thousands of weapons, including machine 
guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Despite this and similar 
sweeps, many Western observers believed that security problems 
would continue to plague the EPRDF regime for the foreseeable 
future because of the large number of available arms and unem- 
ployed ex-fighters in the south. 

In contrast with the political divisiveness in Ethiopia, nearly all 
Eritreans appeared to support the EPLF and its goals. As a result, 
in the first two years after military victory, the PGE was able to 
move swiftly on a number of fronts. As one of its first acts, the 
new government expelled thousands of soldiers and personnel of 
the former Ethiopian army and government in Eritrea, together 
with their dependents, forcing them across the border into Tigray. 
The PGE maintained that the expulsions were necessary to free 
up living quarters and jobs for returning Eritreans and to help 
reduce budgetary oudays. In October 1992, the government opened 
schools across Eritrea. A few weeks later, the PGE announced new 
criminal and civil codes and appointed dozens of judges to run the 
court system. A National Service Decree made it mandatory for 
all Eritreans between the ages of eighteen and forty to perform 
twelve to eighteen months of unpaid service in the armed forces, 
police, government, or in fields such as education or health. 

Perhaps most important, the PGE honored the agreement it had 
reached with the EPRDF and the OLF in 1991 to postpone a 
referendum on the question of Eritrean independence for two years. 
By early 1993, given the general popularity of the PGE and the desire 
among Eritreans to be free of control from Addis Ababa, the out- 
come of the referendum was a foregone conclusion. On April 23- 
25, 1993, the PGE carried out the poll. In a turnout of 98.5 percent 
of the approximately 1.1 million registered voters, 99.8 percent 
voted for independence. A 121-member UN observer mission 
certified that the referendum was free and fair. Within hours, the 



xxxin 



United States, Egypt, Italy, and Sudan extended diplomatic recog- 
nition to the new country. Thereafter, Eritrea joined the UN, the 
Organization of Africa Unity, and the Lome Convention (see 
Glossary). 

A month after the referendum, the EPLF transformed the PGE 
into the Government of Eritrea, composed of executive, legisla- 
tive, and judicial branches. Supreme power resided with a new Na- 
tional Assembly, composed of the EPLF's former central committee 
augmented by sixty additional representatives from the ten provinces 
into which Eritrea was divided. Aside from formulating internal 
and external policies and budgetary matters, the assembly was 
charged with electing a president, who would be head of state and 
commander in chief of the armed forces. The executive branch con- 
sisted of a twenty-four-member State Council, chaired by the presi- 
dent. The judiciary, already in place, continued as before. At its 
initial meeting on May 21, the assembly elected Issaias Afwerki 
president. This new political configuration was to last not longer 
than four years, during which time a democratic constitution was 
to be drafted and all members of the EPLF would continue to work 
for the state without salary. 

In the months following independence, the Eritrean government 
enjoyed almost universal popular support. Even such former ad- 
versaries as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean 
Liberation Front-United Organization, and the Eritrean Libera- 
tion Front-Revolutionary Council issued statements of support for 
the referendum and for the new regime. During his first press con- 
ference after the referendum, President Issaias stressed that his 
government would pursue pragmatic and flexible policies. He also 
discussed prospects for close economic cooperation with Ethiopia 
and raised the prospect of a future confederation between the two 
countries. Meanwhile, the president pledged that Aseb would re- 
main a free port for goods in transit to Ethiopia. Additionally, he 
reaffirmed the EPLF's commitment to the eventual establishment 
of a multiparty political system, but there would be no political 
parties based on ethnicity or religion. 

Its popularity notwithstanding, the Eritrean government faced 
many problems and an uncertain future. Economically, the coun- 
try suffered from the devastation of thirty years of war. Eritrea's 
forty publicly owned factories operated at no more than one-third 
capacity, and many of its more than 600 private companies had 
ceased operations. War damage and drought had caused agricul- 
tural production to decline by as much as 40 percent in some areas; 
as a result, about 80 percent of the population required food aid 
in 1992. The fighting also had wrecked schools, hospitals, govern- 
ment offices, roads, and bridges throughout the country, while 



xxxiv 



A jubilant crowd in Asmera celebrates results of the 
independence referendum, April 1993. 

Courtesy Paul B. Henze 

bombing had destroyed economically important towns like Mitsiwa 
and Nakfa. 

To resolve these problems, Eritrea implemented a multifaceted 
strategy that concentrated on restarting basic economic activities 
and rehabilitating essential infrastructure; encouraging the return 
and reintegration of nearly 500,000 Eritrean refugees from neigh- 
boring Sudan; and establishing the Recovery and Rehabilitation 
Project for Eritrea. Additionally, the Eritrean government reaf- 
firmed its commitment to a liberal investment code, the response 
to which by mid- 1993 was encouraging. Even so, the Eritrean 
government estimated that it needed at least US$2 billion to re- 
habilitate the economy and to finance development programs — 
aid that it sought largely from Western countries and financial in- 
stitutions. 

Another serious issue confronting the new government concerned 
the status of the country's armed forces. Since the country's libera- 
tion in 1991, the government had lacked the funds to pay salaries. 
Nevertheless, officials adopted a compulsory national service act that 
required all former fighters to labor without pay for two years on 
various public works projects. When the new Government of Eritrea 
extended unpaid compulsory national service for an additional four 



xxxv 



years on May 20, 1993, thousands of frustrated former fighters 
who wanted to be paid and to return at last to their families demon- 
strated in Asmera. The government responded by promising to 
begin paying the fighters and by instituting a military demobiliza- 
tion program that would allow volunteers who could fend for them- 
selves to return to their homes. 

Eritrea's long-term well-being also depended on President Issaias's 
ability to preserve the country's unity. Achieving this goal will be 
difficult. Eritrea's 3.5 million population is split equally between 
Christians and Muslims; it also is divided into nine ethnic groups, 
each of which speaks a different language. A reemergence of the 
historical divisions between the Muslim-dominated ELF and the 
largely Christian EPLF is possible and could prove to be the young 
country's undoing. Also, at least some Eritreans doubted Presi- 
dent Issaias's pledge to establish a multiparty democracy and viewed 
with skepticism his determination to prevent the establishment of 
political parties based on ethnic group or religion. However, as 
of late 1993, Eritrea remained at peace, and the government en- 
joyed considerable support. As a result, most Western observers 
maintained that the country had a good chance of avoiding the tur- 
bulence that has plagued much of the rest of the Horn of Africa. 

The ultimate fates of Ethiopia and Eritrea are inevitably inter- 
twined. For economic reasons, Ethiopia needs to preserve its access 
to Eritrean ports, and Eritrea needs food from Ethiopia as well as the 
revenue and jobs that will be generated by acting as a transship- 
ment point for Ethiopian goods. Also, political and military cooper- 
ation will be necessary to prevent conflict between the two nations. 

Despite this obvious interdependence, Ethiopia and Eritrea face 
a difficult future. Many Ethiopians, primarily those who are Amhara, 
and some Eritreans, largely from the Muslim community, remain 
opposed to Eritrean independence and the EPLF-dominated govern- 
ment. These malcontents could become a catalyst for antigovernment 
activities in both countries. Within Ethiopia, the TGE's concept of 
ethnicity as the basis for organizing political life has aroused con- 
troversy and has stymied many of the TGE's policies and programs, 
thereby reducing chances for the emergence of a democratic govern- 
ment. Additionally, if the EPRDF does not broaden its ethnic base 
of support and bring such groups as the Amhara and the Oromo 
into the political process, the likelihood of violence will increase. As 
of late 1993, it was unclear whether the TGE's plans for a new con- 
stitution and national government would resolve these problems or 
would founder on the shoals of ethnic politics and economic despair. 

September 10, 1993 Thomas P. Ofcansky 



XXXVI 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Ethiopian Orthodox cathedral at Aksum, built in the seventeenth century 



Modern Ethiopia is the product of many millen- 
nia of interaction among peoples in and around the Ethiopian high- 
lands region. From the earliest times, these groups combined to 
produce a culture that at any given time differed markedly from 
that of surrounding peoples. The evolution of this early "Ethio- 
pian" culture was driven by a variety of ethnic, linguistic, and re- 
ligious groups. 

One of the most significant influences on the formation and 
evolution of culture in northern Ethiopia consisted of migrants 
from Southwest Arabia. They arrived during the first millennium 
B.C. and brought Semitic speech, writing, and a distinctive stone- 
building tradition to northern Ethiopia. They seem to have con- 
tributed directly to the rise of the Aksumite kingdom, a trading 
state that prospered in the first centuries of the Christian era and 
that united the shores of the southern Red Sea commercially and 
at times politically. It was an Aksumite king who accepted Chris- 
tianity in the mid-fourth century, a religion that the Aksumites 
bequeathed to their successors along with their concept of an empire- 
state under centralized rulership. 

The establishment of what became the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church was critical in molding Ethiopian culture and identity. The 
spread of Islam to the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa in the 
eighth century, however, led to the isolation of the highlands from 
European and Middle Eastern centers of Christendom. The appear- 
ance of Islam was partly responsible for what became a long-term 
rivalry between Christians and Muslims — a rivalry that exacerbated 
older tensions between highlanders and lowlanders and agricul- 
turalists and pastoralists that have persisted to the present day. 

Kingship and Orthodoxy, both with their roots in Aksum, be- 
came the dominant institutions among the northern Ethiopians in 
the post- Aksumite period. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
a dynasty known as the Zagwe ruled from their capital in the north- 
ern highlands. The Zagwe era is one of the most artistically crea- 
tive periods in Ethiopian history, involving among other things the 
carving of a large number of rock-hewn churches. 

The Zagwe heartland was well south of the old Aksumite do- 
main, and the Zagwe interlude was but one phase in the long-term 
southward shift of the locus of political power. The successors of 
the Zagwe after the mid-thirteenth century — the members of the 
so-called "Solomonic" dynasty — located themselves in the central 



3 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

highlands and involved themselves directly in the affairs of neigh- 
boring peoples still farther south and east. 

In these regions, the two dominant peoples of what may be 
termed the "Christian kingdom of Ethiopia," the Amhara of the 
central highlands and the Tigray of the northern highlands, con- 
fronted the growing power and confidence of Muslim peoples who 
lived between the eastern edge of the highlands and the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Aden. In religious and ethnic conflicts that reached 
their climax in the mid- sixteenth century, the Amhara and Tigray 
turned back a determined Muslim advance with Portuguese as- 
sistance, but only after the northern highlands had been overrun 
and devastated. The advent of the Portuguese in the area marked 
the end of the long period of isolation from the rest of Christen- 
dom that had been near total, except for contact with the Coptic 
Church of Egypt. The Portuguese, however, represented a mixed 
blessing, for with them they brought their religion— Roman Cath- 
olicism. During the early seventeenth century, Jesuit and kindred 
orders sought to impose Catholicism on Ethiopia, an effort that 
led to civil war and the expulsion of the Catholics from the kingdom. 

By the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo people of southwestern 
Ethiopia had begun a prolonged series of migrations during which 
they overwhelmed the Muslim states to the east and began settling 
in the central highlands. A profound consequence of the far-flung 
settlement of the Oromo was the fusion of their culture in some 
areas with that of the heretofore dominant Amhara and Tigray. 

The period of trials that resulted from the Muslim invasions, 
the Oromo migrations, and the challenge of Roman Catholicism 
had drawn to a close by the middle of the seventeenth century. 
During the next two-and-one-half centuries, a reinvigorated Ethio- 
pian state slowly reconsolidated its control over the northern high- 
lands and eventually resumed expansion to the south, this time into 
lands occupied by the Oromo. 

By the mid-nineteenth century, the Ethiopian state under Em- 
peror Tewodros II (reigned 1855-68) found itself beset by a num- 
ber of problems, many of them stemming from the expansion of 
European influence in northeastern Africa. Tewodros' s successors, 
Yohannis IV (reigned 1872-89) and Menelik II (reigned 1889- 
1913), further expanded and consolidated the state, fended off local 
enemies, and dealt with the encroachments of European powers, 
in particular Italy, France, and Britain. Italy posed the greatest 
threat, having begun to colonize part of what would become its 
future colony of Eritrea in the mid- 1880s. 

To one of Menelik' s successors, Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930- 
74), was left the task of dealing with resurgent Italian expansionism. 



4 



Historical Setting 



The disinclination of the world powers, especially those in the 
League of Nations, to counter Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935 
was in many ways a harbinger of the indecisiveness that would lead 
to World War II . In the early years of the war, Ethiopia was retaken 
from the Italians by the British, who continued to dominate the 
country's external affairs after the war ended in 1945. A restored 
Haile Selassie attempted to implement reforms and modernize the 
state and certain sectors of the economy. For the most part, 
however, mid-twentieth century Ethiopia resembled what could 
loosely be termed a "feudal" society. 

The later years of Haile Selassie's rule saw a growing insurgency 
in Eritrea, which had been federated with and eventually annexed 
by the Ethiopian government following World War II. This insur- 
gency, along with other internal pressures, including severe famine, 
placed strains on Ethiopian society that contributed in large part 
to the 1974 military rebellion that ended the Haile Selassie regime 
and, along with it, more than 2,000 years of imperial rule. The 
most salient results of the coup d'etat were the eventual emergence 
of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam as head of state 
and the reorientation of the government and national economy from 
capitalism to Marxism. 

A series of crises immediately consumed the revolutionary re- 
gime. First, domestic political violence erupted as groups maneu- 
vered to take control of the revolution. Then, the Eritrean 
insurgency flared at the same time that an uprising in the neigh- 
boring region of Tigray began. In mid-1977 Somalia, intent upon 
wresting control of the Ogaden region from Ethiopia and sensing 
Addis Ababa's distractions, initiated a war on Ethiopia's eastern 
frontier. Mengistu, in need of military assistance, turned to the 
Soviet Union and its allies, who supplied vast amounts of equip- 
ment and thousands of Cuban combat troops, which enabled Ethio- 
pia to repulse the Somali invasion. 

Misery mounted throughout Ethiopia in the 1980s. Recurrent 
drought and famine, made worse in the north by virtual civil war, 
took an enormous human toll, necessitating the infusion of mas- 
sive amounts of international humanitarian aid. The insurgencies 
in Eritrea, Tigray, and other regions intensified until by the late 
1980s they threatened the stability of the regime. Drought, eco- 
nomic mismanagement, and the financial burdens of war ravaged 
the economy. At the same time, democratic reform in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union threatened to isolate the revolution- 
ary government politically, militarily, and economically from its 
allies. 



5 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Origins and the Early Periods 

Early Populations and Neighboring States 

Details on the origins of all the peoples that make up the popu- 
lation of highland Ethiopia were still matters for research and de- 
bate in the early 1990s. Anthropologists believe that East Africa's 
Great Rift Valley is the site of humankind's origins. (The valley 
traverses Ethiopia from southwest to northeast.) In 1974 archaeol- 
ogists excavating sites in the Awash River valley discovered 
3.5-million-year-old fossil skeletons, which they named Australopithe- 
cus afarensis. These earliest known hominids stood upright, lived 
in groups, and had adapted to living in open areas rather than in 
forests. 

Coming forward to the late Stone Age, recent research in histor- 
ical linguistics — and increasingly in archaeology as well — has begun 
to clarify the broad outlines of the prehistoric populations of present- 
day Ethiopia. These populations spoke languages that belong to 
the Afro-Asiatic super-language family, a group of related languages 
that includes Omotic, Cushitic, and Semitic, all of which are found 
in Ethiopia today. Linguists postulate that the original home of 
the Afro-Asiatic cluster of languages was somewhere in northeastern 
Africa, possibly in the area between the Nile River and the Red 
Sea in modern Sudan. From here the major languages of the fam- 
ily gradually dispersed at different times and in different direc- 
tions — these languages being ancestral to those spoken today in 
northern and northeastern Africa and far southwestern Asia. 

The first language to separate seems to have been Omotic, at 
a date sometime after 13,000 B.C. Omotic speakers moved south- 
ward into the central and southwestern highlands of Ethiopia, fol- 
lowed at some subsequent time by Cushitic speakers, who settled 
in territories in the northern Horn of Africa, including the north- 
ern highlands of Ethiopia. The last language to separate was Se- 
mitic, which split from Berber and ancient Egyptian, two other 
Afro-Asiatic languages, and migrated eastward into far south- 
western Asia. 

By about 7000 B.C. at the latest, linguistic evidence indicates 
that both Cushitic speakers and Omotic speakers were present in 
Ethiopia. Linguistic diversification within each group thereafter 
gave rise to a large number of new languages. In the case of 
Cushitic, these include Agew in the central and northern highlands 
and, in regions to the east and southeast, Saho, Afar, Somali, 
Sidamo, and Oromo, all spoken by peoples who would play major 
roles in the subsequent history of the region. Omotic also spawned 
a large number of languages, Welamo (often called Wolayta) and 



6 



Historical Setting 



Gemu-Gofa being among the most widely spoken of them, but 
Omotic speakers would remain outside the main zone of ethnic in- 
teraction in Ethiopia until the late nineteenth century. 

Both Cushitic- and Omotic-speaking peoples collected wild 
grasses and other plants for thousands of years before they even- 
tually domesticated those they most preferred. According to lin- 
guistic and limited archaeological analyses, plough agriculture based 
on grain cultivation was established in the drier, grassier parts of 
the northern highlands by at least several millennia before the Chris- 
tian era. Indigenous grasses such as teff (see Glossary) and eleu- 
sine were the initial domesticates; considerably later, barley and 
wheat were introduced from Southwest Asia. The corresponding 
domesticate in the better watered and heavily forested southern 
highlands was ensete, a root crop known locally as false banana. 
All of these early peoples also kept domesticated animals, includ- 
ing catde, sheep, goats, and donkeys. Thus, from the late prehistoric 
period, agricultural patterns of livelihood were established that were 
to be characteristic of the region through modern times. It was the 
descendants of these peoples and cultures of the Ethiopian region 
who at various times and places interacted with successive waves 
of migrants from across the Red Sea. This interaction began well 
before the modern era and has continued through contemporary 
times. 

During the first millennium B.C. and possibly even earlier, var- 
ious Semitic-speaking groups from Southwest Arabia began to cross 
the Red Sea and settle along the coast and in the nearby highlands. 
These migrants brought with them their Semitic speech (Sabaean 
and perhaps others) and script (Old Epigraphic South Arabic) and 
monumental stone architecture. A fusion of the newcomers with 
the indigenous inhabitants produced a culture known as pre- 
Aksumite. The factors that motivated this settlement in the area 
are not known, but to judge from subsequent history, commercial 
activity must have figured strongly. The port city of Adulis, near 
modern-day Mitsiwa, was a major regional entrepot and proba- 
bly the main gateway to the interior for new arrivals from South- 
west Arabia. Archaeological evidence indicates that by the 
beginning of the Christian era this pre-Aksumite culture had de- 
veloped western and eastern regional variants. The former, which 
included the region of Aksum, was probably the polity or series 
of polities that became the Aksumite state. 

The Aksumite State 

The Aksumite state emerged at about the beginning of the Chris- 
tian era, flourished during the succeeding six or seven centuries, 



7 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

and underwent prolonged decline from the eighth to the twelfth 
century A.D. Aksum's period of greatest power lasted from the 
fourth through the sixth century. Its core area lay in the highlands 
of what is today southern Eritrea, Tigray, Lasta (in present-day 
Welo), and Angot (also in Welo); its major centers were at Aksum 
and Adulis. Earlier centers, such as Yeha, also continued to flour- 
ish. At the kingdom's height, its rulers held sway over the Red 
Sea coast from Sawakin in present-day Sudan in the north to 
Berbera in present-day Somalia in the south, and inland as far as 
the Nile Valley in modern Sudan. On the Arabian side of the Red 
Sea, the Aksumite rulers at times controlled the coast and much 
of the interior of modern Yemen. During the sixth and seventh 
centuries, the Aksumite state lost its possessions in Southwest Arabia 
and much of its Red Sea coastline and gradually shrank to its core 
area, with the political center of the state shifting farther and far- 
ther southward. 

Inscriptions from Aksum and elsewhere date from as early as 
the end of the second century A.D. and reveal an Aksumite state 
that already had expanded at the expense of neighboring peoples. 
The Greek inscriptions of King Zoskales (who ruled at the end of 
the second century A.D.) claim that he conquered the lands to the 
south and southwest of what is now Tigray and controlled the Red 
Sea coast from Sawakin south to the present-day Djibouti and 
Berbera areas. The Aksumite state controlled parts of Southwest 
Arabia as well during this time, and subsequent Aksumite rulers 
continually involved themselves in the political and military affairs 
of Southwest Arabia, especially in what is now Yemen. Much of 
the impetus for foreign conquest lay in the desire to control the 
maritime trade between the Roman Empire and India and adjoining 
lands. Indeed, King Zoskales is mentioned by name in the Periplus 
of the Erythrean Sea (the Latin term for the Red Sea is Mare 
Erythreum), a Greek shipping guide of the first to third centuries 
A.D., as promoting commerce with Rome, Arabia, and India. 
Among the African commodities that the Aksumites exported were 
gold, rhinoceros horn, ivory, incense, and obsidian; in return, they 
imported cloth, glass, iron, olive oil, and wine. 

During the third and fourth centuries, the traditions related to 
Aksumite rule became fixed. Gedara, who lived in the late second 
and early third centuries, is referred to as the king of Aksum in 
inscriptions written in Gi'iz (also seen as Ge'ez), the Semitic lan- 
guage of the Aksumite kingdom. The growth of imperial traditions 
was concurrent with the expansion of foreign holdings, especially 
in Southwest Arabia in the late second century A.D. and later in 



8 



Historical Setting 



areas west of the Ethiopian highlands, including the kingdom of 
Meroe. 

Meroe was centered on the Nile north of the confluence of the 
White Nile and Blue Nile. Established by the sixth century B.C. 
or earlier, the kingdom's inhabitants were black Africans who were 
heavily influenced by Egyptian culture. It was probably the peo- 
ple of Meroe who were the first to be called Aithiopiai (' 'burnt faces' ') 
by the ancient Greeks, thus giving rise to the term Ethiopia that 
considerably later was used to designate the northern highlands 
of the Horn of Africa and its inhabitants. No evidence suggests 
that Meroe had any political influence over the areas included in 
modern Ethiopia; economic influence is harder to gauge because 
ancient commercial networks in the area were probably extensive 
and involved much long-distance trade. 

Sometime around A.D. 300, Aksumite armies conquered Meroe 
or forced its abandonment. By the early fourth century A.D. , King 
Ezana (reigned 325-60) controlled a domain extending from South- 
west Arabia across the Red Sea west to Meroe and south from 
Sawakin to the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden. As an indica- 
tion of the type of political control he exercised, Ezana, like other 
Aksumite rulers, carried the title negusa nagast (king of kings), sym- 
bolic of his rule over numerous tribute-paying principalities and 
a title used by successive Ethiopian rulers into the mid-twentieth 
century. 

The Aksumites created a civilization of considerable distinction. 
They devised an original architectural style and employed it in stone 
palaces and other public buildings. They also erected a series of 
carved stone stelae at Aksum as monuments to their deceased rul- 
ers. Some of these stelae are among the largest known from the 
ancient world. The Aksumites left behind a body of written records, 
that, although not voluminous, are nonetheless a legacy otherwise 
bequeathed only by Egypt and Meroe among ancient African king- 
doms. These records were written in two languages — Gi'iz and 
Greek. Gi'iz is assumed to be ancestral to modern Amharic and 
Tigrinya, although possibly only indirectly. Greek was also widely 
used, especially for commercial transactions with the Hellenized 
world of the eastern Mediterranean. Even more remarkable and 
wholly unique for ancient Africa was the minting of coins over an 
approximately 300-year period. These coins, many with inlay of 
gold on bronze or silver, provide a chronology of the rulers of 
Aksum. 

One of the most important contributions the Aksumite state made 
to Ethiopian tradition was the establishment of the Christian 
Church. The Aksumite state and its forebears had certainly been 



9 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

in contact with Judaism since the first millennium B.C. and with 
Christianity beginning in the first century A.D. These interactions 
probably were rather limited. However, during the second and third 
centuries, Christianity spread throughout the region. Around A.D. 
330-40, Ezana was converted to Christianity and made it the offi- 
cial state religion. The variant of Christianity adopted by the 
Aksumite state, however, eventually followed the Monophysite be- 
lief, which embraced the notion of one rather than two separate 
natures in the person of Christ as defined by the Council of Chal- 
cedon in 451 (see Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, ch. 2). 

Little is known about fifth-century Aksum, but early in the next 
century Aksumite rulers reasserted their control over Southwest 
Arabia, although only for a short time. Later in the sixth century, 
however, Sassanian Persians established themselves in Yemen, ef- 
fectively ending any pretense of Aksumite control. Thereafter, the 
Sassanians attacked Byzantine Egypt, further disrupting Aksumite 
trade networks in the Red Sea area. Over the next century and 
a half, Aksum was increasingly cut off from its overseas entrepots 
and as a result entered a period of prolonged decline, gradually 
relinquishing its maritime trading network and withdrawing into 
the interior of northern Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia and the Early Islamic Period 

The rise of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula had a significant im- 
pact on Aksum during the seventh and eighth centuries. By the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad's death (A.D. 632), the Arabian 
Peninsula, and thus the entire opposite shore of the Red Sea, had 
come under the influence of the new religion. The steady advance 
of the faith of Muhammad through the next century resulted in 
Islamic conquest of all of the former Sassanian Empire and most 
of the former Byzantine dominions. 

Despite the spread of Islam by conquest elsewhere, the Islamic 
state's relations with Aksum were not hostile at first. According 
to Islamic tradition, some members of Muhammad's family and 
some of his early converts had taken refuge with the Aksumites 
during the troubled years preceding the Prophet's rise to power, 
and Aksum was exempted from the jihad, or holy war, as a result. 
The Arabs also considered the Aksumite state to be on a par with 
the Islamic state, the Byzantine Empire, and China as one of the 
world's greatest kingdoms. Commerce between Aksum and at least 
some ports on the Red Sea continued, albeit on an increasingly 
reduced scale. 

Problems between Aksum and the new Arab power, however, 
soon developed. The establishment of Islam in Egypt and the Levant 



10 



Historical Setting 



greatly reduced Aksum's relations with the major Christian power, 
the Byzantine Empire. Although contact with individual Christian 
churches in Egypt and other lands continued, the Muslim conquests 
hastened the isolation of the church in Aksum. Limited commu- 
nication continued, the most significant being with the Coptic 
Church in Egypt, which supplied a patriarch to the Aksumites. 
Such contacts, however, were insufficient to counter an ever- 
growing ecclesiastical isolation. Perhaps more important, Islamic 
expansion threatened Aksum's maritime contacts, already under 
siege by Sassanian Persians. Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade, 
formerly dominated by the Byzantine Empire, Aksum, and Per- 
sia, gradually came under the control of Muslim Arabs, who also 
propagated their faith through commercial activities and other 
contacts. 

Aksum lost its maritime trade routes during and after the mid- 
seventh century, by which time relations with the Arabs had de- 
teriorated to the point that Aksumite and Muslim fleets raided and 
skirmished in the Red Sea. This situation led eventually to the Arab 
occupation of the Dahlak Islands, probably in the early eighth cen- 
tury and, it appears, to an attack on Adulis and the Aksumite fleet. 
Later, Muslims occupied Sawakin and converted the Beja people 
of that region to Islam. 

By the middle of the ninth century, Islam had spread to the 
southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and the coast of East Africa, 
and the foundations were laid for the later extensive conversions 
of the local populace to Islam in these and adjacent regions. East 
of the central highlands, a Muslim sultanate, Ifat, was established 
by the beginning of the twelfth century, and some of the surround- 
ing Cushitic peoples were gradually converted. These conversions 
of peoples to the south and southeast of the highlands who had previ- 
ously practiced local religions were generally brought about by the 
proselytizing efforts of Arab merchants. This population, perma- 
nently Islamicized, thereafter contended with the Amhara-Tigray 
peoples for control of the Horn of Africa. 

The Zagwe Dynasty 

In response to Islamic expansion in the Red Sea area and the 
loss of their seaborne commercial network, the Aksumites turned 
their attention to the colonizing of the northern Ethiopian high- 
lands. The Agew peoples, divided into a number of groups, in- 
habited the central and northern highlands, and it was these peoples 
who came increasingly under Aksumite influence. In all probabil- 
ity, this process of acculturation had been going on since the first 
migrants from Southwest Arabia settled in the highlands, but it 



11 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

seems to have received new impetus with the decline of Aksum's 
overseas trade and consequent dependence upon solely African 
resources. As early as the mid-seventh century, the old capital at 
Aksum had been abandoned; thereafter, it served only as a reli- 
gious center and as a place of coronation for a succession of kings 
who traced their lineage to Aksum. By then, Aksumite cultural, 
political, and religious influence had been established south of 
Tigray in such Agew districts as Lasta, Wag, Angot, and, eventu- 
ally, Amhara. 

This southward expansion continued over the next several 
centuries. The favored technique involved the establishment of 
military colonies, which served as core populations from which 
Aksumite culture, Semitic language, and Christianity spread to the 
surrounding Agew population. By the tenth century, a post- 
Aksumite Christian kingdom had emerged that controlled the cen- 
tral northern highlands from modern Eritrea to Shewa and the coast 
from old Adulis to Zeila in present-day Somalia, territory consider- 
ably larger than the Aksumites had governed. Military colonies 
were also established farther afield among the Sidama people of 
the central highlands. These settlers may have been the forerunners 
of such Semitic-speaking groups as the Argobba, Gafat (extinct), 
Gurage, and Hareri, although independent settlement of Semitic 
speakers from Southwest Arabia is also possible. During the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, the Shewan region was the scene of renewed 
Christian expansion, carried out, it appears, by one of the more 
recently Semiticized peoples — the Amhara. 

About 1137a new dynasty came to power in the Christian high- 
lands. Known as the Zagwe and based in the Agew district of Lasta, 
it developed naturally out of the long cultural and political contact 
between Cushitic- and Semitic-speaking peoples in the northern 
highlands. Staunch Christians, the Zagwe devoted themselves to 
the construction of new churches and monasteries. These were often 
modeled after Christian religious edifices in the Holy Land, a locale 
the Zagwe and their subjects held in special esteem. Patrons of liter- 
ature and the arts in the service of Christianity, the Zagwe kings 
were responsible, among other things, for the great churches carved 
into the rock in and around their capital at Adefa. In time, Adefa 
became known as Lalibela, the name of the Zagwe king to whose 
reign the Adefa churches' construction has been attributed. 

By the time of the Zagwe, the Ethiopian church was showing 
the effects of long centuries of isolation from the larger Christian 
and Orthodox worlds. After the seventh century, when Egypt suc- 
cumbed to the Arab conquest, the highlanders' sole contact with 
outside Christianity was with the Coptic Church of Egypt, which 



12 



Medhani Alem Church, one of twelve rock-hewn churches in Lalibela 
Courtesy United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization (G.S. Wade) 

periodically supplied a patriarch, or abun, upon royal request. Dur- 
ing the long period from the seventh to the twelfth century, the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church came to place strong emphasis upon 
the Old Testament and on the Judaic roots of the church. Chris- 
tianity in Ethiopia became imbued with Old Testament belief and 
practice in many ways, which differentiated it not only from Euro- 
pean Christianity but also from the faith of other Monophy sites, 
such as the Copts. Under the Zagwe, the highlanders maintained 
regular contact with the Egyptians. Also, by then the Ethiopian 
church had demonstrated that it was not a proselytizing religion 
but rather one that by and large restricted its attention to already 
converted areas of the highlands. Not until the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries did the church demonstrate real interest in 
proselytizing among nonbelievers, and then it did so via a rein- 
vigorated monastic movement. 

The "Restoration" of the "Solomonic" Line 

The Zagwe 's championing of Christianity and their artistic 
achievements notwithstanding, there was much discontent with 
Lastan rule among the populace in what is now Eritrea and Tigray 
and among the Amhara, an increasingly powerful people who 



13 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



inhabited a region called Amhara to the south of the Zagwe center 
at Adefa. About 1270, an Amhara noble, Yekuno Amlak, drove 
out the last Zagwe ruler and proclaimed himself king. His assump- 
tion of power marked yet another stage in the southward march 
of what may henceforth be termed the ' 'Christian kingdom of Ethio- 
pia" and ushered in an era of increased contact with the Levant, 
the Middle East, and Europe. 

The new dynasty that Yekuno Amlak founded came to be known 
as the "Solomonic" dynasty because its scions claimed descent not 
only from Aksum but also from King Solomon of ancient Israel. 
According to traditions that were eventually molded into a national 
epic, the lineage of Aksumite kings originated with the offspring 
of an alleged union between Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, 
whose domains Ethiopians have variously identified with parts of 
Southwest Arabia and/or Aksum. Consequently, the notion arose 
that royal legitimacy derived from descent in a line of Solomonic 
kings. The Tigray and Amhara, who saw themselves as heirs to 
Aksum, denied the Zagwe any share in that heritage and viewed 
the Zagwe as usurpers. Yekuno Amlak' s accession thus came to 
be seen as the legitimate "restoration" of the Solomonic line, even 
though the Amhara king's northern ancestry was at best uncer- 
tain. Nonetheless, his assumption of the throne brought the Solo- 
monic dynasty to power, and all subsequent Ethiopian kings traced 
their legitimacy to him and, thereby, to Solomon and Sheba. 

Under Yekuno Amlak, Amhara became the geographical and 
political center of the Christian kingdom. The new king concerned 
himself with the consolidation of his control over the northern high- 
lands and with the weakening and, where possible, destruction of 
encircling pagan and Muslim states. He enjoyed some of his greatest 
success against Ifat, an Islamic sultanate to the southeast of Am- 
hara that posed a threat to trade routes between Zeila and the cen- 
tral highlands (see fig. 3). 

Upon his death in 1285, Yekuno Amlak was succeeded by his 
son, Yagba Siyon (reigned 1285-94). His reign and the period im- 
mediately following were marked by constant struggles among the 
sons and grandsons of Yekuno Amlak. This internecine conflict 
was resolved sometime around 1300, when it became the rule for 
all males tracing descent from Yekuno Amlak (except the reigning 
emperor and his sons) to be held in a mountaintop prison that was 
approachable only on one side and that was guarded by soldiers 
under a commandant loyal to the reigning monarch. When that 
monarch died, all his sons except his heir were also permanently 
imprisoned. This practice was followed with some exceptions until 
the royal prison was destroyed in the early sixteenth century. 



14 



Historical Setting 



The royal prison was one solution to a problem that would plague 
the Solomonic line throughout its history: the conflict over succes- 
sion among those who had any claim to royal lineage. 

Amhara Ascendancy 

Yekuno Amlak's grandson, Amda Siyon (reigned 1313-44), dis- 
tinguished himself by at last establishing firm control over all of 
the Christian districts of the kingdom and by expanding into the 
neighboring regions of Shewa, Gojam, and Damot and into Agew 
districts in the Lake Tana area. He also devoted much attention 
to campaigns against Muslim states to the east and southeast of 
Amhara, such as Ifat, which still posed a powerful threat to the 
kingdom, and against Hadya, a Sidama state southwest of Shewa. 
These victories gave him control of the central highlands and en- 
hanced his influence over trade routes to the Red Sea. His con- 
quests also helped facilitate the spread of Christianity in the southern 
highlands. 

Zara Yakob (reigned 1434-68) was without a doubt one of the 
greatest Ethiopian rulers. His substantial military accomplishments 
included a decisive victory in 1445 over the sultanate of Adal and 
its Muslim pastoral allies, who for two centuries had been a source 
of determined opposition to the Christian highlanders. Zara Yakob 
also sought to strengthen royal control over what was a highly 
decentralized administrative system. Some of his most notable 
achievements were in ecclesiastical matters, where he sponsored 
a reorganization of the Orthodox Church, attempted to unify its 
religious practices, and fostered proselytization among nonbelievers. 
Perhaps most remarkable was a flowering of Gi'iz literature, in 
which the king himself composed a number of important religious 
tracts. 

Beginning in the fourteenth century, the power of the negusa nagast 
(king of kings), as the emperor was called, was in theory unlimi- 
ted, but in reality it was often considerably less than that. The unity 
of the state depended on an emperor's ability to control the local 
governors of the various regions that composed the kingdom, these 
rulers being self-made men with their own local bases of support. 
In general, the court did not interfere with these rulers so long as 
the latter demonstrated loyalty through the collection and submis- 
sion of royal tribute and through the contribution of armed men 
as needed for the king's campaigns. When the military had to be 
used, it was under central control but was composed of provincial 
levies or troops who lived off the land, or who were supported by 
the provincial governments that supplied them (see Military Tra- 
dition in National Life, ch. 5). The result was that the expenses 



15 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 




Figure 3. The Early Period, Thirteenth to Seventeenth Centuries 



borne by the imperial administration were small, whereas the con- 
tributions and tribute provided by the provinces were substantial. 

In theory, the emperor had unrestrained control of political and 
military affairs. In actuality, however, local and even hereditary 
interests were recognized and respected so long as local rulers paid 
tribute, supplied levies of warriors, and, in general, complied with 
royal dictates. Failure to honor obligations to the throne could and 
often did bring retribution in the form of battle and, if the emperor's 



16 



Historical Setting 



forces won, plunder of the district and removal of the local gover- 
nor. Ethiopian rulers continually moved around the kingdom, an 
important technique for assertion of royal authority and for col- 
lection — and consumption — of taxes levied in kind. The emperor 
was surrounded by ceremony and protocol intended to enhance 
his status as a descendant of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. 
He lived in seclusion and was shielded, except on rare occasions, 
from the gaze of all but his servants and high court officials. Most 
other subjects were denied access to his person. 

The emperor's judicial function was of primary importance. The 
administration of justice was centralized at court and was condi- 
tioned by a body of Egyptian Coptic law known as the Fetha Nagast 
(Law of Kings), introduced into Ethiopia in the mid-fifteenth cen- 
tury (see The Legal System, ch. 5). Judges appointed by the em- 
peror were attached to the administration of every provincial 
governor. They not only heard cases but also determined when 
cases could be referred to the governor or sent on appeal to the 
central government. 

The Trials of the Christian Kingdom and the 
Decline of Imperial Power 

From the mid-fifteenth through the mid-seventeenth century, 
Christian Ethiopians were confronted by the aggressiveness of the 
Muslim states, the far-reaching migrations of the Oromo, and the 
efforts of the Portuguese — who had been summoned to aid in the 
fight against the forces of Islam — to convert them from Monophysite 
Christianity to Roman Catholicism. The effects of the Muslim and 
Oromo activities and of the civil strife engendered by the Portuguese 
left the empire much weakened by the mid-seventeenth century. 
One result was the emergence of regional lords essentially indepen- 
dent of the throne, although in principle subject to it. 

Growth of Regional Muslim States 

Beginning in the thirteenth century, one of the chief problems 
confronting the Christian kingdom, then ruled by the Amhara, was 
the threat of Muslim encirclement. By that time, a variety of peo- 
ples east and south of the highlands had embraced Islam, and some 
had established powerful sultanates (or shaykhdoms). One of these 
was the sultanate of Ifat in the northeastern Shewan foothills, and 
another was centered in the Islamic city of Harer farther east. In 
the lowlands along the Red Sea were two other important Muslim 
peoples — the Afar and the Somali. As mentioned previc lsly, Ifat 
posed a major threat to the Christian kingdom, but it was finally 
defeated by Amda Siyon in the mid-fourteenth century after a 



17 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

protracted struggle. During this conflict, Ifat was supported by other 
sultanates and by Muslim pastoralists, but for the most part, the 
Islamicized peoples inhabited small, independent states and were 
divided by differences in language and culture. Many of them spoke 
Cushitic languages, unlike the Semitic speakers of Harer. Some 
were sedentary cultivators and traders, while others were pastoral- 
ists. Consequently, unity beyond a single campaign or even the 
coordination of military activities was difficult to sustain. 

Their tendency toward disunity notwithstanding, the Muslim 
forces continued to pose intermittent threats to the Christian king- 
dom. By the late fourteenth century, descendants of the ruling fam- 
ily of Ifat had moved east to the area around Harer and had 
reinvigorated the old Muslim sultanate of Adal, which became the 
most powerful Muslim entity in the Horn of Africa. Adal came 
to control the important trading routes from the highlands to the 
port of Zeila, thus posing a threat to Ethiopia's commerce and, 
at times, to Christian control of the highlands. 

Although the Christian state was unable to impose its rule over 
the Muslim states to the east, it was strong enough to resist Mus- 
lim incursions through the fourteenth century and most of the 
fifteenth. As the long reign of Zara Yakob came to an end, however, 
the kingdom again experienced succession problems. It was the 
monarchs' practice to marry several wives, and each sought to for- 
ward the cause of her sons in the struggle for the throne. In those 
cases where the sons of the deceased king were too young to take 
office, there could also be conflict within the council of advisers 
at court. In a polity that had been held together primarily by a 
strong warrior king, one or more generations of dynastic conflict 
could lead to serious internal and external problems. Only the per- 
sistence of internal conflicts among Muslims generally and within 
the sultanate of Adal in particular prevented a Muslim onslaught. 
Through the first quarter of the sixteenth century, relations be- 
tween Christian and Muslim powers took the form of raids and 
counterraids. Each side sought to claim as many slaves and as much 
booty as possible, but neither side attempted to bring the other 
firmly under its rule. 

By the second decade of the sixteenth century, however, a young 
soldier in the Adali army, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, had begun 
to acquire a strong following by virtue of his military successes and 
in time became the de facto leader of Adal. Concurrently, he ac- 
quired the status of a religious leader. Ahmad, who came to be 
called Gran (the "Lefthanded") by his Christian enemies, rallied 
the ethnically diverse Muslims, including many Afar and Somali, 
in a jihad intended to break Christian power. In 1525 Grafi led 



18 



Seventeenth-century Portuguese church beside Lake Tana 
Courtesy United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization (Roger Ferra) 

his first expedition against a Christian army and over the next two 
or three years continued to attack Ethiopian territory, burning 
churches, taking prisoners, and collecting booty. At the Battle of 
Shimbra Kure in 1529, according to historian Taddesse Tamrat, 
"Imam Ahmad broke the backbone of Christian resistance against 
his offensives." The emperor, Lebna Dengel (reigned 1508-40), 
was unable to organize an effective defense, and in the early 1530s 
Gran's armies penetrated the heartland of the Ethiopian state — 
northern Shewa, Amhara, and Tigray, devastating the country- 
side and thereafter putting much of what had been the Christian 
kingdom under the rule of Muslim governors. 

It was not until 1543 that the emperor Galawdewos (reigned 
1540-59), joining with a small number of Portuguese soldiers 
requested earlier by Lebna Dengel, defeated the Muslim forces and 
killed Grafi. The death of the charismatic Gran destroyed the 
unity of the Muslim forces that had been created by their leader's 
successes, skill, and reputation as a warrior and religious figure. 
Christian armies slowly pushed the Muslims back and regained 
control of the highlands. Ethiopians had suffered extraordinary 
material and moral losses during the struggle against Grafi, and 
it would be decades or even centuries before they would recover 



19 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

fully. The memory of the bitter war against Gran remains vivid 
even today. 

Oromo Migrations and Their Impact 

In the mid- sixteenth century, its political and military organi- 
zation already weakened by the Muslim assault, the Christian king- 
dom began to be pressured on the south and southeast by 
movements of the Oromo (called Galla by the Amhara). These 
migrations also affected the Sidama, Muslim pastoralists in the 
lowlands, and Adal. At this time, the Oromo, settled in far southern 
Ethiopia, were an egalitarian pastoral people divided into a num- 
ber of competing segments or groups. They shared, however, a 
type of age- set system (see Glossary) of social organization called 
the gada system (see Glossary), which was ideally suited for warfare. 
Their predilection toward warfare, apparently combined with an 
expanding population of both people and cattle, led to a long-term 
predatory expansion at the expense of their neighbors after about 
1550. Unlike the highland Christians or on occasion the lowland 
Muslims, the Oromo were not concerned with establishing an em- 
pire or imposing a religious system. In a series of massive but un- 
coordinated movements during the second half of the sixteenth 
century, they penetrated much of the southern and northern high- 
lands as well as the lowlands to the east, affecting Christians and 
Muslims equally. 

These migrations also profoundly affected the Oromo. Disunited 
in the extreme, they attacked and raided each other as readily as 
neighboring peoples in their quest for new land and pastures. As 
they moved farther from their homeland and encountered new phys- 
ical and human environments, entire segments of the Oromo popu- 
lation adapted by changing their mode of economic life, their 
political and social organization, and their religious adherence. 
Many mixed with the Amhara (particularly in Shewa), became 
Christians, and eventually obtained a share in governing the king- 
dom. In some cases, royal family members came from the union 
of Amhara and Oromo elements. In other cases, Oromo, without 
losing their identity, became part of the nobility. But no matter 
how much they changed, Oromo groups generally retained their 
language and sense of local identity. So differentiated and dispersed 
had they become, however, that few foreign observers recognized 
the Oromo as a distinct people until the twentieth century. 

In a more immediate sense, the Oromo migration resulted in 
a weakening of both Christian and Muslim power and drove a 
wedge between the two faiths along the eastern edge of the high- 
lands. In the Christian kingdom, Oromo groups infiltrated large 



20 



Historical Setting 



areas in the east and south, with large numbers settling in Shewa 
and adjacent parts of the central highlands. Others penetrated as 
far north as eastern Tigray. The effect of the Oromo migrations 
was to leave the Ethiopian state fragmented and much reduced in 
size, with an alien population in its midst. Thereafter, the Oromo 
played a major role in the internal dynamics of Ethiopia, both as- 
similating and being assimilated as they were slowly incorporated 
into the Christian kingdom. In the south, the Sidama fiercely re- 
sisted the Oromo, but, as in the central and northern highlands, 
they were compelled to yield at least some territory. In the east, 
the Oromo swept up to and even beyond Harer, dealing a devastat- 
ing blow to what remained of Adal and contributing in a major 
way to its decline. 

Contact with European Christendom 

Egyptian Muslims had destroyed the neighboring Nile River val- 
ley's Christian states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Tenu- 
ous relations with Christians in western Europe and the Byzantine 
Empire continued via the Coptic Church in Egypt. The Coptic 
patriarchs in Alexandria were responsible for the assignment of 
Ethiopian patriarchs — a church policy that Egypt's Muslim rulers 
occasionally tried to use to their advantage. For centuries after the 
Muslim conquests of the early medieval period, this link with the 
Eastern churches constituted practically all of Ethiopia's adminis- 
trative connection with the larger Christian world. 

A more direct if less formal contact with the outside Christian 
world was maintained through the Ethiopian Monophysite com- 
munity in Jerusalem and the visits of Ethiopian pilgrims to the Holy 
Land. Ethiopian monks from the Jerusalem community attended 
the Council of Florence in 1441 at the invitation of the pope, who 
was seeking to reunite the Eastern and Western churches. Western- 
ers learned about Ethiopia through the monks and pilgrims and 
became attracted to it for two main reasons. First, many believed 
Ethiopia was the long-sought land of the legendary Christian priest- 
king of the East, Prester John. Second, the West viewed Ethiopia 
as a potentially valuable ally in its struggle against Islamic forces 
that continued to threaten southern Europe until the Turkish defeat 
at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. 

Portugal, the first European power to circumnavigate Africa and 
enter the Indian Ocean, displayed initial interest in this potential 
ally by sending a representative to Ethiopia in 1493. The Ethio- 
pians, in turn, sent an envoy to Portugal in 1509 to request a coor- 
dinated attack on the Muslims. Europe received its first written 
accounts of the country from Father Francisco Alvarez, a Franciscan 



21 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

who accompanied a Portuguese diplomatic expedition to Ethiopia 
in the 1520s. His book, The Prester John of the Indies, stirred further 
European interest and proved a valuable source for future histor- 
ians. The first Portuguese forces responded to a request for aid 
in 1541, although by that time the Portuguese were concerned 
primarily with strengthening their hegemony over the Indian Ocean 
trade routes and with converting the Ethiopians to Roman Catholi- 
cism. Nevertheless, joining the forces of the Christian kingdom, 
the Portuguese succeeded eventually in helping to defeat and kill 
Gran. 

Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1554. Ef- 
forts to induce the Ethiopians to reject their Monophysite beliefs 
and accept Rome's supremacy continued for nearly a century and 
engendered bitterness as pro- and anti-Catholic parties maneuvered 
for control of the state. At least two emperors in this period al- 
legedly converted to Roman Catholicism. The second of these, 
Susenyos (reigned 1607-32), after a particularly fierce battle be- 
tween adherents of the two faiths, abdicated in 1632 in favor of 
his son, Fasiladas (reigned 1632-67), to spare the country further 
bloodshed. The expulsion of the Jesuits and all Roman Catholic 
missionaries followed. This religious controversy left a legacy of 
deep hostility toward foreign Christians and Europeans that con- 
tinued into the twentieth century. It also contributed to the isola- 
tion that followed for the next 200 years. 

The Gonder State and the Ascendancy of the Nobility 

Emperor Fasiladas kept out the disruptive influences of the for- 
eign Christians, dealt with sporadic Muslim incursions, and in 
general sought to reassert central authority and to reinvigorate the 
Solomonic monarchy and the Orthodox Church. He revived the 
practice of confining royal family members on a remote mountain- 
top to lessen challenges to his rule and distinguished himself by 
reconstructing the cathedral at Aksum (destroyed by Gran) and 
by establishing his camp at Gonder — a locale that gradually devel- 
oped into a permanent capital and became the cultural and politi- 
cal center of Ethiopia during the Gonder period. 

Although the Gonder period produced a flowering of architec- 
ture and art that lasted more than a century, Gonder monarchs 
never regained full control over the wealth and manpower that the 
nobility had usurped during the long wars against Gran and then 
the Oromo. Many nobles, commanding the loyalty of their home 
districts, had become virtually independent, especially those on the 
periphery of the kingdom. Moreover, during Fasiladas 's reign and 
that of his son Yohannis I (reigned 1667-82), there were substantial 



22 



The castle of Emperor 
Yohannis I (1667-82) in Gonder 
Courtesy United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization 
(G.S. Wade) 




differences between the two monastic orders of the Orthodox 
Church concerning the proper response to the Jesuit challenge to 
Monophysite doctrine on the nature of Christ. The positions of 
the two orders were often linked to regional opposition to the em- 
peror, and neither Fasiladas nor Yohannis was able to settle the 
issue without alienating important components of the church. 

Iyasu I (reigned 1682-1706) was a celebrated military leader who 
excelled at the most basic requirement of the warrior-king. He cam- 
paigned constantly in districts on the south and southeast of the 
kingdom and personally led expeditions to Shewa and beyond, areas 
from which royal armies had long been absent. Iyasu also attempted 
to mediate the doctrinal quarrel in the church, but a solution eluded 
him. He sponsored the construction of several churches, among 
them Debre Birhan Selassie, one of the most beautiful and famous 
of the churches in Gonder. 

Iyasu 's reign also saw the Oromo begin to play a role in the af- 
fairs of the kingdom, especially in the military sense. Iyasu co-opted 
some of the Oromo groups by enlisting them into his army and 
by converting them to Christianity. He came gradually to rely 
almost entirely upon Oromo units and led them in repeated cam- 
paigns against their countrymen who had not yet been incorpo- 
rated into the Amhara-Tigray state. Successive Gonder kings, 
particularly Iyasu II (reigned 1730-55), likewise relied upon Oro- 
mo military units to help counter challenges to their authority from 



23 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

the traditional nobility and for purposes of campaigning in far-flung 
Oromo territory. By the late eighteenth century, the Oromo were 
playing an important role in political affairs as well. At times dur- 
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, Oromo was the primary 
language at court, and Oromo leaders came to number among the 
highest nobility of the kingdom. 

During the reign of Iyoas (reigned 1755-69), son of Iyasu II, 
the most important political figure was Ras Mikael Sehul, a good 
example of a great noble who made himself the power behind the 
throne. Mikael' s base was the province of Tigray, which by now 
enjoyed a large measure of autonomy and from which Mikael raised 
up large armies with which he dominated the Gonder scene. In 
1769 he demonstrated his power by ordering the murder of two 
kings (Iyoas and Yohannis II) and by placing on the throne Tekla 
Haimanot II (son of Yohannis II), a weak ruler who did Mikael' s 
bidding. Mikael continued in command until the early 1770s, when 
a coalition of his opponents compelled him to retire to Tigray, where 
he eventually died of old age. 

Mikael' s brazen murder of two kings and his undisguised role 
as kingmaker in Gonder signaled the beginning of what Ethiopians 
have long termed the Zemene Mesafmt (Era of the Princes), a time 
when Gonder kings were reduced to ceremonial figureheads while 
their military functions and real power lay with powerful nobles. 
During this time, traditionally dating from 1769 to 1855, the king- 
dom no longer existed as a united entity capable of concerted po- 
litical and military activity. Various principalities were ruled by 
autonomous nobles, and warfare was constant. 

The five-volume work Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile by 
James Bruce, the Scottish traveler who lived in Ethiopia from 1769 
to 1772, describes some of the bloody conflicts and personal rival- 
ries that consumed the kingdom. During the most confused pe- 
riod, around 1800, there were as many as six rival emperors. 
Provincial warlords were masters of the territories they controlled 
but were subject to raids from other provinces. Peasants often left 
the land to become soldiers or brigands. In this period, too, Oromo 
nobles, often nominally Christian and in a few cases Muslim, were 
among those who struggled for hegemony over the highlands. The 
church, still riven by theological controversy, contributed to the 
disunity that was the hallmark of the Zemene Mesafint. 

The Making of Modern Ethiopia 

After the mid-nineteenth century, the different regions of the 
Gonder state were gradually reintegrated to form the nucleus of 
a modern state by strong monarchs such as Tewodros II, Yohannis 



24 



Seventeenth-century painting depicting St. George and the dragon, 
in the church of Debre Birhan Selassie in Gonder 
Courtesy United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization (R. Garraud) 

IV, and Menelik II, who resisted the gradual expansion of Euro- 
pean control in the Red Sea area and at the same time staved off 
a number of other challenges to the integrity of the reunited king- 
dom. 

The Reestablishment of the Ethiopian Monarchy 

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Gonder state 
consisted of the northern and central highlands and the lower ele- 
vations immediately adjacent to them. This area was only nomi- 
nally a monarchy, as rival nobles fought for the military title of 
ras (roughly, marshal; literally, head in Amharic) or the highest 
of all nonroyal titles, ras-bitwoded, that combined supreme military 
command with the duties of first minister at court. These nobles 
often were able to enthrone and depose princes who carried the 
empty title of negusa nagast. 

The major peoples who made up the Ethiopian state were the 
Amhara and the Tigray, both Semitic speakers, and Cushitic- 
speaking peoples such as the Oromo and the Agew, many of whom 
were Christian by the early 1800s. In some cases, their conversion 
had been accompanied by their assimilation into Amhara culture 



25 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

or, less often, Tigray culture; in other cases, they had become Chris- 
tian but had retained their languages. The state's largest ethnic 
group was the Oromo, but the Oromo were neither politically nor 
culturally unified. Some were Christian, spoke Amharic, and had 
intermarried with the Amhara. Other Christian Oromo retained 
their language, although their modes of life and social structure 
had changed extensively from those of their pastoral kin. At the 
eastern edge of the highlands, many had converted to Islam, espe- 
cially in the area of the former sultanates of Ifat and Adal. The 
Oromo people, whether or not Christian and Amhara in culture, 
played important political roles in the Zemene Mesafint — often as 
allies of Amhara aspirants to power but sometimes as rases and king- 
makers in their own right. 

Meanwhile, to the south of the kingdom, segments of the Oromo 
population — cultivators and suppliers of goods exportable to the 
Red Sea coast and beyond — had developed kingdoms of their own, 
no doubt stimulated in part by the examples of the Amhara to the 
north and the Sidama kingdoms to the south. The seventeenth 
through nineteenth century was a period not only of migration but 
also of integration, as groups borrowed usable techniques and in- 
stitutions from each other. In the south, too, Islam had made sub- 
stantial inroads. Many Oromo chieftains found Islam a useful tool 
in the process of centralization as well as in the building of trade 
networks. 

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, external fac- 
tors once more affected the highlands and adjacent areas, at least 
in part because trade among the Red Sea states was being revived. 
Egypt made incursions along the coast and sought at various times 
to control the Red Sea ports. Europeans, chiefly British and French, 
showed interest in the Horn of Africa. The competition for trade, 
differences over how to respond to Egypt's activities, and the readier 
availability of modern arms were important factors in the conflicts 
of the period. 

In the mid-nineteenth century, a major figure in Gonder was 
Kasa Haylu, son of a lesser noble from Qwara, a district on the 
border with Sudan. Beginning about 1840, Kasa alternated between 
life as a brigand and life as a soldier of fortune for various nobles, 
including Ras Ali, a Christian of Oromo origin who dominated 
the court in Gonder. Kasa became sufficiently effective as an army 
commander to be offered the governorship of a minor province. 
He also married Ali's daughter, Tawabech. Nonetheless, Kasa 
eventually rebelled against Ali, occupied Gonder in 1847, and com- 
pelled Ali to recognize him as chief of the western frontier area. 
In 1848 he attacked the Egyptians in Sudan; however, he suffered 



26 



Historical Setting 



a crushing defeat, which taught him to respect modern firepower. 
Kasa then agreed to a reconciliation with Ali, whom he served until 
1852, when he again revolted. The following year, he defeated Ali's 
army and burned his capital, Debre Tabor. In 1854 he assumed 
the title negus (king), and in February 1855 the head of the church 
crowned him Tewodros II. 

From Tewodros II to Menelik II, 1855-89 

Tewodros II' s origins were in the Era of the Princes, but his am- 
bitions were not those of the regional nobility. He sought to reestab- 
lish a cohesive Ethiopian state and to reform its administration and 
church. He did not initially claim Solomonic lineage but did seek 
to restore Solomonic hegemony, and he considered himself the 
"Elect of God." Later in his reign, suspecting that foreigners con- 
sidered him an upstart and seeking to legitimize his reign, he added 
"son of David and Solomon" to his title. 

Tewodros' s first task was to bring Shewa under his control. Dur- 
ing the Era of the Princes, Shewa was, even more than most 
provinces, an independent entity, its ruler even styling himself negus. 
In the course of subduing the Shewans, Tewodros imprisoned a 
Shewan prince, Menelik, who would later become emperor him- 
self. Despite his success against Shewa, Tewodros faced constant 
rebellions in other provinces. In the first six years of his reign, the 
new ruler managed to put down these rebellions, and the empire 
was relatively peaceful from about 1861 to 1863. The energy, 
wealth, and manpower necessary to deal with regional opposition, 
however, limited the scope of Tewodros's other activities. By 1865 
other rebels had emerged, including Menelik, who had escaped 
from prison and returned to Shewa, where he declared himself negus. 

In addition to his conflicts with rebels and rivals, Tewodros en- 
countered difficulties with the European powers. Seeking aid from 
the British government (he proposed a joint expedition to conquer 
Jerusalem), he became unhappy with the behavior of those Britons 
whom he had counted on to advance his request, and he took them 
hostage. In 1868, as a British expeditionary force sent from India 
to secure release of the hostages stormed his stronghold, Tewodros 
committed suicide. 

Tewodros never realized his dream of restoring a strong monar- 
chy, although he took some important initial steps. He sought to 
establish the principle that governors and judges must be salaried 
appointees. He also established a professional standing army, rather 
than depending on local lords to provide soldiers for his expedi- 
tions. He also intended to reform the church, believing the clergy 
to be ignorant and immoral, but he was confronted by strong 



27 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

opposition when he tried to impose a tax on church lands to help 
finance government activities. His confiscation of these lands gained 
him enemies in the church and little support elsewhere. Essentially, 
Tewodros was a talented military campaigner but a poor politician. 

The kingdom at Tewodros 's death was disorganized, but those 
contending to succeed him were not prepared to return to the 
Zemene Mesafint system. One of them, crowned Tekla Giorgis, 
took over the central part of the highlands. Another, Kasa Mercha, 
governor of Tigray, declined when offered the title of ras in ex- 
change for recognizing Tekla Giorgis. The third, Menelik of Shewa, 
came to terms with Tekla Giorgis in return for a promise to respect 
Shewa's independence. Tekla Giorgis, however, sought to bring 
Kasa Mercha under his rule but was defeated by a small Tigrayan 
army equipped with more modern weapons than those possessed 
by his Gonder forces. In 1872 Kasa Mercha was crowned negusa 
nagast in a ceremony at the ancient capital of Aksum, taking the 
throne name of Yohannis IV. 

Yohannis was unable to exercise control over the nearly indepen- 
dent Shewans until six years later. From the beginning of his reign, 
he was confronted with the growing power of Menelik, who had 
proclaimed himself king of Shewa and traced his Solomonic line- 
age to Lebna Dengel. While Yohannis was struggling against op- 
posing factions in the north, Menelik consolidated his power in 
Shewa and extended his rule over the Oromo to the south and west. 
He garrisoned Shewan forces among the Oromo and received 
military and financial support from them. Despite the acquisition 
of European firearms, in 1878 Menelik was compelled to submit 
to Yohannis and to pay tribute; in return, Yohannis recognized 
Menelik as negus and gave him a free hand in territories to the south 
of Shewa. This agreement, although only a truce in the long-standing 
rivalry between Tigray and Shewa, was important to Yohannis, 
who was preoccupied with foreign enemies and pressures. In many 
of Yohannis 's external struggles, Menelik maintained separate 
relations with the emperor's enemies and continued to consoli- 
date Shewan authority in order to strengthen his own position. In 
a subsequent agreement designed to ensure the succession in the 
line of Yohannis, one of Yohannis 's younger sons was married to 
Zawditu, Menelik' s daughter. 

In 1875 Yohannis had to meet attacks from Egyptian forces on 
three fronts. The khedive in Egypt envisioned a "Greater Egypt" 
that would encompass Ethiopia. In pursuit of this goal, an Egyp- 
tian force moved inland from present-day Djibouti but was anni- 
hilated by Afar tribesmen. Other Egyptian forces occupied Harer, 
where they remained for nearly ten years, long after the Egyptian 



28 



Historical Setting 



cause had been lost. Tigrayan warriors defeated a more ambitious 
attack launched from the coastal city of Mitsiwa in which the Egyp- 
tian forces were almost completely destroyed. A fourth Egyptian 
army was decisively defeated in 1876 southwest of Mitsiwa. 

Italy was the next source of danger. The Italian government took 
over the port of Aseb in 1882 from the Rubattino Shipping Com- 
pany, which had purchased it from a local ruler some years be- 
fore. Italy's main interest was not the port but the eventual 
colonization of Ethiopia. In the process, the Italians entered into 
a long-term relationship with Menelik. The main Italian drive was 
begun in 1885 from Mitsiwa, which Italy had occupied. From this 
port, the Italians began to penetrate the hinterland, with British 
encouragement. In 1887, after the Italians were soundly defeated 
at Dogali by Ras Alula, the governor of northeastern Tigray, they 
sent a stronger force into the area. 

Yohannis was unable to attend to the Italian threat because of 
difficulties to the west in Gonder and Gojam. In 1887 Sudanese 
Muslims, known as Mahdists, made incursions into Gojam and 
Begemdir and laid waste parts of those provinces. In 1889 the em- 
peror met these forces in the Battle of Metema on the Sudanese 
border. Although the invaders were defeated, Yohannis himself 
was fatally wounded, and the Ethiopian forces disintegrated. Just 
before his death, Yohannis designated one of his sons, Ras 
Mengesha Yohannis of Tigray, as his successor, but this gesture 
proved futile, as Menelik successfully claimed the throne in 1889. 

The Shewan ruler became the dominant personality in Ethio- 
pia and was recognized as Emperor Menelik II by all but Yohannis 's 
son and Ras Alula. During the temporary period of confusion fol- 
lowing Yohannis 's death, the Italians were able to advance far- 
ther into the hinterland from Mitsiwa and establish a foothold in 
the highlands, from which Menelik was unable to dislodge them. 
From 1889 until after World War II, Ethiopia was deprived of its 
maritime frontier and was forced to accept the presence of an am- 
bitious European power on its borders. 

The Reign of Menelik II, 1889-1913 

By 1900 Menelik had succeeded in establishing control over much 
of present-day Ethiopia and had, in part at least, gained recogni- 
tion from the European colonial powers of the boundaries of his 
empire. Although in many respects a traditionalist, he introduced 
several significant changes. His decision in the late 1880s to locate 
the royal encampment at Addis Ababa ("New Flower") in southern 
Shewa led to the gradual rise of a genuine urban center and a per- 
manent capital in the 1890s, a development that facilitated the in- 
troduction of new ideas and technology. The capital's location 



29 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



not necessarity authoritative 



ANGLO-EGYPTIAN 
SUDAN 

(Egypt, 1820-84; 
Mahdists, 1884-99; I 
Anglo-Egyptian j 
condominium. 1899) 



Present-day inter- 
national boundary 

Present-day admini- 
strative line 




UGANDA 

(Britain, 1894) 



BRITISH EAST AFRICA 

(Britain, 1895) 



Indian 
Ocean 



Figure 4. Colonization of the Horn of Africa and Southwest Arabia, 1820- 
ca. 1900 



symbolized the empire's southern reorientation, a move that fur- 
ther irritated Menelik's Tigrayan opponents and some Amhara of the 
more northerly provinces who resented Shewan hegemony. Menelik 
also authorized a French company to build a railroad, not complet- 
ed until 1917, that eventually would link Addis Ababa and Djibouti. 

Menelik embarked on a program of military conquest that more 
than doubled the size of his domain (see fig. 4). Enjoying superior fire 



30 



Historical Setting 



power, his forces overran the Kembata and Welamo regions in the 
southern highlands. Also subdued were the Kefa and other Oromo- 
and Omotic-speaking peoples. 

Expanding south, Menelik introduced a system of land rights 
considerably modified from that prevailing in the Amhara-Tigray 
highlands. These changes had significant implications for the or- 
dinary cultivator in the south and ultimately were to generate quite 
different responses there to the land reform programs that would 
follow the revolution of 1974 (see The Struggle for Power, 1974-77, 
this ch.). In the central and northern highlands, despite regional 
variations, most peasants had substantial inheritable (broadly, 
rist — see Glossary) rights in land. In addition to holding rights of 
this kind, the nobility held or were assigned certain economic rights 
in the land, called gult (see Glossary) rights, which entitled them 
to a portion of the produce of the land in which others held rist 
rights and to certain services from the rist holders. The Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church also held land of its own and gult rights in land 
to which peasants held rist rights. In the south, all land theoreti- 
cally belonged to the emperor. He in turn allocated land rights to 
those he appointed to office and to his soldiers. The rights allo- 
cated by the king were more extensive than the gult rights prevail- 
ing in the north and left most of the indigenous peoples as tenants, 
with far fewer rights than Amhara and Tigray peasants. Thus, the 
new landowners in the south were aliens and remained largely so. 

At the same time that Menelik was extending his empire, Euro- 
pean colonial powers were showing an interest in the territories 
surrounding Ethiopia. Menelik considered the Italians a formida- 
ble challenge and negotiated the Treaty of Wuchale with them in 
1889 (see Diplomacy and State Building in Imperial Ethiopia, 
ch. 4). Among its terms were those permitting the Italians to es- 
tablish their first toehold on the edge of the northern highlands and 
from which they subsequently sought to expand into Tigray. Dis- 
agreements over the contents of the treaty eventually induced 
Menelik to renounce it and repay in full a loan Italy had granted 
as a condition. Thereafter, relations with Italy were further strained 
as a result of the establishment of Eritrea as a colony and Italy's 
penetration of the Somali territories. 

Italian ambitions were encouraged by British actions in 1891, 
when, hoping to stabilize the region in the face of the Mahdist threat 
in Sudan, Britain agreed with the Italian government that Ethio- 
pia should fall within the Italian sphere of influence. France, 
however, encouraged Menelik to oppose the Italian threat by 
delineating the projected boundaries of his empire. Anxious to ad- 
vance French economic interests through the construction of a 



31 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

railroad from Addis Ababa to the city of Djibouti in French 
Somaliland, France accordingly reduced the size of its territorial 
claims there and recognized Ethiopian sovereignty in the area. 

Italian-Ethiopian relations reached a low point in 1895, when 
Ras Mengesha of Tigray, hitherto reluctant to recognize the Shewan 
emperor's claims, was threatened by the Italians and asked for the 
support of Menelik. In late 1895, Italian forces invaded Tigray. 
However, Menelik completely routed them in early 1896 as they 
approached the Tigrayan capital, Adwa. This victory brought 
Ethiopia new prestige as well as general recognition of its sover- 
eign status by the European powers. Besides confirming the an- 
nulment of the Treaty of Wuchale, the peace agreement ending 
the conflict also entailed Italian recognition of Ethiopian indepen- 
dence; in return, Menelik permitted the Italians to retain their col- 
ony of Eritrea. 

In addition to attempts on the part of Britain, France, and Italy 
to gain influence within the empire, Menelik was troubled by in- 
trigues originating in Russia, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. 
But, showing a great capacity to play one power off against another, 
the emperor was able to avoid making any substantial concessions. 
Moreover, while pursuing his own territorial designs, Menelik 
joined with France in 1898 to penetrate Sudan at Fashoda and then 
cooperated with British forces in British Somaliland between 1900 
and 1904 to put down a rebellion in the Ogaden by Somali leader 
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. By 1908 the colonial powers had 
recognized Ethiopia's borders except for those with Italian Somali- 
land. 

After Menelik suffered a disabling stroke in May 1906, his per- 
sonal control over the empire weakened. Apparently responding 
to that weakness and seeking to avoid an outbreak of conflict in 
the area, Britain, France, and Italy signed the Tripartite Treaty, 
which declared that the common purpose of the three powers was 
to maintain the political status quo and to respect each other's in- 
terests. Britain's interest, it was recognized, lay around Lake Tana 
and the headwaters of the Abay (Blue Nile). Italy's chief interest 
was in linking Eritrea with Italian Somaliland. France's interest 
was the territory to be traversed by the railroad from Addis Ababa 
to Djibouti in French Somaliland. 

Apparently recognizing that his political strength was ebbing, 
Menelik established a Council of Ministers in late 1907 to assist 
in the management of state affairs. The foremost aspirants to the 
throne, Ras Mekonnen and Ras Mengesha, had died in 1906. In 
June 1908, the emperor designated his thirteen-year-old nephew, 



32 



Historical Setting 



Lij Iyasu, son of Ras Mikael of Welo, as his successor. After suf- 
fering another stroke in late 1908, the emperor appointed Ras 
Tessema as regent. These developments ushered in a decade of 
political uncertainty. The great nobles, some with foreign finan- 
cial support, engaged in intrigues anticipating a time of troubles 
as well as of opportunity upon Menelik's death. 

Empress Taytu, who had borne no children, was heavily involved 
in court politics on behalf of her kin and friends, most of whom 
lived in the northern provinces and included persons who either 
had claims of their own to the throne or were resentful of Shewan 
hegemony. However, by 1910 her efforts had been thwarted by 
the Shewan nobles; thereafter, the empress withdrew from politi- 
cal activity. 

The Interregnum 

The two years of Menelik's reign that followed the death of Ras 
Tessema in 1 9 1 1 found real power in the hands of Ras (later Negus) 
Mikael of Welo, an Oromo and former Muslim, who had con- 
verted to Christianity under duress. Mikael could muster an army 
of 80,000 in his predominantly Muslim province and commanded 
the allegiance of Oromo outside it. In December 1913, Menelik 
died, but fear of civil war induced the court to keep his death secret 
for some time. Although recognized as emperor, Menelik's nephew, 
Lij Iyasu, was not formally crowned. The old nobility quickly at- 
tempted to reassert its power, which Menelik had undercut, and 
united against Lij Iyasu. At the outbreak of World War I, en- 
couraged by his father and by German and Turkish diplomats, Lij 
Iyasu adopted the Islamic faith. Seeking to revive Muslim-Oromo 
predominance, Lij Iyasu placed the eastern half of Ethiopia under 
Ras Mikael' s control, officially placed his country in religious de- 
pendence on the Ottoman sultan-caliph, and established cordial 
relations with Somali leader Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. 

The Shewan nobility immediately secured a proclamation from 
the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church excommunicating Lij 
Iyasu and deposing him as emperor. Menelik's daughter, Zawditu, 
was declared empress. Tafari Mekonnen, the son of Ras Mekonnen 
of Harer (who was a descendant of a Shewan negus and a supporter 
of the nobles), was declared regent and heir to the throne and given 
the title of ras. By virtue of the power and prestige he derived from 
his achievements as one of Menelik's generals, Habte Giorgis, the 
minister of war and a traditionalist, continued to play a major role 
in government affairs until his death in 1926. Although Lij Iyasu 
was captured in a brief military campaign in 1921 and imprisoned 
until his death in 1936, his father, Negus Mikael, continued for 



33 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

some time to pose a serious challenge to the government in Addis 
Ababa. The death of Habte Giorgis in 1926 left Tafari in effective 
control of the government. In 1928 he was crowned negus. When 
the empress died in 1930, Tafari succeeded to the throne without 
contest. Seventeen years after the death of Menelik, the succes- 
sion struggle thus ended in favor of Tafari. 

Well before his crowning as negus, Tafari began to introduce a 
degree of modernization into Ethiopia. As early as 1920, he or- 
dered administrative regulations and legal code books from vari- 
ous European countries to provide models for his newly created 
bureaucracy. Ministers were also appointed to advise the regent 
and were given official accommodations in the capital. To ensure 
the growth of a class of educated young men who might be useful 
in introducing reforms in the years ahead, Tafari promoted govern- 
ment schooling. He enlarged the school Menelik had established 
for the sons of nobles and founded Tafari Mekonnen Elementary 
School in 1925. In addition, he took steps to improve health and 
social services. 

Tafari also acted to extend his power base and to secure allies 
abroad. In 1919, after efforts to gain membership in the League 
of Nations were blocked because of the existence of slavery in Ethio- 
pia, he (and Empress Zawditu) complied with the norms of the 
international community by banning the slave trade in 1923. That 
same year, Ethiopia was unanimously voted membership in the 
League of Nations. Continuing to seek international approval of 
the country's internal conditions, the government enacted laws in 
1924 that provided for the gradual emancipation of slaves and their 
offspring and created a government bureau to oversee the process. 
The exact degree of servitude was difficult to determine, however, 
as the majority of slaves worked in households and were considered, 
at least among Amhara and Tigray, to be second-class family 
members. 

Ethiopia signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship with Italy in 
1928, providing for an Ethiopian free-trade zone at Aseb in Eritrea 
and the construction of a road from the port to Dese in Welo. A 
joint company controlled road traffic. Contact with the outside world 
expanded further when the emperor engaged a Belgian military 
mission in 1929 to train the royal bodyguards (see Training, ch. 5). 
In 1930 negotiations started between Ethiopia and various inter- 
national banking institutions for the establishment of the Bank of 
Ethiopia. In the same year, Tafari signed the Arms Traffic Act 
with Britain, France, and Italy, by which unauthorized persons 
were denied the right to import arms. The act also recognized the 



34 



Historical Setting 



government's right to procure arms against external aggression and 
to maintain internal order. 

Haile Selassie: The Prewar Period, 1930-36 

Although Empress Zawditu died in April 1930, it was not until 
November that Negus Tafari was crowned Haile Selassie I, "Con- 
quering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, and King of 
Kings of Ethiopia." As emperor, Haile Selassie continued to push 
reforms aimed at modernizing the country and breaking the no- 
bility's authority. Henceforth, the great rases were forced either to 
obey the emperor or to engage in treasonable opposition to him. 

In July 1931, the emperor granted a constitution that asserted 
his own status, reserved imperial succession to the line of Haile 
Selassie, and declared that "the person of the Emperor is sacred, 
his dignity inviolable, and his power indisputable." All power over 
central and local government, the legislature, the judiciary, and 
the military remained with the emperor. The constitution was es- 
sentially an effort to provide a legal basis for replacing the tradi- 
tional provincial rulers with appointees loyal to the emperor. 

The new strength of the imperial government was demonstrated 
in 1932 when a revolt led by Ras Hailu Balaw of Gojam in sup- 
port of Lij Iyasu was quickly suppressed and a new nontraditional 
governor put in Hailu 's place. By 1934 reliable provincial rulers 
had been established throughout the traditional Amhara territo- 
ries of Shewa, Gojam, and Begemdir, as well as in Kefa and 
Sidamo — well outside the core Amhara area. The only traditional 
leader capable of overtly challenging central rule at this point was 
the ras of Tigray. Other peoples, although in no position to con- 
front the emperor, remained almost entirely outside the control 
of the imperial government. 

Although Haile Selassie placed administrators of his own choosing 
wherever he could and thus sought to limit the power of the rases 
and other nobles with regional power bases, he did not directly 
attack the systems of land tenure that were linked to the traditional 
political order. Abolition of the pattern of gult rights in the Amhara- 
Tigray highlands and the system of land allocation in the south 
would have amounted to a social and economic revolution that Haile 
Selassie was not prepared to undertake. 

The emperor took nonmilitary measures to promote loyalty to 
the throne and to the state. He established new elementary and 
secondary schools in Addis Ababa, and some 150 university-age 
students studied abroad. The government enacted a penal code 
in 1930, imported printing presses to provide nationally oriented 
newspapers, increased the availability of electricity and telephone 



35 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

services, and promoted public health. The Bank of Ethiopia, founded 
in 1931, commenced issuing Ethiopian currency. 

Italian Rule and World War II 

Italian Administration in Eritrea 

A latecomer to the scramble for colonies in Africa, Italy estab- 
lished itself first in Eritrea (its name was derived from the Latin 
term for the Red Sea, Mare Erythreum) in the 1880s and secured 
Ethiopian recognition of its claim in 1889. Despite its failure to pene- 
trate Tigray in 1896, Italy retained control over Eritrea. A succes- 
sion of Italian chief administrators, or governors, maintained a 
degree of unity and public order in a region marked by cultural, 
linguistic, and religious diversity. Eritrea also experienced material 
progress in many areas before Ethiopia proper did so. 

One of the most important developments during the post- 1889 
period was the growth of an Eritrean public administration. The 
Italians employed many Eritreans to work in public service — 
particularly the police and public works — and fostered loyalty by 
granting Eritreans emoluments and status symbols. The local popu- 
lation shared in the benefits conferred under Italian colonial ad- 
ministration, especially through newly created medical services, 
agricultural improvements, and the provision of urban amenities 
in Asmera and Mitsiwa. 

After Benito Mussolini assumed power in Italy in 1922, the 
colonial government in Eritrea changed. The new administration 
stressed the racial and political superiority of Italians, authorized 
segregation, and relegated the local people to the lowest level of 
public employment. At the same time, Rome implemented agricul- 
tural improvements and established a basis for commercial agricul- 
ture on farms run by Italian colonists. 

State control of the economic sphere was matched by tighter po- 
litical control. Attempts at improving the management of the colony, 
however, did not transform it into a self-sufficient entity. The colo- 
ny's most important function was to serve as a strategic base for 
future aggrandizement. 

Mussolini's Invasion and the Italian Occupation 

As late as September 29, 1934, Rome affirmed its 1928 treaty 
of friendship with Ethiopia. Nonetheless, it became clear that Italy 
wished to expand and link its holdings in the Horn of Africa (see 
fig. 5). Moreover, the international climate of the mid- 1930s pro- 
vided Italy with the expectation that aggression could be undertaken 
with impunity. Determined to provoke a casus belli, the Mussolini 



36 



Historical Setting 



regime began deliberately exploiting the minor provocations that 
arose in its relations with Ethiopia. 

In December 1934, an incident took place at Welwel in the 
Ogaden, a site of wells used by Somali nomads regularly travers- 
ing the borders between Ethiopia and British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland. The Italians had built fortified positions in Welwel 
in 1930 and, because there had been no protests, assumed that the 
international community had recognized their rights over this area. 
However, an Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission challenged 
the Italian position when it visited Welwel in late November 1934 
on its way to set territorial boundary markers. On encountering 
Italian belligerence, the commission's members withdrew but left 
behind their Ethiopian military escort, which eventually fought a 
battle with Italian units. 

In September 1935, the League of Nations exonerated both par- 
ties in the Welwel incident. The long delay and the intricate Brit- 
ish and French maneuverings persuaded Mussolini that no obstacle 
would be placed in his path. An Anglo-French proposal in August 
1935 — just before the League of Nations ruling — that the signato- 
ries to the 1906 Tripartite Treaty collaborate for the purpose of 
assisting in the modernization and reorganization of Ethiopian in- 
ternal affairs, subject to the consent of Ethiopia, was flatly rejected 
by the Italians. On October 3, 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia from 
Eritrea and Italian Somaliland without a declaration of war. On 
October 7, the League of Nations unanimously declared Italy an 
aggressor but took no effective action. 

In a war that lasted seven months, Ethiopia was outmatched by 
Italy in armaments — a situation exacerbated by the fact that a 
League of Nations arms embargo was not enforced against Italy. 
Despite a valiant defense, the next six months saw the Ethiopians 
pushed back on the northern front and in Harerge. Acting on long- 
standing grievances, a segment of the Tigray forces defected, as 
did Oromo forces in some areas. Moreover, the Italians made 
widespread use of chemical weapons and air power. On March 
31, 1936, the Ethiopians counterattacked the main Italian force 
at May chew but were defeated. By early April 1936, Italian forces 
had reached Dese in the north and Harer in the east. On May 2, 
Haile Selassie left for French Somaliland and exile — a move resented 
by some Ethiopians who were accustomed to a warrior emperor. 
The Italian forces entered Addis Ababa on May 5. Four days later, 
Italy announced the annexation of Ethiopia. 

On June 30, Haile Selassie made a powerful speech before the 
League of Nations in Geneva in which he set forth two choices — 
support for collective security or international lawlessness. The 



37 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



A 



SAUDI ARABIA 



} Keren 

ERITREA 



ANGLO- 
EGYPTIAN j 

SUDAN \ 

(Britain and \ 

Egypt) j Maychew 



y'Gonder^ 



/ 



UGANDA 

(Britain) ) 



La 
Tana 



9 




(Italy) • 

■■^Asmera 



International 

boundary 

Administrative 

line 



Undefined 
boundary 

Populated place 

75 150 Kilometers 



FRENCH SOMALILAND 

Djibouti (Franco) 



Addis 
Ababa • 



Harer- \ 



V 



BRITISH 
SOMALILAND 

(Britain) 




ETHIOPIA 



- r - ITALIAN 
/ SOMALILAND 



Indian 



(Italy) 



KENYA 

(Britain) 



Mogadishu OCCOtl 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 5. The Horn of Africa and Southwest Arabia, Mid- 1930s 



emperor stirred the conscience of many and was thereafter regarded 
as a major international figure. Britain and France, however, soon 
recognized Italy's control of Ethiopia. Among the major powers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union refused to do so. 

In early June 1936, Rome promulgated a constitution bringing 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland together into a single ad- 
ministrative unit divided into six provinces. On June 11, 1936, 
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani replaced Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who 
had commanded the Italian forces in the war. In December the 
Italians declared the whole country to be pacified and under their 
effective control. Ethiopian resistance nevertheless continued. 

After a failed assassination attempt against Graziani on Febru- 
ary 19, 1937, the colonial authorities executed 30,000 persons, 



38 



Historical Setting 



including about half of the younger, educated Ethiopian popula- 
tion. This harsh policy, however, did not pacify the country. In 
November 1937, Rome therefore appointed a new governor and 
instructed him to adopt a more flexible line. Accordingly, large- 
scale public works projects were undertaken. One result was the 
construction of the country's first system of improved roads. In 
the meantime, however, the Italians had decreed miscegenation 
to be illegal. Racial separation, including residential segregation, 
was enforced as thoroughly as possible. The Italians showed favor- 
itism to non-Christian Oromo (some of whom had supported the 
invasion), Somali, and other Muslims in an attempt to isolate the 
Amhara, who supported Haile Selassie. 

Ethiopian resistance continued, nonetheless. Early in 1938, a 
revolt broke out in Gojam led by the Committee of Unity and Col- 
laboration, which was made up of some of the young, educated 
elite who had escaped the reprisal after the attempt on Graziani's 
life. In exile in Britain, the emperor sought to gain the support 
of the Western democracies for his cause but had little success until 
Italy entered World War II on the side of Germany in June 1940. 
Thereafter, Britain and the emperor sought to cooperate with Ethio- 
pian and other indigenous forces in a campaign to dislodge the 
Italians from Ethiopia and from British Somaliland, which the 
Italians seized in August 1940, and to resist the Italian invasion 
of Sudan. Haile Selassie proceeded immediately to Khartoum, 
where he established closer liaison with both the British headquarters 
and the resistance forces within Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia in World War II 

The wresting of Ethiopia from the occupying Italian forces in- 
volved British personnel, composed largely of South African and 
African colonial troops penetrating from the south, west, and north, 
supported by Ethiopian guerrillas. It was the task of an Anglo- 
Ethiopian mission, eventually commanded by Colonel Orde Win- 
gate, to coordinate the activities of the Ethiopian forces in support 
of the campaign. The emperor arrived in Gojam on January 20, 
1941 , and immediately undertook the task of bringing the various 
local resistance groups under his control. 

The campaigns of 1940 and 1941 were based on a British strategy 
of preventing Italian forces from attacking or occupying neighboring 
British possessions, while at the same time pressing northward from 
East Africa through Italian Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia to iso- 
late Italian troops in the highlands. This thrust was directed at the 
Harer and Dire Dawa area, with the objective of cutting the rail 
link between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. At the same time, British 



39 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

troops from Sudan penetrated Eritrea to cut off Italian forces from 
the Red Sea. The campaign in the north ended in February and 
March of 1941 with the Battle of Keren and the defeat of Italian 
troops in Eritrea. By March 3, Italian Somaliland had fallen to 
British forces, and soon after the Italian governor initiated negoti- 
ations for the surrender of the remaining Italian forces. On May 5, 
1941, Haile Selassie reentered Addis Ababa, but it was not until 
January 1942 that the last of the Italians, cut off near Gonder, sur- 
rendered to British and Ethiopian forces. 

During the war years, British military officials left responsibil- 
ity for internal affairs in the emperor's hands. However, it was 
agreed that all acts relating to the war effort — domestic or inter- 
national — required British approval. Without defining the limits 
of authority, both sides also agreed that the emperor would issue 
"proclamations" and the British military administration would issue 
"public notices." Without consulting the British, Haile Selassie 
appointed a seven-member cabinet and a governor of Addis Ababa, 
but for tactical reasons he announced that they would serve as ad- 
visers to the British military administration. 

This interim Anglo-Ethiopian arrangement was replaced in Janu- 
ary 1942 by a new agreement that contained a military conven- 
tion. The convention provided for British assistance in the 
organization of a new Ethiopian army that was to be trained by 
a British military mission (see Military Tradition in National Life, 
ch. 5). In addition to attaching officers to Ethiopian army battal- 
ions, the British assigned advisers to most ministries and to some 
provincial governors. British assistance strengthened the emperor's 
efforts to substitute, as his representatives in the provinces, ex- 
perienced administrators for the traditional nobility. But such help 
was rejected whenever proposed reforms threatened to weaken the 
emperor's personal control. 

The terms of the agreement confirmed Ethiopia's status as a 
sovereign state. However, the Ogaden and certain strategic areas, 
such as the French Somaliland border, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti 
railroad, and the Haud (collectively termed the "Reserved Areas"), 
remained temporarily under British administration. Other provi- 
sions set forth recruitment procedures for additional British advisers 
should they be requested. About the same time, a United States 
economic mission arrived, thereby laying the groundwork for an 
alliance that in time would significantly affect the country's di- 
rection. 

A British-trained national police administration and police force 
gradually took the place of the police who had served earlier in 
the retinues of the provincial governors. Opposition to these changes 



40 



Italian troops march past billboard of Mussolini during 1936 invasion. 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 

was generally minor except for a revolt in 1943 in Tigray — long 
a stronghold of resistance to the Shewans — and another in the 
Ogaden, inhabited chiefly by the Somali. British aircraft brought 
from Aden helped quell the Tigray rebellion, and two battalions 
of Ethiopian troops suppressed the Ogaden uprising. The 1942 
Anglo-Ethiopian agreement enabled the British military to disarm 
the Somali rebels and to patrol the region. 

After Haile Selassie returned to the throne in 1941, the British as- 
sumed control over currency and foreign exchange as well as imports 
and exports. Additionally, the British helped Ethiopia to rehabilitate 
its national bureaucracy. These changes, as well as innovations 
made by the Italians during the occupation, brought home to many 
Ethiopians the need to modernize — at least in some sectors of public 
life — if the country were to survive as an independent entity. 

In addition, the emperor made territorial demands, but these 
met with little sympathy from the British. Requests for the annex- 
ation of Eritrea, which the Ethiopians claimed to be racially, cul- 
turally, and economically inseparable from Ethiopia, were received 
with an awareness on the part of the British of a growing Eritrean 
sense of separate political identity. Similarly, Italian Somaliland 
was intended by the British to be part of "Greater Somalia"; thus, 
the emperor's claims to that territory were also rejected. 



41 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The Postwar Period, 1945-60: Reform and Opposition 

Despite criticism of the emperor's 1936 decision to go into ex- 
ile, the concept of the monarchy remained widely accepted after 
World War II. The country's leaders and the church assumed that 
victory over the Italians essentially meant the restoration of their 
traditional privileges. Before long, however, new social classes 
stirred into life by Haile Selassie's centralizing policies, as well as 
a younger generation full of frustrated expectations, clashed with 
forces bent on maintaining the traditional system. 

Change and Resistance 

The expansion of central authority by appointed officials required 
a dependable tax base, and that in turn encroached on the estab- 
lished prerogatives of those who had been granted large holdings 
in the south and of ^//-holders of the Amhara-Tigray highlands. 
Consequently, in March 1942, without reference to the restored 
parliament, the emperor decreed a taxation system that divided 
all land into one of three categories: fertile, semifertile, and poor. 
A fixed levy, depending on category, was imposed for each gasha 
(forty hectares) of land. 

The nobles of Gojam, Tigray, and Begemdir refused to accept 
any limitation upon the prevailing land tenure system and suc- 
cessfully battled the government over the issue. The emperor ac- 
knowledged defeat by excluding those provinces from the tax. When 
landlords elsewhere also protested the tax, the emperor exempted 
them as well, contenting himself with a flat 10 percent tithe on all 
but church land. But this tax, traditionally collected by landlords, 
was simply passed on to the tenants. In short, the emperor pur- 
sued policies that did not infringe on the rights of the nobility and 
other large landholders. In 1951, in response to additional pres- 
sure from the landlords, Haile Selassie further reduced the land 
tax payable by landlords and not covered by previous exemptions; 
the peasant cultivator, as in centuries past, continued to carry the 
entire taxation burden. 

Some reform was also effected within the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church. In July 1948, Haile Selassie initiated steps, completed in 
1956, by which he, rather than the patriarch of Alexandria, would 
appoint the abun, or patriarch, of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 
Thus, for the first time in sixteen centuries of Ethiopian Chris- 
tianity, an Ethiopian rather than an Egyptian served as head of 
the national church. The Ethiopian church, however, continued 
to recognize the primacy of the Alexandrian see. This appointment 
was followed by the creation of enough new bishoprics to allow the 



42 



Historical Setting 



Ethiopians to elect their own patriarch. Abuna Basilios, the first 
Ethiopian archbishop, was elevated to the status of patriarch in 
1959. The postwar years also saw a change in the church-state rela- 
tionship; the vast church landholdings became subject to tax legis- 
lation, and the clergy lost the right to try fellow church officials 
for civil offenses in their own court. 

Acutely aware of his international image, Haile Selassie also was 
active on the diplomatic front (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). Ethio- 
pia was a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). After the postwar relation- 
ship with Britain wound down, the emperor in 1953 asked the 
United States for military assistance and economic support. Al- 
though his dependence on Washington grew, Haile Selassie diver- 
sified the sources of his international assistance, which included 
such disparate nations as Italy, China, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany), Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and the 
Soviet Union. 

Administrative Change and the 1955 Constitution 

In pursuit of reform, Haile Selassie faced the recalcitrance of 
the provincial nobility, other great landholders, and church offi- 
cials — all of whom intended to maintain their power and privileges. 
Moreover, some provincial nobility opposed the emperor because 
of their own long-held claims to the throne. Whatever his inten- 
tions as a reformer, Haile Selassie was a political realist and recog- 
nized that, lacking a strong military, he had to compromise with 
the Amhara and Tigray nobility and with the church. And, where 
required, he made his peace with other ethnic groups in the em- 
pire. For example, he eventually granted autonomy over Afar areas 
that Addis Ababa could not dominate by armed force to the sultan 
of Aussa. In general, political changes were few and were com- 
promised at the first sign of substantial opposition. In the 1950s, 
despite his many years as emperor and his international stature, 
there was almost no significant section of the Ethiopian popula- 
tion on which Haile Selassie could rely to support him in such 
efforts. 

The emperor sought to gain some control over local government 
by placing it in the hands of the central administration in Addis 
Ababa. He revised the administrative divisions and established po- 
litical and administrative offices corresponding to them. The larg- 
est of these administrative units were the provinces (teklay ghizats), 
of which there were fourteen in the mid-1960s, each under a gover- 
nor general appointed directly by Haile Selassie. Each province 
was subdivided into subprovinces (awrajas), districts (weredas), and 



43 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



subdistricts (mikitil weredas). Although the structure outwardly 
resembled a modern state apparatus, its impact was largely dissi- 
pated by the fact that higher-ranking landed nobles held all the 
important offices. Younger and better educated officials were lit- 
tle more than aides to the governors general, and their advice more 
often than not was contemptuously set aside by their superiors. 

The emperor also attempted to strengthen the national govern- 
ment. A new generation of educated Ethiopians was introduced 
to new enlarged ministries, the powers of which were made more 
specific. The emperor established a national judiciary and appointed 
its judges. Finally, in 1955 he proclaimed a revised constitution. 
Apparently, he sought to provide a formal basis for his efforts at 
centralization and to attract the loyalty of those who gained their 
livelihood from relatively modern economic activities or who were 
better educated than most Ethiopians. 

The younger leaders were mostly the sons of the traditional elite. 
Having been educated abroad, they were favorably disposed toward 
reform and were frequently frustrated and in some cases alienated 
by their inability to initiate and implement it. The remnants of 
the small number of educated Ethiopians of an earlier generation 
had been appointed to high government positions. But whatever 
their previous concern with reform, they had little impact on tradi- 
tional methods, and by the mid-1950s even this earlier reformist 
elite was considered conservative by the succeeding generation. 

The new elite was drawn largely from the postwar generation and 
was generally the product of a half-dozen secondary schools oper- 
ated by foreign staffs. A majority of the students continued to come 
from families of the landed nobility, but they were profoundly af- 
fected by the presence of students from less affluent backgrounds 
and by their more democratically oriented Western teachers. 

The 1955 constitution was prompted, like its 1931 predecessor, 
by a concern with international opinion. Such opinion was partic- 
ularly important at a time when some neighboring African states 
were rapidly advancing under European colonial tutelage and Ethio- 
pia was pressing its claims internationally for the incorporation of 
Eritrea, where an elected parliament and more modern adminis- 
tration had existed since 1952. 

The bicameral Ethiopian parliament played no part in drawing 
up the 1955 constitution, which, far from limiting the emperor's 
control, emphasized the religious origins of imperial power and 
extended the centralization process. The Senate remained appoin- 
tive, but the Chamber of Deputies was, at least nominally, elected. 
However, the absence of a census, the near total illiteracy of the 
population, and the domination of the countryside by the nobility 



44 



Historical Setting 



meant that the majority of candidates who sought election in 1957 
were in effect chosen by the elite. The Chamber of Deputies was 
not altogether a rubber stamp, at times discussing bills and ques- 
tioning state ministers. However, provisions in the constitution that 
guaranteed personal freedoms and liberties, including freedom of 
assembly, movement, and speech, and the due process of law, were 
so far removed from the realities of Ethiopian life that no group 
or individual sought to act upon them publicly. 

The Attempted Coup of 1960 and Its Aftermath 

Haile Selassie's efforts to achieve a measure of change without 
jeopardizing his own power stimulated rising expectations, some 
of which he was unwilling or unable to satisfy. Impatient with the 
rate or form of social and political change, several groups conspired 
to launch a coup d'etat on December 13, 1960, while the emperor 
was abroad on one of his frequent trips. The leadership of the 1960 
revolt came from three groups: the commander of the Imperial 
Bodyguard, Mengistu Neway, and his followers; a few security offi- 
cials, including the police chief; and a handful of radical intellec- 
tuals related to the officials, including Girmame Neway, Mengistu 's 
brother. 

The coup was initially successful in the capital, as the rebels seized 
the crown prince and more than twenty cabinet ministers and other 
government leaders. The support of the Imperial Bodyguard, the 
backbone of the revolt, was obtained without informing the en- 
listed men — or even a majority of the officers — of the purpose of 
the rebels' actions. The proclaimed intent of the coup leaders was 
the establishment of a government that would improve the eco- 
nomic, social, and political position of the general population, but 
they also appealed to traditional authority in the person of the crown 
prince. No mention was made of the emperor. 

The coup's leaders failed to achieve popular support for their 
actions. Although university students demonstrated in favor of the 
coup, army and air force units remained loyal to the emperor, who 
returned to the capital on December 17. The patriarch of the 
church, who condemned the rebels as antireligious traitors and 
called for fealty to the emperor, supported the loyalists. Despite 
the coup's failure, it succeeded in stripping the monarchy of its 
claim to universal acceptance and led to a polarization of tradi- 
tional and modern forces. 

Growth of Secessionist Threats 

Outside the Amhara-Tigray heartland, the two areas posing the 
most consistent problems for Ethiopia's rulers were Eritrea and 
the largely Somali-occupied Ogaden and adjacent regions. 



45 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The Liberation Struggle in Eritrea 

Eritrea had been placed under British military administration 
in 1941 after the Italian surrender. In keeping with a 1950 deci- 
sion of the UN General Assembly, British military administration 
ended in September 1952 and was replaced by a new autonomous 
Eritrean government in federal union with Ethiopia. Federation 
with the former Italian colony restored an unhindered maritime 
frontier to the country. The new arrangement also enabled the coun- 
try to gain limited control of a territory that, at least in its inland 
areas, was more advanced politically and economically. 

The Four Power Inquiry Commission established by the World 
War II Allies (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States) had failed to agree in its September 1948 report on a fu- 
ture course for Eritrea. Several countries had displayed an active 
interest in the area. In the immediate postwar years, Italy had re- 
quested that Eritrea be returned as a colony or as a trusteeship. 
This bid was supported initially by the Soviet Union, which anti- 
cipated a communist victory at the Italian polls. The Arab states, 
seeing Eritrea and its large Muslim population as an extension of 
the Arab world, sought the establishment of an independent state. 
Some Britons favored a division of the territory, with the Chris- 
tian areas and the coast from Mitsiwa southward going to Ethio- 
pia and the northwest area going to Sudan. 

A UN commission, which arrived in Eritrea in February 1950, 
eventually approved a plan involving some form of association with 
Ethiopia. In December the UN General Assembly adopted a reso- 
lution affirming the commission's plan, with the provision that Brit- 
ain, the administering power, should facilitate the UN efforts and 
depart from the colony no later than September 15, 1952. Faced 
with this constraint, the British administration held elections on 
March 16, 1952, for a representative assembly of sixty-eight mem- 
bers. This body, made up equally of Christians and Muslims, ac- 
cepted the draft constitution advanced by the UN commissioner 
on July 10. The constitution was ratified by the emperor on Sep- 
tember 11, and the assembly, by prearrangement, was transformed 
into the Eritrean Assembly three days before the federation was 
proclaimed. 

The UN General Assembly resolution of September 15, 1952, 
adopted by a vote of forty-seven to ten, provided that Eritrea should 
be linked to Ethiopia through a loose federal structure under the 
emperor's sovereignty but with a form and organization of inter- 
nal self-government. The federal government, which for all intents 
and purposes was the existing imperial government, was to control 



46 



Historical Setting 



foreign affairs, defense, foreign and interstate commerce, trans- 
portation, and finance. Control over domestic affairs (including 
police, local administration, and taxation to meet its own budget) 
was to be exercised by an elected Eritrean assembly on the 
parliamentary model. The state was to have its own administra- 
tive and judicial structure and its own flag. 

Almost from the start of federation, the emperor's representa- 
tive undercut the territory's separate status under the federal sys- 
tem. In August 1955, Tedla Bairu, an Eritrean who was the chief 
executive elected by the assembly, resigned under pressure from 
the emperor, who replaced Tedla with his own nominee. He made 
Amharic the official language in place of Arabic and Tigrinya, ter- 
minated the use of the Eritrean flag, and moved many businesses 
out of Eritrea. In addition, the central government proscribed all 
political parties, imposed censorship, gave the top administrative 
positions to Amhara, and abandoned the principle of parity be- 
tween Christian and Muslim officials. In November 1962, the 
Eritrean Assembly, many of whose members had been accused of 
accepting bribes, voted unanimously to change Eritrea's status to 
that of a province of Ethiopia. Following his appointment of the 
arch-conservative Ras Asrate Kasa as governor general, the em- 
peror was accused of "refeudalizing" the territory. 

The extinction of the federation consolidated internal and ex- 
ternal opposition to union (see The Eritrean Movement, ch. 4; The 
Eritreans, ch. 5). Four years earlier, in 1958, a number of Eritrean 
exiles had founded the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in 
Cairo, under Hamid Idris Awate's leadership. This organization, 
however, soon was neutralized. A new faction, the Eritrean Libera- 
tion Front (ELF), emerged in 1960. Initially a Muslim movement, 
the ELF was nationalist rather than Marxist and received Iraqi 
and Syrian support. As urban Christians joined, the ELF became 
more radical and anticapitalist. Beginning in 1961, the ELF turned 
to armed struggle and by 1966 challenged imperial forces through- 
out Eritrea. 

The rapid growth of the ELF also created internal divisions be- 
tween urban and rural elements, socialists and nationalists, and 
Christians and Muslims. Although these divisions did not take any 
clear form, they were magnified as the ELF extended its opera- 
tions and won international publicity. In June 1970, Osman Salah 
Sabbe, former head of the Muslim League, broke away from the 
ELF and formed the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF), which led 
directly to the founding of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF) in early 1972. Both organizations initially attracted a large 



47 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

number of urban, intellectual, and leftist Christian youths and 
projected a strong socialist and nationalist image. By 1975 the EPLF 
had more than 10,000 members in the field. However, the growth 
of the EPLF was also accompanied by an intensification of inter- 
necine Eritrean conflict, particularly between 1972 and 1974, when 
casualties were well over 1,200. In 1976 Osman broke with the 
EPLF and formed the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Libera- 
tion Front (ELF-PLF). The division reflected differences between 
combatants in Eritrea and representatives abroad as well as per- 
sonal rivalries and basic ideological differences, factors important 
in earlier splits within the Eritrean separatist movement. 

Encouraged by the imperial regime's collapse and attendant con- 
fusion, the guerrillas extended their control over the whole region 
by 1977. Ethiopian forces were largely confined to urban centers 
and controlled the major roads only by day. 

Discontent in Tigray 

Overt dissidence in Tigray during Haile Selassie's reign centered 
on the 1943 resistance to imperial rule known as the Weyane. The 
movement took advantage of popular discontent against Amhara 
rule but was primarily a localized resistance to imperial rule that 
depended on three main sources of support. These were the semi- 
pastoralists of eastern Tigray, including the Azebo and Ray a, who 
believed their traditional Oromo social structure to be threatened; 
the local Tigray nobility, who perceived their position to be en- 
dangered by the central government's growth; and the peasantry, 
who felt victimized by government officials and their militias. 

The course of the Weyane was relatively brief, lasting from May 
22 to October 14, 1943. Although the rebels made some initial gains, 
the imperial forces, supported by British aircraft, soon took the 
offensive. Poor military leadership, combined with disagreements 
among the rebel leaders, detracted from the effectiveness of their 
efforts. After the fall of Mekele, capital of Tigray, on October 14, 
1943, practically all organized resistance collapsed. The govern- 
ment exiled or imprisoned the leaders of the revolt. The emperor 
took reprisals against peasants suspected of supporting the Weyane. 

Although a military resolution of the Weyane restored imperial 
authority to Tigray, the harsh measures used by the Ethiopian mili- 
tary to do so created resentment of imperial rule in many quar- 
ters. This resentment, coupled with a long-standing feeling that 
Shewan Amhara rule was of an upstart nature, lasted through the 
end of Haile Selassie's reign. After Haile Selassie's demise in 1974, 
separatist feelings again emerged throughout Tigray. 



48 



Historical Setting 



The Ogaden and the Haud 

Ethiopia's entry into the Somali region in modern times dated 
from the conquest of Harer in the late 1890s by Menelik, who based 
his actions on old claims of Ethiopian sovereignty. In 1945 Haile 
Selassie, fearing the possibility of British support for a separate 
Somali state that would include the Ogaden, claimed Italian Somali- 
land as a "lost province." In Italian Somaliland, the Somali Youth 
League (SYL) resisted this claim and in its turn demanded unifi- 
cation of all Somali areas, including those in Ethiopia. 

After the British evacuated the Ogaden in 1948, Ethiopian offi- 
cers took over administration in the city of Jijiga, at one point sup- 
pressing a demonstration led by the SYL, which the government 
subsequently outlawed. At the same time, Ethiopia renounced 
its claim to Italian Somaliland in deference to UN calls for self- 
determination. The Ethiopians, however, maintained that self- 
determination was not incompatible with eventual union. 

Immediately upon the birth of the Republic of Somalia in 1960, 
which followed the merger of British Somaliland and Italian Soma- 
liland, the new country proclaimed an irredentist policy. Somalia 
laid claim to Somali-populated regions of French Somaliland (later 
called the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, and Djibouti 
after independence in 1977), the northeastern corner of Kenya, 
and the Ogaden, a vast, ill-defined region occupied by Somali 
nomads extending southeast from Ethiopia's southern high- 
lands that includes a separate region east of Harer known as the 
Haud. The uncertainty over the precise location of the frontier be- 
tween Ethiopia and the former Italian possessions in Somalia fur- 
ther complicated these claims. Despite UN efforts to promote an 
agreement, none was made in the colonial or the Italian trustee- 
ship period. 

In the northeast, an Anglo-Ethiopian treaty determined the fron- 
tier's official location. However, Somalia contended that it was un- 
fairly placed so as to exclude the herders resident in Somalia from 
vital seasonal grazing lands in the Haud. The British had ad- 
ministered the Haud as an integral part of British Somaliland, 
although Ethiopian sovereignty had been recognized there. After 
it was disbanded in the rest of Ethiopia, the British military ad- 
ministration continued to supervise the area from Harer eastward 
and did not withdraw from the Haud until 1955. Even then, the 
British stressed the region's importance to Somalia by requiring 
the Ethiopians to guarantee the Somali free access to grazing lands. 

Somalia refused to recognize any pre- 1960 treaties defining the 
Somali-Ethiopian borders because colonial governments had 



49 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

concluded the agreements. Despite the need for access to pasturage 
for local herds, the Somali government even refused co acknowledge 
the British treaty guaranteeing Somali grazing rights in the Haud 
because it would have indirectly recognized Ethiopian sovereignty 
over the area. 

Within six months after Somali independence, military incidents 
occurred between Ethiopian and Somali forces along their mutual 
border. Confrontations escalated again in 1964, when the Ethio- 
pian air force raided Somali villages and encampments inside the 
Somali border. Hostilities were ended through mediation by the 
OAU and Sudan. However, Somalia continued to promote irreden- 
tism by supporting the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), 
which was active in the Ogaden. Claims of oil discoveries prompted 
the resurgence of fighting in 1973. 

Revolution and Military Government 

In early 1974, Ethiopia entered a period of profound political, 
economic, and social change, frequently accompanied by violence. 
Confrontation between traditional and modern forces erupted and 
changed the political, economic, and social nature of the Ethio- 
pian state. 

Background to Revolution, 1960-74 

The last fourteen years of Haile Selassie's reign witnessed growing 
opposition to his regime. After the suppression of the 1960 coup 
attempt, the emperor sought to reclaim the loyalty of coup sym- 
pathizers by stepping up reform. Much of this effort took the form 
of land grants to military and police officers, however, and no co- 
herent pattern of economic and social development appeared. 

In 1966 a plan emerged to confront the traditional forces through 
the implementation of a modern tax system. Implicit in the 
proposal, which required registration of all land, was the aim of 
destroying the power of the landed nobility. But when progressive 
tax proposals were submitted to parliament in the late 1960s, they 
were vigorously opposed by the members, all of whom were 
property owners. Parliament passed a tax on agricultural produce 
in November 1967, but in a form vastly altered from the govern- 
ment proposal. Even this, however, was fiercely resisted by the 
landed class in Gojam, and the entire province revolted. In 1969, 
after two years of military action, the central government with- 
drew its troops, discontinued enforcement of the tax, and canceled 
all arrears of taxation going back to 1940. 

The emperor's defeat in Gojam encouraged defiance by other pro- 
vincial landowners, although not on the same scale. But legislation 



50 



Historical Setting 



calling for property registration and for modification of landlord- 
tenant relationships was more boldly resisted in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. Debate on these proposals continued until 
the mid-1970s. 

At the same time the emperor was facing opposition to change, 
other forces were exerting direct or indirect pressure in favor of 
reform. Beginning in 1965, student demonstrations focused on the 
need to implement land reform and to address corruption and ris- 
ing prices. Peasant disturbances, although on a small scale, were 
especially numerous in the southern provinces, where the imper- 
ial government had traditionally rewarded its supporters with land 
grants. Although it allowed labor unions to organize in 1962, the 
government restricted union activities. Soon, even the Confeder- 
ation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) was criticized as being 
too subservient to the government. Faced with such a multiplicity 
of problems, the aging emperor increasingly left domestic issues 
in the care of his prime minister, Aklilu Habte Wold (appointed 
in 1961), and turned his attention to foreign affairs. 

The Establishment of the Derg 

The government's failure to effect significant economic and po- 
litical reforms over the previous fourteen years — combined with 
rising inflation, corruption, a famine that affected several provinces 
(but especially Welo and Tigray) and that was concealed from the 
outside world, and the growing discontent of urban interest 
groups — provided the backdrop against which the Ethiopian revo- 
lution began to unfold in early 1974. Whereas elements of the 
urban-based, modernizing elite previously had sought to establish 
a parliamentary democracy, the initiation of the 1974 revolution 
was the work of the military, acting essentially in its own immedi- 
ate interests. The unrest that began in January of that year then 
spread to the civilian population in an outburst of general dis- 
content. 

The Ethiopian military on the eve of the revolution was riven 
by factionalism; the emperor promoted such division to prevent 
any person or group from becoming too powerful. Factions included 
the Imperial Bodyguard, which had been rebuilt since the 1960 
coup attempt; the Territorial Army (Ethiopia's national ground 
force), which was broken into many factions but which was domi- 
nated by a group of senior officers called "The Exiles" because 
they had fled with Haile Selassie in 1936 after the Italian invasion; 
and the air force. The officer graduates of the Harer Military Acad- 
emy also formed a distinct group in opposition to the Holeta Mili- 
tary Training Center graduates (see Training, ch. 5). 



51 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Conditions throughout the army were frequently substandard, 
with enlisted personnel often receiving low pay and insufficient food 
and supplies. Enlisted personnel as well as some of the Holeta gradu- 
ates came from the peasantry, which at the time was suffering from 
a prolonged drought and resulting famine. The general percep- 
tion was that the central government was deliberately refusing to 
take special measures for famine relief. Much popular discontent 
over this issue, plus the generally perceived lack of civil freedoms, 
had created widespread discontent among the middle class, which 
had been built up and supported by the emperor since World War 
II. 

The revolution began with a mutiny of the Territorial Army's 
Fourth Brigade at Negele in the southern province of Sidamo on 
January 12, 1974. Soldiers protested poor food and water condi- 
tions; led by their noncommissioned officers, they rebelled and took 
their commanding officer hostage, requesting redress from the em- 
peror. Attempts at reconciliation and a subsequent impasse pro- 
moted the spread of the discontent to other units throughout the 
military, including those stationed in Eritrea. There, the Second 
Division at Asmera mutinied, imprisoned its commanders, and an- 
nounced its support for the Negele mutineers. The Signal Corps, 
in sympathy with the uprising, broadcast information about events 
to the rest of the military. Moreover, by that time, general discon- 
tent had resulted in the rise of resistance throughout Ethiopia. Op- 
position to increased fuel prices and curriculum changes in the 
schools, as well as low teachers' salaries and many other grievances, 
crystalized by the end of February. Teachers, workers, and even- 
tually students — all demanding higher pay and better conditions 
of work and education — also promoted other causes, such as land 
reform and famine relief. Finally, the discontented groups de- 
manded a new political system. Riots in the capital and the con- 
tinued military mutiny eventually led to the resignation of Prime 
Minister Aklilu. He was replaced on February 28, 1974, by another 
Shewan aristocrat, Endalkatchew Mekonnen, whose government 
would last only until July 22. 

On March 5, the government announced a revision of the 1955 
constitution — the prime minister henceforth would be responsible 
to parliament. The new government probably reflected Haile 
Selassie's decision to minimize change; the new cabinet, for in- 
stance, represented virtually all of Ethiopia's aristocratic families. 
The conservative constitutional committee appointed on March 2 1 
included no representatives of the groups pressing for change. The 
new government introduced no substantial reforms (although it 
granted the military several salary increases). It also postponed 



52 



Historical Setting 



unpopular changes in the education system and instituted price roll- 
backs and controls to check inflation. As a result, the general dis- 
content subsided somewhat by late March. 

By this time, there were several factions within the military that 
claimed to speak for all or part of the armed forces. These included 
the Imperial Bodyguard under the old high command, a group of 
"radical" junior officers, and a larger number of moderate and 
radical army and police officers grouped around Colonel Alem Zewd 
Tessema, commander of an airborne brigade based in Addis Ababa. 
In late March, Alem Zewd became head of an informal, inter-unit 
coordinating committee that came to be called the Armed Forces 
Coordinating Committee (AFCC). Acting with the approval of the 
new prime minister, Alem Zewd arrested a large number of dis- 
gruntled air force officers and in general appeared to support the 
Endalkatchew government. 

Such steps, however, did not please many of the junior officers, 
who wished to pressure the regime into making major political re- 
forms. In early June, a dozen or more of them broke away from 
the AFCC and requested that every military and police unit send 
three representatives to Addis Ababa to organize for further ac- 
tion. In late June, a body of men that eventually totaled about 120, 
none above the rank of major and almost all of whom remained 
anonymous, organized themselves into a new body called the Coor- 
dinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial 
Army. This body soon came to be called the Derg (Amharic for 
"committee" or "council" — see Glossary). They elected Major 
Mengistu Haile Mariam chairman and Major Atnafu Abate vice 
chairman, both outspoken proponents of far-reaching change. 

This group of men would remain at the forefront of political and 
military affairs in Ethiopia for the next thirteen years. The identi- 
ty of the Derg never changed after these initial meetings in 1974. 
Although its membership declined drastically during the next few 
years as individual officers were eliminated, no new members were 
admitted into its ranks, and its deliberations and membership re- 
mained almost entirely unknown. At first, the Derg's officers exer- 
cised their influence behind the scenes; only later, during the era 
of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, did its leaders 
emerge from anonymity and become both the official as well as 
the de facto governing personnel. 

Because its members in effect represented the entire military es- 
tablishment, the Derg could henceforth claim to exercise real power 
and could mobilize troops on its own, thereby depriving the em- 
peror's government of the ultimate means to govern. Although the 
Derg professed loyalty to the emperor, it immediately began to 



53 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

arrest members of the aristocracy, military, and government who 
were closely associated with the emperor and the old order. Colonel 
Alem Zewd, by now discredited in the eyes of the young radicals, 
fled. 

In July the Derg wrung five concessions from the emperor: the 
release of all political prisoners, a guarantee of the safe return of 
exiles, the promulgation and speedy implementation of the new 
constitution, assurance that parliament would be kept in session 
to complete the aforementioned task, and assurance that the Derg 
would be allowed to coordinate closely with the government at all 
levels of operation. Hereafter, political power and initiative lay with 
the Derg, which was increasingly influenced by a wide-ranging pub- 
lic debate over the future of the country. The demands made of 
the emperor were but the first of a series of directives or actions 
that constituted the "creeping coup" by which the imperial sys- 
tem of government was slowly dismantled. Promoting an agenda 
for lasting changes going far beyond those proposed since the revo- 
lution began in January, the Derg proclaimed Ethiopia Tikdem 
(Ethiopia First) as its guiding philosophy. It forced out Prime 
Minister Endalkatchew and replaced him with Mikael Imru, a 
Shewan aristocrat with a reputation as a liberal. 

The Derg's agenda rapidly diverged from that of the reformers 
of the late imperial period. In early August, the revised constitu- 
tion, which called for a constitutional monarchy, was rejected when 
it was forwarded for approval. Thereafter, the Derg worked to under- 
mine the authority and legitimacy of the emperor, a policy that en- 
joyed much public support. The Derg arrested the commander of 
the Imperial Bodyguard, disbanded the emperor's governing coun- 
cils, closed the private imperial exchequer, and nationalized the 
imperial residence and the emperor's other landed and business 
holdings. By late August, the emperor had been directly accused 
of covering up the Welo and Tigray famine of the early 1970s that 
allegedly had killed 100,000 to 200,000 people. After street demon- 
strations took place urging the emperor's arrest, the Derg formally 
deposed Haile Selassie on September 12 and imprisoned him. The 
emperor was too old to resist, and it is doubtful whether he really 
understood what was happening around him. Three days later, 
the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (i.e. , the Derg) trans- 
formed itself into the Provisional Military Administrative Council 
(PMAC) under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Aman 
Mikael Andom and proclaimed itself the nation's ruling body. 

The Struggle for Power, 1974-77 

Although not a member of the Derg per se, General Aman had 
been associated with the Derg since July and had lent his good name 



54 



Revolutionary monument extols the virtues of communism. 

Courtesy Paul Henze 



to its efforts to reform the imperial regime. He was a well-known, 
popular commander and hero of a war against Somalia in the 1960s. 
In accordance with the Derg's wishes, he now became head of state, 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of defense, in 
addition to being chairman of the PMAC. Despite his standing, 
however, General Aman was almost immediately at odds with a 
majority of the Derg's members on three major issues: the size of 
the Derg and his role within it, the Eritrean insurgency, and the 
fate of political prisoners. Aman claimed that the 120-member Derg 
was too large and too unwieldy to function efficiently as a governing 
body; as an Eritrean, he urged reconciliation with the insurgents 
there; and he opposed the death penalty for former government 
and military officials who had been arrested since the revolution 
began. 

The Derg immediately found itself under attack from civilian 
groups, especially student and labor groups who demanded the for- 
mation of a "people's government" in which various national or- 
ganizations would be represented. These demands found support 
in the Derg among a faction composed mostly of army engineers 
and air force officers. On October 7, the Derg arrested dissidents 
supporting the civilian demands. By mid-November, Aman, op- 
posed by the majority of the Derg, was attempting unsuccessfully 



55 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

to appeal directly to the army for support as charges, many appar- 
ently fabricated, mounted against him within the Derg. He retired 
to his home and on November 23 was killed resisting arrest. The 
same evening of what became known as "Bloody Saturday," fifty- 
nine political prisoners were executed. Among them were promi- 
nent civilians such as Aklilu and Endalkatchew, military officers 
such as Colonel Alem Zewd and General Abiye Abebe (the em- 
peror's son-in-law and defense minister under Endalkatchew), and 
two Derg members who had supported Aman. 

Following the events of Bloody Saturday, Brigadier General 
Tafari Banti, a She wan, became chairman of the PMAC and head 
of state on November 28, but power was retained by Major 
Mengistu, who kept his post as first vice chairman of the PMAC, 
with Major Atnafu as second vice chairman. Mengistu hereafter 
emerged as the leading force in the Derg and took steps to protect 
and enlarge his power base. Preparations were made for a new 
offensive in Eritrea, and social and economic reform was addressed; 
the result was the promulgation on December 20 of the first so- 
cialist proclamation for Ethiopia. 

In keeping with its declared socialist path, the Derg announced 
in March 1975 that all royal titles were revoked and that the pro- 
posed constitutional monarchy was to be abandoned. In August 
Haile Selassie died under questionable circumstances and was 
secretly buried. One of the last major links with the past was broken 
in February 1976, when the patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church, Abuna Tewoflos, an imperial appointee, was deposed. 

In April 1976, the Derg at last set forth its goals in greater detail 
in the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR). 
As announced by Mengistu, these objectives included progress 
toward socialism under the leadership of workers, peasants, the pe- 
tite bourgeoisie, and all antifeudal and anti-imperialist forces. The 
Derg's ultimate aim was the creation of a one-party system. To ac- 
complish its goals, the Derg established an intermediary organ called 
the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA). 
Designed to act as a civilian political bureau, POMOA was at first 
in the hands of the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (whose Amharic 
acronym was MEISON), headed by Haile Fida, the Derg's chief 
political adviser. Haile Fida, as opposed to other leftists who had 
formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), had 
resourcefully adopted the tactic of working with the military in the 
expectation of directing the revolution from within (see Political 
Participation and Repression, ch. 4). 

By late 1976, the Derg had undergone an internal reconfigura- 
tion as Mengistu 's power came under growing opposition and as 



56 



Historical Setting 



Mengistu, Tafari, and Atnafu struggled for supremacy. The in- 
stability of this arrangement was resolved in January and Febru- 
ary of 1977, when a major shootout at the Grand (Menelik's) Palace 
in Addis Ababa took place between supporters of Tafari and those 
of Mengistu, in which the latter emerged victorious. With the death 
of Tafari and his supporters in the fighting, most internal oppo- 
sition within the Derg had been eliminated, and Mengistu pro- 
ceeded with a reorganization of the Derg. This action left Mengistu 
as the sole vice chairman, responsible for the People's Militia, the 
urban defense squads, and the modernization of the armed forces — 
in other words, in effective control of Ethiopia's government and 
military. In November 1977, Atnafu, Mengistu's last rival in the 
Derg, was eliminated, leaving Mengistu in undisputed command. 

Ethiopia's Road to Socialism 

Soon after taking power, the Derg promoted Ye-Itiopia Hibrete- 
sebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism). The concept was embodied in slo- 
gans such as "self-reliance," "the dignity of labor," and "the 
supremacy of the common good." These slogans were devised to 
combat the widespread disdain of manual labor and a deeply rooted 
concern with status. A central aspect of socialism was land reform. 
Although there was common agreement on the need for land re- 
form, the Derg found little agreement on its application. Most 
proposals — even those proffered by socialist countries — counseled 
moderation in order to maintain production. The Derg, however, 
adopted a radical approach, with the Land Reform Proclamation 
of March 1975, which nationalized all rural land, abolished tenancy, 
and put peasants in charge of enforcement. No family was to have 
a plot larger than ten hectares, and no one could employ farm work- 
ers. Farmers were expected to organize peasant associations, one 
for every 800 hectares, which would be headed by executive com- 
mittees responsible for enforcement of the new order. Implemen- 
tation of these measures caused considerable disruption of local 
administration in rural areas. In July 1975, all urban land, rent- 
able houses, and apartments were also nationalized, with the 3 mil- 
lion urban residents organized into urban dwellers' associations, 
or kebeles (see Glossary), analogous in function to the rural peasant 
associations (see Peasant Associations; Kebeles, ch. 4). 

Although the government took a radical approach to land re- 
form, it exercised some caution with respect to the industrial and 
commercial sectors. In January and February 1975, the Derg na- 
tionalized all banks and insurance firms and seized control of prac- 
tically every important company in the country. However, retail 



57 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

trade and the wholesale and export- import sectors remained in 
private hands. 

Although the Derg ordered national collective ownership of land, 
the move was taken with little preparation and met with opposi- 
tion in some areas, especially Gojam, Welo, and Tigray. The Derg 
also lost much support from the country's left wing, which had been 
excluded from power and the decision-making process. Students 
and teachers were alienated by the government's closure of the 
university in Addis Ababa and all secondary schools in September 
1975 in the face of threatened strikes, as well as the forced mobi- 
lization of students in the Development Through Cooperation 
Campaign (commonly referred to as zemecha — see Glossary) under 
conditions of military discipline. The elimination of the Con- 
federation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) in favor of the 
government-controlled All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU) in De- 
cember 1975 further disillusioned the revolution's early support- 
ers. Numerous officials originally associated with the revolution 
fled the country. 

The Mengistu Regime and Its Impact 

The transition from imperial to military rule was turbulent. In 
addition to increasing political discontent, which was particularly 
intense in the late 1970s, the Derg faced powerful insurgencies and 
natural calamities throughout the 1980s. 

Political Struggles Within the Government 

Following the establishment of his supremacy through the elimi- 
nation of Tafari Banti, Mengistu declared himself Derg chairman 
in February 1977 and set about consolidating his power. However, 
several internal and external threats prevented Mengistu from doing 
this. Various insurgent groups posed the most serious threat to the 
Derg. The EPRP challenged the Derg's control of the revolution 
itself by agitating for a broad-based democratic government run 
by civilians, not by the military. In February 1977, the EPRP 
initiated terrorist attacks — known as the White Terror — against 
Derg members and their supporters. This violence immediately 
claimed at least eight Derg members, plus numerous Derg sup- 
porters, and soon provoked a government counteraction — the Red 
Terror (see Glossary). During the Red Terror, which lasted until 
late 1978, government security forces systematically hunted down 
and killed suspected EPRP members and their supporters, espe- 
cially students. Mengistu and the Derg eventually won this latest 
struggle for control of the Ethiopian revolution, at a cost to the 



58 



Historical Setting 



EPRP of thousands of its members and supporters imprisoned, 
dead, or missing. 

Also slated for destruction was MEISON, proscribed in mid- 
1978. In coordination with the government, MEISON had or- 
ganized the kebeles and the peasant associations but had begun to 
act independently, thus threatening Derg dominance of local 
governments throughout the country. In response to the political 
vacuum that would be left as a result of the purging of MEISON, 
the Derg in 1978 promoted the union of several existing Marxist- 
Leninist organizations into a single umbrella group, the Union of 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organizations (whose Amharic acro- 
nym was EMALEDEH). The new organization's duty was simi- 
lar to that of MEISON — promoting control of Ethiopian socialism 
and obtaining support for government policies through various po- 
litical activities. The creation of EMALEDEH symbolized the vic- 
tory of the Derg in finally consolidating power after having 
overcome these challenges to its control of the Ethiopian revolution. 

War in the Ogaden and the Turn to the Soviet Union 

The year 1977 saw the emergence of the most serious external 
challenge to the revolutionary regime that had yet materialized. 
The roots of the conflict lay with Somali irredentism and the desire 
of the Somali government of Mahammad Siad Barre to annex the 
Ogaden area of Ethiopia. Somalia's instrument in this process was 
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali guerrilla 
organization, which by February 1977 had begun to take advan- 
tage of the Derg's political problems as well as its troubles in Eritrea 
to attack government positions throughout the Ogaden (see The 
Somali, ch. 5). The Somali government provided supplies and logis- 
tics support to the WSLF. Through the first half of the year, the 
WSLF made steady gains, penetrating and capturing large parts 
of the Ogaden from the Dire Dawa area southward to the Kenya 
border. 

The increasingly intense fighting culminated in a series of ac- 
tions around Jijiga in September, at which time Ethiopia claimed 
that Somalia's regular troops, the Somali National Army (SNA), 
were supporting the WSLF. In response, the Somali government 
admitted giving "moral, material, and other support" to the 
WSLF. Following a mutiny of the Ethiopian garrison at Jijiga, the 
town fell to the WSLF. The Mengistu regime, desperate for help, 
turned to the Soviet Union, its ties to its former military supplier, 
the United States, having foundered in the spring over the Derg's 
poor human rights record. The Soviet Union had been supplying 
equipment and some advisers for months. When the Soviet Union 



59 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

continued to aid Ethiopia as a way of gaining influence in the coun- 
try, Somalia, which until then had been a Soviet client, responded 
by abrogating its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with 
Moscow and by expelling all Soviet advisers. 

The Soviet turnaround immediately affected the course of the 
war. Starting in late November, massive Soviet military assistance 
began to pour into Ethiopia, with Cuban troops deploying from 
Angola to assist the Ethiopian units. By the end of the year, 17,000 
Cubans had arrived and, with Ethiopian army units, halted the 
WSLF momentum. On February 13, 1978, Mogadishu dispatched 
the SNA to assist the WSLF, but the Somali forces were driven 
back toward the border. After the Ethiopian army recapture of Jijiga 
in early March, the Somali government decided to withdraw its 
forces from the Ogaden, leaving the Ethiopian army in control of 
the region. However, in the process of eliminating the WSLF threat, 
Addis Ababa had become a military client of Moscow and Havana, 
a situation that had significant international repercussions and that 
resulted in a major realignment of power in the Horn of Africa. 

Eritrean and Tigrayan Insurgencies 

After 1974, insurgencies appeared in various parts of the coun- 
try, the most important of which were centered in Eritrea and 
Tigray (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4; External and Internal Oppo- 
nents, ch. 5). The Eritrean problem, inherited from Haile Selassie's 
regime, was a matter of extensive debate within the Derg. It was 
a dispute over policy toward Eritrea that resulted in the death of 
the PMAC's first leader, General Aman, an Eritrean, on Novem- 
ber 23, 1974, so-called "Bloody Saturday." Hereafter, the Derg 
decided to impose a military settlement on the Eritean Liberation 
Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). 
Attempts to invade rebel-held Eritrea failed repeatedly, and by 
mid- 1978 the insurgent groups controlled most of the countryside 
but not major towns such as Keren, Mitsiwa, Aseb, and a few other 
places. Despite large commitments of arms and training from com- 
munist countries, the Derg failed to suppress the Eritrean rebellion. 

By the end of 1976, insurgencies existed in all of the country's 
fourteen administrative regions (the provinces were officially 
changed to regions in 1974 after the revolution). In addition to the 
Eritrean secessionists, rebels were highly active in Tigray, where 
the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), formed in 1975, was 
demanding social justice and self-determination for all Ethiopians. 
In the southern regions of Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi, the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali Abo Liberation Front 
(SALF), active since 1975, had gained control of parts of the 



60 



Famine scene at Korem, in Welo 
Courtesy United Nations Children's Fund (Bert Demmers) 



61 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

countryside, and the WSLF was active in the Ogaden. Under Ali 
Mirah's leadership, the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) began armed 
operations in March 1975, and in 1976 it coordinated some ac- 
tions with the EPLF and the TPLF. 

Despite an influx of military aid from the Soviet Union and its 
allies after 1977, the government's counterinsurgency effort in 
Eritrea progressed haltingly. After initial government successes in 
retaking territory around the major towns and cities and along some 
of the principal roads in 1978 and 1979, the conflict ebbed and 
flowed on an almost yearly basis. Annual campaigns by the Ethio- 
pian armed forces to dislodge the EPLF from positions around the 
northern town of Nakfa failed repeatedly and proved costly to the 
government. Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents began to cooper- 
ate, the EPLF providing training and equipment that helped build 
the TPLF into a full-fledged fighting force. Between 1982 and 1985, 
the EPLF and the Derg held a series of talks to resolve the Eritrean 
conflict, but to no avail. By the end of 1987, dissident organiza- 
tions in Eritrea and Tigray controlled at least 90 percent of both 
regions. 

Social and Political Changes 

Although Addis Ababa quickly developed a close relationship 
with the communist world, the Soviet Union and its allies had con- 
sistent difficulties working with Mengistu and the Derg. These 
difficulties were largely the result of the Derg's preoccupation with 
internal matters and the promotion of Ethiopian variations on what 
Marxist-Leninist theoreticians regarded as preordained steps on 
the road to a socialist state. The Derg's status as a military govern- 
ment was another source of concern. Ethiopia's communist allies 
made an issue of the need to create a civilian "vanguard party" 
that would rule a people's republic. In a move geared to ensure 
continued communist support, the Derg formed the Commission 
to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (GOPWE) in 
December 1979, with Mengistu as its chairman. At COPWE's sec- 
ond congress, in January 1983, it was announced that COPWE 
would be replaced by a genuine communist party. Accordingly, 
the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was proclaimed on Septem- 
ber 12, 1984 (see The Workers' Party of Ethiopia, ch. 4). 

About the same time, work continued on a new constitution for 
the planned people's republic. On February 1, 1987, the proposed 
constitution, which had been submitted to the public for popular 
debate and changes the prior year, was finally put to a vote. Al- 
though the central government claimed an 81 percent approval of 
the new constitution (with modifications proposed by the public), 



62 



Historical Setting 



the circumstances of its review and approval by the general pop- 
ulation were called into question. The task of publicizing the 
document had been entrusted to the kebeles and the peasant 
associations — organizations that had a state security mission as well 
as local administrative duties. Observers noted that little commen- 
tary or dissent was possible under such circumstances. Additional 
criticism included the charge that the proposed constitution was 
not designed to address or even understand Ethiopian needs; in 
fact, many noted that the constitution was "almost an abridged 
translation of the Soviet Constitution of 1977" (see The 1987 Con- 
stitution, ch. 4). 

Ethiopia in Crisis: Famine and Its Aftermath, 1984-88 

Toward the end of the 1980s, several crises, including famine, 
economic collapse, and military setbacks in Eritrea and Tigray, 
confronted the Derg. In addition, as democratic reform swept 
through the communist world, it became evident that Addis Ababa 
no longer could rely on its allies for support. 

Famine and Economic Collapse 

Ethiopia had never recovered from the previous great famine 
of the early 1970s, which was the result of a drought that affected 
most of the countries of the African Sahel. The late 1970s again 
brought signs of intensifying drought. By the early 1980s, large 
numbers of people in central Eritrea, Tigray, Welo, and parts of 
Gonder and Shewa were beginning to feel the effects of renewed 
famine. 

By mid- 1984 it was evident that another drought and resulting 
famine of major proportions had begun to affect large parts of north- 
ern Ethiopia. Just as evident was the government's inability to pro- 
vide relief. The almost total failure of crops in the north was 
compounded by fighting in and around Eritrea, which hindered 
the passage of relief supplies. Although international relief organi- 
zations made a major effort to provide food to the affected areas, 
the persistence of drought and poor security conditions in the north 
resulted in continuing need of as well as hazards for famine relief 
workers. In late 1985, another year of drought was forecast, and 
by early 1986 the famine had spread to parts of the southern high- 
lands, with an estimated 5.8 million people dependent on relief food. 
Exacerbating the problem in 1986 were locust and grasshopper 
plagues. 

The government's inability or unwillingness to deal with the 
1984-85 famine provoked universal condemnation by the inter- 
national community. Even many supporters of the Ethiopian regime 



63 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

opposed its policy of withholding food shipments to rebel areas. 
The combined effects of famine and internal war had by then put 
the nation's economy into a state of collapse. 

The primary government response to the drought and famine 
was the decision to uproot large numbers of peasants who lived 
in the affected areas in the north and to resettle them in the southern 
part of the country. In 1985 and 1986, about 600,000 people were 
moved, many forcibly, from their home villages and farms by the 
military and transported to various regions in the south. Many 
peasants fled rather than allow themselves to be resettled; many 
of those who were resettled sought later to return to their native 
regions. Several human rights organizations claimed that tens of 
thousands of peasants died as a result of forced resettlement (see 
The Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4). 

Another government plan involved villagization, which was a 
response not only to the famine but also to the poor security situ- 
ation. Beginning in 1985, peasants were forced to move their 
homesteads into planned villages, which were clustered around 
water, schools, medical services, and utility supply points to facilitate 
distribution of those services. Many peasants fled rather than sub- 
mit to relocation, which in general proved highly unpopular. Ad- 
ditionally, the government in most cases failed to provide the 
promised services. Far from benefiting agricultural productivity, 
the program caused a decline in food production. Although tem- 
porarily suspended in 1986, villagization was subsequently resumed. 

Government Defeats in Eritrea and Tigray 

In March 1988, the EPLF initiated one of its most successful 
military campaigns by striking at Ethiopian army positions on the 
Nakfa front north of the town of Afabet, where the Derg had es- 
tablished a base for a new attack against the insurgents. In two 
days of fighting, the Eritrean rebels annihilated three Ethiopian 
army divisions, killing or capturing at least 18,000 government 
troops and seizing large amounts of equipment, including armor 
and artillery. Subsequently, the town of Afabet, with its military 
stores, fell to the EPLF, which then threatened all remaining Ethio- 
pian military concentrations in northern Eritrea. 

The Ethiopian army's defeat in Eritrea came after setbacks during 
the preceding week in Tigray. Using the same tactics employed 
by the EPLF, the TPLF preempted a pending Ethiopian offensive 
in Tigray with a series of attacks on government positions there 
in early March. A government attack against central Tigray failed 
disastrously, with four Ethiopian army divisions reportedly de- 
stroyed and most of their equipment captured. In early April, the 



64 



Historical Setting 



TPLF took the town of Adigrat in northern Tigray, cutting the 
main road link between Addis Ababa and Eritrea. 

The March 1988 defeats of the Ethiopian army were catastrophic 
in terms of their magnitude and crippling in their effect on govern- 
ment strategy in Eritrea and Tigray. The capability of government 
forces in both regions collapsed as a result. Subsequently, Ethio- 
pian government control of Eritrea was limited to the Keren- 
Asmera-Mitsiwa triangle and the port of Aseb to the southeast. 
The TPLF's victories in Tigray ultimately led to its total conquest 
by the rebels and the expansion of the insurgency into Gonder, 
Welo, and even parts of Shewa the following year. 

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 

On September 10, 1987, after thirteen years of military rule, 
the nation officially became the People's Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (PDRE) under a new constitution providing for a civilian 
government. The PMAC was abolished, and in June of that year 
Ethiopians had elected the National Shengo (National Assembly), 
a parliament. Despite these changes, members of the now-defunct 
Derg still ran the government but with different titles. For exam- 
ple, the National Shengo elected Mengistu to be the country's first 
civilian president; he remained, however, the WPE's general secre- 
tary. Other high-ranking Derg and WPE members received simi- 
lar posts in the new government, including the Derg deputy 
chairman, Fikre-Selassie Wogderes, who became Ethiopia's prime 
minister, and Fisseha Desta, WPE deputy general secretary, who 
became the country's vice president. 

Despite outward appearances, little changed in the way the coun- 
try was actually run. Old Derg members still were in control, and 
the stated mission of the WPE allowed continued close supervi- 
sion by the government over much of the urban population. Despite 
the granting of "autonomy" to Eritrea, Aseb, Tigray, Dire Dawa, 
and the Ogaden, the 1987 constitution was ambiguous on the ques- 
tion of self-determination for national groups such as the Eritreans, 
except within the framework of the national government. And 
although the constitution contained provisions to protect the rights 
of citizens, the power of peasant associations and kebeles was left 
intact. 

Changes in Soviet Policy and New International Horizons 

The Soviet Union changed policies toward its allies among the 
developing countries in the late 1980s; these changes appeared likely 
to result in significant reductions in its hitherto extensive sup- 
port of Ethiopia. By then it was evident that the Soviet-Ethiopian 



65 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

relationship had undergone a fundamental reorientation. The 
change was partly the result of the new directions in Soviet for- 
eign policy undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev. But other contribut- 
ing factors were the strong undercurrents of Soviet disapproval of 
Ethiopia's conduct of its internal affairs and of Addis Ababa's in- 
ability to make effective use of the aid that Moscow sent. The im- 
plications of this changed policy for Ethiopia were likely to be 
profound, inasmuch as continued high levels of military assistance 
were vital to the pursuit of Mengistu's military solution in Eritrea 
as well as to the fight against other internal insurgencies. 

* * * 

The literature on Ethiopia is relatively rich and deep, the con- 
sequence of Ethiopia's indigenous written tradition, mostly in Gi'iz, 
and of the extraordinary interest in the country shown by Europe- 
ans over the last five centuries. For the early historical period, two 
works are fundamental: Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiq- 
uity by Stuart Munro-Hay, and Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270- 
1 527 'by Taddesse Tamrat. Each is the best work on its respective 
subject and period and likely to remain so for the foreseeable fu- 
ture. In nearly the same league is John Spencer Trimingham's Islam 
in Ethiopia, a standard work and a starting point for the history, 
culture, and religion of Ethiopia's Muslim peoples, despite its 1952 
publishing date. 

A comprehensive, up-to-date survey of the country remains to 
be written, but an older work by Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: 
An Introduction to Country and People (1973), is still quite useful, despite 
its emphasis on the northern, Semitic-speaking population. As a 
supplement, the reader might consult the relevant chapters in the 
eight volumes of The Cambridge History of Africa, edited by J.D. Fage 
and Roland Oliver. Two books by Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia and 
the Red Sea and Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes, cover subjects or peri- 
ods otherwise almost totally neglected, including trade, commerce, 
and the contributions of the Oromo. Richard K. Pankhurst's Eco- 
nomic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935 contains a wealth of informa- 
tion on a wide variety of topics, as do other works by this scholar. 
Two books by Donald N. Levine, Wax and Gold and Greater Ethio- 
pia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, provide stimulating and 
at times provocative analyses of Amhara, Tigray, and (in the lat- 
ter volume) Oromo cultures but should be consulted only after 
basics in the field have been mastered. A highly useful reference 
is the Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia by Chris Prouty and Eugene 



66 



Historical Setting 



Rosenfeld, which provides a lexicon of Ethiopian topics as well as 
an extensive bibliography. 

Bahru Zewde's^4 History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 surveys 
the last century of imperial rule, with an emphasis on the twen- 
tieth century. Two biographical histories on nineteenth-century em- 
perors are recommended: Yohannes IV of Ethiopia by Zewde Gabre- 
Sellassie, and The Life and Times of Menelik II 'by Harold G. Marcus. 
The following are among outstanding works on the reign of Haile 
Selassie: George W. Baer's The Coming of the Italian- Ethiopian War; 
Christopher S. Clapham's Haile Selassie's Government; John Markakis's 
Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity; and Harold G. Marcus's 
Haile Selassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936. A new work by 
Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, analyzes three major 
peasant revolts and the response of the imperial government. 

An excellent discussion of contemporary Ethiopia that treats both 
the Haile Selassie era and the revolutionary years is Ethiopia: Tran- 
sition and Development in the Horn of Africa by Mulatu Wubneh and 
Yohannis Abate. Among the best sources on the military govern- 
ment and its policies are Marina and David Ottaway's Ethiopia: 
Empire in Revolution, still the basic source on the early years of the 
Derg, and Christopher S. Clapham's Transformation and Continuity 
in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Among periodicals, the Journal of African 
History and Northeast African Studies are particularly valuable for schol- 
arly coverage of Ethiopia and the Horn. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



67 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Traditional council of elders 



THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE ARE ETHNICALLY heteroge- 
neous, comprising more than 100 groups, each speaking a dialect 
of one of more than seventy languages. The Amhara, Oromo, and 
Tigray are the largest groups. With the accession of Menelik II 
to the throne in 1889, the ruling class consisted primarily of the 
Amhara, a predominantly Christian group that constitutes about 
30 percent of the population and occupies the central highlands. 
The Oromo, who constitute about 40 percent of the population, 
are half Orthodox Christians and half Muslims whose traditional 
alliance with the Amhara in Shewa included participation in pub- 
lic administration and the military. Predominantly Christian, the 
Tigray occupy the far northern highlands and make up 12 to 15 
percent of the population. They or their Eritrean neighbors had 
been battling the government for nearly three decades and by 1 99 1 
had scored many battlefield successes. 

According to estimates based on the first census (1984), Ethio- 
pia's population was 51.7 million in 1990 and was projected to reach 
more than 67 million by the year 2000. About 89 percent of the 
people live in rural areas, large sectors of which have been ravaged 
by drought, famine, and war. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam 
embarked on controversial villagization and resettlement programs 
to combat these problems. Villagization involved the relocation of 
rural people into villages, while resettlement moved people from 
drought-prone areas in the north to sparsely populated and resource- 
rich areas in the south and southwest. The international community 
criticized both programs for poor implementation and the conse- 
quent toll in human lives. 

The traditional social system in the northern highlands was, in 
general, based on landownership and tenancy. After conquest, 
Menelik II (reigned 1889-1913) imposed the north's imperial sys- 
tem on the conquered south. The government appointed many Am- 
hara administrators, who distributed land among themselves and 
relegated the indigenous peasants to tenancy. The 1974 revolution 
swept away this structure of ethnic and class dominance. The Provi- 
sional Military Administrative Council (PMAC ; also known as the 
Derg — see Glossary) appointed representatives of the Workers' 
Party of Ethiopia and the national system of peasant associations to 
implement land reform. Additionally, the government organized 
urban centers into a hierarchy of urban dwellers' associations 
(kebeles — see Glossary). Despite these reforms, however, dissatisfaction 



71 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

and covert opposition to the regime continued in the civilian and 
military sectors. 

Prior to the 1974 revolution, the state religion of Ethiopia had 
been Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, whose adherents comprised 
perhaps 40 to 50 percent of the population, including a majority 
of the Amhara and Tigray. Islam was the faith of about 40 per- 
cent of the population, including large segments (perhaps half) of 
the Oromo and the people inhabiting the contiguous area of the 
northern and eastern lowlands, such as the Beja, Saho, Afar, and 
Somali. Adherents of indigenous belief systems were scattered 
among followers of the two major religions and could be found in 
more concentrated numbers on the western peripheries of the high- 
lands. In line with its policy that all religions were equally legiti- 
mate, the regime in 1975 declared several Muslim holy days national 
holidays, in addition to the Ethiopian Orthodox holidays that were 
already observed. 

Declaring education one of its priorities, the PMAC expanded 
the education system at the primary level, especially in small towns 
and rural areas, which had never had modern schools during the 
imperial era. The new policy relocated control and operation of 
primary and secondary schools to the subregion iawrajd) level, where 
officials reoriented curricula to emphasize agriculture, handicrafts, 
commercial training, and other practical subjects. The regime also 
embarked on a national literacy campaign. 

The regime's health policy included expansion of rural health 
services, promotion of community involvement, self-reliance in 
health activities, and emphasis on the prevention and control of 
disease. As with education, the PMAC decentralized health care 
administration to the local level as part of its effort to encourage 
community involvement. Despite an emphasis on rural health ser- 
vices, less than a third of the total population had effective health 
coverage in mid- 1991. 

Physical Setting 

Ethiopia occupies most of the Horn of Africa. The country covers 
approximately 1,221,900 square kilometers and shares frontiers with 
Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti. Its Red Sea coastline is 
about 960 kilometers long. The major physiographic features are 
a massive highland complex of mountains and plateaus divided by 
the Great Rift Valley and surrounded by lowlands along the periph- 
ery. The diversity of the terrain is fundamental to regional varia- 
tions in climate, natural vegetation, soil composition, and settiement 
patterns. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 

Boundaries: International and Administrative 

Except for the Red Sea coastline, only limited stretches of the 
country's borders are defined by natural features. Most of Ethio- 
pia's borders have been delimited by treaty. The Ethiopia-Somalia 
boundary has long been an exception, however. One of its sectors 
has never been definitively demarcated, thanks to disputed interpre- 
tations of 1897 and 1908 treaties signed by Britain, Italy, and Ethio- 
pia. This sector was delimited by a provisional "Administrative 
Line" that was defined by a 1950 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, when 
the United Nations (UN) established Somalia as a trust territory. 
After it became independent in 1960, Somalia refused to recog- 
nize any of the border treaties signed between Ethiopia and the 
former colonial powers. The Somali government also demanded 
a revision of the boundary that would ensure self-determination 
for Somali living in the Ogaden. Consequently, the frontier be- 
came the scene of recurrent violence and open warfare between 
Ethiopia and Somalia. 

Topography and Drainage 

Much of the Ethiopian landmass is part of the East African Rift 
Plateau. Ethiopia has a general elevation ranging from 1,500 to 
3,000 meters above sea level. Interspersed on the landscape are 
higher mountain ranges and cratered cones, the highest of which, 
at 4,620 meters, is Ras Dashen Terara northeast of Gonder. The 
northernmost part of the plateau is Ethiopia's historical core and 
is the location of the ancient kingdom of Aksum. The national cap- 
ital of Addis Ababa ("New Flower") is located in the center of 
the country on the edge of the central plateau (see fig. 6). 

Millennia of erosion have produced steep valleys, in places 1 ,600 
meters deep and several kilometers wide. In these valleys flow rapid 
streams unsuitable for navigation but possessing potential as sources 
of hydroelectric power and water for irrigation. 

The highlands that comprise much of the country are often 
referred to as the Ethiopian Plateau and are usually thought of as 
divided into northern and southern parts. In a strict geographical 
sense, however, they are bisected by the Great Rift Valley into the 
northwestern highlands and the southeastern highlands, each with 
associated lowlands. The northwestern highlands are considera- 
bly more extensive and rugged and are divided into northern and 
southern sections by the valley of the Abay (Blue Nile). 

North of Addis Ababa, the surface of the plateau is interspersed 
with towering mountains and deep chasms that create a variety 
of physiography, climate, and indigenous vegetation. The plateau 



73 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

also contains mountain ranges such as the Chercher and Aranna. 
Given the rugged nature of these mountains and the surrounding 
tableland, foreigners receive a false impression of the country's 
topography when Ethiopians refer to the landform as a plateau. 
Few of these peaks' surfaces are flat except for a scattering of level- 
topped mountains known to Ethiopians as ambas. 

Southwest of Addis Ababa, the plateau also is rugged, but its 
elevation is slightly lower than in its northern section. To the 
southeast of Addis Ababa, beyond the Ahmar and Mendebo moun- 
tain ranges and the higher elevations of the southeastern highlands, 
the plateau slopes gently toward the southeast. The land here is 
rocky desert and, consequently, is sparsely populated. 

The Great Rift Valley forms a third physiographic region. This 
extensive fault system extends from the Jordan Valley in the Mid- 
dle East to the Zambezi River's Shire tributary in Mozambique. 
The segment running through central Ethiopia is marked in the 
north by the Denakil Depression and the coastal lowlands, or Afar 
Plain, as they are sometimes known. To the south, at approximately 
9° north latitude, the Great Rift Valley becomes a deep trench slic- 
ing through the plateau from southwest to northeast, its width aver- 
aging fifty kilometers. The southern half of the Ethiopian segment 
of the valley is dotted by a chain of relatively large lakes. Some 
hold fresh water, fed by small streams from the east; others con- 
tain salts and minerals. 

In the north, the Great Rift Valley broadens into a funnel-shaped 
saline plain. The Denakil Depression, a large, triangle-shaped basin 
that in places is 115 meters below sea level, is one of the hottest 
places on earth. On the northeastern edge of the depression, mari- 
time hills border a hot, arid, and treeless strip of coastal land six- 
teen to eighty kilometers wide. These coastal hills drain inland into 
saline lakes, from which commercial salt is extracted. Along the 
Red Sea coast are the Dahlak Islands, which are sparsely inhabited. 

In contrast with the plateau's steep scarps along the Great Rift 
Valley and in the north, the western and southwestern slopes 
descend somewhat less abruptly and are broken more often by river 
exits. Between the plateau and the Sudanese border in the west 
lies a narrow strip of sparsely populated tropical lowland that be- 
longs politically to Ethiopia but whose inhabitants are related to 
the people of Sudan (see Ethiopia's Peoples, this ch.). These trop- 
ical lowlands on the periphery of the plateau, particularly in the 
far north and along the western frontier, contrast markedly with 
the upland terrain. 

The existence of small volcanoes, hot springs, and many deep 
gorges indicates that large segments of the landmass are still 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



geologically unstable. Numerous volcanoes occur in the Denakil 
area, and hot springs and steaming fissures are found in other north- 
ern areas of the Great Rift Valley. A line of seismic faults extends 
along the length of Eritrea and the Denakil Depression, and small 
earthquakes have been recorded in the area in recent times. 

All of Ethiopia's rivers originate in the highlands and flow out- 
ward in many directions through deep gorges. Most notable of these 
is the Blue Nile, the country's largest river. It and its tributaries 
account for two-thirds of the Nile River flow below Khartoum in 
Sudan. Because of the general westward slope of the highlands, 
many large rivers are tributaries of the Nile system, which drains 
an extensive area of the central portion of the plateau. The Blue 
Nile, the Tekeze, and the Baro are among them and account for 
about half of the country's water outflow. In the northern half of 
the Great Rift Valley flows the Awash River, on which the govern- 
ment has built several dams to generate power and irrigate major 
commercial plantations. The Awash flows east and disappears in 
the saline lakes near the boundary with Djibouti. The southeast 
is drained by the Genale and Shebele rivers and their tributaries, 
and the southwest is drained by the Omo. 

Climate 

Diverse rainfall and temperature patterns are largely the result 
of Ethiopia's location in Africa's tropical zone and the country's 
varied topography. Altitude-induced climatic conditions form the 
basis for three environmental zones — cool, temperate, and hot — 
which have been known to Ethiopians since antiquity as the dega, 
the weina dega, and the holla, respectively. 

The cool zone consists of the central parts of the western and 
eastern sections of the northwestern plateau and a small area around 
Harer. The terrain in these areas is generally above 2,400 meters 
in elevation; average daily highs range from near freezing to 16°C, 
with March, April, and May the warmest months. Throughout 
the year, the midday warmth diminishes quickly by afternoon, and 
nights are usually cold. During most months, light frost often forms 
at night and snow occurs at the highest elevations. 

Lower areas of the plateau, between 1,500 and 2,400 meters in 
elevation, constitute the temperate zone. Daily highs there range 
from 16°C to 30°C. 

The hot zone consists of areas where the elevation is lower than 
1,500 meters. This area encompasses the Denakil Depression, the 
Eritrean lowlands, the eastern Ogaden, the deep tropical valleys 
of the Blue Nile and Tekeze rivers, and the peripheral areas along 
the Sudanese and Kenyan borders. Daytime conditions are torrid, 



77 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

and daily temperatures vary more widely here than in the other 
two regions. Although the hot zone's average annual daytime tem- 
perature is about 27°C, midyear readings in the arid and semi- 
arid areas along the Red Sea coast often soar to 50 °C and to more 
than 40 °C in the arid Ogaden. Humidity is usually high in the 
tropical valleys and along the seacoast. 

Variations in precipitation throughout the country are the result 
of differences in elevation and seasonal changes in the atmospheric 
pressure systems that control the prevailing winds. Because of these 
factors, several regions receive rainfall throughout most of the year, 
but in other areas precipitation is seasonal. In the more arid low- 
lands, rainfall is always meager. 

In January the high pressure system that produces monsoons 
in Asia crosses the Red Sea. Although these northeast trade winds 
bring rain to the coastal plains and the eastern escarpment in 
Eritrea, they are essentially cool and dry and provide little moisture 
to the country's interior. Their effect on the coastal region, however, 
is to create a Mediterranean-like climate. Winds that originate over 
the Atiantic Ocean and blow across Equatorial Africa have a marked 
seasonal effect on much of Ethiopia. The resulting weather pat- 
tern provides the highlands with most of its rainfall during a pe- 
riod that generally lasts from mid-June to mid-September. 

The main rainy season is usually preceded in April and May 
by converging northeast and southeast winds that produce a brief 
period of light rains, known as balg. These rains are followed by 
a short period of hot dry weather, and toward the middle of June 
violent thunderstorms occur almost daily. In the southwest, precipi- 
tation is more evenly distributed and also more abundant. The rela- 
tive humidity and rainfall decrease generally from south to north 
and also in the eastern lowlands. Annual precipitation is heaviest 
in the southwest, scant in the Great Rift Valley and the Ogaden, 
and negligible in the Denakil Depression. 

Population 

Size, Distribution, and Growth 

Ethiopia's population was estimated at 51.7 million in 1990. Ac- 
cording to the nation's only census, conducted in 1984, Ethiopia's 
population was about 42 million. But the census was far from com- 
prehensive. The rural areas of Eritrea and Tigray were excluded 
because of hostilities. In addition, the population in the southern 
parts of Bale and Harerge could only be estimated because of the 
prevalence of pastoral nomadism. 

The 1984 census revealed that Ethiopia's population was about 
89 percent rural, and this percentage did not appear to have changed 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



by the late 1980s (see table 2, Appendix). This segment included 
many nomadic and seminomadic peoples. The Ethiopian popula- 
tion always has been predominantly rural, engaging in sedentary 
agricultural activities such as the cultivation of crops and livestock- 
raising in the highlands. In the lowlands, the main activities tradi- 
tionally have been subsistence farming by seminomadic groups and 
seasonal grazing of livestock by nomadic people. 

The distribution of Ethiopia's population generally is related to 
altitude, climate, and soil. These physical factors explain the con- 
centration of population in the highlands, which are endowed with 
moderate temperatures, rich soil, and adequate rainfall. About 14 
percent of the population lives in areas above 2,400 meters (cool 
climatic zone), about 75 percent between 1,500 and 2,400 meters 
(temperate zone), and only 1 1 percent below 1 ,500 meters (hot cli- 
matic zone), although the hot zone encompasses more than half 
of Ethiopia's territory. Localities with elevations above 3,000 meters 
and below 1,500 meters are sparsely populated, the first because 
of cold temperatures and rugged terrain, which limit agricultural 
activity, and the second because of high temperatures and low rain- 
fall, except in the west and southwest. 

Although census data indicated that overall density was about 
thirty-seven people per square kilometer, density varied from over 
100 per square kilometer for Shewa and seventy-five for Arsi to 
fewer than ten in the Ogaden, Bale, the Great Rift Valley, and 
the western lowlands adjoining Sudan. There was also great varia- 
tion among the populations of the various administrative regions 
(see table 3, Appendix). 

In 1990 officials estimated the birth rate at forty-five births per 
1,000 population and the total fertility rate (the average number 
of children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime) 
at about seven per 1 ,000 population. Census findings indicated that 
the birth rate was higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Ethio- 
pia's birth rate, high even among developing countries, is explained 
by early and universal marriage, kinship and religious beliefs that 
generally encourage large families, a resistance to contraceptive 
practices, and the absence of family planning services for most of 
the population. Many Ethiopians believe that families with many 
children have greater financial security and are better situated to 
provide for their elderly members. 

In the absence of a national population policy or the provision 
of more than basic health services, analysts consider the high birth 
rate likely to continue. A significant consequence of the high birth 
rate is that the population is young; children under fifteen years 
of age made up nearly 50 percent of the population in 1989 (see 



79 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




3 2 10 12 3 
POPULATION IN MILLIONS 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1989, New York, 
1991, 166-67. 



Figure 7. Population by Age and Sex, 1989 

fig. 7). Thus, a large segment of the population was dependent 
and likely to require heavy expenditures on education, health, and 
social services. 

In 1990 the death rate was estimated at fifteen per 1,000 popu- 
lation (down from 18.1 per 1,000 in 1984). This also was a very 
high rate but typical of poor developing countries. The high death 
rate was a reflection of the low standard of living, poor health con- 
ditions, inadequate health facilities, and high rates of infant mor- 
tality (116 per 1,000 live births in 1990; 139 per 1,000 in 1984) 
and child mortality. Additional factors contributing to the high death 
rate include infectious diseases, poor sanitation, malnutrition, and 
food shortages. Children are even more vulnerable to such de- 
privations. In Ethiopia half of the total deaths involve children 
under five years of age. In addition, drought and famine in the 
1980s, during which more than 7 million people needed food aid, 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



interrupted the normal evolution of mortality and fertility and un- 
doubtedly left many infants and children with stunted physical and 
mental capabilities. Life expectancy in 1990 was estimated at forty- 
nine years for males and fifty-two years for females. 

Generally, birth rates, infant mortality rates, and overall mor- 
tality rates were lower in urban areas than in rural areas. As of 
1990, urban residents had a life expectancy of just under fifty-three 
years, while rural residents had a life expectancy of forty-eight years. 
The more favorable statistics for urban areas can be explained by 
the wider availability of health facilities, greater knowledge of sani- 
tation, easier access to clean water and food, and a slightly higher 
standard of living. 

There has been a steady increase in the population growth rate 
since 1960. Based on 1984 census data, population growth was es- 
timated at about 2.3 percent for the 1960-70 period, 2.5 percent 
for the 1970-80 period, and 2.8 percent for the 1980-85 period. 
Population projections compiled in 1988 by the Central Statistical 
Authority (CSA) projected a 2.83 percent growth rate for 1985-90 
and a 2.96 percent growth rate for 1990-95. This would result in 
a population of 57.9 million by 1995. Estimated annual growth 
for 1995-2000 varied from 3.03 percent to 3.16 percent. Popula- 
tion estimates ranged from 67.4 million to 67.8 million by the year 
2000. The CSA projected that Ethiopia's population could range 
from 104 million to 115 million by the year 2015. The Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA) provided a more optimis- 
tic estimate. Based on the assumption of a gradual fertility decline, 
such as might be caused by steady economic development without 
high priority given to population and family planning programs, 
the population growth rate might fall to about 2.8 percent per 
annum in 1995-2000 and to 2.1 percent in 2010-15, resulting in 
a population of 93 million in 2015. 

Analysts believed that reducing the population growth rate was 
a pressing need, but one that could only be addressed through a 
persistent and comprehensive nationwide effort over the long term. 
As of mid- 1991, the Ethiopian regime had shown no commitment 
to such a program. 

Variations in population growth existed among administrative 
regions. Kefa, Sidamo, and Shewa had the highest average growth 
rates for the 1967-84 period, ranging from 4.2 percent for Kefa 
to 3.5 percent for Sidamo and Shewa. Whereas Shewa' s popula- 
tion growth was the result of Addis Ababa's status as the adminis- 
trative, commercial, and industrial center of Ethiopia, Kefa and 
Sidamo grew primarily because of agricultural and urban develop- 
ment. The population in administrative regions such as Harerge, 



81 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Welo, and Tigray, which had been hard hit by famine and insur- 
rection, grew at slow rates: 1.3 percent, 1 percent, and 0.2 per- 
cent, respectively. Generally, the population of most central and 
western administrative regions grew more rapidly than did the 
population of the eastern and northern administrative regions. 

Urbanization 

Ethiopia was under-urbanized, even by African standards. In 
the late 1980s, only about 11 percent of the population lived in 
urban areas of at least 2,000 residents. There were hundreds of 
communities with 2,000 to 5,000 people, but these were primarily 
extensions of rural villages without urban or administrative func- 
tions. Thus, the level of urbanization would be even lower if one 
used strict urban structural criteria. Ethiopia's relative lack of ur- 
banization is the result of the country's history of agricultural self- 
sufficiency, which has reinforced rural peasant life. The slow pace 
of urban development continued until the 1935 Italian invasion. 
Urban growth was fairly rapid during and after the Italian occu- 
pation of 1936-41 . Urbanization accelerated during the 1960s, when 
the average annual growth rate was about 6.3 percent. Urban 
growth was especially evident in the northern half of Ethiopia, where 
most of the major towns are located. 

Addis Ababa was home to about 35 percent of the country's 
urban population in 1987. Another 7 percent resided in Asmera, 
the second largest city. Major industrial, commercial, governmen- 
tal, educational, health, and cultural institutions were located in 
these two cities, which together were home to about 2 million peo- 
ple, or one out of twenty-five Ethiopians. Nevertheless, many small 
towns had emerged as well. In 1970 there were 171 towns with 
populations of 2,000 to 20,000; this total had grown to 229 by 1980. 

The period 1967-75 saw rapid growth of relatively new urban 
centers (see table 4, Appendix). The population of six towns — Akaki, 
Arba Minch, Awasa, Bahir Dar, Jijiga, and Shashemene — more 
than tripled, and that of eight others more than doubled. Awasa, 
Arba Minch, Metu, and Goba were newly designated capitals of 
administrative regions and important agricultural centers. Awasa, 
capital of Sidamo, had a lakeshore site and convenient location on 
the Addis Ababa-Nairobi highway. Bahir Dar was a newly planned 
city on Lake Tana and the site of several industries and a polytech- 
nic institute. Akaki and Aseb were growing into important industrial 
towns, while Jijiga and Shashemene had become communications 
and service centers. 

Urban centers that experienced moderate growth tended to be 
more established towns, such as Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Debre Zeyit. A few old provincial capitals, such as Gonder, also 
experienced moderate growth, but others, such as Harer, Dese, 
Debre Markos, and Jima, had slow growth rates because of com- 
petition from larger cities. By the 1990s, Harer was being over- 
shadowed by Dire Dawa, Dese by Kembolcha, and Debre Markos 
by Bahir Dar. 

Overall, the rate of urban growth declined from 1975 to 1987. 
With the exception of Aseb, Arba Minch, and Awasa, urban centers 
grew an average of about 40 percent over that twelve-year period. 
This slow growth is explained by several factors. Rural-to-urban 
migration had been largely responsible for the rapid expansion dur- 
ing the 1967-75 period, whereas natural population growth may 
have been mostly responsible for urban expansion during the 
1975-84 period. The 1975 land reform program provided incen- 
tives and opportunities for peasants and other potential migrants 
to stay in rural areas. Restrictions on travel, lack of employment, 
housing shortages, and social unrest in some towns during the 
1975-80 period also contributed to a decline in rural-to-urban 
migration. 

Although the male and female populations were about equal, 
men outnumbered women in rural areas. More women migrated 
to the urban centers for a variety of reasons, including increased 
job opportunities. 

As a result of intensified warfare in the period 1988-91 , all urban 
centers received a large influx of population, resulting in severe 
overcrowding, shortages of housing and water, overtaxed social 
services, and unemployment. In addition to beggars and maimed 
persons, the new arrivals comprised large numbers of young peo- 
ple. These included not only primary and secondary school stu- 
dents but also an alarming number of orphans and street children, 
estimated at well over 100,000. Although all large towns shared 
in this influx, Addis Ababa, as the national capital, was most af- 
fected. This situation underscored the huge social problems that 
the Mengistu regime had neglected for far too long. 

Resettlement and Villagization 

Drought and famine have been frequent occurrences in Ethio- 
pia. In fact, it was the imperial government's attempt to hide the 
effects of the 1973-74 famine that aroused world indignation and 
eventually contributed to Haile Selassie I's demise (see The Es- 
tablishment of the Derg, ch. 1). Between 1984 and 1986, drought 
and famine again hit Ethiopia and may have claimed as many as 
1 million lives and threatened nearly 8 million more (see The Pol- 
itics of Drought and Famine, ch. 4). Even worse disaster was averted 



83 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

when the international community mounted a massive effort to 
airlift food and medical supplies to famine victims. 

The government embarked on forced resettlement and villagi- 
zation in the mid-1980s as part of a national program to combat 
drought, avert famine, and increase agricultural productivity. 
Resettlement, the regime's long-term solution to the drought 
problem, involved the permanent relocation of about 1.5 million 
people from the drought-prone areas of the north to the south and 
southwest, where population was relatively sparse and so-called 
virgin, arable land was plentiful (see Government Rural Programs, 
ch. 3; The Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4). 

Development specialists agreed on the need for resettlement of 
famine victims in Ethiopia, but once the process had begun, there 
was widespread criticism that resettlement was poorly planned and 
haphazardly executed and thus increased the number of famine 
deaths. Moreover, critics charged that the government forcibly relo- 
cated peasants, in the process breaking up thousands of families. 
Thousands also died of malaria and sleeping sickness because of 
poor sanitation and inadequate health care in newly settled areas. 
A Paris-based international doctors' organization, Doctors Without 
Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres), estimated that the forced reset- 
tlement and mass deportation of peasants for purposes of resettle- 
ment endangered the lives of 300,000 because of shortages of food, 
water, and medicine. Other international organizations accused 
the Ethiopian government of moving peasants to resettlement areas 
without adequate preparation of such basic items as housing, water, 
seeds, and tools. Because of widespread criticism, the Mengistu 
regime temporarily halted the resettlement program in mid- 1986 
after 600,000 people had been relocated, but the program resumed 
in November 1987. 

Some sources voiced suspicion that the regime's primary mo- 
tive in resettlement was to depopulate the northern areas where 
it faced insurgencies. Resettlement, the argument went, would 
reduce the guerrillas' base of support. But this argument did not 
take into account the strength of the Tigray People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF) (see The Tigrayan Movement, ch. 4; The Tigray, 
ch.-5). Another Western objection to the resettlement program re- 
lated to the long-term government policy concerning peasant farms. 
Western countries, on whose support the resettlement program de- 
pended, did not want to sponsor a plan in which recruits labored 
for communist-style collectives and state farms. 

The villagization program, the regime's plan to transform rural 
society, started in earnest in January 1985 (see The Politics of Vil- 
lagization, ch. 4). If completed, the program might have uprooted 



84 




Cornfields surround a village in Ansokia Valley, 350 kilometers 

north of Addis Ababa. 
Courtesy World Vision (Bruce Brander) 

and relocated more than 30 million peasants over a nine-year period. 
The regime's rationale for the program was that the existing ar- 
rangement of dispersed settlements made it difficult to provide social 
services and to use resources, especially land and water, efficiently. 
The relocation of the peasants into larger villages (with forty to 
300 families, or 200 to 2,500 people) would give rural people bet- 
ter access to amenities such as agricultural extension services, 
schools, clinics, water, and electricity cooperative services and would 
strengthen local security and the capacity for self-defense. Improved 
economic and social services would promote more efficient use of 
land and other natural resources and would lead to increased 
agricultural production and a higher standard of living. 

More specifically, the Ethiopian government perceived villagiza- 
tion as a way to hasten agricultural collectivization. Most peasant 
farming in Ethiopia was still based on a traditional smallholding sys- 
tem, which produced 90 percent of farm output, employed about 
80 percent of the labor force, and accounted for 94 percent of cul- 
tivable land in 1985. State farms and cooperative farms were respon- 
sible for only 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of cultivated land. 

By the end of 1988, more than 12 million people had been relo- 
cated in villages in twelve of the fourteen administrative regions. 



85 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



The exceptions were Eritrea and Tigray, where insurgents were 
waging war against the regime. In 1989 the total reached about 
13 million people. Some regions implemented villagization more 
rapidly than others. In Harerge, where the program began in 1985, 
more than 90 percent of the population had been relocated to vil- 
lages by early 1987, whereas in Gonder and Welo the program was 
just beginning. In Ilubabor more than 1 million peasants had been 
relocated to 2,106 villages between December 1985 and March 
1989. Nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators were not affected 
by villagization. 

The verdict on villagization was not favorable. Thousands of peo- 
ple fled to avoid villagization; others died or lived in deplorable 
conditions after being forcibly resettled. Moreover, the program's 
impact on rural peasants and their social and economic well-being 
remained to be assessed. There were indications that in the short 
term, villagization may have further impoverished an already poor 
peasantry. The services that were supposed to be delivered in new 
villages, such as water, electricity, health care clinics, schools, trans- 
portation, and agricultural extension services, were not being 
provided because the government lacked the necessary resources. 
Villagers therefore resorted to improvised facilities or reverted to 
old ways of doing things. Villagization also reduced the produc- 
tive capacity of the peasants by depriving them of the opportunity 
for independent organization and action. By increasing the dis- 
tance peasants had to travel to work on their land and graze their 
cattle, villagization wasted time and effort. Denied immediate ac- 
cess to their fields, the peasants were also prevented from guard- 
ing their crops from birds and other wild animals. 

In the long run, analysts believed that villagization would be 
counterproductive to a rational land use system and would be 
damaging ecologically. Concentrating people in a central area 
would, in time, intensify pressure on available water and grazing 
and lead to a decline in soil fertility and to a poorer peasantry. 
The ecological damage could be averted by the application of cap- 
ital investment in infrastructure, such as irrigation and land- 
intensive agricultural technology and strict application of land ro- 
tation to avert overgrazing. But resources were unavailable for such 
agricultural investment. 

The most bitter critics of villagization, such as Survival Inter- 
national, a London-based human rights organization, argued that 
the Mengistu regime's noneconomic objective in villagization was 
control of the population. Larger villages would facilitate the re- 
gime's control over the population, cut rebels off from peasant sup- 
port, and discourage dissident movements. Indeed, some observers 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



believed that the reason for starting villagization in Harerge and 
Bale was nothing less than to suppress support of the Oromo Liber- 
ation Front (OLF). 

After the government's announcement of the new economic pol- 
icy in March 1990, peasants were given the freedom to join or aban- 
don cooperatives and to bring their produce to market. Hence, the 
Mengistu regime abandoned one of the strong rationales for vil- 
lagization and, in effect, the whole program as well. 

Refugees, Drought, and Famine 

In Ethiopia, a predominantly rural society, the life of peasants 
is rooted in the land, from which they eke out a meager existence. 
Through the ages, they have faced frequent natural disasters, armed 
conflict, and political repression, and in the process they have 
suffered hunger, societal disruption, and death. 

Periodic crop failures and losses of livestock often occur when 
seasonal rains fail or when unusually heavy storms cause widespread 
flooding. Pastoral nomads, who move seasonally in search of water 
and grazing, often are trapped when drought inhibits rejuvena- 
tion of the denuded grasslands, which their overgrazing produces. 
During such times, a family's emergency food supplies diminish 
rapidly, and hunger and starvation become commonplace until 
weather conditions improve and livestock herds are subsequently 
rejuvenated. For centuries, this has been the general pattern of life 
for most Ethiopian peasants; the insurgent movements in Eritrea, 
Tigray, and the Ogaden have only served to exacerbate the effects 
of these natural calamities (see The Eritreans; The Tigray; The 
Somali, ch. 5). 

A drought that began in 1969 continued as dry weather brought 
disaster to the Sahel and swept eastward through the Horn of Africa. 
By 1973 the attendant famine had threatened the lives of hundreds 
of thousands of Ethiopian nomads, who had to leave their home 
grounds and struggle into Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan, 
seeking relief from starvation. By the end of 1973, famine had 
claimed the lives of about 300,000 peasants of Tigray and Welo, 
and thousands more had sought relief in Ethiopian towns and 
villages. 

After assuming power in 1974, the military regime embarked 
on a program to improve the condition of peasants, but famine 
and hunger continued despite this effort, which was supplemented 
by substantial foreign assistance. Moreover, the escalation of the 
military campaign against the insurgent movements in Eritrea, 
Tigray, and the Ogaden forced thousands of Ethiopians to flee into 
neighboring countries. 



87 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The 1977-78 Ogaden War and the 1978 drought in eastern Ethio- 
pia forced large numbers of people across the southeastern fron- 
tier into Somalia. After the defeat of Somali forces in the Ogaden, 
the government launched a counteroffensive against Eritrean guer- 
rillas, and several hundred thousand Ethiopians sought refuge in 
Sudan. Meanwhile, in the Ogaden, international relief agencies 
estimated the number of refugees entering Somali refugee camps 
at more than 1,000 a day. Most were women and children, and 
many suffered from dehydration, malnutrition, and diseases such 
as dysentery, malaria, and tuberculosis. There were more than 
700,000 reported refugees scattered in twenty-six makeshift camps, 
where the absence of sanitation and inadequate medical assistance 
were compounding the misery created by the food shortages. 

By mid- 1980 most observers considered the refugee crisis in the 
Horn of Africa to be the world's worst. During the 1980s, the cri- 
sis intensified, as 2.5 million people in the region abandoned their 
homes and sought asylum in neighboring countries. Although 
drought, famine, government repression, and conflict with insur- 
gents were the principal causes of large-scale refugee migrations, 
other factors such as resettlement and villagization in Ethiopia and 
conflicts in southern Sudan and northern Somalia also generated 
refugees. Sudan's war against the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) forced many Sudanese into Ethiopia. In northern 
Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) had been fight- 
ing Somali government forces, and in the process hundreds of thou- 
sands of Somali fled into Ethiopia. 

Several factors were responsible for the refugee crisis in Ethio- 
pia. The repressive Mengistu regime was ruthless in its treatment 
of both real and imagined opponents (see Human Rights, ch. 5). 
During the so-called Red Terror (see Glossary) of 1977-78, gov- 
ernment security forces killed thousands of students and urban 
professionals. Because human rights violations characterized the 
government's policy toward dissidents, there was a constant exo- 
dus of young and educated people. The regime also found itself 
engaged in continuous civil war with one or more of the insurgent 
groups, which had a devastating impact on the people, the land, 
and the economy. The fighting not only generated hundreds of thou- 
sands of refugees but also displaced thousands of other people from 
their farms and villages. Forcible villagization and resettlement also 
generated refugees. In Harerge alone, the forced imposition of vil- 
lagization prompted 33,000 people to flee to Somalia. 

Famine also contributed to Ethiopia's refugee crises. The 1984- 
85 famine resulted in the death or displacement of hundreds of 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



thousands of people within Ethiopia and forced about 100,000 into 
Somalia, 10,000 into Djibouti, and more than 300,000 into Sudan. 

In 1987 another drought threatened 5 million people in Eritrea 
and Tigray. This time, however, the international community was 
better prepared to get food to the affected areas in time to prevent 
starvation and massive population movements. However, insur- 
gents belonging to the TPLF and the Eritrean People's Libera- 
tion Front (EPLF) attacked convoys carrying food supplies or denied 
them access to rebel-held areas because they believed the govern- 
ment would use relief convoys to cover the movement of military 
supplies. The consequence was more deaths and more refugees. 

International relief agencies considered the 1990 famine more 
critical because of the scarcity of rain after 1987. Mitsiwa was one 
of the Eritrean ports where ships unloaded food and medical sup- 
plies for distribution to famine victims in Eritrea. Following the 
EPLF's capture of Mitsiwa in February 1990 and the government's 
bombing of the city in an effort to dislodge the insurgents, the port 
was out of action. A few months later, however, the EPLF and 
the Ethiopian government reached an agreement that allowed the 
port to reopen. In addition, the government lost control of Tigray 
in early 1989 and was reluctant to allow food shipments to go 
through rebel-held territory until May 1990, when the rebels, the 
government, the UN, and donor officials agreed to move grain sup- 
plies from Dese to Tigray. Food could not be airlifted into Tigray 
because fighting had destroyed the airport in Mekele, capital of 
Tigray. Sudan was the only nation through which food shipments 
could come to Tigray and Eritrea. Both the Relief Society of Tigray 
and the Eritrean Relief Association — arms of the TPLF and EPLF, 
respectively — operated overland food convoys from Sudan to Tigray 
and Eritrea. But poor road conditions and the fact that convoys 
had to operate at night to avoid Ethiopian air force attacks prevented 
adequate supplies from reaching affected regions. Consequently, 
about 3 million people were threatened with death and starvation 
in Eritrea and Tigray. 

Disagreements persist concerning the number of Ethiopian refu- 
gees in Somalia in the late 1980s. A UN survey estimated the num- 
ber of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia at 450,000 to 620,000. The 
United States Catholic Relief Services, however, estimated that 
about 410,000 refugees had returned to Ethiopia, leaving about 
430,000 in Somali refugee camps. At the same time, more than 
350,000 Somali of the Isaaq clan-family (see Glossary) fled north- 
ern Somalia for Ethiopia after mid- 1988. Most of these people re- 
mained in camps run by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 



89 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Djibouti was home to about 45,000 Ethiopian refugees from the 
Ogaden by late 1978. These people had fled after Somalia's defeat 
in the Ogaden War. In 1983 the UNHCR began a repatriation 
program, which resulted in the departure of 15,000 former refu- 
gees by mid- 1984. But the 1984 drought in Ethiopia brought an 
additional influx of 10,000 refugees into Djibouti. Slow, steady 
repatriation continued through 1989, by which time there were only 
1,500 Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti. 

A large influx of Ethiopian refugees into Sudan occurred in 1978, 
during the escalation of the conflict between Eritrean insurgents 
and the Mengistu regime. The influx continued into 1983, when 
the refugees numbered about 132,500. The 1984 drought and fam- 
ine forced 160,000 refugees into Sudan in 1984 and more than 
300,000 by April 1985. By June 1985, in anticipation of summer 
rains in Tigray, 55,000 Tigrayans left Sudan, followed by another 
65,000 in 1986, but only a small percentage of refugee Eritreans 
returned to Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia also had been host to refugees from southern Sudan 
since 1983. As the conflict in southern Sudan between the SPLA 
and the Sudanese regime intensified, more refugees fled into western 
Ethiopia, where the Sudanese refugees numbered about 250,000 
in early 1988 and perhaps 400,000 by early 1991. 

Ethiopia's Peoples 

A simple ethnic classification of Ethiopia's population is not feasi- 
ble. People categorized on the basis of one criterion, such as lan- 
guage, may be divided on the basis of another. Moreover, 
ethnicity — a people's insistence that it is distinctive and its behavior 
on the basis of that, insistence — is a subjective response to both 
historical experience and current situations. A group thus distin- 
guished may not be the same as that established on the basis of 
objective criteria. 

Historically, entities defining themselves in ethnic terms reacted 
or adapted to Amhara domination in various ways. Affecting their 
adaptation was the degree of Amhara domination — in some areas 
Amhara were present in force, while in others they established a 
minimal administrative presence — and the extent of ethnic mix- 
ing. In some areas, historical differences and external conditions 
led to disaffection and attempts at secession, as in multiethnic Eritrea 
and in the Ogaden. In others, individuals adapted to the Amhara. 
Often they understood the change not so much as a process of be- 
coming Amhara as one of taking on an Ethiopian (and urban) 
identity. 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 

Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language 

One way of segmenting Ethiopia's population is on the basis of 
language. However, the numbers in each category are uncertain, 
and estimates are often in conflict. At present, at least seventy lan- 
guages are spoken as mother tongues, a few by many millions, 
others by only a few hundred persons. The number of distinct so- 
cial units exceeds the number of languages because separate com- 
munities sometimes speak the same language. More than fifty of 
these languages — and certainly those spoken by the vast majority 
of Ethiopia's people — are grouped within three families of the Afro- 
Asiatic super-language family: Semitic (represented by the branch 
called Ethio-Semitic and by Arabic), Cushitic, and Omotic. In ad- 
dition, about 2 percent of the population speak the languages of 
four families — East Sudanic, Koman, Berta, and Kunema — of the 
Nilo-Saharan super-language family. 

Most speakers of Ethio-Semitic languages live in the highlands 
of the center and north. Speakers of East Cushitic languages are 
found in the highlands and lowlands of the center and south, and 
other Cushitic speakers live in the center and north; Omotic speak- 
ers live in the south; and Nilo-Saharan speakers live in the south- 
west and west along the border with Sudan. Of the four main 
ethno-linguistic groups of Ethiopia, three — the Amhara, Tigray, and 
Oromo — generally live in the highlands; the fourth — the Somali — 
live in the lowlands to the southeast (see fig. 8). 

Ethio-Semitic Language Groups 

The most important Ethio-Semitic language is Amharic. It was 
the empire's official language and is still widely used in govern- 
ment and in the capital despite the Mengistu regime's changes in 
language policy. Those speaking Amharic as a mother tongue num- 
bered about 8 million in 1970, a little more than 30 percent of the 
population. A more accurate count might show them to constitute 
a lesser proportion. The total number of Amharic speakers, includ- 
ing those using Amharic as a second language, may constitute as 
much as 50 percent of the population. 

The Amhara are not a cohesive group, politically or otherwise. 
From the perspective of many Amhara in the core area of Gonder, 
Gojam, and western Welo, the Amhara of Shewa (who constituted 
the basic ruling group under Menelik II and Haile Selassie) are 
not true descendants of the northern Amhara and the Tigray and 
heirs to the ancient kingdom of Aksum. Regional variations not- 
withstanding, the Amhara do not exhibit the differences of religion 
and mode of livelihood characteristic of the Oromo, for example, 



91 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, Ethiopia, Boul- 
der, Colorado, 1988, 129; and M. Lionel Bender (ed.), The Non-Semitic Languages 
of Ethiopia, East Lansing, 1976. 

Figure 8. Principal Ethno Unguis tic Groups, 1991 

who constitute Ethiopia's largest linguistic category. With a few 
exceptions, the Amhara are Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and 
are highland plow agriculturists. 

The Tigray (whose language is Tigrinya) constitute the second 
largest category of Ethio-Semitic speakers. They made up about 
14 percent of the population in 1970. Like the Amhara, the Tigray 
are chiefly Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and most are plow 
agriculturists. Despite some differences in dialect, Tigray believe, 
as anthropologist Dan Franz Bauer has noted, "that they have a 
common tenuous kinship with other Tigray regardless of their place 
of residence." 

The number of persons speaking other Ethio-Semitic languages 
is significantly smaller than the number who speak Amharic and 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



Tigrinya. Moreover, unlike the Amhara and Tigray, members of 
other Ethio- Semitic groups do not share the Aksumite heritage and 
Orthodox Christianity, and their traditional economic base is dif- 
ferent. 

Of the seven Ethio-Semitic languages found among the Gurage 
of southern Shewa, four are single tongues and three are dialect 
clusters, each encompassing four or five dialects. All correspond 
to what anthropologist William A. Shack calls tribes, which, in turn, 
consist of independent clan (see Glossary) chiefdoms. Although most 
people accept the name Gurage, they are likely to specify a tribal 
name in addition. 

The traditional social organization and religion of the Gurage 
resemble those of the neighboring East Cushitic-speaking Sidama 
and related peoples. In some cases, Orthodox Christianity or Islam 
has displaced the traditional religious system, in whole or in part. 
The Gurage traditionally depended on the ensete plant (known lo- 
cally as false banana) rather than grain for their staple food and 
used the hoe rather than the plow. 

In 1970 there were more than 500,000 speakers of Gurage tongues, 
but no single group numbered more than 100,000. Substantial num- 
bers, perhaps 15 to 20 percent of all Gurage, live in urban centers, 
particularly Addis Ababa, where they work at a range of manual 
tasks typically avoided by the Amhara and the Tigray. 

In 1970 a total of 1 17,000 persons were estimated to speak Tigre, 
which is related to Tigrinya; but that figure was likely an under- 
estimate. The ten or so Eritrean groups or clusters of groups speak- 
ing the language do not constitute an ethnic entity, although they 
share an adherence to Islam. Locally, people traditionally used the 
term Tigre to refer to what has been called the serf class, as op- 
posed to the noble class, in most Tigre-speaking groups. 

Perhaps the most numerous of the Tigre-speaking peoples are 
the Beni Amir, a largely pastoral people living in the semiarid region 
of the north and west along the Sudanese border. A large number 
of the Beni Amir also speak Beja, a North Cushitic language. Other 
groups are, in part at least, cultivators, and some, who live along 
the Red Sea coast and on nearby islands, gain some of their liveli- 
hood from fishing. 

Except for the fact that the distinction between nobles and serfs 
seems at one time to have been pervasive, little is known of early 
social and political organization among these groups except for the 
Beni Amir, who were organized in a tribal federation with a para- 
mount chief. The other groups seem to have been autonomous 
units. 



93 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



The Hareri are of major historical importance, and their home 
was in that part of Ethiopia once claimed by Somali irredentists. 
The Hareri ("people of the city") established the walled city of 
Harer as early as the thirteenth century A.D. Harer was a major 
point from which Islam spread to Somalia and then to Ethiopia. 

The Argobba consist of two groups. Living on the hilly slopes 
of the Great Rift Valley escarpment are small groups of Northern 
Argobba. The Southern Argobba live southwest of Harer. North- 
ern Argobba villages, interspersed among Amharic- or Oromo- 
speaking communities, stretch from an area at roughly the lati- 
tude of Addis Ababa to southeasternmost Welo. Most Argobba 
speak either Amharic or Oromo in addition to their native tongue. 

Cushitic Language Groups 

The Oromo, called Galla by the Amhara, constitute the largest 
and most ubiquitous of the East Cushitic-speaking peoples. Oromo 
live in many regions as a result of expansion from their homeland 
in the central southern highlands beginning in the sixteenth cen- 
tury. Although they share a common origin and a dialectically 
varied language, Oromo groups changed in a variety of ways with 
respect to economic base, social and political organization, and 
religion as they adapted to different physical and sociopolitical en- 
vironments and economic opportunities. 

Even more uncertain than estimates of the Amhara population 
are estimates for the Oromo. The problem stems largely from the 
imperial government's attempts to downplay the country's ethnic 
diversity. Government estimates put the number of Oromo speakers 
at about 7 million in 1970 — about 28 percent of the total popula- 
tion of Ethiopia. By contrast, the OLF claimed there were 18 mil- 
lion Oromo in 1978, well over half of a total population roughly 
estimated that year at 31 million. Anthropologist P.T. W. Baxter, 
taking into account the lack of a census (until 1984) and the politi- 
cal biases affecting estimates, asserted that the Oromo were almost 
certainly the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, making up some- 
where between a third and just over half its population. A widely 
accepted estimate in the late 1980s was 40 percent. 

The Oromo provide an example of the difficulties of specifying 
the boundaries and nature of an ethnic group. Some Oromo groups, 
such as the Borana, remain pastoralists. But others, the great 
majority of the people, have become plow cultivators or are en- 
gaged in mixed farming. A few groups, particularly the pastoralists, 
retain significant features of the traditional mode of social and po- 
litical organization marked by generation and age-set systems (see 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Glossary) and the absence of a centralized political structure; others, 
such as those who established kingdoms along the Gibe River, de- 
veloped hierarchial systems. Cutting across the range of economic 
and political patterns are variations in religious belief and prac- 
tice. Again, the pastoralists usually adhere to the indigenous sys- 
tem. Other groups, particularly those in Shewa and Welega, have 
been influenced by Orthodox Christianity, and still others have 
been converted to Islam. Here and there, missionary Protestan- 
tism has had minor successes. Moreover, the Oromo sections and 
subsections have a long history of conflict. Sometimes this conflict 
has been the outcome of competition for land; sometimes it has 
resulted from strife between those allied with the Amhara and those 
resisting the expansion of the empire. Some Oromo adapted to Am- 
hara dominance, the growth of towns, and other changes by learning 
Amharic and achieving a place in the empire's political and eco- 
nomic order. But they had not thereby become Amhara or lost their 
sense of being Oromo. 

In the far south live several groups speaking languages of the 
Oromic branch of Lowland East Cushitic and in many cases shar- 
ing features of Oromo culture. Most have been cultivators or mixed 
farmers, and some have developed distinctive features, such as the 
highlands-dwelling Konso, who live in walled communities of 
roughly 1,500 persons. All these groups are small and are often 
subdivided. With an estimated population of 60,000 in 1970, the 
Konso are the largest of these groups. 

Three other Lowland East Cushitic groups — the Somali, Afar, 
and Saho — share a pastoral tradition (although some sections of 
each group have been cultivators for some time), commitments of 
varying intensity to Islam, and social structures composed of au- 
tonomous units defined as descent groups (see Glossary). In addi- 
tion, all have a history of adverse relations with the empire's 
dominant Orthodox Christian groups and with Ethiopian govern- 
ments in general. 

The largest of the three groups are the Somali, estimated to num- 
ber nearly 900,000 in 1970. Many Somali clans and lineages liv- 
ing predominantly in Ethiopia have close links with or are members 
of such groups in Somalia. The number of Somali in Ethiopia in 
the late 1980s — given the Ogaden War and the movement of 
refugees — was uncertain. 

Somali society is divided into groups of varying genealogical 
depth based on putative or traceable common patrilineal descent. 
The largest of these groups is the clan-family (see Glossary), which 
is in turn divided into clans, which are further divided into lin- 
eages (see Glossary) and sublineages (see Glossary). The clan-family 



95 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



has no concrete political, economic, or social functions. The other 
groups do, however, and these functions often entail political and 
economic competition and sometimes conflict between parallel so- 
cial units. 

The government estimated that the Afar (called Denakil or Adal 
by their neighbors) numbered no more than 363,000 in 1970. 
Despite their relatively small numbers, they were of some impor- 
tance because of their location between the highlands and the Red 
Sea, their antipathy to Ethiopian rule, and the quasi-autonomy 
of a part of the Afar under the sultan of Aussa before the 1974 revo- 
lution. 

Except for several petty centralized states under sultans or 
shaykhs, the Afar are fragmented among tribes, subtribes, and still 
smaller divisions and are characterized by a distinction between 
noble and commoner groups, about which little is known. Most 
Afar are pastoralists but are restricted in their nomadism by the 
need to stay close to permanent wells in extremely arid country. 
A number of them in the former sultan of Aussa' s territory have 
long been settled cultivators in the lower Awash River valley, 
although the imperial government initiated a program to settle 
others along the middle Awash. 

Saho is a linguistic rather than an ethnic category. The groups 
speaking the language include elements from the Afar, the Tigray, 
Tigre speakers, and others, including some Arabs. Almost all are 
pastoralists. Most are Muslims, but several groups — those heav- 
ily influenced by the Tigray — are Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. 

Little is known about the political and social systems of the ten 
or so groups making up the total estimated Saho-speaking popula- 
tion of 120,000, but each group seems to be divided into segments. 
None was ever marked by the noble-serf distinction characteristic 
of Tigre speakers to their north, and all were said to elect their chiefs. 

The speakers of the Highland East Cushitic languages (some- 
times called the Sidamo languages after a version of the name of 
their largest component) numbered more than 2 million in 1970. 
The two largest groups were the Sidama (857,000) and the Hadya- 
Libido speakers (700,000). Kembata-Timbaro-Alaba speakers and 
the Deresa made up the rest. Each of these two groups numbered 
about 250,000 in 1970. As the hyphenated names suggest, two or 
more autonomous groups speaking dialects of the same language 
have been grouped together. In fact, most Sidama, although call- 
ing themselves by a single name in some contexts, traditionally are 
divided into a number of localized and formerly politically autono- 
mous patrilineal clans, each under a chief. 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Sidama and other Highland East Cushitic speakers are cul- 
tivators of ensete and of coffee as a cash crop. In areas below 1 ,500 
meters in elevation, however, the Sidama keep cattle. 

The Sidama and other groups have retained their traditional re- 
ligious systems, although some have been responsive to Protestant 
missionaries. Others, such as the Alaba, the Hadya, and the Tim- 
baro, have accepted Islam. Only the Kembata are converts to Or- 
thodox Christianity. 

There are six groups of Central Cushitic (Agew) speakers, five 
of which live in the central highlands surrounded by Amhara. The 
Bilen in the extreme northern highlands form an enclave between 
the Tigray and the Tigre speakers. Agew-speaking groups total be- 
tween 100,000 and 125,000 persons. They are the remnants of a 
population thought to have been the inhabitants of much of the 
central and northern highlands when Semitic-speaking migrants 
arrived millennia ago to begin the process that led to the forma- 
tion of such groups as the Tigray and the Amhara. It is likely that 
Agew speakers provided much of the basic stock from which the 
Amhara and Tigray were drawn. 

The largest of the Agew-speaking groups are the Awi (whose lan- 
guage is Awngi), estimated to number 50,000 in 1970. The lin- 
guistically related but geographically separate Kunfel numbered 
no more than 2,000. The Awi and the Qimant, numbering about 
17,000, retain their traditional religious system; but the Kunfel and 
the Xamtanga, totaling about 5,000, are apparently Orthodox 
Christians. The Bilen have been much influenced by Islam, and 
many have begun to speak the Tigre of their Islamic neighbors as 
a second tongue. 

A special case is the Beta Israel (their own name; others call them 
Falasha or Kayla), who numbered about 20,000 in 1989, most of 
whom emigrated to Israel in late 1984 and in May 1991. Perhaps 
preceding the arrival of Christianity in the fourth century A.D., 
a group of Agew speakers adopted a form of Judaism, although 
their organization and many of their religious practices resemble 
those of their Orthodox Christian neighbors. The precise origins 
and nature of the Judaic influence are matters of dispute. Most 
Beta Israel speak Amharic as a first language. Agew occurs in their 
liturgy, but the words are not understood. 

Except for the Beta Israel, all Agew-speaking groups are plow 
agriculturists (the Kunfel augment their livelihood by hunting). 
The Beta Israel had been cultivators until deprived of their right 
to hold land after a major conflict with the Amhara and their refusal 
to convert to Christianity in the fifteenth century. They then became 
craftsmen, although many later returned to the land as tenants. 



97 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The sole group speaking a Northern Cushitic tongue is the Beja, 
a Muslim pastoral group that numbered about 20,000 in 1970. 
(Many more live in neighboring Sudan.) Their language is in- 
fluenced by Arabic, and the Beja have come to claim Arab descent 
since their conversion to Islam. Like many of the other nomadic 
pastoralists in the area, they traditionally were segmented into tribes 
and smaller units, based on actual or putative descent from a com- 
mon male ancestor and characterized by considerable autonomy, 
although federated under a paramount chief. 

Omotic Language Groups 

Between the lakes of southern Ethiopia's Great Rift Valley and 
the Omo River (in a few cases west of the Omo) live many groups 
that speak languages of the Omotic family. As many as eighty 
groups have been distinguished, but various sets of them speak dia- 
lects of the same language. Together they were estimated to num- 
ber 1.3 million in 1970. Of these, the Welamo (often called Wolayta) 
are the most numerous, estimated to number more than 500,000 
in 1970. Gemu-Gofa is a language spoken by perhaps forty auton- 
omous groups, estimated at 295,000 in 1970 in the Gemu highlands. 
Kefa-Mocha, spoken by an estimated 170,000, is the language of 
two separate groups (one, commonly called Mocha, calls itself 
Shekatcho). Of the two, Kefa is the larger. 

The relatively limited area in which they live, the diversity of 
their languages, and other linguistic considerations suggest that the 
ancestors of the speakers of Omotic languages have been in place 
for many millennia. Omotic speakers have been influenced linguisti- 
cally and otherwise by Nilo-Saharan groups to the west and by East 
Cushitic groups surrounding them. As a result of the early forma- 
tion of ancestral Omotic-speaking groups, external influences, and 
the demands of varied physical and social environments, the Omotic 
speakers have developed not only linguistic diversity but also sub- 
stantial differences in other respects. Most Omotic-speaking peo- 
ples, for example, are hoe cultivators, relying on the cultivation 
of ensete at higher altitudes and of grains below approximately 1 ,500 
meters. They also practice animal husbandry. Many in the Gemu 
highlands are artisans, principally weavers. Their craftwork has 
become attractive as the demand for their work in Addis Ababa 
and other urban centers has increased. In the capital these people 
are commonly called Dorze, although that is the name of just one 
of their groups. 

Except for the Kefa — long influenced by Orthodox Christi- 
anity — and a small number of Muslims, Omotic speakers have re- 
tained their indigenous religious systems, although a few have been 



98 



Tall cacti in southern Ethiopia 
Courtesy United Nations (0. Monsen) 

influenced by European missionaries. Most of these groups origi- 
nally had chiefs or kings. Among the exceptions are larger entities 
such as the Welamo and the Kefa, both characterized by central- 
ized political systems that exacted tribute from neighboring peoples. 

Nilo-Saharan Language Groups 

In the far southwest and along the country's western border live 
several peoples speaking Nilo-Saharan languages. The most numer- 
ous of these are the Nuer and Anuak, both members of the East 
Sudanic family. Most Nuer are found in Sudan, whereas the Anuak 
live almost entirely in Ethiopia. Most of these people are hoe cul- 
tivators of grains, but many have cattle. A few, such as the Nuer, 
are seminomadic. 

The Kunema are found in western Tigray. Perhaps because of 
the long Italian influence in Eritrea, they have been most affected 
by foreign religious influences. Although Orthodox Christianity 
had little or no impact on them, the Kunema often accepted the 
teachings of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries. Two 
other groups, the Berta and the Nara, have been influenced by 
Islam. Otherwise, these peoples have retained their traditional re- 
ligious systems. Koman speakers consist of several groups who live 
along the Ethio-Sudan border in western Welega. Among these 
little-known peoples are the Gumuz, who, along with the Berta, 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

are also called Bani Shangul. In the past, these peoples were often 
the object of slave raids by their neighbors in Ethiopia and Sudan. 

Occupational Castes 

Sixty to seventy groups scattered throughout Ethiopia tradition- 
ally were on the periphery of local social systems. Many authori- 
ties refer to them as occupational castes. Characterized by 
endogamy and also by specialization in one or more occupations 
considered unclean or degrading, they have been excluded from 
ordinary interaction with members of the host community, although 
one group acted as ritual functionaries for its host. The members 
of a caste group typically speak the local language, but some also 
have a language of their own or speak a variation on the local one. 
They also tend to be physically distinguishable from members of 
the host group. Their most common occupational specialties are 
woodworking, beekeeping, and ritual functions. Another group, 
consisting primarily of hunters, at one time provided royal guards 
for the traditional ruler of one host society. 

Ethnic and Social Relations 

Interethnic Relations 

Ethnicity in Ethiopia is an enormously complex concept. No ethnic 
entity has been untouched by others. Groups in existence in the twen- 
tieth century are biological and social amalgams of several preexisting 
entities. The ingredients are often discernible only by inference, par- 
ticularly if the mixing took place long ago. Nonetheless, such mix- 
ing led to the formation of groups that think of themselves and are 
considered by others as different. For instance, in the prerevolu- 
tionary period there were thousands of non-Amhara who had ac- 
quired the wherewithal to approximate the life- style of wealthy 
Amhara and had in fact gained recognition as Amhara. Such mix- 
ing has continued, and the boundaries of ethnic groups also con- 
tinue to change. 

Interethnic relations in prerevolutionary Ethiopia did not con- 
form to a single model and were complex because of the nature 
of Amhara contact with other groups and the internal social and 
economic dynamics of the groups. Each group reacted differently 
to Amhara dominance. What makes this analysis even more com- 
plex is that the Amhara themselves do not constitute a cohesive 
group. Indeed, the tendency to see Ethiopia before (and, by some 
accounts, after) the revolution as dominated by Amhara has ob- 
scured the complexity of interethnic relations. 

The Amhara are found predominantly in Gojam, Gonder, in 
parts of Welo such as Lasta and Wag, and in parts of Shewa such 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



as Menz. Amhara from one area view those from other areas as 
different, and there is a long history of conflicts among Amhara 
nobles aspiring to be kings or kingmakers. 

Intraprovincial and interprovincial conflict between Amhara no- 
bles and their followers was quite common. Some aspects of intra- 
Amhara friction may be seen in the relations of Shewan Amhara 
to other Amhara and to other Ethiopians. Shewan Arnharic speakers 
are on the southern periphery of the territory occupied by the Am- 
hara. They made their presence felt in much of the Shewa region 
relatively late, except in areas such as Menz, which had always 
been Amhara. Thus, the Shewans over the centuries developed a 
culture and a society that emerged from Oromo, Amhara, and 
perhaps other groups. Whereas the southern people considered 
Shewan Orthodox Christians as Amhara, people from older Am- 
hara areas such as Gojam and Gonder thought of such persons as 
Shewans or sometimes even as Oromo. 

During the imperial regime, Amhara dominance led to the adop- 
tion of Arnharic as the language of government, commerce, and 
education. Other forms of Amhara dominance occurred in local 
government, where Amhara served as representatives of the cen- 
tral government or became landholders. 

Reaction to the Amhara varied even within individual ethnic 
groups. Some resisted the Amhara bitterly, while others aided them. 
In its most extreme form, resistance to Amhara dominance resulted 
in enduring separatist movements, particularly in Eritrea, Tigray, 
and the Ogaden. The separatist movement in Eritrea reflects a 
somewhat different historical experience from that of other areas 
of Ethiopia. Despite Eritrea's seeming unity, ethnic and religious 
differences among Eritreans abounded. For example, the Kunema, 
a Nilo-Saharan-speaking people who formed an enclave among 
Eritrea's Muslims and Christians and who have long been treated 
as inferior by some groups that make up the Eritrean independence 
movement, historically have provided an island of support for the 
central government. 

Perhaps the only region to which the Amhara did not bring their 
sense of superiority was Tigray, home of the people who lay claim 
to the Aksumite heritage. The Amhara did not come to Tigray as 
receivers of land grants, and government administrators were often 
Tigray an themselves. Tigray perspectives on the Amhara were, 
however, influenced negatively by a number of historical factors. 
For example, the son of the only emperor of Tigray origin to have 
ruled Ethiopia, Yohannis IV (reigned 1872-89), was deprived of 
the throne by Menelik II, an Amhara. In 1943 the imperial re- 
gime brutally repressed a Tigray rebellion called the Weyane. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Ethiopia's Ogaden region, inhabited primarily by ethnic Somali, 
was the scene of a series of Ethiopian- Somali struggles in 1964, 
1977-78, and intermittently after that until 1987. Somalia supported 
self-determination for Ogaden Somali. Although Somalia and Ethio- 
pia signed a joint communique in 1988 to end hostilities, Mogadishu 
refused to abandon its claim to the Ogaden. Moreover, in 1989 
and 1990, the Ogaden region was home to about 350,000 Isaaq 
Somali from northern Somalia who had escaped persecution by 
the regime of Mahammad Siad Barre. 

In April 1976, the PMAC promulgated its Program for the Na- 
tional Democratic Revolution (PNDR), which accepted the notions 
of self-determination for nationalities and regional autonomy. In 
compliance with the program, the PMAC created the Institute for 
the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in 1983 to develop adminis- 
trative and political proposals to accommodate all the country's 
major nationalities. As a result of the institute's findings, the govern- 
ment expressed a desire to abolish Ethiopia's fourteen administra- 
tive regions and to create thirty regions, of which five — Eritrea, 
Tigray, Aseb, Dire Dawa, and the Ogaden — were to be autono- 
mous. Eritrean and Tigrayan leaders denounced the plan as noth- 
ing more than an attempt to perpetuate government control of 
Eritrea and Tigray. Their military campaigns to wrest control of 
the two regions from the Mengistu regime eventually succeeded. 

The PMAC undermined the patterns of ethnic relations prevail- 
ing in imperial Ethiopia and eliminated the basis for Amhara 
dominance. However, postrevolutionary Ethiopia continued to ex- 
hibit ethnic tension. Traits based on ethnicity and religion are deeply 
ingrained and are not susceptible to elimination by ideology. 

Social Relations 

Ethiopia's ethnic and cultural diversity has affected social rela- 
tions. Most lowland people are geographically and socially isolated 
from the highland population. Moreover, rural inhabitants, who 
constitute about 89 percent of the total population, generally live 
their lives without coming into contact with outsiders. Exposure 
to other ethnic groups usually occurs by means of relatively lim- 
ited contact with administrators, tax collectors, and retail merchants. 
By contrast, the towns are a mosaic of social and ethnic diversity. 
Since the early 1940s, towns fulfilling administrative and economic 
functions have proliferated. In Addis Ababa, it is common for fam- 
ilies and groups from disparate social and economic classes to live 
side by side. Only in recent years, with unprecedented urbaniza- 
tion, have upper-income residential zones emerged. Smaller urban 
centers have tended to be fairly homogeneous in ethnic and religious 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



makeup. But with increasing urbanization, towns are expected to 
be the scene of increased interaction among different ethnic groups 
and social classes. 

Traditionally, among the most important factors in social rela- 
tions in Ethiopia has been religion (see Religious Life, this ch.). 
Ethiopian emperors nurtured the country's identity with Christi- 
anity, although there were at least as many Muslims as Chris- 
tians in the country. Although the imperial regime did not impose 
Orthodox Christianity on Muslims and pagans, very few non- 
Christians held high positions in government and the military. In 
many cases, Muslims gravitated to commerce and trade, occupa- 
tions relatively untainted by religious discrimination. 

The Mengistu regime downplayed the role of religion in the 
state's life and disestablished the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 
Moreover, the 1987 constitution guaranteed freedom of religion. 
In principle, all religions had equal status in relation to the state. 

Muslims live throughout Ethiopia, but large concentrations can 
be found in Bale, Eritrea, Harerge, and Welo. Muslims also be- 
long to many ethnic groups, a factor that may prevent them from 
exerting political influence commensurate with their numbers. Cen- 
turies of conflict between the Christian kingdom and its Muslim 
antagonists, recent apprehensions about Arab nationalism, and 
Arab support for Eritrean separatism and Somali irredentism all 
continue to perpetuate Ethiopian historical fears of "Islamic en- 
circlement." Such historically rooted religious antagonism has per- 
sisted in creating a social barrier between Christians and Muslims. 

Those who profess traditional religious beliefs are interspersed 
among Christians and Muslims. Such groups include the Sidama, 
the Gurage, the Oromo of Arsi and Borana, and the Nilotic groups 
along the Ethiopia-Sudan border. They have no political influence 
and are scorned socially by Muslims and Christians. 

The existence of more than seventy languages has been another 
barrier to social communication and national integration. The im- 
perial government, recognizing the importance of a national lan- 
guage, adopted Amharic as the official tongue. The use of Amharic 
became mandatory in government, education, radiobroadcasts, and 
newspapers. But the government's promotion of Amharic entailed 
the suppression of other major languages, which aroused opposi- 
tion and accusations of cultural imperialism. Language policy 
changed under the Mengistu regime, which attempted to reverse 
the trend by dropping Amharic as a requirement in schools for non- 
Amharic speakers. The new policy recognized several languages 
widely spoken in specific areas — such as Oromo, Tigrinya, Welamo, 
and Somali — for use in schools at the lower levels (see Primary and 



103 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Secondary Education since 1975, this ch.). Addis Ababa also autho- 
rized the use of the five languages mentioned above, as well as Afar, 
in radiobroadcasts and literacy campaigns. Nevertheless, Amharic 
remained the language of government, and anyone who aspired 
to a national role had to learn to speak and write Amharic. 

The most preferred occupations traditionally have been in 
government, the military, the clergy, and farming, with commerce 
and trade considered less important and consequently usually left 
to Muslims and foreigners. All major Ethiopian ethnic units in- 
clude hereditary groups of artisans and craftsmen. Their occupa- 
tions historically have been held in low esteem by the dominant 
groups. Prior to 1974, artisans and craftsmen could not own land 
or hold political office and could not participate in local meetings 
or assemblies. Dominant groups in their respective areas generally 
treated them as subjects. 

Social status in Ethiopia during the centuries of imperial rule 
depended on one's landholdings, which provided the basis for class 
formation and social stratification. The emperor, the nobility, and 
landlords occupied the social hierarchy's highest positions. Under 
them were smallholding farmers, followed by millions of landless 
peasants who cultivated rented land. In the twentieth century, most 
of the southern landlord class consisted of Christian settlers from 
the north, whereas the tenants were mostly non-Christians and na- 
tives of the area. Thus, ethnic and cultural differences exacerbated 
class distinctions, which, in turn, adversely affected social relations 
(see Rural Society, this ch.). 

With the dissolution of the imperial system and the nationaliza- 
tion of urban and rural land, social stratification and community 
relations based on landholding largely disappeared. The military 
regime wanted to create a classless society, but the social hierarchy 
based on landholdings simply was replaced by one based on polit- 
ical power and influence. National and regional party members, 
government ministers, military officers, and senior civil servants 
had enormous political sway and enjoyed the economic perquisites 
that the nobility and landlords once possessed. 

After Ethiopia's liberation from Italian occupation in 1941, edu- 
cation played an important role in social relations by creating a 
"new nobility" and a middle class whose position and status were 
largely independent of landownership. This new group consisted 
of educated children of the nobility, commoners who had achieved 
distinction for their loyalty to the emperor, and others with ad- 
vanced education whose skills were needed to modernize the 
bureaucracy and military. The postwar education system, the new 
government bureaucracy, and the modern sector of the economy 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



also encouraged the growth of a middle class employed in the public 
and private sectors. Members of the small educated class that filled 
the bureaucracy and the professions during the postwar imperial 
period by and large retained their positions under Mengistu, al- 
though many left the country because of disenchantment with his 
regime. 

The educated group was generally less attached to religion and 
tradition than was the rest of Ethiopian society. Members' educa- 
tion, income, occupation, and urban life-style likewise set them 
apart. They had more in common with educated people from other 
ethnic groups and frequently married across ethnic lines, although 
rarely across religious lines. Nevertheless, in the last decade or so 
before the 1974 revolution, some younger and better-educated non- 
Amhara expressed continued, even heightened, ethnic awareness 
through membership in urban-based self-help associations, which 
the Mengistu regime later banned. Although this educated group 
played a vital role in the emperor's downfall, it had little influence 
on the military government. 

Many of the PMAC's policies were perceived as inimical to the 
interests of major ethnic and class groups. Despite the regime's 
tentative efforts — such as land reform — to defuse some longstand- 
ing grievances, opposition based on ethnic, religious, and class in- 
terests continued. 

Social System 

Rural areas, which contain an estimated 89 percent of the popu- 
lation, make up most of the country; it is the urban centers, 
however, that generate most of the country's political, adminis- 
trative, cultural, and commercial activities. The towns and cities 
are also home to a variety of people forced to live on the margins 
of society by the Mengistu regime — absentee landlords whose rural 
lands and urban property had been confiscated by the state, as well 
as erstwhile activists who had aspired to genuine democratic re- 
forms and had seen their hopes dashed. 

Prior to the 1974 revolution, most Ethiopians conducted their 
daily lives in accordance with norms peculiar to each community 
or region. Ethnic groups characterized by common features of so- 
cial organization and values were, on closer examination, actually 
quite diverse. As important as local structures were, the societies 
they characterized were not autonomous. Those that came closest 
to self-sufficiency were the eastern nomads. In the inaccessible and 
inhospitable areas inhabited by these groups, representatives of the 
central government were scarce. Elsewhere, each community was 
bound to a region and through it to the imperial center by layers 



105 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

of social and political strata. Binding these strata together even 
tighter was a complex system of land rights. 

Modifications introduced after World War II, particularly with 
respect to land rights, had little effect on the essential charac- 
teristics of the social order. The regime that took power in 1974 
attempted to replace the old rural order with a new one based on 
the principle that land should be distributed equitably. Even though 
most rural areas supported the government's efforts to bring about 
such a change, the ultimate shape of the social and economic order 
remained uncertain as the 1990s began. 

Rural Society 

Political scientist John Markakis has observed, "The social struc- 
ture of traditional Amhara-Tigray society [represented] the classic 
trinity of noble, priest, and peasant. These groups [were] distin- 
guished not only through the division of labor, distinct social sta- 
tus, and a clear awareness of such distinctions expressed and justified 
in ideological terms, but also through differences in their relation- 
ships to the only means of production: land." In the northern high- 
lands, land was usually held by the kin group, the state, and the 
church and, through each of these, by individuals. Private owner- 
ship in the Western sense came later and was abolished in 1975. 

Anthropologist Allan Hoben is considered to have made the most 
thorough analysis of Amhara land tenure and its relation to social 
structure. According to his findings, the cognatic descent group 
(see Glossary), comprising men and women believed to be de- 
scended from a common ancestor through both males and females, 
ultimately held a block of land. As in cognatic descent systems else- 
where, men and women could belong to several such landholding 
groups. The descent group and each of its segments had a represen- 
tative who looked after its collective interests. This agent, the 
respected elders, and politically influential members of the group 
or its segments acted in disputes over rights to land. The land was 
called rist (see Glossary) land, and the rights held or claimed in 
it were rist rights. An Amhara had claims not to a specific piece 
of land but to a portion of it administered by the descent group 
or a segment of this group. The person holding such rights was 
called ristegna. In principle, rist rights guaranteed security of tenure. 
Litigation over such rights was common, however. Most north- 
ern highland peasants held at least some rist land, but some mem- 
bers of pariah groups and others were tenants. 

Peasants were subject to claims for taxes and labor from those 
above them, including the church. The common term for peasant, 
derived from the word for tribute, was gebbar. Taxes and fees were 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



comprehensive, multiple, and burdensome. In addition, the peasant 
had to provide labor to a hierarchy of officials for a variety of tasks. 
It was only after World War II that administrative and fiscal re- 
forms ended many of these exactions. 

The state exercised another set of rights over land, including land 
held in rist. The emperor was the ultimate and often immediate 
arbiter of such rights, called gult (see Glossary) rights, and the 
recipient was called gultegna. There was considerable variation in 
the content and duration of the gult rights bestowed on any person. 

Gult rights were the typical form of compensation for an official 
until the government instituted salaries in the period after World 
War II. Many gult grants were for life, or were hereditary, and 
did not depend on the performance of official duties. The grants 
served to bind members of noble families and the local gentry to 
the emperor. 

The emperor also granted hereditary possession (rist gult) of state 
land to members of the higher nobility or the royal family. Peasants 
on such land became tenants of the grantee and paid rent in addi- 
tion to the usual taxes and fees. Lieutenants who shared in the trib- 
ute represented the absentee landlords. 

Those who benefited from the allocation of gult rights included 
members of the royal family (masajint, or princes), the nobility 
(makuannent) , the local gentry, low-level administrators, and per- 
sons with local influence. Until the twentieth century, the chief 
duties of the makuannent were administrative and military. Mem- 
bership in the makuannent was not fixed, and local gentry who proved 
able and loyal often assumed higher office and were elevated to 
the nobility. It was possible for a commoner to become a noble 
and for the son of a noble — even one with a hereditary title — to 
lose status and wealth unless he demonstrated military or other capa- 
bilities. Although there was a gap in living standards between 
peasant and noble, cultural differences were not profound. Con- 
sequently, the Amhara and Tigray lacked the notion of a heredi- 
tary class of nobles. Although it is possible to divide the Amhara 
and Tigray populations of the late nineteenth and much of the twen- 
tieth centuries in terms of rank, social status, power, and wealth, 
those who fell into various categories did not necessarily consti- 
tute distinct strata. 

The pattern of land allocation in the southern territories incor- 
porated into the empire by Menelik II differed in important ways 
from the pattern in the north. Moreover, the consequences of al- 
location and the administrative regime imposed by Menelik II and 
Haile Selassie varied, depending on the way in which particular 
ethnic groups or regions became subject to Ethiopian rule, on the 



107 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

nature of the preexisting sociopolitical structure, and on the terri- 
tory's economic appeal. 

Supposedly, the government divided conquered land in the south 
on the one-third (siso) principle, by which two-thirds went to the 
state and the remainder to the indigenous population. In fact, the 
proportion of the land taken by the state ranged from virtually none 
to more than two-thirds. In areas such as Jima, which had capitu- 
lated to Menelik II without resistance, the state took no occupied 
land, although it later took over unoccupied land and granted much 
of it to leading imperial officials. Other northerners, attracted by 
the coffee-growing potential of the Jima area, bought land in that 
region. In areas inhabited by nomads, all the land was state land, 
little was granted, and the pastoralists used it as before. 

The government allocated state-held land to a variety of claim- 
ants. The emperor retained a substantial portion of the most fer- 
tile land. Churches also received large amounts of land in the south 
as northern governors implemented the imperial policy of estab- 
lishing Orthodox Christian churches in conquered territory and 
as northern clergy came in numbers to serve them. Each church 
received samon grants, according to which the church held the rights 
to tribute in perpetuity, and the tribute from those working the 
land went solely to the support of the church (or local monastery). 
No part of it went through the secular hierarchy to the emperor. 
The nobility, including the leaders of Menelik' s conquering ar- 
mies (many of whom became governors in the south), received rist 
gult rights over large areas occupied by peasants. Rist gult holders, 
secure in their rights, allocated land rights of various kinds to kins- 
men and retainers. The government granted rist gult rights over 
smaller parcels of land to officials at any level for loyal service. Re- 
maining land was divided between the indigenous population and 
traditional leaders {balabats — see Glossary), who acquired some of 
the best land. People who had been on the land thus became tenants 
(gebbars). 

Peasants from the north went south as soldiers and settlers. If 
the soldiers and their heirs continued to perform military or other 
service, they received land that remained in the family. If they ar- 
rived as settlers, the government gave them small parcels of land 
or allowed them to buy land from the state at low cost. Such land, 
unencumbered by the residual rights of a kin group but requiring 
the payment of state taxes, was thus held in an arrangement much 
like that applied to freehold land. Generally, settlers were armed 
and were expected to support local officials with force. 

Most of the southern population consisted of indigenous peo- 
ples, largely deprived of the rights they had held under local systems. 



108 




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Ethiopia: A Country Study 



They, like Amhara and Tigray peasants, were called gebbars, but 
they held no rist land and therefore had little security of tenure. 
The situation of the southern gebbars depended on the rights granted 
by the state over the land on which they lived. Those working land 
granted to a minor official paid tribute through him. If the land 
reverted to state control, the gebbar became a tributary of the state. 
As salaries for officials became the rule after World War II, the 
land that formerly served as compensation in lieu of salary was 
granted in permanent possession (in effect, became freehold land) 
to those holding contingent rights or to others. In these circum- 
stances, the gebbars became tenants. 

The basis of southern social stratification was, as in the north, 
the allocation of political office and rights in land by the emperor. 
The method of allocating rights in land and of appointing govern- 
ment officials in the south gave rise to a structure of status, power, 
and wealth that differed from the arrangement in the north and 
from the earlier forms of sociopolitical organization in the area. 
Those appointed as government officials in the south were north- 
erners — mainly Amhara, Tigray, and educated Oromo — virtually 
all of whom were Orthodox Christians who spoke Amharic. This 
meant that social stratification coincided with ethnicity. However, 
the path to social mobility and higher status, as in the north, was 
education and migration to urban areas. 

In 1966, under growing domestic pressure for land reform, the 
imperial government abolished rist gult in the north and south and 
siso gult in the south. Under the new system, the gultegna and the 
gebbar paid taxes to the state. In effect, this established rights of 
private ownership. The abolition of rist gult left the northern Am- 
hara and Tigray peasant a rist holder, still dependent on the cog- 
natic descent group to verify his rights to rist land. But at least he 
was formally freed of obligations to the gult holder. 

Typically, the landholders and many northern provincial offi- 
cials came from families with at least several generations of status, 
wealth, and power in the province — situations they owed not to 
Menelik II or to Haile Selassie but to earlier emperors or to great 
provincial lords. These nobles had some claim to the peasants' 
loyalty, inasmuch as all belonged to the same ethnic group and 
shared the same values. Peasants often saw attacks on the north- 
ern nobility as challenges to the entire system of which they were 
a part, including their right to rist land. 

By contrast, whether or not they were descended from the older 
nobility, southern landholders were more dependent on the cen- 
tral government for their status and power. They were confronted 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



with an ethnically different peasantry and lacked a base in the 
culture and society of the locality in which they held land. 

In 1975 the revolution succeeded in eliminating the nobility and 
landlord classes. Those individual group members who avoided 
being killed, exiled, or politically isolated were able to do so be- 
cause they had in some way already modified or surrendered their 
rights and privileges. 

Land reform affected huge numbers of people throughout Ethio- 
pia. However, there were regional differences in its execution. 
Peasant associations carried out land redistribution in the south, 
motivated not only by economic need but also by their antipathy 
toward the landlords. In the north, the government preserved rist 
tenure, and the peasant associations concerned themselves mainly 
with litigation over rist rights. Moreover, northern peasants were 
not driven by the ethnic and class hatred characteristic of southern 
peasants. 

The 1975 Peasant Associations Organization and Consolidation 
Proclamation granted local self-government to peasant associations. 
Subsequently, peasant associations established judicial tribunals to 
deal with certain criminal and civil cases, including those involv- 
ing violations of association regulations. Armed units, known as 
peasant defense squads, enforced decisions. Additionally, peasant 
associations had economic powers, including the right to establish 
service cooperatives as a prelude to collective ownership (although 
there was little peasant enthusiasm for the latter). The revolution- 
ary government also established a hierarchy of administrative and 
development committees in districts, subregions, and regions to 
coordinate the work of the bodies at each administrative level. The 
Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) later supplemented the work 
of these committees. Only a few officials spoke for peasants at the 
district and subregional levels, and rarely, if at all, were peasants 
represented in regional organizations, where civilians and military 
members of the central government were in control (see Peasant 
Associations, ch. 4). 

Urban Society 

After World War II, towns, commerce, and bureaucracy gradu- 
ally became more significant in Ethiopia. Except for Addis Ababa 
and some Red Sea ports, towns were small, and urbanization had 
proceeded more slowly than in many other African countries. City 
and town life had not been a feature of Ethiopian society, and trade 
was not a full-time occupation for Ethiopians except for itinerant 
Muslims and Arabized peoples on the Red Sea coast. Manufac- 
turing had arrived only recently, and the role of Ethiopians, except 



111 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



as unskilled laborers, was minimal. Ownership and management, 
with relatively few exceptions, were in the hands of foreigners. 

Most Ethiopians who entered into occupations not associated with 
the land or with traditional methods of administration worked for 
the central government, which had expanded to bring Ethiopia 
under the emperor's control, to provide essential services, and to 
generate economic development. During the 1940s, Ethiopia's few 
educated persons, who usually came from families of the nobility 
and gentry, joined the government. 

Beginning in the 1950s, relatively younger Ethiopians with higher 
education developed hopes and expectations for democratic insti- 
tutions. Still small in number, perhaps 7,000 to 8,000 by 1970, 
they were more ethnically varied in origin than the older educated 
group, although Amhara and Tigray were still represented dis- 
proportionately (as they were even among secondary school gradu- 
ates). These would-be reformers were frequently frustrated by the 
older ways of the senior officials, who were dependent on Haile 
Selassie and beholden to him. Nevertheless, sustained opposition 
to the regime did not occur, largely because even middle- and lower- 
level government employees were better off than the peasants, small 
traders, and some of the gentry. 

Small traders and craftsmen, below educated government work- 
ers in income and status, had little influence on the government, 
which tended to encourage larger-scale capital-intensive ventures 
typically requiring foreign investment and management. Although 
an increasing number of Christians were involved in commercial 
activities, small traders remained largely a Muslim group. Skilled 
craftsmen who were not of the traditional pariah groups often be- 
longed to small ethnic groups, such as the weavers (often called 
Dorze) of Gamo Gofa. 

At the bottom of the urban social scale were workers of varied 
ethnic origins, generally unskilled in a labor market crowded with 
unskilled workers ready to replace them. Neither government pol- 
icy, the weak labor unions, nor the condition of the labor market 
gave them social or political leverage. By the late 1960s, inflation 
and a lack of jobs for university and secondary school graduates 
intensified disgruntlement. Urban-based agitation by students, 
labor, and the military eventually toppled the imperial regime. 

Those who had served in senior positions in the imperial govern- 
ment and the military establishment were dismissed, imprisoned, 
executed, or they fled the country. The survivors of the old social 
structure were younger persons in government service: bureaucrats, 
teachers, and technicians. Some benefited from the nationaliza- 
tion of private enterprises and expansion of the government 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



apparatus, filling posts held by senior officials or foreign specialists 
before the revolution. But this group was excluded from power, 
and some became militant opponents of the new regime's radical 
policies. 

The position of the middle class — traders and artisans — varied. 
Generally, the status of Muslim traders rose after the new regime 
disestablished the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. As economic con- 
ditions worsened and consumer goods became scarce, however, 
traders became scapegoats and subject to violent attacks. 

Notwithstanding allusions to the proletariat's revolutionary role, 
the urban working class — mainly in Addis Ababa and its envi- 
rons — gained neither status nor power. The military government 
replaced the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) 
with the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU) when the CELU 
leadership started opposing the direction of the revolution. The 
AETU focused its activities on supporting the government policy 
of emphasizing production rather than on advancing worker rights. 
The AETU — unlike the CELU — was a hierarchy rather than a con- 
federation; unions at the base accepted policy decisions made at 
higher levels. In the next few years, the government had difficulty 
enforcing this policy. Deteriorating economic conditions caused 
strikes and demonstrations. In addition, violence often broke out 
between workers and government officials (see Labor Unions, 
ch. 3). 

The urban equivalents of the peasant associations were the kebeles 
(see Kebeles, ch. 4). Initially, mid- and lower-level bureaucrats were 
elected to posts in these associations, but the military government 
soon purged them for opposing the revolutionary regime. New laws 
excluded from elective office for one year those who had owned 
rental property and members of their households. Thus, not only 
were the wealthy excluded from participation, but also many 
middle-class investors who had built and rented low-cost housing 
and who were far from rich were excluded as well. This exclu- 
sion also deprived many students and other young people of a 
role in the kebeles. Those who worked full time away from the neigh- 
borhood tended to be unwilling to take on kebele positions. Partly 
by default and partly with the PMAC's encouragement, elec- 
tions in 1976 filled kebele posts with (in the words of John Mar- 
kakis and Nega Ayele) "persons of dubious character, indeterminate 
occupation, busybodies and opportunists of all sorts .... Militia 
units [attached to the urban associations] charged with local 
security mustered the perennially unemployed, the shiftless and 
hangers-on, young toughs and delinquents, who were in- 
stantly transformed into revolutionary proletarian fighters." These 



113 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

individuals perpetrated crimes against people they disliked or dis- 
agreed with. 

The kebeles engaged in some of the revolution's most brutal blood- 
letting. Increasing criticism eventually forced the regime to restrain 
them. After the populace recognized the PMAC's permanence, 
more people participated in kebele administration. By 1990 the kebeles 
were part of the grass-roots WPE organization. 

The Role of Women 

There have been few studies concerning women in Ethiopia, but 
many observers have commented on the physical hardship that 
Ethiopian women experience throughout their lives. Such hard- 
ship involves carrying loads over long distances, grinding corn 
manually, working in the homestead, raising children, and cook- 
ing. Ethiopian women traditionally have suffered sociocultural and 
economic discrimination and have had fewer opportunities than 
men for personal growth, education, and employment. Even the 
civil code affirmed the woman's inferior position, and such rights 
as ownership of property and inheritance varied from one ethnic 
group to another. 

As in other traditional societies, a woman's worth is measured 
in terms of her role as a mother and wife. Over 85 percent of Ethio- 
pian women reside in rural areas, where peasant families are en- 
gaged primarily in subsistence agriculture. Rural women are 
integrated into the rural economy, which is basically labor inten- 
sive and which exacts a heavy physical toll on all, including chil- 
dren. The revolution had little impact on the lives of rural women. 
Land reform did not change their subordinate status, which was 
based on deep-rooted traditional values and beliefs. An improve- 
ment in economic conditions would improve the standard of liv- 
ing of women, but real change would require a transformation of 
the attitudes of governments and men regarding women. 

There have been some changes for women in urban areas, where 
education, health care, and employment outside the home have 
become more available. Although a few women with higher edu- 
cation have found professional employment, most hold low-paying 
jobs. About 40 percent of employed women in urban areas worked 
in the service sector, mainly in hotels, restaurants, and bars, ac- 
cording to a 1976 government survey. Employment in production 
and related areas (such as textiles and food processing) accounted 
for 25 percent of the female work force, followed by sales, which 
accounted for about 1 1 percent. The survey also showed that women 
factory workers in Addis Ababa earned about a quarter of the wages 
men earned for the same type of work. These differences existed 



114 



The Society and hs Environment 



despite a 1975 proclamation stipulating equal pay for equal work 
for men and women. 

Following the revolution, women made some gains in economic 
and political areas. The Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Associ- 
ation (REWA), which claimed a membership of over 5 million, 
took an active part in educating women. It encouraged the crea- 
tion of women's organizations in factories, local associations, and 
in the civil service. Some women participated in local organiza- 
tions and in peasant associations and kebeles. However, the role of 
women was limited at the national level. In 1984, for example, the 
government selected only one woman as a full member of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the WPE. Of the 2,000 delegates who attended 
the WPE's inaugural congress in 1984, only 6 percent were women. 

On a more positive note, the Mengistu regime could claim suc- 
cess in increasing literacy among women (see Literacy, this ch.). 
The enrollment of women in primary and secondary schools in- 
creased from about 32 percent in 1974/75 (Ethiopian calendar 
year — see Glossary) to 39 percent in 1985/86, although the rate of 
enrollment of urban women far exceeded the rate for rural women. 

Religious Life 

The 1955 constitution stated, "The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 
founded in the fourth century on the doctrines of Saint Mark, is 
the established church of the Empire and is, as such, supported 
by the state." The church was the bulwark of the state and the 
monarchy and became an element in the ethnic identity of the 
dominant Amhara and Tigray. By contrast, Islam spread among 
ethnically diverse and geographically dispersed groups at differ- 
ent times and therefore failed to provide the same degree of politi- 
cal unity to its adherents. Traditional belief systems were strongest 
in the lowland regions, but elements of such systems characterized 
much of the popular religion of Christians and Muslims as well. 
Beliefs and rituals varied widely, but fear of the evil eye, for ex- 
ample, was widespread among followers of all religions. 

Officially, the imperial regime tolerated Muslims. For example, 
the government retained Muslim courts, which dealt with family 
and personal law according to Islamic law. However, the imperial 
authorities gradually took over Muslim schools and discouraged 
the teaching of Arabic. Additionally, the behavior of Amhara ad- 
ministrators in local communities and the general pattern of Chris- 
tian dominance tended to alienate Muslims. 

The revolution brought a major change in the official status of 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and other religions. In 1975 the 
Mengistu regime disestablished the church, which was a substantial 



115 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

landholder during the imperial era, and early the next year removed 
its patriarch. The PMAC declared that all religions were equal, 
and a number of Muslim holy days became official holidays in ad- 
dition to the Christian holidays already honored. Despite these 
changes, divisions between Muslims and Christians persisted. 

Demography and Geography of Religious Affiliation 

Statistical data on religious affiliation, like those on ethnic groups, 
are unreliable. Most Orthodox Christians are Amhara and Tigray, 
two groups that together constitute more than 40 percent of the 
population. When members of these two groups are combined with 
others who have accepted Orthodoxy, the total Christian popula- 
tion might come to roughly 50 percent of all Ethiopians. 

Muslims have been estimated to constitute 40 percent of the 
population. The largest ethnic group associated with Islam is the 
Somali. Several other much smaller Islamic groups include the Afar, 
Argobba, Hareri, Saho, and most Tigre-speaking groups in north- 
ern Eritrea (see Ethiopia's Peoples, this ch.). Oromo also consti- 
tute a large proportion of the total Muslim population. There are 
also Muslims in other important ethnic categories, e.g., the Sidamo 
speakers and the Gurage. In the far north and the east, and to some 
extent in the south, Islamic peoples surround Orthodox Christians. 

The only people (variously estimated at 5 to 15 percent of the 
population) who have had little if any contact with Orthodox Chris- 
tianity or Islam live in the far south and the west. Included among 
adherents of indigenous religions are most of those speaking Nilo- 
Saharan languages and many of those speaking Omotic and Cushitic, 
including sections of the Oromo, such as the pastoral Borana. It 
is among these peoples that the few converts to missionary Christi- 
anity — Protestant and Roman Catholic — are to be found. 

Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity 

John Markakis has remarked of Ethiopia that "the dominant 
element in this culture and its major distinguishing feature is the 
Christian religion." Yet almost all of the analysis of Orthodox 
Christianity as practiced by Ethiopians has focused on the Am- 
hara and Tigray. The meaning of that religion for the Oromo and 
others is not clear. For some Oromo who achieved significant po- 
litical power in Amhara kingdoms in the eighteenth century and 
after, adherence to Christianity seemed to be motivated by noth- 
ing more than expediency. 

By the mid- twentieth century, some educated Amhara and 
Tigray had developed skepticism, not so much of doctrine — 
although that also occurred — as of the church's political and 
economic role. They had developed similar feelings toward the 



116 



Worshipers dressed in white shammas attend a service at Holy Trinity 

Cathedral in Addis Ababa. 
Courtesy World Vision (Bruce Brander) 

clergy, most of whom were poorly educated. Nevertheless, the ef- 
fects of the church's disestablishment and of the continuing social 
upheaval and political repression impelled many Ethiopians to turn 
to religion for solace. 

Organization of the Church and the Clergy 

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church's headquarters was in Addis 
Ababa. The boundaries of the dioceses, each under a bishop, fol- 
lowed provincial boundaries; a patriarch (abun) headed the church. 
The ultimate authority in matters of faith was the Episcopal Synod. 
In addition, the Church Council, a consultative body that included 
clergy and laity, reviewed and drafted administrative policy. 

Beginning in 1950, the choice of the abun passed from the Cop- 
tic Church of Egypt in Alexandria to the Episcopal Synod in Ad- 
dis Ababa. When Abuna Tewoflos was ousted by the government 
in 1976, the church announced that nominees for patriarch would 
be chosen from a pool of bishops and monks — archbishops were 
disqualified — and that the successful candidate would be chosen 
on the basis of a vote by clergy and laity. The new abun was a fifty- 
eight-year-old monk who took the name of Tekla Haimanot, after 
a fourteenth-century Ethiopian saint. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 



From the Christian peasant's point of view, the important church 
figures are the local clergy. The priest has the most significant role. 
An estimated 10 to 20 percent of adult male Amhara and Tigray 
were priests in the 1960s — a not extraordinary figure, considering 
that there were 17,000 to 18,000 churches and that the celebration 
of the Eucharist required the participation of at least two priests 
and three deacons, and frequently included more. Large churches 
had as many as 100 priests; one was said to have 500. 

There are several categories of clergy, collectively referred to as 
the kahinat (priests, deacons, and some monks) and the debteras 
(priests who have lost their ordination because they are no longer 
ritually pure, or individuals who have chosen not to enter the priest- 
hood). A boy between the ages of seven and ten who wishes to be- 
come a deacon joins a church school and lives with his teacher — a 
priest or debtera who has achieved a specified level of learning — 
and fellow students near a church. After about four years of study, 
the diocesan bishop ordains him a deacon. 

After three or four years of service and additional study, a dea- 
con can apply to be ordained a priest. Before doing so, he has to 
commit himself to celibacy or else get married. Divorce and remar- 
riage or adultery result in a loss of ritual purity and loss of one's 
ordination. 

A priest's chief duty is to celebrate the Eucharist, a task to which 
he is assigned for a fixed period of weeks or months each year. He 
also officiates at baptisms and funeral services and attends the feasts 
(provided by laymen) associated with these and other events. His 
second important task is to act as confessor, usually by arrange- 
ment with specific families. 

Most priests come from the peasantry, and their education is 
limited to what they acquire during their training for the diaconate 
and in the relatively short period thereafter. They are, however, 
ranked according to their learning, and some acquire far more re- 
ligious knowledge than others. 

Debteras often have a wider range of learning and skills than what 
is required for a priest. Debteras act as choristers, poets, herbalists, 
astrologers, fortune-tellers, and scribes (for those who cannot read). 

Some monks are laymen, usually widowers, who have devoted 
themselves to a pious life. Other monks undertake a celibate life 
while young and commit themselves to advanced religious educa- 
tion. Both kinds of monks might lead a hermit's life, but many 
educated monks are associated with the great monastic centers, 
which traditionally were the sources of doctrinal innovation or dis- 
pute that had sometimes riven the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



Nuns are relatively few, usually older women who perform largely 
domestic tasks in the churches. 

Faith and Practice 

The faith and practice of most Orthodox Christians combine ele- 
ments from Monophysite Christianity as it has developed in Ethio- 
pia over the centuries and from a non-Christian heritage rejected 
by more educated church members but usually shared by the or- 
dinary priest. According to Monophysite doctrine, Christ is a di- 
vine aspect of the trinitarian God. Broadly, the Christian elements 
are God (in Amharic, Egziabher), the angels, and the saints. A 
hierarchy of angelic messengers and saints conveys the prayers of 
the faithful to God and carries out the divine will. When an Ethio- 
pian Christian is in difficulty, he or she appeals to these angels and 
saints as well as to God. In more formal and regular rituals, priests 
communicate on behalf of the community, and only priests may 
enter the inner sanctum of the usually circular or octagonal church 
where the ark (tabot) dedicated to the church's patron saint is housed. 
On important religious holidays, the ark is carried on the head of 
a priest and escorted in procession outside the church. The ark, 
not the church, is consecrated. Only those who feel pure, have fasted 
regularly, and have generally conducted themselves properly may 
enter the middle ring to take communion. At many services, most 
parish members remain in the outer ring, where debteras sing hymns 
and dance. 

Weekly services constitute only a small part of an Ethiopian Or- 
thodox Christian's religious observance. Several holy days require 
prolonged services, singing and dancing, and feasting. An impor- 
tant religious requirement, however, is the keeping of fast days. 
Only the clergy and the very devout maintain the full schedule of 
fasts, comprising 250 days, but the laity is expected to fast 165 days 
per year, including every Wednesday and Friday and the two 
months that include Lent and the Easter season. 

In addition to standard holy days, most Christians observe many 
saint's days. A man might give a small feast on his personal saint's 
day. The local voluntary association (called the maheber) connected 
with each church honors its patron saint with a special service and 
a feast two or three times a year. 

Belief in the existence of active spirits — many malevolent, some 
benevolent — is widespread among Ethiopians, whether Christian, 
Muslim, or pagan. The spirits called zar can be male or female 
and have a variety of personality traits. Many peasants believe they 
can prevent misfortune by propitiating the zar. 



119 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The protective adbar spirits belong to the community rather than 
to the individual or family. The female adbar is thought to protect 
the community from disease, misfortune, and poverty, while the 
male adbar is said to prevent fighting, feuds, and war and to bring 
good harvests. People normally pay tribute to the adbars in the form 
of honey, grains, and butter. 

Myths connected with the evil eye (buda) vary, but most people 
believe that the power rests with members of lowly occupational 
groups who interact with Amhara communities but are not part 
of them. To prevent the effects of the evil eye, people wear amu- 
lets or invoke God's name. Because one can never be sure of the 
source of illness or misfortune, the peasant has recourse to wiz- 
ards who can make diagnoses and specify cures. Debteras also make 
amulets and charms designed to ward off satanic creatures. 

The belief system, Christian and other, of peasant and priest 
was consonant with the prerevolutionary social order in its stress 
on hierarchy and order. The long-range effects on this belief sys- 
tem of a Marxist- Leninist regime that ostensibly intended to de- 
stroy the old social order were difficult to evaluate in mid- 1991. 
Even though the regime introduced some change in the organiza- 
tion of the church and clergy, it was not likely that the regime had 
succeeded in significantly modifying the beliefs of ordinary Chris- 
tians. 

Islam 

Basic Teachings of Islam 

Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing 
way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct 
of society's members. Therefore, it is incumbent on the individ- 
ual to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law and incum- 
bent on the community to build the perfect human society on earth 
according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions be- 
tween church and state. The distinction between religious and secu- 
lar law is a recent development that reflects the more pronounced 
role of the state in society and of Western economic and cultural 
penetration. Religion has a greater impact on daily life in Muslim 
countries than it has had in the largely Christian West since the 
Middle Ages. 

Islam came to Ethiopia by way of the Arabian Peninsula, where 
in A.D. 610, Muhammad — a merchant of the Hashimite branch 
of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca — began 
to preach the first of a series of revelations he said had been granted 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, 
Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Be- 
cause the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage 
business to the shrine called the Kaaba and to numerous other pagan 
religious sites in the area, Muhammad's censure earned him the 
enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers 
accepted an invitation to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known 
as Medina (the city), because it was the center of Muhammad's 
activities. The move, or hijra, known in the West as the hegira, 
marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in 
history; indeed, the Muslim calendar begins in 622. In Medina, 
Muhammad continued to preach, and he eventually defeated 
his detractors in battle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiri- 
tual leadership in his person before his death in 632. After 
Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words 
regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the holy 
scriptures of Islam. Others of his sayings and teachings, recalled 
by those who had known him, became the hadith. The precedent 
of Muhammad's personal behavior is called the sunna. Together, 
these works form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, 
and social life of the orthodox Sunni Muslim. 

The duties of Muslims form the five pillars of Islam, which set 
forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce the faith. These 
are the recitation of the shahada ("There is no god but God [Allah], 
and Muhammad is his prophet."), salat (daily prayer), zakat (alms- 
giving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage). The believer is to 
pray in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ab- 
lutions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and night- 
fall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the 
prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward Mecca. 
Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque with 
an imam, or prayer leader, and on Fridays they make a special 
effort to do so. The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for 
weekly sermons by religious leaders. Women may also attend public 
worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, 
although women usually pray at home. A special functionary, the 
muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the 
appropriate hour. Those out of earshot determine the time by the 
position of the sun. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt 
of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all but the sick and 
weak, pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travelers on 
necessary journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, 



121 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse during the daylight hours. 
Those adults who are excused are obliged to endure an equivalent 
fast at their earliest opportunity. A festive meal breaks the daily 
fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and celebration. The pious 
well-to-do usually perform little or no work during this period, and 
some businesses close for all or part of the day. Because the months 
of the lunar year revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls 
at various seasons in different years. A considerable test of discipline 
at any time of the year, a fast that falls in summertime imposes 
severe hardship on those who must do physical work. 

All Muslims, at least once in their lifetimes, are strongly en- 
couraged to make the hajj to Mecca to participate in special rites 
held there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Mu- 
hammad instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic cus- 
tom, to emphasize sites associated with God and Abraham 
(Ibrahim), considered the founder of monotheism and father of the 
Arabs through his son Ismail. 

Other tenets of the Muslim faith include the jihad (holy war) 
and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all evil thoughts, 
words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims agree on certain basic prin- 
ciples of faith based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad: 
there is one God, who is a unitary divine being, in contrast to the 
trinitarian belief of Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of 
prophets beginning with Abraham and including Moses (Musa) 
and Jesus (Isa), was chosen by God to present His message to hu- 
manity; and there is to be a general resurrection on the last, or 
judgment, day. 

During his lifetime, Muhammad was spiritual and temporal 
leader of the Muslim community. Religious and secular law 
merged, and all Muslims traditionally have been subject to sharia, 
or religious law. A comprehensive legal system, sharia developed 
gradually through the first four centuries of the Islamic era, primar- 
ily through the accretion of interpretations and precedents set by 
various judges and scholars. 

After Muhammad's death, Muslim community leaders chose 
Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest fol- 
lowers, to succeed him. At that time, some persons favored Ali ibn 
Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter 
Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) 
eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs 
(successors) — Umar, who succeeded in A.D. 634, and Uthman, 
who took power in 644 — enjoyed the recognition of the entire com- 
munity. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, 
Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his cap- 
ital to the area of present-day Iraq, where he was murdered shortly 
thereafter. 

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates 
and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized 
a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damas- 
cus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umayyad 
caliphs, and withdrew in the great schism to establish the dissi- 
dent sect, known as the Shia, who supported the claims of Ali's 
line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger 
faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph must 
be elected, and over the centuries they have represented themselves 
as the orthodox branch. 

Early in Islam's history the Sufism movement emerged. It 
stressed the possibility of emotional closeness to God and mystical 
knowledge of God in contrast to the intellectual and legalistic em- 
phasis of orthodox Sunni theology. By the twelfth century, this ten- 
dency had taken a number of forms. Orders, each emphasizing 
specific disciplines (ways) of achieving that closeness and knowledge, 
were organized. Disdained by orthodox Islamic theologians, Sufi 
orders nevertheless became an integral part of Islam, although their 
importance varied regionally. 

Local Character of Belief and Practice 

Ethiopian Muslims are adherents of the dominant Sunni, or or- 
thodox, branch of Islam. Shia are not represented in Ethiopia. The 
beliefs and practices of Ethiopian Muslims are embodied in a more 
or less integrated amalgam of three elements: the Islam of the Quran 
and the sharia, the worship of saints and the rituals and organiza- 
tion of religious orders, and the still-important remnant of pre- 
Islamic patterns. Islam in the traditional sense is dominant only 
on the Eritrean coast among Arab and Arab-influenced popula- 
tions and in Harer and a few other towns. 

In general, the most important practices of the Islamic faith, par- 
ticularly regular prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan, 
are observed in urban centers rather than in the smaller towns and 
villages and more among settled peoples than among nomads. 
Records of the pilgrimage to Mecca by Ethiopian Muslims are 
scarce. 

Under Haile Selassie, Muslim communities could bring mat- 
ters of personal and family law and inheritance before Islamic 
courts; many did so and probably continued to do so under the 
revolutionary regime. However, many Muslims dealt with such 
matters in terms of customary law. For example, the Somali and 



123 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

other pastoralists tended not to follow the requirement that daugh- 
ters inherit half as much property as sons, particularly when 
livestock was at issue. In parts of Eritrea, the tendency to treat land 
as the corporate property of a descent group (lineage or clan) 
precluded following the Islamic principle of division of property 
among one's heirs. 

In Ethiopia's Muslim communities, as in neighboring Sudan and 
Somalia, the faithful are associated with, but not necessarily mem- 
bers of, specific orders. Nevertheless, although formal and infor- 
mal attachment to Sufi orders is widespread, the emphasis is less 
on contemplative and disciplined mysticism than on the powers 
of the founders and other leaders of local branches of the orders. 
Most believe that these persons possess extraordinary powers to 
intercede with God and have the ability to promote the fertility 
of women and cure illness. In many cases, these individuals are 
recognized as saints. People visit their tombs to pray for their help 
or their intercession with God. 

Indigenous Religions 

Among indigenous religious systems, the names of certain dei- 
ties and spirits recur frequently, especially among groups speak- 
ing related languages. Certain features of these traditional belief 
systems are broadly similar — for example, the existence of a 
supreme god identified with the sky and relatively remote from the 
everyday concerns of the people and addressed through spirits. Sur- 
face similarities notwithstanding, the configuration of the accepted 
roster of spirits, the rituals addressed to them, the social units (some 
based on the territorial community, others on common descent, 
generation, or sex) participating in specific rituals, and the nature 
and functions of religious specialists are peculiar to each ethnic 
group or subsection. Common to almost all indigenous systems 
is a range of spirits, some closely resembling in name and func- 
tion the spirits recognized by neighboring Christians or Muslims. 

Among the Oromo, especially those not fully Christianized, there 
is a belief in a supreme god called Waka, represented by spirits 
known as ayanas. The ayanas are mediators between the high god 
and human beings and are themselves approached through the kallu, 
a ritual specialist capable of being possessed by these spirits. The 
kallu is said to communicate directly with Waka and bless the com- 
munity in his name. By contrast, some pastoral Oromo, such as 
the Guji and Borana, are regarded as monotheists. 

Foreign Missions 

In a 1944 decree, Haile Selassie forbade missionaries from at- 
tempting to convert Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and they had 



124 



Priest conducting a 
service at a church 
in Debre Markos 
Courtesy United Nations (Y. Levy) 




little success in proselytizing among Muslims. Most missionaries 
focused their activities on adherents of local religions — but still with 
only little success. In the 1960s, there were about 900 foreign mis- 
sionaries in Ethiopia, but many were laypersons. This fact was con- 
sistent with the emphasis of many such missions on the education 
and vocational training of the people they sought to serve. One 
obstacle to the missions' success in the rural areas may have been 
the imperial government's insistence that Amharic be used as the 
medium of religious instruction except in the earliest stages of mis- 
sionary activity. There was also some evidence that Ethiopian Or- 
thodox priests residing outside the Amhara and Tigray heartland, 
as well as local administrators, were hostile to the missionaries. 

In the late 1960s, there were 350,000 to 400,000 Protestants and 
Catholics in Ethiopia, roughly 1.5 percent of the population. About 
36 percent of these were Catholics, divided among those adhering 
to the Ethiopian rite (about 60 percent) and those following the 
Latin rite. The three bishops were Ethiopians. Protestants were 
divided among a number of denominations. The largest, nearly 
equaling in number the size of the Catholic congregation, consisted 
of adherents to the Fellowship of Evangelical Believers, the Ethio- 
pian branch of the Sudan Interior Mission. The next largest group, 
about half as large, was the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane 
Yesus, an entity that was fostered jointly by Scandinavian, Ger- 
man, and American Lutheran groups. This group claimed 400,000 



125 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

members in the late 1970s and had an Ethiopian head. Several other 
groups, including the Bethel Evangelical Church (sponsored by the 
American United Presbyterian Church) and the Seventh-Day Ad- 
ventists, had between 5,000 and 15,000 members each. 

Many missionaries and other observers claimed that the revolu- 
tionary regime opposed missions and harassed the clergy and com- 
municants. Although the government denied these accusations, its 
approach to those accused of not accepting its authority suggests 
that the mission churches and the regime had not reached a modus 
vivendi. 

Education 

Education in Ethiopia was oriented toward religious learning until 
after World War II, when the government began to emphasize secu- 
lar learning as a means to achieve social mobility and national de- 
velopment. By 1974, despite efforts by the government to improve 
the situation, less than 10 percent of the total population was liter- 
ate. There were several reasons for this lack of progress. Accord- 
ing to Teshome G. Wagaw, a former educator at Haile Selassie 
I University, the primary failure of the education system was its 
inability to "satisfy the aspirations of the majority of the people 
and to prepare in any adequate way those passing through its 
ranks." Teshome described the system as elitist, inflexible, and 
unresponsive to local needs. He was equally critical of the distri- 
bution of educational opportunity, which favored a few adminis- 
trative regions and urban centers at the expense of a predominantly 
illiterate rural population. The education system also suffered from 
inadequate financing. 

In the early 1990s, the problems Ethiopians faced in making their 
education system responsive to national needs remained formida- 
ble. Social and political change had affected many traditional ele- 
ments of national life, but it was too soon to predict what effect 
the changes would have on the progress of education. 

Education During Imperial Rule 

Until the early 1900s, formal education was confined to a sys- 
tem of religious instruction organized and presented under the aegis 
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Church schools prepared in- 
dividuals for the clergy and for other religious duties and positions. 
In the process, these schools also provided religious education to 
the children of the nobility and to the sons of limited numbers of 
tenant farmers and servants associated with elite families. Such 
schools mainly served Amhara and Tigray inhabitants of the cen- 
tral highlands. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Menelik 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



II had also permitted the establishment of European missionary 
schools. At the same time, Islamic schools provided some educa- 
tion for a small part of the Muslim population. 

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the education sys- 
tem's failure to meet the needs of people involved in statecraft, 
diplomacy, commerce, and industry led to the introduction of 
government-sponsored secular education. The first public school 
was established in Addis Ababa in 1907, and a year later a primary 
school opened in Harer. Foreign languages, elementary mathemat- 
ics, and rudimentary science were taught in French to a limited 
number of students, along with Amharic and religious subjects. 

In 1925 the government adopted a plan to expand secular edu- 
cation, but ten years later there were only 8,000 students enrolled 
in twenty public schools. A few students also studied abroad on 
government scholarships. Schools closed during the Italian occu- 
pation of 1936-41. After the restoration of Ethiopian independence, 
schools reopened, but the system faced shortages of teachers, text- 
books, and facilities. The government recruited foreign teachers 
for primary and secondary schools to offset the teacher shortage. 
By 1952 a total of 60,000 students were enrolled in 400 primary 
schools, eleven secondary schools, and three institutions offering 
college-level courses. In the 1960s, 310 mission and privately oper- 
ated schools with an enrollment of 52,000 supplemented the coun- 
try's public school system. 

In May 1961, Ethiopia hosted the United Nations-sponsored 
Conference of African States on the Development of Education. 
Among other things, the conference highlighted Ethiopia's educa- 
tional deficiencies. The Ethiopian education system, especially in 
primary and secondary education, was ranked at the bottom among 
African nations. There were school and teacher shortages, a high 
dropout rate, and low overall attendance rates (about 10 percent 
among all school-age children in the country), especially among 
females, non-Christians, and rural children. Embarrassed by this 
record, the Ministry of Education developed a new education policy, 
which was in effect until 1974. Designed in conjunction with the 
objectives of the government's second and third five-year develop- 
ment plans, extending from 1962 to 1973, the policy gave prece- 
dence to the establishment of technical training schools, although 
academic education also was expanded. Curriculum revisions in- 
troduced a mix of academic and nonacademic subjects. But Am- 
haric became the language of instruction for the entire primary 
cycle, which handicapped any child who had a different primary 
language. 



127 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Under the revised system, the two-year junior secondary schools 
offered a general academic program for individuals who wished 
to continue their education. A number of vocational subjects pre- 
pared others to enter technical or vocational schools. Some practi- 
cal experience in the use of tools was provided, which qualified 
graduates as semiskilled workers. The curriculum in the four-year 
senior secondary schools prepared students for higher education 
in Ethiopia or abroad. Successful completion of the cycle also quali- 
fied some for specialized agricultural or industrial institutes. Others 
were qualified for intermediate positions in the civil service, the 
armed forces, or private enterprises. 

There were two institutions of higher education: Haile Selassie 
I University in Addis Ababa, formed by imperial charter in 1961 , 
and the private University of Asmera, founded by a Roman Catho- 
lic religious order based in Italy. 

Between 1961 and 1971, the government expanded the public 
school system more than fourfold, and it declared universal primary 
education a long-range objective. In 1971 there were 1,300 primary 
and secondary schools and 13,000 teachers, and enrollment had 
reached 600,000. In addition, many families sent their children 
to schools operated by missionary groups and private agencies. But 
the system suffered from a shortage of qualified personnel, a lack 
of funds, and overcrowded facilities. Often financed with foreign 
aid, school construction usually proceeded faster than the training 
and certification of teachers. Moreover, many teachers did not stay 
long in the profession. Sources such as the United States Peace 
Corps and teachers from the National Service program (univer- 
sity students who taught for one year after completing their junior 
year) served only as stopgaps. In addition, most schools were in 
the major towns. Crowded and understaffed, those schools in small 
towns and rural areas provided a poor education. 

The inadequacies of public education before the mid-1970s re- 
sulted partly from the school financing system. To finance primary 
education, the government levied a special tax on agricultural land. 
Local boards of education supervised the disbursement of tax re- 
ceipts. (The central government financed secondary and higher edu- 
cation.) The system's inequities fostered the expansion of primary 
education in wealthier regions rather than in poorer ones. More- 
over, urban inhabitants, who did not have to pay the tax but who 
were predominantly represented in the schools, sent their children 
at the expense of the taxpaying rural landowners and poor peasants. 
The government attempted to rectify this imbalance in 1970 by 
imposing an education tax on urban landowners and a 2 percent 
tax on the personal income of urban residents. But the Ministry 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



of Finance treated the funds collected as part of the general revenue 
and never spent the money for its intended purpose. 

Despite the fact that money spent on education increased from 
10 percent of total government expenditures in 1968 to 20 percent 
in the early 1970s, funding remained inadequate. Expenditure on 
education was only 1.4 to 3 percent of the gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) between 1968 and 1974, compared with 2.5 
to 6 percent for other African countries during the same period. 

Under the pressure of growing public dissatisfaction and mount- 
ing student activism in the university and secondary schools, the 
imperial government initiated a comprehensive study of the edu- 
cation system. Completed in July 1972, the Education Sector 
Review (ESR) recommended attaining universal primary educa- 
tion as quickly and inexpensively as possible, ruralizing the cur- 
ricula through the inclusion of informal training, equalizing 
educational opportunities, and relating the entire system to the na- 
tional development process. 

The ESR criticized the education system's focus on preparing 
students for the next level of academic study and on the comple- 
tion of rigid qualifying examinations. Also criticized was the govern- 
ment's lack of concern for the young people who dropped out before 
learning marketable skills, a situation that contributed to unem- 
ployment. The report stated that, by contrast, "The recommend- 
ed system would provide a self-contained program at each level 
that would be terminal for most students." 

The report was not published until February 1974, which gave 
time for rumors to generate opposition among students, parents, 
and the teachers' union to the ESR recommendations. Most re- 
sented what they considered the removal of education from its elite 
position. Many teachers also feared salary reductions. Strikes and 
widespread disturbances ensued, and the education crisis became 
a contributing factor in the imperial regime's fall later that year. 

Primary and Secondary Education since 1975 

After the overthrow of imperial rule, the provisional military 
government dismantled the feudal socioeconomic structure through 
a series of reforms that also affected educational development. By 
early 1975, the government had closed Haile Selassie I University 
and all senior secondary schools and had deployed some 60,000 
students and teachers to rural areas to participate in the govern- 
ment's Development Through Cooperation Campaign (commonly 
referred to as zemecha — see Glossary). The campaign's stated pur- 
poses were to promote land reform and improve agricultural 



129 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

production, health, and local administration and to teach peasants 
about the new political and social order. 

In 1975 the new regime nationalized all private schools, except 
church-affiliated ones, and made them part of the public school 
system. Additionally, the government reorganized Haile Selassie 
I University and renamed it Addis Ababa University. It also in- 
itiated reforms of the education system based partly on ESR recom- 
mendations and partly on the military regime's socialist ideology. 
However, no meaningful education occurred (except at the primary 
level) from 1975 to 1978 because of the social turmoil, which pit- 
ted the regime against numerous opposition forces, including 
students. 

Beginning in 1975, a new education policy emphasized improving 
learning opportunities in the rural areas as a means of increasing 
economic productivity. In the mid-1980s, the education system was 
still based on a structure of primary, secondary, and higher edu- 
cation levels, much as it was during the imperial regime. However, 
the government's objective was to establish an eight-year unified 
education system at the primary level. Preliminary to implement- 
ing this program, officials tested a new curriculum in seventy pilot 
schools. This curriculum emphasized expanded opportunities for 
nonacademic training. The new approach also decentralized con- 
trol and operation of primary and secondary schools to the sub- 
regional level, where the curriculum addressed local requirements. 
In each case, committees drawn from the peasant associations and 
kebeles and augmented by at least one teacher and one student over 
the age of sixteen from each school administered the public schools. 
Students used free textbooks in local languages. In late 1978, the 
government expanded the program to include nine languages, and 
it adopted plans to add five others. 

There were also changes in the distribution and number of schools 
and the size and composition of the student body. The military 
regime worked toward a more even distribution of schools by con- 
centrating its efforts on small towns and rural areas that had been 
neglected during the imperial regime. With technical assistance from 
the Ministry of Education, individual communities performed all 
primary school construction. In large part because of such com- 
munity involvement, the number of primary schools grew from 
3,196 in 1974/75 to 7,900 in 1985/86 (the latest years for which 
figures were available in mid- 1991), an average increase of 428 
schools annually (see table 5, Appendix). The number of primary 
schools increased significantly in all regions except three, includ- 
ing Eritrea and Tigray, where there was a decline because of con- 
tinuing insurgencies. In Addis Ababa, the number of primary 



130 



Students in a school near Holeta 
Courtesy International Development Association (Ray Muldoon) 

schools declined because of the closure or absorption of nongovern- 
ment schools, especially religious ones, into the government sys- 
tem. 

Primary school enrollment increased from about 957,300 in 
1974/75 to nearly 2,450,000 in 1985/86. There were stiU variations 
among regions in the number of students enrolled and a disparity 
in the enrollment of boys and girls. Nevertheless, while the enroll- 
ment of boys more than doubled, that of girls more than tripled 
(see table 6, Appendix). Urban areas had a higher ratio of chil- 
dren enrolled in schools, as well as a higher proportion of female 
students, compared with rural areas. 

The number of junior secondary schools almost doubled, with 
fourfold increases in Gojam, Kefa, and Welega. Most junior secon- 
dary schools were attached to primary schools. 

The number of senior secondary schools almost doubled as well, 
with fourfold increases in Arsi, Bale, Gojam, Gonder, and Welo. 
The prerevolutionary distribution of schools had shown a concen- 
tration in the urban areas of a few administrative regions. In 1974/ 
75 about 55 percent of senior secondary schools were in Eritrea 
and Shewa, including Addis Ababa. In 1985/86 the figure was down 
to 40 percent. Although there were significantly fewer girls enrolled 
at the secondary level, the proportion of females in the school system 



131 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

at all levels and in all regions increased from about 32 percent in 
1974/75 to 39 percent in 1985/86. 

The number of teachers also increased, especially in senior secon- 
dary schools (see table 7 , Appendix). However, this increase had 
not kept pace with student enrollment. The student- teacher ratio 
went from forty-four to one in 1975 to fifty-four to one in 1983 
in primary schools and also increased from thirty-five to one in 
1975 to forty-four to one in 1983 in secondary schools. 

Although the government achieved impressive improvements in 
primary and secondary education, prospects for universal educa- 
tion in the near future were not bright. In 1985/86, the latest year 
for which government statistics were available, enrollment in the 
country's primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary schools 
totaled 3.1 million students, up from the nearly 785,000 enrolled 
a decade earlier. Only about 2.5 million (42 percent) of the 6 mil- 
lion primary school-age children were enrolled in school in 1985/86. 
Junior secondary school enrollments (grades seven and eight) 
amounted to 363,000, while at the secondary school level (grades 
nine through twelve), only 292,385 out of 5.5 million, or 5.3 per- 
cent, attended school. In addition, prospects for continued study 
for most primary school graduates were slim. In 1985/86 there was 
only one junior secondary school for every eight primary schools 
and only one senior secondary school for every four junior secon- 
dary schools. There were many primary school students for whom 
space would not be available and who therefore would most likely 
end up on the job market, where work already was scarce for peo- 
ple with limited educations. 

School shortages also resulted in crowding, a situation aggra- 
vated by the rural-urban influx of the late 1980s. Most schools oper- 
ated on a morning and afternoon shift system, particularly in urban 
areas. A teacher shortage exacerbated the problems created by 
crowded classrooms. In addition to these problems were those of 
the destruction and looting of educational facilities as a result of 
fighting in northern regions. By 1990/91 destruction was especially 
severe in Eritrea, Tigray, and Gonder, but looting of schools was 
reported in other parts of the country as well. 

Higher and Vocational Education since 1975 

In 1977 the revolutionary regime issued Proclamation No. 109, 
which created the Commission for Higher Education. This docu- 
ment also outlined the main objectives of higher education insti- 
tutions as follows: to train individuals for high-level positions in 
accordance with the national plan of development and to provide 
qualified medium-level personnel to meet the immediate needs of 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



the economy; to improve the quality of education, strengthen and 
expand tertiary-level institutions, and establish new research and 
training centers; and to contribute to a better standard of living 
among the masses by developing science, technology, the arts, and 
literature. 

Additionally, Addis Ababa reoriented institutions of higher edu- 
cation to reflect the new regime's objectives and modified admis- 
sion criteria to benefit students from small towns and rural areas. 
But the government also assigned many students to specialize in 
certain fields, which denied them the opportunity to decide on 
careers of their choosing. 

Higher education expanded modestly in the period after 1975. 
The College of Agriculture at Alemaya, which was part of Addis 
Ababa University, was granted independent university status in 
1985. A postgraduate studies program was established in 1978, 
which had an enrollment of 246 students in 1982/83, of whom fifteen 
were women. Graduate programs were offered in several fields, 
including engineering, natural science, agriculture, the social sci- 
ences, and medicine. Several research institutes supported these 
institutions of higher education. Addis Ababa University also pro- 
vided an evening extension program offering courses in many fields. 

Other diploma- granting independent colleges trained middle-level 
manpower in several fields. These included the College of Teacher 
Education, the Junior College of Commerce, and the Municipal 
Technical College, all in Addis Ababa. There were also junior col- 
leges of agriculture in Ambo and Jima, the Institute of Animal 
Health Assistants in Debre Zeyit, and the Institute of Health 
Sciences in Jima. Altogether, there were approximately twelve col- 
leges or universities in the country in the early 1990s, with intense 
competition among students for admission. 

Enrollment in higher education grew from 4,500 in 1970 to more 
than 18,400 in 1985/86, of whom nearly 11 percent were women. 
But enrollment was low, considering the size of the population. 
Space limitations at the colleges and universities caused the govern- 
ment to raise admission standards. To narrow the gap somewhat, 
the number of students sent abroad on scholarships and fellowships 
grew from an annual average of 433 during 1969-73 to about 1 ,200 
during 1978-82. 

The number of Ethiopians on teaching staffs also grew. The 
faculty of Addis Ababa University increased from 437 in 1970 to 
1,296 in 1983, with a corresponding increase in Ethiopian faculty 
from 48 percent to 74 percent of this total during the same period. 

There was also more emphasis on the creation of technical and 
vocational schools, most of which were operated by the government. 



133 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The Ministry of Education operated or supervised nine such schools 
scattered around the country. These schools had an enrollment of 
more than 4,200 in 1985/86, and their graduates were in great de- 
mand by industries. With Soviet assistance, Ethiopia established 
its first polytechnic institute, in Bahir Dar, in the 1960s. It trained 
personnel in agromechanics, industrial chemistry, electricity, and 
textile and metal-working technology. In addition, a system of 
general polytechnic education had been introduced into the senior 
secondary school curriculum so that those who did not continue 
their education still could venture into the skilled job market. 

The government also introduced vocational training to upgrade 
peasant skills. The peasant training centers, operated by the Minis- 
try of Agriculture, provided training in vocational trades related 
to agriculture for periods ranging from three weeks to six months. 
The country had twelve such centers, which trained more than 
200,000 farmers from 1974 to 1988. 

Literacy 

Among the revolutionary regime's few successes was the national 
literacy campaign. The literacy rate, under 10 percent during the 
imperial regime, increased to about 63 percent by 1984, accord- 
ing to government figures. Others sources, however, estimated it 
at around 37 percent. In 1990/91 an adult literacy rate of just over 
60 percent was still being reported in government as well as in some 
international reports. As with the 1984 data, it several wise to ex- 
ercise caution with regard to the latest figure. As some observers 
pointed out, defining just what the term ''literacy" means presented 
a problem; in addition, the military government's desire to report 
as high a literacy rate as possible had to be taken into account. 

The national literacy campaign began in early 1975 when the 
government mobilized more than 60,000 students and teachers, 
sending them all over the country for two-year terms of service. 
This experience was crucial to the creation in 1979 of the National 
Literacy Campaign Coordinating Committee (NLCCC) and a na- 
tionwide effort to raise literacy levels. The government organized 
the campaign in rounds, which began in urban centers and spread 
outward to the remote parts of the country up to Round 1 2 . Offi- 
cials originally conducted the literacy training in five languages: 
Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, Welamo, and Somali. The number 
of languages was later expanded to fifteen, which represented about 
93 percent of the population. By the end of Round 12, in the late 
1980s, about 17 million people had been registered, of whom 12 
million had passed the literacy test. Women represented about half 
of those enrolled. 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



According to government sources, about 1.5 million people even- 
tually worked in the campaign. They included students, civil ser- 
vants, teachers, military personnel, housewives, and members of 
religious groups, all of whom, it was claimed, offered their services 
freely. Adult literacy classes used primary and secondary school 
facilities in many areas. Officials distributed more than 22 million 
reading booklets for beginners and more than 9 million texts for 
postliteracy participants. The Ministry of Education also stocked 
reading centers with appropriate texts. These books focused on 
topics such as agriculture, health, and basic technology. To con- 
solidate the gains from the literacy campaign, the government 
offered follow-up courses for participants up to grade four, after 
which they could enroll in the regular school system. In addition, 
national newspapers included regular columns for new readers. 
The literacy campaign received international acclaim when the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza- 
tion (UNESCO) awarded Ethiopia the International Reading As- 
sociation Literacy Prize in 1980. 

Foreign Educational Assistance 

The regime's efforts to resolve the country's educational problems 
received considerable support from abroad. The initial cost of re- 
orienting the education system toward national development goals 
through improving opportunities in remote rural areas had been 
estimated at US$34.7 million. Of this amount, US$23 million was 
received from the International Development Association (IDA). 
By late 1978, the European Community had contributed US$2.6 
million to help with the government's education development plan. 
The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) sent teachers, 
training specialists, and curriculum development experts. The 
Soviet Union provided hundreds of scholarships. In 1978 there were 
1 ,200 Ethiopian children (aged nine to fifteen years) from poor fam- 
ilies who attended two special schools in Cuba for an undeter- 
mined period. Other students followed this initial group. In 1990 
the Swedish International Development Authority granted US$10.5 
million for elementary education. This aid helped make possible 
the construction of about 300 schools. The Swedish agency already 
had contributed to the construction of 7,000 elementary schools. 

Health and Welfare 

The main cause of many of Ethiopia's health problems is the 
relative isolation of large segments of the population from the 
modern sector. Additionally, widespread illiteracy prevents the 



135 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

dissemination of information on modern health practices. A shortage 
of trained personnel and insufficient funding also hampers the 
equitable distribution of health services. Moreover, most health 
institutions were concentrated in urban centers prior to 1974 and 
were concerned with curative rather than preventive medicine. 

Western medicine came to Ethiopia during the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century with the arrival of missionary doctors, 
nurses, and midwives. But there was little progress on measures 
to cope with the acute and endemic diseases that debilitated large 
segments of the population until the government established its 
Ministry of Public Health in 1948. The World Health Organiza- 
tion (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and 
the United States Agency for International Development (AID) 
provided technical and financial assistance to eliminate the sources 
of health problems. 

In addition to establishing hospitals, health centers, and out- 
patient clinics, the government initiated programs to train Ethio- 
pian health care personnel so that they could supplement the private 
institutions that existed in a few major urban centers. The few 
government campaigns that exhorted the people to cooperate in 
the fight against disease and unhealthful living conditions were 
mainly directed at the urban population. 

By the mid-1970s, the number of modern medical facilities had 
increased relatively slowly — particularly in rural areas, where at 
least 80 percent of the people still did not have access to techniques 
or services that would improve health conditions (see table 8; table 
9, Appendix). Forty- six percent of the hospital beds were concen- 
trated in Addis Ababa, Asmera, Dire Dawa, and Harer. In the 
absence of modern medical services, the rural population continued 
to rely on traditional folk medicine. According to official statistics, 
in 1983/84 there were 546 physicians in the country to serve a popu- 
lation of 42 million, a ratio of roughly one physician per 77,000 
people, one of the worst ratios in the world. Less than 40 percent 
of the population was within reach of modern health services. 

As in most developing countries in the early 1990s, Ethiopia's 
main health problems were communicable diseases caused by poor 
sanitation and malnutrition and exacerbated by the shortage of 
trained manpower and health facilities. Mortality and morbidity 
data were based primarily on health facility records, which may 
not reflect the real incidence of disease in the population. Accord- 
ing to such records, the leading causes of hospital deaths were dysen- 
tery and gastroenteritis (11 percent), tuberculosis (11 percent), 
pneumonia (11 percent), malnutrition and anemia (7 percent), liver 
diseases including hepatitis (6 percent), tetanus (3 percent), and 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



malaria (3 percent). The leading causes of outpatient morbidity 
in children under age five were upper respiratory illnesses, diar- 
rhea, eye infections including trachoma, skin infections, malnutri- 
tion, and fevers. Nearly 60 percent of childhood morbidity was 
preventable. The leading causes of adult morbidity were dysen- 
tery and gastrointestinal infections, malaria, parasitic worms, skin 
and eye diseases, venereal diseases, rheumatism, malnutrition, 
fevers, upper respiratory tract infections, and tuberculosis. These 
diseases were endemic and quite widespread, reflecting the fact that 
Ethiopians had no access to modern health care. 

Tuberculosis still affected much of the population despite efforts 
to immunize as many people as possible. Venereal diseases, par- 
ticularly syphilis and gonorrhea, were prevalent in towns and ci- 
ties, where prostitution contributed to the problem. The high 
prevalence of worms and other intestinal parasites indicated poor 
sanitary facilities and education and the fact that potable water was 
available to less than 14 percent of the population. Tapeworm in- 
fection was common because of the popular practice of eating raw 
or partially cooked meat. 

Schistosomiasis, leprosy, and yellow fever were serious health 
hazards in certain regions of the country. Schistosomiasis, a dis- 
ease caused by a parasite transmitted from snails to humans through 
the medium of water, occurred mainly in the northern part of the 
highlands, in the western lowlands, and in Eritrea and Harerge. 
Leprosy was common in Harerge and Gojam and in areas bor- 
dering Sudan and Kenya. The incidence of typhoid, whooping 
cough, rabies, cholera, and other diseases had diminished in the 
1970s because of school immunization programs, but serious out- 
breaks still plagued many rural areas. Frequent famine made health 
conditions even worse. 

Smallpox has been stamped out in Ethiopia, the last outbreak 
having occurred among the nomadic population in the late 1970s. 
Malaria, which is endemic in 70 percent of the country, was once 
a scourge in areas below 1,500 meters elevation. Its threat had 
declined considerably as a result of government efforts supported 
by WHO and AID, but occasional seasonal outbreaks were com- 
mon. The most recent occurrence was in 1989, and the outbreak 
was largely the result of heavy rain, unusually high temperatures, 
and the setding of peasants in new locations. There was also a report 
of a meningitis epidemic in southern and western Ethiopia in 1989, 
even though the government had taken preventive measures by 
vaccinating 1.6 million people. The logistics involved in reaching 
the 70 percent of Ethiopians who lived more than three days' walk 



137 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



from a health center with refrigerated vaccines and penicillin 
prevented the medical authorities from arresting the epidemic. 

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was a growing 
problem in Ethiopia. In 1985 the Ministry of Health reported the 
country's first AIDS case. In subsequent years, the government 
sponsored numerous AIDS studies and surveys. For example, in 
1988 the country's AIDS Control and Prevention Office conducted 
a study in twenty-four towns and discovered that an average of 
1 7 percent of the people in each town tested positive for the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the precursor of full-blown AIDS. 
A similar survey in Addis Ababa showed that 24 percent tested 
positive. 

In 1990 Mengistu Mihret, head of the Surveillance and Research 
Coordination Department of the AIDS Control and Prevention 
Office, indicated that AIDS was spreading more rapidly in heav- 
ily traveled areas. According to the Ministry of Health, there were 
two AIDS patients in the country in 1986, seventeen in 1987, eighty- 
five in 1988, 188 in 1989, and 355 as of mid-1990. Despite this 
dramatic growth rate, the number of reported AIDS cases in Ethio- 
pia was lower than in many other African countries. However, the 
difference likely reflected the comparatively small amount of 
resources being devoted to the study of AIDS. 

Starting in 1975, the regime embarked on the formulation of 
a new health policy emphasizing disease prevention and control, 
rural health services, and promotion of community involvement 
and self-reliance in health activities. The ground for the new pol- 
icy was broken during the student zemecha of 1975/76, which in- 
troduced peasants to the need for improved health standards. In 
1983 the government drew up a ten-year health perspective plan 
that was incorporated into the ten-year economic development plan 
launched in September 1984. The goal of this plan was the provi- 
sion of health services to 80 percent of the population by 1993/94. 
To achieve such a goal would have required an increase of over 
10 percent in annual budget allocations, which was unrealistic in 
view of fiscal constraints. 

The regime decentralized health care administration to the local 
level in keeping with its objective of community involvement in 
health matters. Regional Ministry of Health offices gave assistance 
in technical matters, but peasant associations and kebeles had con- 
siderable autonomy in educating people on health matters and in 
constructing health facilities in outlying areas. Starting in 1981, 
a hierarchy of community health services, health stations, health 
centers, rural hospitals, regional hospitals, and central referral hos- 
pitals were supposed to provide health care. By the late 1980s, 



138 




Nurses comfort a patient at a hospital in Addis Ababa. 

Courtesy World Vision (Bruce Brander) 

however, these facilities were available to only a small fraction of 
the country's population. 

At the bottom of the health-care pyramid was the community 
health service, designed to give every 1 ,000 people access to a com- 
munity health agent, someone with three months of training in en- 
vironmental sanitation and the treatment of simple diseases. In 
addition to the community health agent, there was a traditional 
birth attendant, with one month of training in prenatal and post- 
natal care and safe delivery practices. As of 1988, only about a 
quarter of the population was being served by a community health 
agent or a traditional birth attendant. Both categories were made 
up of volunteers chosen by the community and were supported by 
health assistants. 

Health assistants were full-time Ministry of Health workers with 
eighteen months of training, based at health stations ultimately to 
be provided at the rate of one health station per 10,000 popula- 
tion. Each health station was ultimately to be staffed by three health 
assistants. Ten health stations were supervised by one health center, 
which was designed to provide services for a 100,000-person seg- 
ment of the population. The Regional Health Department super- 
vised health centers. Rural hospitals with an average of seventy-five 
beds and general regional hospitals with 100 to 250 beds provided 



139 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

referral services for health centers. The six central referral hospi- 
tals were organized to provide care in all important specialties, train 
health professionals, and conduct research. There were a few 
specialized hospitals for leprosy and tuberculosis, but overall the 
lack of funds meant emphasis on building health centers and health 
stations rather than hospitals. 

Trained medical personnel were also in short supply. As noted 
previously, the ratio of citizens to physicians was one of the worst 
in the world. Of 4,000 positions for nurses, only half were filled, 
and half of all health stations were staffed by only one health assis- 
tant instead of the planned three. There were two medical schools — 
in Addis Ababa and Gonder — and one school of pharmacy, all 
managed by Addis Ababa University. The Gonder medical school 
also trained nurses and sanitation and laboratory technicians. The 
Ministry of Health ran three nursing schools and eleven schools 
for health assistants. Missionaries also ran two such schools. The 
regime increased the number of nurses to 385 and health assistants 
to 650 annually, but the health budget could not support this many 
new graduates. The quality of graduates had also not kept pace 
with the quantity of graduates. 

Since 1974 there have been modest improvements in national 
expenditures on public health. Between 1970 and 1975, the govern- 
ment spent about 5 percent of its total budget on health programs. 
From 1975 to 1978, annual expenditures varied between 5.5 and 
6.6 percent of outlays, and for the 1982-88 period total expendi- 
tures on the Ministry of Health were about 4 percent of total govern- 
ment expenditures. This was a low figure but comparable to that 
for other low-income African countries. Moreover, much of the 
real increases of 7 to 8 percent in the health budget went to salaries. 

A number of countries were generous in helping Ethiopia meet 
its health care needs. Cuba, the Soviet Union, and a number of 
East European countries provided medical assistance. In early 1980, 
nearly 300 Cuban medical technicians, including more than 100 
physicians, supported local efforts to resolve public health problems. 
Western aid for long-term development of Ethiopia's health sec- 
tor was modest, averaging about US$10 million annually, the lowest 
per capita assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. The main Western 
donors included Italy and Sweden. International organizations, 
namely UNICEF, WHO, and the United Nations Population 
Fund, also extended assistance. 

* * * 

Much of the literature on Ethiopian society is based on research 
concluded before the 1974 revolution. However, an increasing 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



number of post- 1974 works contain useful information on both the 
imperial and the revolutionary periods. 

An excellent linguistic study is Language in Ethiopia, edited by 
M. Lionel Bender et al. John Markakis's Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Tradi- 
tional Polity provides a useful assessment of Ethiopia's prerevolu- 
tionary social order with particular reference to the political 
ramifications of social stratification, interethnic relations, and land 
control. Donald N. Levine's Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution oj a Multi- 
Ethnic Society analyzes the main structural features of the tradition- 
al Amhara, Tigrayan, and Oromo sociocultural systems. Allan 
Hoben's Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia and Ambaye 
Zekarias's Land Tenure in Eritrea (Ethiopia) examine the land tenure 
system in the Amhara highlands and in Eritrea, respectively. 
Taddesse Tamrat's Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 and John 
Spencer Trimingham's Islam in Ethiopia are useful for an under- 
standing of the role of religion in Ethiopia. 

Richard K. Pankhurst's An Introduction to the Medical History of 
Ethiopia provides useful insight into the evolution of health prac- 
tices in Ethiopia. Implementing Educational Policies in Ethiopia by Fassil 
R. Kiros examines the revolutionary government's attempts to re- 
form Ethiopia's education system. Desta Asayehegn's Socio- Economic 
and Educational Reforms in Ethiopia, 1942-1974 analyzes the educa- 
tional changes made during Haile Selassie's last thirty- two years 
on the throne. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



141 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Coffee plant foliage and roasted coffee beans 



Restructuring the economy along socialist lines and 

achieving sustained economic growth were the two major economic 
objectives of the Provisional Military Administrative Council when 
it assumed power in 1974. After the 1974 revolution, the pace of 
economic restructuring was accelerated by a barrage of legislation. 
A key part of the effort to reshape the economy was the implemen- 
tation of Africa's most ambitious land reform program, which in- 
cluded nationalization of both rural and urban land. Most of 
Ethiopia's industries, large-scale agricultural farms, and financial 
institutions were brought under the control of the government, and 
both rural and urban communities were organized into a hierar- 
chy of associations. Pursuit of the military regime's second objec- 
tive — sustained economic growth — was less successful. Drought, 
regional conflicts, inflexible government policy, and lack of confi- 
dence by the private sector seriously affected the economy. Fall- 
ing productivity, soaring inflation, growing dependence on foreign 
aid and loans, high unemployment, and a deteriorating balance 
of payments all combined to create a deepening economic crisis. 
In 1990 Ethiopia had a gross national product of US$6 billion and 
a per capita income of about US$120, one of the lowest per capita 
incomes of any country in the world. 

Following the 1974 revolution, the socialist government devel- 
oped a series of annual plans and a ten-year perspective plan to 
revitalize the war-ravaged economy. Although the annual plans 
helped the regime deal with some urgent economic problems, such 
as shortages of food and consumer goods, decline in productivity, 
lack of foreign exchange, and rising unemployment, these plans 
failed to move the country significantly closer to attaining its long- 
term development objectives. In 1984/85 (Ethiopian calendar 
year — see Glossary) the military government launched a new ten- 
year perspective plan, which represented a renewed commitment 
to economic growth and structural transformation of the economy. 
However, the economy continued to deteriorate. In response, the 
regime introduced several additional reforms. For instance, the 1988 
Investment Code allowed unlimited participation of the private sec- 
tor in certain areas of the economy. In January 1988, under pres- 
sure from aid donor countries, the government agreed to restructure 
agricultural and farm price policies. Finally, in March 1990 Presi- 
dent Mengistu Haile Mariam announced the end of the country's 



145 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Marxist economic system and the beginning of a mixed economy. 
Despite these reforms, the economy failed to improve. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

Developments up to 1974 

By African standards, Ethiopia is a potentially wealthy coun- 
try, with fertile soil and good rainfall over large regions. Farmers 
produce a variety of grains, including wheat, corn, and millet. 
Coffee also grows well on southern slopes. Herders can raise cat- 
tle, sheep, and goats in nearly all parts of the country. Additionally, 
Ethiopia possesses several valuable minerals, including gold and 
platinum. 

Unlike most sub-Saharan African countries, Ethiopia's resources 
have enabled the country to maintain contacts with the outside world 
for centuries. Since ancient times, Ethiopian traders exchanged 
gold, ivory, musk, and wild animal skins for salt and luxury goods, 
such as silk and velvet. By the late nineteenth century, coffee had 
become one of Ethiopia's more important cash crops. At that time, 
most trade flowed along two major trade routes, both of which ter- 
minated in the far southwest in the Kefa-Jima region. From there, 
one route went north to Mitsiwa via Gonder and Adwa, the other 
along the Awash River valley to Harer and then on to Berbera or 
Zeila on the Red Sea. 

Despite its many riches, Ethiopia never became a great trading 
nation. Most Ethiopians despised traders, preferring instead to emu- 
late the country's warriors and priests. After establishing a foothold 
in the country, Greek, Armenian, and Arab traders became the 
economic intermediaries between Ethiopia and the outside world. 
Arabs also settled in the interior and eventually dominated all com- 
mercial activity except petty trade. 

When their occupation of Ethiopia ended in 1941, the Italians 
left behind them a country whose economic structure was much 
as it had been for centuries. There had been some improvements 
in communications, particularly in the area of road building, and 
attempts had been made to establish a few small industries and to 
introduce commercial farming, particularly in Eritrea, which Italy 
had occupied since 1890. But these changes were limited. With only 
a small proportion of the population participating in the money econ- 
omy, trade consisted mostly of barter. Wage labor was limited, eco- 
nomic units were largely self-sufficient, foreign trade was negligible, 
and the market for manufactured goods was extremely small. 

During the late 1940s and 1950s, much of the economy remained 
unchanged. The government focused its development efforts on 



146 



The Economy 



expansion of the bureaucratic structure and ancillary services. Most 
farmers cultivated small plots of land or herded cattle. Traditional 
and primitive farming methods provided the population with a sub- 
sistence standard of living. In addition, many nomadic peoples 
raised livestock and followed a life of seasonal movement in drier 
areas. The agricultural sector grew slightly, and the industrial sector 
represented a small part of the total economy. 

By the early 1950s, Emperor Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930-74) 
had renewed calls for a transition from a subsistence economy to 
an agro-industrial economy. To accomplish this task, Ethiopia 
needed an infrastructure to exploit resources, a material base to 
improve living conditions, and better health, education, commu- 
nications, and other services. A key element of the emperor's new 
economic policy was the adoption of centrally administered develop- 
ment plans. Between 1945 and 1957, several technical missions, 
including one each from the United States, the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and Yugoslavia, 
prepared a series of development plans. However, these plans failed 
to achieve any meaningful results, largely because basic statistical 
data were scarce and the government's administrative and techni- 
cal capabilities were minimal. 

In 1954/55 the government created the National Economic Coun- 
cil to coordinate the state's development plans. This agency, which 
was a policy-making body chaired by the emperor, devoted its at- 
tention to improving agricultural and industrial productivity, 
eradicating illiteracy and diseases, and improving living standards 
for all Ethiopians. The National Economic Council helped to pre- 
pare Ethiopia's first and second five-year plans. 

The First Five- Year Plan (1957-61) sought to develop a strong 
infrastructure, particularly in transportation, construction, and 
communications, to link isolated regions. Another goal was the es- 
tablishment of an indigenous cadre of skilled and semiskilled per- 
sonnel to work in processing industries to help reduce Ethiopia's 
dependence on imports. Lastiy, the plan aimed to accelerate agricul- 
tural development by promoting commercial agricultural ventures. 
The Second Five-Year Plan (1962-67) signaled the start of a twenty- 
year program to change Ethiopia's predominandy agricultural econ- 
omy to an agro-industrial one. The plan's objectives included diver- 
sification of production, introduction of modern processing methods, 
and expansion of the economy's productive capacity to increase the 
country's growth rate. The Third Five-Year Plan (1968-73) also 
sought to facilitate Ethiopia's economic well-being by raising manu- 
facturing and agro-industrial performance. However, unlike its 



147 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

predecessors, the third plan expressed the government's willing- 
ness to expand educational opportunities and to improve peasant 
agriculture. Total investment for the First Five- Year Plan reached 
839.6 million birr (for value of the birr — see Glossary), about 25 
percent above the planned 674 million birr figure; total expendi- 
ture for the Second Five-Year Plan was 13 percent higher than the 
planned 1 ,694 million birr figure. The allocation for the Third Five- 
Year Plan was 3,115 million birr. 

Several factors hindered Ethiopia's development planning. Apart 
from the fact that the government lacked the administrative and 
technical capabilities to implement a national development plan, 
staffing problems plagued the Planning Commission (which pre- 
pared the first and second plans) and the Ministry of Planning 
(which prepared the third). Many project managers failed to achieve 
plan objectives because they neglected to identify the resources (per- 
sonnel, equipment, and funds) and to establish the organizational 
structures necessary to facilitate large-scale economic development. 

During the First Five-Year Plan, the gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) increased at a 3.2 percent annual rate as op- 
posed to the projected figure of 3.7 percent, and growth in eco- 
nomic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and mining failed 
to meet the national plan's targets. Exports increased at a 3.5 per- 
cent annual rate during the first plan, whereas imports grew at a 
rate of 6.4 percent per annum, thus failing to correct the negative 
balance of trade that had existed since 1951. 

The Second Five-Year Plan and Third Five-Year Plan anticipated 
that the economy would grow at an annual rate of 4.3 percent and 
6.0 percent, respectively. Officials also expected agriculture, manu- 
facturing, and transportation and communications to grow at 
respective rates of 2.5, 27.3, and 6.7 percent annually during the 
Second Five-Year Plan and at respective rates of 2.9, 14.9, and 
10.9 percent during the Third Five-Year Plan. The Planning Com- 
mission never assessed the performance of these two plans, largely 
because of a shortage of qualified personnel. 

However, according to data from the Ethiopian government's 
Central Statistical Authority, during the 1960/61 to 1973/74 pe- 
riod the economy achieved sustained economic growth. Between 
1960 and 1970, for example, Ethiopia enjoyed an annual 4.4 per- 
cent average growth rate in per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary). The manufacturing sector's growth rate 
more than doubled (from 1.9 percent in 1960/61 to 4.4 percent 
in 1973/74), and the growth rate for the wholesale, retail trade, 
transportation, and communications sectors increased from 9.3 per- 
cent to 15.6 percent. 



148 



The Economy 



Relative to its neighbors, Ethiopia's economic performance was 
mixed. Ethiopia's 4.4 percent average per capita GDP growth rate 
was higher than Sudan's 1.3 percent rate or Somalia's 1 percent 
rate. However, Kenya's GDP grew at an estimated 6 percent an- 
nual rate, and Uganda achieved a 5.6 percent growth rate during 
the same 1960/61 to 1972/73 period. 

By the early 1970s, Ethiopia's economy not only had started to 
grow but also had begun to diversify into areas such as manufac- 
turing and services. However, these changes failed to improve the 
lives of most Ethiopians. About four-fifths of the population were 
subsistence farmers who lived in poverty because they used most 
of their meager production to pay taxes, rents, debt payments, and 
bribes. On a broader level, from 1953 to 1974 the balance of trade 
registered annual deficits. The only exception was 1973, when a 
combination of unusually large receipts from the export of oilseeds 
and pulses and an unusually small rise in import values resulted 
in a favorable balance of payments of 454 million birr. With the 
country registering trade deficits, the government attempted to re- 
strict imports and to substitute locally produced industrial goods 
to improve the trade balance. Despite these efforts, however, the 
unfavorable trade balance continued. As a result, foreign grants 
and loans financed much of the balance of payments deficit. 

Postrevolution Period 

The 1974 revolution resulted in the nationalization and restruc- 
turing of the Ethiopian economy. After the revolution, the coun- 
try's economy can be viewed as having gone through four phases 
(see table 10, Appendix). 

Internal political upheaval, armed conflict, and radical institu- 
tional reform marked the 1974-78 period of the revolution. There 
was little economic growth; instead, the government's nationali- 
zation measures and the highly unstable political climate caused 
economic dislocation in sectors such as agriculture and manufac- 
turing. Additionally, the military budget consumed a substantial 
portion of the nation's resources. As a result of these problems, 
GDP increased at an average annual rate of only 0.4 percent. 
Moreover, the current account deficit and the overall fiscal deficit 
widened, and the retail price index jumped, experiencing a 16.5 
percent average annual increase. 

In the second phase (1978-80), the economy began to recover 
as the government consolidated power and implemented institu- 
tional reforms. The government's new Development Through 
Cooperation Campaign (commonly referred to as zemecha — see Glos- 
sary) also contributed to the economy's improvement. More 



149 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

important, security conditions improved as internal and external 
threats subsided. In the aftermath of the 1977-78 Ogaden War and 
the decline in rebel activity in Eritrea, Addis Ababa set produc- 
tion targets and mobilized the resources needed to improve eco- 
nomic conditions. Consequently, GDP grew at an average annual 
rate of 5.7 percent. Benefiting from good weather, agricultural 
production increased at an average annual rate of 3.6 percent, and 
manufacturing increased at an average annual rate of 18.9 per- 
cent, as many closed plants, particularly in Eritrea, reopened. The 
current account deficit and the overall fiscal deficit remained below 
5 percent of GDP during this period. 

In the third phase (1980-85), the economy experienced a set- 
back. Except for Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY — see Glossary) 1982/83, 
the growth of GDP declined. Manufacturing took a downturn as 
well, and agriculture reached a crisis stage. Four factors accounted 
for these developments. First, the 1984-85 drought affected almost 
all regions of the country. As a result, the government committed 
scarce resources to famine relief efforts while tabling long-term de- 
velopment projects. Consequently, the external accounts (as shown 
in the current account deficit and the debt service ratio) and the 
overall fiscal deficit worsened, despite international drought as- 
sistance totaling more than US$450 million. Notwithstanding these 
efforts, close to 8 million people became famine victims during the 
drought of the mid-1980s, and about 1 million died. Second, the 
manufacturing sector stagnated as agricultural inputs declined. Also, 
many industries exhausted their capacity to increase output; as a 
result, they failed to meet the rising demand for consumer items. 
Third, the lack of foreign exchange and declining investment 
reversed the relatively high manufacturing growth rates of 1978-80. 
Finally, Ethiopia's large military establishment created a major bur- 
den on the economy. Defense expenditures during this time were 
absorbing 40 to 50 percent of the government's current expendi- 
ture (see Defense Costs, ch. 5). 

In the fourth period (1985-90), the economy continued to stag- 
nate, despite an improvement in the weather in EFY 1985/86 and 
EFY 1986/87, which helped reverse the agricultural decline. GDP 
and the manufacturing sector also grew during this period, GDP 
increasing at an average annual rate of 5 percent. However, the 
lingering effects of the 1984-85 drought undercut these achieve- 
ments and contributed to the economy's overall stagnation. Dur- 
ing the 1985-90 period, the current account deficit and the overall 
fiscal deficit worsened to annual rates of 10.6 and 13.5 percent, 
respectively, and the debt service ratio continued to climb. 



150 



Rug-weaving room at a government-run crafts center in Addis Ababa 
Courtesy Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 

Nations (S. Pierbattistin) 

Role of Government 

The imperial government presided over what was, even in the 
mid- twentieth century, essentially a feudal economy, with aristocrats 
and the church owning most arable land and tenant farmers who 
paid exorbitant rents making up the majority of the nation's agricul- 
turalists. Acting primarily through the Ministry of Finance, the 
emperor used fiscal and monetary strategies to direct the local econ- 
omy. The various ministries, although not always effective, played 
a key role in developing and implementing programs. The govern- 
ment conducted negotiations with the ministries to allocate resources 
for plan priorities. 

Officials formulated actual operations, however, without adhering 
to plan priorities. This problem developed partly because the rela- 
tionship between the Planning Commission, responsible for for- 
mulating national objectives and priorities, and the Ministry of 
Finance, responsible for resource planning and management, was 
not clearly defined. The Ministry of Finance often played a piv- 
otal role, whereas the Planning Commission was relegated to a 
minor role. Often the Planning Commission was perceived as mere- 
ly another bureaucratic layer. The ultimate power to approve 



151 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

budgets and programs rested with the emperor, although the Coun- 
cil of Ministers had the opportunity to review plans. 

After the revolution, the government's role in determining eco- 
nomic policies changed dramatically. In January and February 
1975, the government nationalized or took partial control of more 
than 100 companies, banks and other financial institutions, and 
insurance companies. In March 1975, the regime nationalized rural 
land and granted peasants "possessing rights" to parcels of land 
not to exceed ten hectares per grantee. In December 1975, the 
government issued Proclamation No. 76, which established a 
500,000 birr ceiling on private investment and urged Ethiopians 
to invest in enterprises larger than cottage industries. This policy 
changed in mid- 1989, when the government implemented three 
special decrees to encourage the development of small-scale indus- 
tries, the participation of nongovernmental bodies in the hotel in- 
dustry, and the establishment of joint ventures. 

Under the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC; 
also known as the Derg — see Glossary), Ethiopia's political sys- 
tem and economic structure changed dramatically, and the govern- 
ment embraced a Marxist-Leninist political philosophy. Planning 
became more ambitious and more pervasive, penetrating all regions 
and all sectors of the society, in contrast to the imperial period. 
Article 11 of the 1987 constitution legitimized these changes by 
declaring that "the State shall guide the economic and social ac- 
tivities of the country through a central plan." The Office of the 
National Council for Central Planning (ONCCP), which replaced 
the Planning Commission and which was chaired by Mengistu as 
head of state, served as the supreme policy-making body and had 
the power and responsibility to prepare the directives, strategies, 
and procedures for short- and long-range plans. The ONCCP 
played a pivotal role in mediating budget requests between other 
ministries and the Ministry of Finance. The government also sought 
to improve Ethiopia's economic performance by expanding the 
number of state-owned enterprises and encouraging barter and 
countertrade practices (see Industry and Energy; Foreign Trade, 
this ch.). 

On March 5, 1990, President Mengistu delivered a speech to 
the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) Central Committee in which 
he declared the failure of the Marxist economic system imposed 
by the military regime after the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile 
Selassie. He also announced the adoption of a new strategy for the 
country's future progress and development. Mengistu' s proposals 
included decentralization in planning and a free-market, mixed 



152 



The Economy 



economy in which the private and public sectors would play com- 
plementary roles. The new strategy would permit Ethiopian and 
foreign private individuals to invest in foreign and domestic trade, 
industry, construction, mining, and agriculture and in the coun- 
try's development in general. Although Mengistu's new economic 
policy attracted considerable attention, many economists were skep- 
tical about Ethiopia's ability to bring about a quick radical trans- 
formation of its economic policies. In any case, the plan proved 
irrelevant in view of the deteriorating political and military situa- 
tion that led to the fall of the regime in 1991. 

The Budgetary Process 

During the imperial period, the government initiated the bud- 
get cycle each year on the first day of Tikimt (October 1 1) by issu- 
ing a "call for budget proposals." Supposedly, the various ministries 
and agencies adhered to deadlines in completing the budgetary 
process. These organizations submitted current and capital bud- 
get proposals to the Ministry of Finance; the Council of Ministers 
reviewed all requests. The ultimate power for approval rested with 
the emperor. 

After the revolution, the government developed new guidelines 
on budget preparation and approval. Addis Ababa issued annual 
budget "calls" in July or August, with preliminary information 
and guidance. The new guidelines required ministries and agen- 
cies to complete their proposals by January, when budget hear- 
ings would begin. The hearings included discussions with ministries 
in which requests would be aligned with allocations, and justifica- 
tions for requests would be evaluated. After the ministries submitted 
their current budget proposals to the Ministry of Finance for review, 
with a copy to the ONCCP, the ONCCP executive committee 
would approve, disapprove, or change the requests. Conversely, 
ministries would send capital budget proposals to the ONCCP with 
a copy to the Ministry of Finance. The ONCCP would conclude 
a similar process of budget hearings, which would include a review 
of adherence to guidelines, justifications for requests, and confor- 
mity to investment priorities identified in the national plan. Thus, 
under the new system, the Ministry of Finance developed the cur- 
rent budget, and the ONCCP developed the capital budget. Draft 
current and capital budgets prepared by the Ministry of Finance 
and the ONCCP, respectively, would then be reconciled with es- 
timates of revenues, domestic resources, and other sources of fund- 
ing such as loans and aid. The consolidated current and capital 
budgets then would go to the Council of Ministers for review and 



153 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

recommendations. The final approval was the head of state's 
prerogative (see Banking and Monetary Policy, this ch.). 

Revenue and Expenditures 

Resources were allocated among the various sectors of the econ- 
omy differently in the imperial and revolutionary periods. Under 
the emperor, the government dedicated about 36 percent of the 
annual budget to national defense and maintenance of internal 
order. Toward the end of the imperial period, the budgets of the 
various ministries increased steadily while tax yields stagnated. With 
a majority of the population living at a subsistence level, there was 
limited opportunity to increase taxes on personal or agricultural 
income. Consequently, the imperial government relied on indirect 
taxes (customs, excise, and sales) to generate revenues. For instance, 
in the early 1970s taxes on foreign trade accounted for close to two- 
fifths of the tax revenues and about one-third of all government 
revenues, excluding foreign grants. At the same time, direct taxes 
accounted for less than one-third of tax revenues. 

The revolutionary government changed the tax structure in 1976, 
replacing taxes on agricultural income and rural land with a rural 
land-use fee and a new tax on income from agricultural activities. 
The government partially alleviated the tax collection problem that 
existed during the imperial period by delegating the responsibility 
for collecting the fee and tax on agriculture to peasant associations, 
which received a small percentage of revenues as payment. Whereas 
total revenue increased significantly, to about 24 percent of GDP 
in EFY 1988/89, tax revenues remained stagnant at around 15 per- 
cent of GDP. In EFY 1974/75, total revenue and tax revenue had 
been 13 and 11 percent of GDP, respectively. Despite the 1976 
changes in the tax structure, the government believed that the 
agricultural income tax was being underpaid, largely because of 
underassessments by peasant associations. 

The government levied taxes on exports and imports. In 1987 
Addis Ababa taxed all exports at 2 percent and levied an additional 
export duty and a surtax on coffee. Import taxes included customs 
duties and a 19 percent general import transaction tax. Because 
of a policy of encouraging new capital investment, the government 
exempted capital goods from all import taxes. Among imports, in- 
termediate goods were taxed on a scale ranging from to 35 per- 
cent, consumer goods on a scale of to 100 percent, and luxuries 
at a flat rate of 200 percent. High taxes on certain consumer goods 
and luxury items contributed to a flourishing underground econ- 
omy in which the smuggling of some imports, particularly liquor 
and electronic goods, played an important part. 



154 



The Economy 



Although tax collection procedures proved somewhat ineffective, 
the government maintained close control of current and capital ex- 
penditures. The Ministry of Finance oversaw procurements and 
audited ministries to ensure that expenditures conformed to budget 
authorizations. 

Current expenditures as a proportion of GDP grew from 13.2 
percent in EFY 1974/75 to 26.1 percent in EFY 1987/88. This 
growth was largely the result of the increase in expenditures for 
defense and general services following the 1974 revolution. Dur- 
ing the 1977-78 Ogaden War, for example, when the Somali coun- 
teroffensive was under way, defense took close to 60 percent of the 
budget. That percentage declined after 1979, although it remained 
relatively higher than the figure for the prerevolutionary period. 
Between 1974 and 1988, about 40 to 50 percent of the budget was 
dedicated to defense and government services. 

Economic and social services received less than 30 percent of 
government funds until EFY 1972/73, when a rise in educational 
outlays pushed them to around 40 percent. Under the Mengistu 
regime, economic and social service expenditures remained at 
prerevolutionary levels: agriculture's share was 2 percent, while 
education and health received an average of 14 and 4 percent, 
respectively. 

Banking and Monetary Policy 

The 1974 revolution brought major changes to the banking sys- 
tem. Prior to the emergence of the Marxist government, Ethiopia 
had several state-owned banking institutions and private financial 
institutions. The National Bank of Ethiopia (the country's central 
bank and financial adviser), the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(which handled commercial operations), the Agricultural and In- 
dustrial Development Bank (established largely to finance state- 
owned enterprises), the Savings and Mortgage Corporation of 
Ethiopia, and the Imperial Savings and Home Ownership Public 
Association (which provided savings and loan services) were the 
major state-owned banks. Major private commercial institutions, 
many of which were foreign owned, included the Addis Ababa 
Bank, the Banco di Napoli, and the Banco di Roma. In addition, 
there were several insurance companies. 

In January and February 1975, the government nationalized and 
subsequently reorganized private banks and insurance companies. 
By the early 1980s, the country's banking system included the 
National Bank of Ethiopia; the Addis Ababa Bank, which was 
formed by merging the three commercial banks that existed prior 
to the revolution; the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, which 



155 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

incorporated all of the nationalized insurance companies; and the 
new Housing and Savings Bank, which was responsible for mak- 
ing loans for new housing and home improvement. The govern- 
ment placed all banks and financial institutions under the National 
Bank of Ethiopia's control and supervision. The National Bank 
of Ethiopia regulated currency, controlled credit and monetary pol- 
icy, and administered foreign-currency transactions and the offi- 
cial foreign-exchange reserves. A majority of the banking services 
were concentrated in major urban areas, although there were ef- 
forts to establish more rural bank branches throughout the coun- 
try. However, the lending strategies of the banks showed that the 
productive sectors were not given priority. In 1988, for example, 
about 55 percent of all commercial bank credit financed imports 
and domestic trade and services. Agriculture and industry received 
only 6 and 13 percent of the commercial credit, respectively. 

To combat inflation and reduce the deficit, the government 
adopted a conservative fiscal management policy in the 1980s. The 
government limited the budget deficit to an average of about 14 
percent of GDP in the five years ending in EFY 1988/89 by bor- 
rowing from local sources. For instance, in EFY 1987/88 domes- 
tic borrowing financed about 38 percent of the deficit. Addis Ababa 
also imposed measures to cut back capital expenditures and to lower 
inflation. However, price controls, official overvaluing of the birr, 
and a freeze on the wages of senior government staff have failed 
to control inflation. By 1988 inflation was averaging 7.1 percent 
annually, but it turned sharply upward during 1990 as war expen- 
ditures increased and was estimated at 45 percent by mid- 1991. 
Moreover, money supply, defined as currency in circulation and 
demand deposits with banks (except that of the National Bank of 
Ethiopia), rose with the expansion in government budget deficits, 
which reached about 1.6 billion birr in EFY 1988/89. To help 
resolve this deficit problem and numerous other economic difficul- 
ties, Addis Ababa relied on foreign aid (see Balance of Payments 
and Foreign Assistance, this ch.). 

Labor Force 

Ethiopia's first and only national census, conducted in 1984, put 
the population at 42 million, which made Ethiopia the third most 
populous country in Africa, after Egypt and Nigeria. The census 
also showed that by 1994 Ethiopia's population would reach 56 
million. According to World Bank (see Glossary) projections, Ethio- 
pia will have a population of 66 million by the year 2000 (other 
estimates suggested that the population would be more than 67 
million). 



156 



The Economy 



The 1984 census indicated that 46.6 percent of the population 
consisted of children under fifteen years of age, which indicated 
a relatively high rate of dependence on the working population for 
education, health, and social services. Such a high dependency rate 
often is characteristic of a country in transition from a subsistence 
to a monetized economy. Because of limited investment resources 
in the modern sector, not all the working-age population can be 
absorbed, with the result that unemployment can become a grow- 
ing social and economic problem for an economy in transition. 

The 1988/89 economically active labor force was estimated to 
be 21 million, of which 19.3 million were in rural areas and 1.7 
million in urban areas. Estimates of the labor force's annual growth 
ranged from 1.8 to 2.9 percent. 

The labor force's occupational distribution showed that in 1990 
some 80 percent of the labor force worked in agriculture, 8 per- 
cent in industry, and 12 percent in services. These figures had 
changed slightly from the 1965 figures of 86, 5, and 9 percent, 
respectively. Thus, while agriculture's proportionate share of the 
labor force fell, the other two sectors gained. This trend reflects 
a modernizing society that is diversifying its economy by expand- 
ing secondary and tertiary sectors. 

Unemployment 

Generally, it is difficult to measure unemployment in less devel- 
oped countries such as Ethiopia because of the lack of reliable 
records and the existence of various informal types of work. 
However, based on Ministry of Labor surveys and numerous other 
analyses, a general assessment of unemployment in Ethiopia can 
be made. According to the Ministry of Labor, the unemployment 
rate increased 11.5 percent annually during the 1979-88 period; 
by 1987/88 there were 715,065 registered unemployed workers in 
thirty-six major towns. Of those registered, 134,117 ultimately 
found jobs, leaving the remaining 580,948 unemployed. The urban 
labor force totaled 1.7 million in 1988/89. The Ministry of Labor 
indicated that the government employed 523,000 of these workers. 
The rest relied on private employment or self-employment for their 
livelihood. 

According to the government, rural unemployment was virtu- 
ally nonexistent. A 1981/82 rural labor survey revealed that 97.5 
percent of the rural labor force worked, 2.4 percent did not work 
because of social reasons, and 0.1 percent had been unemployed 
during the previous twelve months. However, it is important to 
note that unemployment, as conventionally defined, records only 



157 




158 



women from a producers 9 cooperative weave baskets 

to be sold as souvenirs. 
Courtesy Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (F. Mattiol) 



159 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

part of the story; it leaves out disguised unemployment and under- 
employment, which were prevalent in both urban and rural areas. 
For instance, the same rural labor force survey found that 50 per- 
cent of those working were unpaid family workers. What is im- 
portant about unemployment in Ethiopia is that with an expansion 
of the labor force, the public sector — with an already swollen pay- 
roll and acute budgetary problems — was unlikely to absorb more 
than a tiny fraction of those entering the labor market. 

Labor Unions 

The 1955 constitution guaranteed the right to form workers' as- 
sociations. However, it was not until 1962 that the Ethiopian 
government issued the Labor Relations Decree, which authorized 
trade unions. In April 1963, the imperial authorities recognized 
the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU), which 
represented twenty- two industrial labor groups. By 1973 CELU 
had 167 affiliates with approximately 80,000 members, which 
represented only about 30 percent of all eligible workers. 

CELU never evolved into a national federation of unions. In- 
stead, it remained an association of labor groups organized at the 
local level. The absence of a national constituency, coupled with 
other problems such as corruption, embezzlement, election fraud, 
ethnic and regional discrimination, and inadequate finances, 
prevented CELU from challenging the status quo in the industrial 
sector. Nevertheless, CELU sponsored several labor protests and 
strikes during the first decade of its existence. After 1972 CELU 
became more militant as drought and famine caused the death of 
up to 200,000 people. The government responded by using force 
to crush labor protests, strikes, and demonstrations. 

Although many of its members supported the overthrow of Haile 
Selassie, CELU was the first labor organization to reject the mili- 
tary junta and to demand the creation of a people's government. 
On May 19, 1975, the Derg temporarily closed CELU headquarters 
on the grounds that the union needed to be reorganized. Further- 
more, the military authorities asserted that workers should elect 
their future leaders according to the aims and objectives of Ethio- 
pian socialism. This order did not rescind traditional workers' 
rights, such as the right to organize freely, to strike, and to bar- 
gain collectively over wages and working conditions. Rather, it 
sought to control the political activities of the CELU leadership. 
As expected, CELU rejected these actions and continued to de- 
mand democratic changes and civilian rights. In January 1977, 
the Derg replaced CELU (abolished December 1975) with the All- 
Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU). The AETU had 1,341 local 



160 



The Economy 



chapters, known as workers' associations, with a total member- 
ship of 287,000. The new union thus was twice as large as CELU 
had ever been. The government maintained that the AETU's pur- 
pose was to educate workers about the need to contribute their share 
to national development by increasing productivity and building 
socialism. 

In 1978 the government replaced the AETU executive commit- 
tee after charging it with political sabotage, abuse of authority, and 
failure to abide by the rules of democratic centralism. In 1982 a 
further restructuring of the AETU occurred when Addis Ababa 
issued the Trade Unions' Organization Proclamation. An uncom- 
promising Marxist-Leninist document, this proclamation empha- 
sized the need "to enable workers to discharge their historical 
responsibility in building the national economy by handling with 
care the instruments of production as their produce, and by en- 
hancing the production and proper distribution of goods and ser- 
vices." A series of meetings and elections culminated in a national 
congress in June 1982, at which the government replaced the leader- 
ship of the AETU. In 1986 the government relabeled the AETU 
the Ethiopia Trade Union (ETU). 

In 1983/84 the AETU claimed a membership of 313,434. The 
organization included nine industrial groups, the largest of which 
was manufacturing, which had accounted for 29.2 percent of the 
membership in 1982/83, followed by agriculture, forestry, and fish- 
ing with 26.6 percent, services with 15.1 percent, transportation 
with 8.1 percent, construction with 8.0 percent, trade with 6.2 per- 
cent, utilities with 3.7 percent, finance with 2.4 percent, and min- 
ing with 0.7 percent. A total of 35.6 percent of the members lived 
in Addis Ababa and another 18.0 percent in Shewa. Eritrea and 
Tigray accounted for no more than 7 . 5 percent of the total mem- 
bership. By the late 1980s, the AETU had failed to regain the ac- 
tivist reputation its predecessors had won in the 1970s. According 
to one observer, this political quiescence probably indicated that 
the government had successfully co-opted the trade unions. 

Wages and Prices 

Prior to the revolution, the Central Personnel Agency formu- 
lated and regulated wage policies. At the time of the military 
takeover, there was no minimum wage law; wages and salaries de- 
pended much on demand. There was, however, some legislation 
that defined pay scales. For instance, Notice 49 of 1972 defined 
pay scales and details regarding incremental steps for civil servants. 
Similarly, the Ethiopian Workers Commission had developed pay- 
scale guidelines based on skill, experience, and employment. In 



161 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



1974 CELU asked for a 3 birr daily minimum wage, which the 
imperial government eventually granted. 

After the revolution, the government's policy was to control wage 
growth to reduce pay scales. For parastatal and public enterprise 
workers earning 650 birr or less per month (real income, i.e., in- 
come adjusted for inflation) and civil servants earning 600 birr or 
less per month, the government allowed incremental pay increases. 
But for those above these cutoff points, there was a general salary 
freeze. However, promotions sometimes provided a worker a raise 
over the cutoff levels. 

Given inflation, the salary freeze affected the real income of many 
workers. For instance, the starting salary of a science graduate in 

1975 was 600 birr per month. In 1984 the real monthly income 
of a science graduate had dropped to 239 birr. Similarly, the highest 
civil servant's maximum salary in 1975 was 1 ,440 birr per month; 
the real monthly income of the same civil servant in 1984 was 573 
birr. 

Data on real wages of manufacturing workers and the behavior 
of price indexes provide further evidence of worsening living stan- 
dards after the revolution. In 1985/86 the average real monthly 
income of an industrial worker was 65.6 percent of the 1974/75 
level (see table 11, Appendix). The general trend shows that real 
income fell as consumer prices continued to increase. The retail 
price index for Addis Ababa rose from 375.2 in 1980/81 (1963 = 100) 
to 480.0 in 1987/88. This rise in the retail price index included 
increases in the cost of food (27 percent), household items (38 per- 
cent), and transportation (17 percent) (see table 12, Appendix). 

Price increases mainly affected urban wage earners on fixed in- 
comes, as purchases of necessities used larger portions of their pay. 
The government's wage freeze and the controls it placed on job 
transfers and changes made it difficult for most urban wage earn- 
ers to improve their living standards. The freeze on wages and job 
changes also reduced productivity. 

Agriculture 

Accounting for over 40 percent of GDP, 80 percent of exports, 
and 80 percent of the labor force, agriculture remained in 1991 
the economy's most important sector (see fig. 9). Ethiopia has great 
agricultural potential because of its vast areas of fertile land, diverse 
climate, generally adequate rainfall, and large labor pool. Despite 
this potential, however, Ethiopian agriculture has remained under- 
developed. Because of drought, which has persistently affected the 
country since the early 1970s, a poor economic base (low produc- 
tivity, weak infrastructure, and low level of technology), and the 



162 



The Economy 



Mengistu government's commitment to Marxism-Leninism, the 
agricultural sector has performed poorly. For instance, according 
to the World Bank, between 1980 and 1987 agricultural produc- 
tion dropped at an annual rate of 2.1 percent, while the popula- 
tion grew at an annual rate of 2.4 percent. Consequently, the 
country faced a tragic famine that resulted in the death of nearly 
1 million people from 1984 to 1986. 

During the imperial period, the development of the agricultural 
sector was retarded by a number of factors, including tenancy and 
land reform problems, the government's neglect of the agricultural 
sector (agriculture received less than 2 percent of budget alloca- 
tions even though the vast majority of the population depended 
on agriculture), low productivity, and lack of technological develop- 
ment. Moreover, the emperor's inability to implement meaning- 
ful land reform perpetuated a system in which aristocrats and the 
church owned most of the farmland and in which most farmers 
were tenants who had to provide as much as 50 percent of their 
crops as rent. To make matters worse, during the 1972-74 drought 
and famine the imperial government refused to assist rural Ethio- 
pians and tried to cover up the crisis by refusing international aid. 
As a result, up to 200,000 Ethiopians perished. 

Although the issue of land reform was not addressed until the 
1974 revolution, the government had tried to introduce programs 
to improve the condition of farmers. In 1971 the Ministry of 
Agriculture introduced the Minimum Package Program (MPP) to 
bring about economic and social changes. The MPP included credit 
for the purchase of items such as fertilizers, improved seeds, and 
pesticides; innovative extension services; the establishment of 
cooperatives; and the provision of infrastructure, mainly water sup- 
ply and all-weather roads. The program, designed for rural de- 
velopment, was first introduced in a project called the Chilalo 
Agricultural Development Unit (CADU). The program later facili- 
tated the establishment of similar internationally supported and 
financed projects at Ada (just south of Addis Ababa), Welamo, 
and Humera. By 1974 the Ministry of Agriculture's Extension and 
Project Implementation Department (EPID) had more than twenty- 
eight areas with more than 200 extension and marketing centers. 
Although the MPPs improved the agricultural productivity of farm- 
ers, particularly in the project areas, there were many problems 
associated with discrimination against small farmers (because of 
a restrictive credit system that favored big landowners) and tenant 
eviction. 

Imperial government policy permitting investors to import fer- 
tilizers, pesticides, tractors and combines, and (until 1973) fuel free 



163 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



GDP 1 1984/85 -8,939 million birr 2 



MINING 0.2% 




For value of the birr-- see Glossary. 



Figure 9. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Ethiopian 
Fiscal Year 1984/85 

of import duties encouraged the rapid expansion of large-scale com- 
mercial farming. As a result, agriculture continued to grow, al- 
beit below the population growth rate. According to the World 
Bank, agricultural production increased at an average annual rate 
of 2.1 percent between 1965 and 1973, while population increased 
at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent during the same pe- 
riod. 

Agricultural productivity under the Derg continued to decline. 
According to the World Bank, agricultural production increased 
at an average annual rate of 0.6 percent between 1973 and 1980 
but then decreased at an average annual rate of 2 . 1 percent be- 
tween 1980 and 1987. During the same period (1973-87), popula- 
tion increased at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent (2.4 percent 
for 1980-87). The poor performance of agriculture was related to 
several factors, including drought; a government policy of control- 
ling prices and the free movement of agricultural products from 
surplus to deficit areas; the unstable political climate; the disloca- 
tion of the rural community caused by resettlement, villagization, 
and conscription of young farmers to meet military obligations; 
land tenure difficulties and the problem of land fragmentation; the 
lack of resources such as farm equipment, better seeds, and fer- 
tilizers; and the overall low level of technology. 



164 



The Economy 



President Mengistu's 1990 decision to allow free movement of 
goods, to lift price controls, and to provide farmers with security 
of tenure was designed to reverse the decline in Ethiopia's agricul- 
tural sector. There was much debate as to whether or not these 
reforms were genuine and how effectively they could be imple- 
mented. Nonetheless, agricultural output rose by an estimated 3 
percent in 1990-91, almost certainly in response to the relaxation 
of government regulation. This modest increase, however, was not 
enough to offset a general decrease in GDP during the same period. 

Land Use and Land Reform 

Land Use 

Of Ethiopia's total land area of 1,221,480 square kilometers, the 
government estimated in the late 1980s that 15 percent was under 
cultivation and 51 percent was pastureland. It was also estimated 
that over 60 percent of the cultivated area was cropland. Forestland, 
most of it in the southwestern part of the country, accounted for 
4 percent of the total land area, according to the government. These 
figures varied from those provided by the World Bank, which es- 
timated that cropland, pastureland, and forestland accounted for 
13, 41, and 25 percent, respectively, of the total land area in 1987. 

Inaccessibility, water shortages, and infestations of disease-causing 
insects, mainly mosquitoes, prevented the use of large parcels of 
potentially productive land. In Ethiopia's lowlands, for example, 
the presence of malaria kept farmers from settling in many areas. 

Most agricultural producers were subsistence farmers with small 
holdings, often broken into several plots. Most of these farmers 
lived on the highlands, mainly at elevations of 1 ,500 to 3,000 meters. 
The population in the lowland peripheries (below 1,500 meters) 
was nomadic, engaged mainly in livestock raising. 

There are two predominant soil types in the highlands. The first, 
found in areas with relatively good drainage, consists of red-to- 
reddish-brown clayey loams that hold moisture and are well en- 
dowed with needed minerals, with the exception of phosphorus. 
These types of soils are found in much of Ilubabor, Kefa, and Gamo 
Gofa. The second type consists of brownish- to- gray and black soils 
with a high clay content. These soils are found in both the north- 
ern and the southern highlands in areas with poor drainage. They 
are sticky when wet, hard when dry, and difficult to work. But 
with proper drainage and conditioning, these soils have excellent 
agricultural potential. 

Sandy desert soils cover much of the arid lowlands in the north- 
east and in the Ogaden area of southeastern Ethiopia. Because of 



165 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

low rainfall, these soils have limited agricultural potential, except 
in some areas where rainfall is sufficient for the growth of natural 
forage at certain times of the year. These areas are used by pas- 
toralists who move back and forth in the area following the availa- 
bility of pasture for their animals. 

The plains and low foothills west of the highlands have sandy 
and gray-to-black clay soils. Where the topography permits, they 
are suitable for farming. The soils of the Great Rift Valley often 
are conducive to agriculture if water is available for irrigation. The 
Awash River basin supports many large-scale commercial farms 
and several irrigated small farms. 

Soil erosion has been one of the country's major problems. Over 
the centuries, deforestation, overgrazing, and practices such as cul- 
tivation of slopes not suited to agriculture have eroded the soil, 
a situation that worsened considerably during the 1970s and 1980s, 
especially in Eritrea, Tigray, and parts of Gonder and Welo. In 
addition, the rugged topography of the highlands, the brief but ex- 
tremely heavy rainfalls that characterize many areas, and centuries- 
old farming practices that do not include conservation measures 
have accelerated soil erosion in much of Ethiopia's highland areas. 
In the dry lowlands, persistent winds also contribute to soil erosion. 

During the imperial era, the government failed to implement 
widespread conservation measures, largely because the country's 
complex land tenure system stymied attempts to halt soil erosion 
and improve the land. After 1975 the revolutionary government 
used peasant associations to accelerate conservation work through- 
out rural areas. The 1977 famine also provided an impetus to pro- 
mote conservation. The government mobilized farmers and 
organized "food for work" projects to build terraces and plant trees. 
During 1983-84 the Ministry of Agriculture used "food for work" 
projects to raise 65 million tree seedlings, plant 18,000 hectares 
of land, and terrace 9,500 hectares of land. Peasant associations 
used 361 nurseries to plant 11,000 hectares of land in community 
forest. Between 1976 and 1985, the government constructed 600,000 
kilometers of agricultural embankments on cultivated land and 
470,000 kilometers of hillside terraces, and it closed 80,000 hect- 
ares of steep slopes for regeneration. However, the removal of arable 
land for conservation projects has threatened the welfare of increas- 
ing numbers of rural poor. For this reason, some environmental 
experts maintain that large-scale conservation work in Ethiopia has 
been ineffective. 

Land Reform 

Until the 1974 revolution, Ethiopia had a complex land tenure 
system. In Welo Province, for example, there were an estimated 



166 



The Economy 



111 types of land tenure. The existence of so many land tenure 
systems, coupled with the lack of reliable data, has made it difficult 
to give a comprehensive assessment of landownership in Ethiopia. 
However, the tenure system can be understood in a rudimentary 
way if one examines it in the context of the basic distinction be- 
tween landownership patterns in the north and those in the south. 

Historically, Ethiopia was divided into the northern highlands, 
which constituted the core of the old Christian kingdom, and the 
southern highlands, most of which were brought under imperial 
rule by conquest. This north-south distinction was reflected in land 
tenure differences. In the northern provinces — particularly Gojam, 
Begemdir and Simen (called Gonder after 1974), Tigray, highland 
Eritrea, parts of Welo, and northern Shewa — the major form of 
ownership was a type of communal system known as rist (see Glos- 
sary). According to this system, all descendants (both male and 
female) of an individual founder were entitled to a share, and in- 
dividuals had the right to use (a usufruct right) a plot of family 
land. Rist was hereditary, inalienable, and inviolable. No user of 
any piece of land could sell his or her share outside the family or 
mortgage or bequeath his or her share as a gift, as the land be- 
longed not to the individual but to the descent group (see Glos- 
sary). Most peasants in the northern highlands held at least some 
rist land, but there were some members belonging to minority ethnic 
groups who were tenant farmers. 

The other major form of tenure was gult (see Glossary), an owner- 
ship right acquired from the monarch or from provincial rulers who 
were empowered to make land grants. Gult owners collected trib- 
ute from the peasantry and, until 1966 (when gult rights were 
abolished in principle), exacted labor service as payment in kind 
from the peasants. Until the government instituted salaries in the 
twentieth century, gult rights were the typical form of compensa- 
tion for an official. 

Other forms of tenure included samon, mengist, and maderia land. 
Samon was land the government had granted to the Ethiopian Ortho- 
dox Church in perpetuity. Traditionally, the church had claimed 
about one-third of Ethiopia's land; however, actual ownership prob- 
ably never reached this figure. Estimates of church holdings range 
from 10 to 20 percent of the country's cultivated land. Peasants 
who worked on church land paid tribute to the church (or 
monastery) rather than to the emperor. The church lost all its land 
after the 1974 revolution. The state owned large tracts of agricul- 
tural land known as mengist and maderia. Mengist was land registered 
as government property, and maderia was land granted mainly to 
government officials, war veterans, and other patriots in lieu of 



167 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

a pension or salary. Although it granted maderia land for life, the 
state possessed a reversionary right over all land grants. Govern- 
ment land comprised about 12 percent of the country's agricul- 
tural land. 

In general, absentee landlordism in the north was rare, and land- 
less tenants were few. For instance, tenancy in Begemdir and Simen 
and in Gojam was estimated at about 2 percent of holdings. In 
the southern provinces, however, few farmers owned the land on 
which they worked. Southern landownership patterns developed 
as a result of land measurement and land grants following the Ethio- 
pian conquest of the region in the late nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries. After conquest, officials divided southern land 
equally among the state, the church, and the indigenous popula- 
tion. Warlords who administered the occupied regions received the 
state's share. They, in turn, redistributed part of their share to their 
officers and soldiers. The government distributed the church's share 
among the church hierarchy in the same manner. Officials divided 
the rest between the traditional leaders {balabats — see Glossary) and 
the indigenous people. Thus, the loss of two-thirds of the land to 
the new landlords and the church made many local people tenants 
(gebbars). Tenancy in the southern provinces ranged between 65 
and 80 percent of the holdings, and tenant payments to landowners 
averaged as high as 50 percent of the produce. 

In the lowland periphery and the Great Rift Valley, the tradi- 
tional practice of transhumance and the allocation of pastoral land 
according to tribal custom remained undisturbed until after World 
War II. These two areas are inhabited by pastoralists, including 
the Afar and Isa in eastern Eritrea, Welo, and Harerge; the Somali 
in the Ogaden; the Borana in Sidamo and Bale; and the Kereyu 
in the Great Rift Valley area of Shewa. The pastoral social struc- 
ture is based on a kinship system with strong interclan connections; 
grazing and water rights are regulated by custom. Until the 1950s, 
this pastoral life remained largely undisturbed by the highlanders, 
who intensely disliked the hot and humid lowland climate and feared 
malaria. Beginning in the 1950s, however, the malaria eradica- 
tion programs made irrigation agriculture in these areas possible. 
The government's desire to promote such agriculture, combined 
with its policy of creating new tax revenues, created pressure on 
many pastoralists, especially the Afar and the Arsi (a division of 
the Oromo). Major concessionaires, such as the Tendaho Cotton 
Plantation (managed until the 1974 revolution by the British firm 
Mitchell Cotts) and the Wonji Sugar Plantation (managed by HVA, 
a Dutch company), acquired large tracts of traditional Afar and 
Arsi grazing land and converted it into large-scale commercial 



168 



The Economy 



farms. The loss of grazing land to these concessions significantly 
affected traditional migration patterns for grazing and water. 

In the northern and southern parts of Ethiopia, peasant farm- 
ers lacked the means to improve production because of the frag- 
mentation of holdings, a lack of credit, and the absence of modern 
facilities. Particularly in the south, the insecurity of tenure and high 
rents killed the peasants' incentive to improve production. 

By the mid-1960s, many sectors of Ethiopian society favored land 
reform. University students led the land reform movement and cam- 
paigned against the government's reluctance to introduce land re- 
form programs and the lack of commitment to integrated rural 
development. By 1974 it was clear that the archaic land tenure sys- 
tem was one of the major factors responsible for the backward con- 
dition of Ethiopia's agriculture and the onset of the revolution. On 
March 4, 1975, the Derg announced its land reform program. The 
government nationalized rural land without compensation, 
abolished tenancy, forbade the hiring of wage labor on private 
farms, ordered all commercial farms to remain under state con- 
trol, and granted each peasant family so-called "possessing rights" 
to a plot of land not to exceed ten hectares. 

Tenant farmers in southern Ethiopia, where the average tenan- 
cy was as high as 55 percent and rural elites exploited farmers, 
welcomed the land reform. But in the northern highlands, where 
communal ownership (rist) dominated and large holdings and ten- 
ancy were exceptions, many people resisted land reform. Despite 
the special provision for communal areas (Article 19 of the procla- 
mation gave peasants in the communal areas "possessing rights" 
to the land they were tilling at the time of the proclamation) and 
the PMAC's efforts to reassure farmers that land reform would 
not affect them negatively, northerners remained suspicious of the 
new government's intentions. The reform held no promise of gain 
for most northerners; rather, many northern farmers perceived land 
reform as an attack on their rights to rist land. Resistance intensi- 
fied when zemecha (see Glossary) members campaigned for collec- 
tivization of land and oxen. 

Land reform had the least impact on the lowland peripheries, 
where nomads traditionally maintained their claims over grazing 
lands. The new proclamation gave them rights of possession to land 
they used for grazing. Therefore, the nomads did not perceive the 
new program as a threat. However, in the Afar area of the lower 
Awash Valley, where large-scale commercial estates had thrived, 
there was opposition to land reform, led mainly by tribal leaders 
(and large landowners), such as Ali Mirah, the sultan of Aussa. 



169 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The land reform destroyed the feudal order; changed landowning 
patterns, particularly in the south, in favor of peasants and small 
landowners; and provided the opportunity for peasants to partici- 
pate in local matters by permitting them to form associations. 
However, problems associated with declining agricultural produc- 
tivity and poor farming techniques still were prevalent. 

Government attempts to implement land reform also created 
problems related to land fragmentation, insecurity of tenure, and 
shortages of farm inputs and tools. Peasant associations often were 
periodically compelled to redistribute land to accommodate young 
families or new households moving into their area. The process 
meant not only smaller farms but also the fragmentation of hold- 
ings, which were often scattered into small plots to give families 
land of comparable quality. Consequentiy, individual holdings were 
frequently far smaller than the permitted maximum allotment of 
ten hectares. A 1979 study showed that around Addis Ababa in- 
dividual holdings ranged from 1.0 to 1.6 hectares and that about 
48 percent of the parcels were less than one-fourth of a hectare in 
size. Another study, of Dejen awraja (subregion) in Gojam, found 
that land fragmentation had been exacerbated since the revolution. 
For example, during the pre-reform period, sixty-one out of 200 
farmer respondents owned three or four parcels of land; after the 
reform, the corresponding number was 135 farmers. 

The second problem related to security of tenure, which was 
threatened by increasing pressure to redistribute land and to col- 
lectivize farms. Many peasants were reluctant to improve their land 
because they were afraid that they would not receive adequate com- 
pensation for upgrades. The third problem developed as a result 
of the military government's failure to provide farmers with basic 
items like seeds, oxen, and fertilizer. For instance, one study of 
four communities in different parts of Ethiopia found that up to 
50 percent of the peasants in some areas lacked oxen and about 
40 percent did not have plows. 

Government Rural Programs 

In 1984 the founding congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia 
( WPE) emphasized the need for a coordinated strategy based on 
socialist principles to accelerate agricultural development. To imple- 
ment this strategy, the government relied on peasant associations and 
rural development, cooperatives and state farms, resettlement and 
villagization, increased food production, and a new marketing policy. 

Peasant Associations and Rural Development 

Articles 8 and 10 of the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation re- 
quired that peasants be organized into a hierarchy of associations 



170 



Planting cotton in the Awash Valley 
Courtesy United Nations 




Ethiopia: A Country Study 

that would facilitate the implementation of rural development pro- 
grams and policies. Accordingly, after the land reform announce- 
ment, the government mobilized more than 60,000 students to 
organize peasants into associations. By the end of 1987, there were 
20,367 peasant associations with a membership of 5.7 million farm- 
ers. Each association covered an area of 800 hectares, and mem- 
bers included tenants, landless laborers, and landowners holding 
fewer than ten hectares. Former landowners who had held more 
than ten hectares of land could join an association only after the 
completion of land redistribution. An umbrella organization known 
as the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association (AEPA) represented local 
associations. Peasant associations assumed a wide range of respon- 
sibilities, including implementation of government land use direc- 
tives; adjudication of land disputes; encouragement of development 
programs, such as water and land conservation; construction of 
schools, clinics, and cooperatives; organization of defense squads; 
and tax collection. Peasant associations also became involved in 
organizing forestry programs, local service and production cooper- 
atives, road construction, and data collection projects, such as the 
1984 census. 

Cooperatives and State Farms 

Starting in 1976, the government encouraged farmers to form 
cooperatives. Between 1978 and 1981, the PMAC issued a series 
of proclamations and directives outlining procedures for the for- 
mation of service cooperatives and producers' cooperatives. Ser- 
vice cooperatives provided basic services, such as the sale of farm 
inputs and consumer items that were often rationed, the provision 
of loans, the education of peasant association members in socialist 
philosophy, and the promotion of cottage industries. 

The producers' cooperatives alleviated shortages of inputs (be- 
cause farmers could pool resources) and problems associated with 
the fragmentation of landholdings. The government ordered the 
creation of these cooperatives because of its belief that small farm- 
ers were inefficient and were unable to take advantage of econo- 
mies of scale. 

The producers' cooperatives developed in three stages. The first 
stage was the melba, an elementary type of cooperative that required 
members to pool land (with the exception of plots of up to 2,000 
square meters, which could be set aside for private use) and to share 
oxen and farm implements. The second stage, welba, required mem- 
bers to transfer their resources to the cooperative and reduce pri- 
vate plots to 1,000 square meters. The third stage, the weland, 
abolished private land use and established advanced forms of 



172 



The Economy 



cooperatives, whose goal was to use mechanized farming with mem- 
bers organized into production brigades. Under this system, in- 
come would be distributed based on labor contributions. 

The government provided a number of inducements to pro- 
ducers' cooperatives, including priority for credits, fertilizers, im- 
proved seed, and access to consumer items and building materials. 
According to the ten-year plan, more than half of the country's 
cultivated land would be organized into producers' cooperatives 
by 1994. 

Despite the incentives, farmers responded less than enthusiasti- 
cally. Farmers saw the move to form cooperatives as a prelude to 
the destruction of their "family farms." By 1985/86 there were 
only 2,323 producers' cooperatives, of which only 255 were 
registered. Some critics argued that the resistance of farmers caused 
the government to formulate its resettlement and villagization 
programs. 

A major component of the government's agricultural policy since 
the 1974 revolution has been the development of large-scale state 
farms. After the 1975 land reform, the Derg converted a majority 
of the estimated 75,000 hectares of large, commercial farms owned 
by individuals and cooperatives into state farms. Since then, the 
government has expanded the size of state farms. In 1987/88 there 
were about 216,000 hectares of state farmland, accounting for 3.3 
percent of the total cultivated area. The ten-year plan indicated 
that state farms would be expanded to 468,000 hectares by 1994, 
accounting for 6.4 percent of the cultivated land. 

The primary motive for the expansion of state farms was the 
desire to reverse the drop in food production that has continued 
since the revolution. After the 1975 land reform, peasants began 
withholding grain from the market to drive up prices because 
government price-control measures had created shortages of con- 
sumer items such as coffee, cooking oil, salt, and sugar. Addition- 
ally, increased peasant consumption caused shortages of food items 
such as teff (see Glossary), wheat, corn, and other grains in urban 
areas. The problem became so serious that Mengistu lashed out 
against the individual and petit burgeois tendencies of the peasan- 
try and their capitalist mentality on the occasion of the fourth an- 
niversary of military rule in September 1978. Mengistu and his 
advisers believed that state farms would produce grain for urban 
areas and raw materials for domestic industry and would also in- 
crease production of cash crops such as coffee to generate badly 
needed foreign exchange. Accordingly, state farms received a large 
share of the country's resources for agriculture; from 1982 to 1990, 
this totaled about 43 percent of the government's agricultural 



173 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

investment. In 1983 state farms received 76 percent of the total 
allocation of chemical fertilizers, 95 percent of the improved seeds, 
and 81 percent of agricultural credit. In terms of subsidies, between 
1982/83 and 1985/86 the various state farm corporations received 
more than 90 million birr in direct subsidies. Despite the empha- 
sis on state farms, state farm production accounted for only 6 per- 
cent of total agricultural output in 1987 (although meeting 65 
percent of urban needs), leaving peasant farmers responsible for 
over 90 percent of production. 

The stress on large-scale state farms was under attack by Western 
donors, who channeled their agricultural aid to the peasant sec- 
tor. These donors maintained that experiences elsewhere in Africa 
and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had shown that state 
farms were inefficient and a drain on scare resources. 

Resettlement and Villagization 

The policy of encouraging voluntary resettlement went back to 
1958, when the government established the first known planned 
resettlement in Sidamo. Shortly after the 1974 revolution, it be- 
came Derg policy to accelerate resettlement. Article 18 of the 1975 
Land Reform Proclamation stated that "the government shall have 
the responsibility to settle peasants or to establish cottage indus- 
tries to accommodate those who, as a result of distribution of 
land . . . remain with little or no land." Accordingly, in 1975/76 
there were eighty-eight settlement centers accommodating 38,818 
households. The government conducted most of these resettlement 
programs under the auspices of the Relief and Rehabilitation Com- 
mission (RRC) and the Ministry of Agriculture. By 1982 there were 
112 planned settlements populated by more than 120,000 people. 
The settlements were concentrated mainly in the south and south- 
west. In 1984 Addis Ababa announced its intention to resettle 1.5 
million people from the drought-affected northern regions to the 
south and southwest, where arable land was plentiful. By 1986 the 
government had resettled more than 600,000 people to three set- 
tlement areas. More than 250,000 went to Welega; about 150,000 
settled in the Gambela area of Ilubabor; and just over 100,000 went 
to Pawe, the largest planned resettlement in Gojam and largely 
sustained by Italian financial support. In addition, another 78,000 
went to Kefa, Shewa, and western Gonder. 

In mid- 1986 the government halted the resettlement program, 
largely to fend off the negative reaction from the international com- 
munity. But in November 1987 the program resumed, and in 
March 1988 Mengistu spoke of the need to move at least 7 million 



174 



The Economy 



people. He claimed resettlement would resolve the country's recur- 
ring drought problem and would ease population pressure from 
northern areas where the land had been badly overused. Western 
donors and governments, whom Addis Ababa expected to help with 
the program, remained apprehensive of the government's inten- 
tions, however. Some believed that the plan to resettle 1.5 million 
people by 1994 was unrealistic, given the country's strained 
finances. Others argued that resettlement was a ploy to depopu- 
late areas of resistance, weaken the guerrillas' support base, and 
deny them access to recruits, particularly in Eritrea and Tigray. 
Additional arguments against resettlement included charges of 
human rights violations, forced separations of families, and lack 
of medical attention in resettlement centers, which resulted in thou- 
sands of deaths from malaria and sleeping sickness. 

Although many of these charges were valid, some criticisms may 
have been unfounded. For instance, the claim that the resettlement 
was a ploy to depopulate the rebel areas may not have been valid, 
given that by 1986 only 15 percent of the 600,000 resettled peasants 
were from Tigray and none were from Eritrea. More than 80 per- 
cent of those resettled were from Welo and Shewa. 

In 1985 the government initiated a new relocation program 
known as villagization. The objectives of the program, which 
grouped scattered farming communities throughout the country 
into small village clusters, were to promote rational land use; con- 
serve resources; provide access to clean water and to health and 
education services; and strengthen security. Government guide- 
lines stipulated that villages were to house 200 to 300 households, 
with 100-square-meter compounds for each family. 

In 1985 Addis Ababa established a national coordinating com- 
mittee to oversee the villagization plan's implementation. By March 
1986, about 4.6 million people in Shewa, Arsi, and Harerge had 
been relocated into more than 4,500 villages. Although the govern- 
ment had villagized about 13 million people by 1989, international 
criticism, deteriorating security conditions, and lack of resources 
doomed the plan to failure. Nevertheless, Mengistu remained com- 
mitted to the villagization concept. 

Opponents of villagization argued that the scheme was disrup- 
tive to agricultural production because the government moved many 
farmers during the planting and harvesting seasons. There also was 
concern that villagization could have a negative impact on fragile 
local resources, particularly on water and grazing land; accelerate 
the spread of communicable diseases; and increase problems with 
plant pests and diseases. In early 1990, the government essentially 
abandoned villagization when it announced new economic policies 



175 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

that called for free-market reforms and a relaxation of centralized 
planning. 

Agricultural Production 

The effect of the PMAC's land reform program on food produc- 
tion and its marketing and distribution policies were among two 
of the major controversies surrounding the revolution. Available 
data on crop production show that land reform and the various 
government rural programs had a minimal impact on increasing 
the food supply, as production levels displayed considerable fluc- 
tuations and low growth rates at best (see table 13, Appendix). 

Major Cash Crops 

The most important cash crop in Ethiopia was coffee. During 
the 1970s, coffee exports accounted for 50 to 60 percent of the total 
value of all exports, although coffee's share dropped to 25 percent 
as a result of the economic dislocation following the 1974 revolu- 
tion. By 1976 coffee exports had recovered, and in the five years 
ending in 1988/89, coffee accounted for about 63 percent of the 
value of exports. Domestically, coffee contributed about 20 per- 
cent of the government's revenue. Approximately 25 percent of 
Ethiopia's population depended directly or indirectly on coffee for 
its livelihood. 

Ethiopia's coffee is almost exclusively of the arabica type, which 
grows best at altitudes between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Coffee 
grows wild in many parts of the country, although most Ethiopian 
coffee is produced in the southern and western regions of Kefa, 
Sidamo, Ilubabor, Gamo Gofa, Welega, and Harerge. 

Reliable estimates of coffee production in Ethiopia were unavail- 
able as of mid- 1991 . However, some observers indicated that Ethio- 
pia produced between 140,000 and 180,000 tons annually. The 
Ethiopian government placed coffee production at 187,000 tons 
in 1979/80, 233,000 tons in 1983/84, and 172,000 tons in 1985/86. 
Estimates for 1986/87 and 1987/88 were put at 186,000 and 189,000 
tons, respectively. Preliminary figures from other sources indicated 
that coffee production continued to rise in 1988/89 and 1989/90 
but registered a sharp decline of perhaps as much as one-third dur- 
ing 1990/91. About 44 percent of the coffee produced was exported. 
Although the potential for local coffee consumption was high, the 
government, eager to increase its hard-currency reserves, sup- 
pressed domestic consumption by controlling coffee sales. The 
government also restricted the transfer of coffee from coffee- 
producing areas to other parts of the country. This practice made 



176 



The Economy 



the price of local coffee two to three times higher than the price 
of exported coffee. 

About 98 percent of the coffee was produced by peasants on small 
holdings of less than a hectare, and the remaining 2 percent was 
produced by state farms. Some estimates indicated that yields on 
peasant farms were higher than those on state farms. In the 1980s, 
as part of an effort to increase production and to improve the cul- 
tivation and harvesting of coffee, the government created the Minis- 
try of Coffee and Tea Development, which was responsible for 
production and marketing. The ten-year plan called for an increase 
in the size of state farms producing coffee from 14,000-15,000 hect- 
ares to 50,000 hectares by 1994. However, given the strain on the 
government's financial resources and the consistently declining 
coffee price in the world market, this may have been an unrealis- 
tic goal. 

The decline in world coffee prices, which began in 1987, reduced 
Ethiopia's foreign-exchange earnings. In early 1989, for example, 
the price of one kilogram of coffee was US$0.58; by June it had 
dropped to US$0.32. Mengistu told the 1989 WPE party congress 
that at US$0.32 per kilogram, foreign-exchange earnings from 
coffee would drop by 240 million birr, and government revenue 
would be reduced by 140 million birr by the end of 1989. Such 
declines not only hampered the government's ability to implement 
its political, economic, and social programs but also reduced Ad- 
dis Ababa's capacity to prosecute its war against various rebel 
groups in northern Ethiopia. 

Before the revolution, pulses and oilseeds played an important 
role, second only to coffee, in Ethiopia's exports. In EFY 1974/75, 
pulses and oilseeds accounted for 34 percent of export earnings 
(about 163 million birr), but this share declined to about 3 percent 
(about 30 million birr) in EFY 1988/89 (see table 14, Appendix). 
Three factors contributed to the decline in the relative importance 
of pulses and oilseeds. First, the recurring droughts had devastated 
the country's main areas where pulses and oilseeds were produced. 
Second, because peasants faced food shortages, they gave priority 
to cereal staples to sustain themselves. Finally, although the produc- 
tion cost of pulses and oilseeds continued to rise, the government's 
price control policy left virtually unchanged the official procure- 
ment price of these crops, thus substantially reducing net income 
from them. The Ethiopian Pulses and Oilseeds Corporation, the 
agency responsible for exporting two-thirds of these crops, reported 
losses in EFY 1982/83 and EFY 1983/84. In EFY 1983/84, the cor- 
poration received export subsidies of more than 9 million birr. Sub- 
sequently, production of both crops failed to improve; by 1988 the 



177 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



output index, whose base year was 1972 (100), was 85.3 for pulses 
and 15.8 for oilseeds. Given the country's economic and political 
problems and the ongoing war in the north, there was little prospect 
of improvement. 

Cotton is grown throughout Ethiopia below elevations of about 
1,400 meters. Because most of the lowlands lack adequate rain- 
fall, cotton cultivation depends largely on irrigation. Before the revo- 
lution, large-scale commercial cotton plantations were developed 
in the Awash Valley and the Humera areas. The Tendaho Cotton 
Plantation in the lower Awash Valley was one of Ethiopia's larg- 
est cotton plantations. Rain-fed cotton also grew in Humera, Bi- 
late (in Sidamo), and Arba Minch (in Gamo Gofa). 

Since the revolution, most commercial cotton has been grown 
on irrigated state farms, mostly in the Awash Valley area. Produc- 
tion jumped from 43,500 tons in 1974/75 to 74,900 tons in 1984/85. 
Similarly, the area of cultivation increased from 22,600 hectares 
in 1974/75 to 33,900 hectares in 1984/85. 

Major Staple Crops 

Ethiopia's major staple crops include a variety of cereals, pulses, 
oilseeds, and coffee. Grains are the most important field crops and 
the chief element in the diet of most Ethiopians. The principal grains 
are teff, wheat, barley, corn, sorghum, and millet. The first three 
are primarily cool-weather crops cultivated at altitudes generally 
above 1,500 meters. Teff, indigenous to Ethiopia, furnishes the 
flour for injera, an unleavened bread that is the principal form in 
which grain is consumed in the highlands and in urban centers 
throughout the country. Barley is grown mostly between 2,000 and 
3,500 meters. A major subsistence crop, barley is used as food and 
in the production of tella, a locally produced beer. 

Sorghum, millet, and corn are cultivated mostly in warmer areas 
at lower altitudes along the country's western, southwestern, and 
eastern peripheries. Sorghum and millet, which are drought resis- 
tant, grow well at low elevations where rainfall is less reliable. Corn 
is grown chiefly between elevations of 1 ,500 and 2,200 meters and 
requires large amounts of rainfall to ensure good harvests. These 
three grains constitute the staple foods of a good part of the popu- 
lation and are major items in the diet of the nomads. 

Pulses are the second most important element in the national 
diet and a principal protein source. They are boiled, roasted, or 
included in a stew-like dish known as wot, which is sometimes a 
main dish and sometimes a supplementary food. Pulses, grown 
widely at all altitudes from sea level to about 3,000 meters, are 



178 



Fruit stall in Addis Ababa 
Courtesy Paul Henze 

more prevalent in the northern and central highlands. Pulses were 
a particularly important export item before the revolution. 

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church traditionally has forbidden con- 
sumption of animal fats on many days of the year. As a result, 
vegetable oils are widely used, and oilseed cultivation is an impor- 
tant agricultural activity. The most important oilseed is the in- 
digenous niger seed (neug), which is grown on 50 percent or more 
of the area devoted to oilseeds. Niger seed is found mostly in the 
northern and central highlands at elevations between 1,800 and 
2,500 meters. Flaxseed, also indigenous, is cultivated in the same 
general area as niger seed. The third most important oilseed is ses- 
ame, which grows at elevations from sea level to about 1,500 meters. 
In addition to its domestic use, sesame is also the principal export 
oilseed. Oilseeds of lesser significance include castor beans, rape- 
seed, groundnuts (peanuts), and safflower and sunflower seeds. 
Most oilseeds are raised by small-scale farmers, but sesame was 
also grown by large-scale commercial farms before the era of land 
reform and the nationalization of agribusiness. 

Ensete, known locally as false banana, is an important food source 
in Ethiopia's southern and southwestern highlands. It is cultivated 
principally by the Gurage, Sidama, and several other ethnic groups 
in the region. Resembling the banana but bearing an inedible fruit, 



179 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

the plant produces large quantities of starch in its underground 
rhizome and an above-ground stem that can reach a height of several 
meters. Ensete flour constitutes the staple food of the local people. 
Taro, yams, and sweet potatoes are commonly grown in the same 
region as the ensete. 

The consumption of vegetables and fruits is relatively limited, 
largely because of their high cost. Common vegetables include 
onions, peppers, squash, and a cabbage similar to kale. Demand 
for vegetables has stimulated truck farming around the main urban 
areas such as Addis Ababa and Asmera. Prior to the revolution, 
urbanization increased the demand for fruit, leading to the estab- 
lishment of citrus orchards in areas with access to irrigation in 
Shewa, Arsi, Harerge, and Eritrea. The Mengistu regime en- 
couraged fruit and vegetable production. Fresh fruits, including 
citrus and bananas, as well as fresh and frozen vegetables, became 
important export items, but their profitability was marginal. The 
Ethiopian Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Enterprise (EFVME), 
which handled about 75 percent of Ethiopia's exports of fruits and 
vegetables in 1984-85, had to receive government subsidies be- 
cause of losses. 

Ethiopia's demand for grain continued to increase because of 
population pressures, while supply remained short, largely because 
of drought and government agricultural policies, such as price con- 
trols, which adversely affected crop production. Food production 
had consistently declined throughout the 1980s. Consequently, 
Ethiopia became a net importer of grain worth about 243 million 
birr annually from 1983/84 to 1987/88. The food deficit estimate 
for the 1985/89 period indicated that production averaged about 
6 million tons while demand reached about 10 million tons, thus 
creating an annual deficit of roughly 4 million tons. Much of the 
food deficit was covered through food aid. Between 1984/85 and 
1986/87, at the height of the drought, Ethiopia received more than 
1.7 million tons of grain, about 14 percent of the total food aid 
for Africa. In addition, Ethiopia spent 341 million birr on food 
purchases during the 1985-87 period. 

Livestock 

Livestock production plays an important role in Ethiopia's econ- 
omy. Estimates for 1987 indicated that livestock production contrib- 
uted one-third of agriculture's share of GDP, or nearly 15 percent 
of total GDP. Hides and skins constituted the second largest ex- 
port earner, averaging about 15 percent of the total export value 
during the period 1984/85 to 1988/89; live animals averaged around 
3 percent of the total value of exports during the same period. 



180 



The Economy 



Although varying from region to region, the role of livestock in 
the Ethiopian economy was greater than the figures suggest. Almost 
the entire rural population was involved in some way with animal 
husbandry, whose role included the provision of draft power, food, 
cash, transportation, fuel, and, especially in pastoral areas, social 
prestige. In the highlands, oxen provided draft power in crop produc- 
tion. In pastoral areas, livestock formed the basis of the economy. 
Per capita meat consumption was high by developing countries' stan- 
dards, an estimated thirteen kilograms annually. According to a 1987 
estimate, beef accounted for about 51 percent of all meat consump- 
tion, followed by mutton and lamb (19 percent), poultry (15 per- 
cent), and goat (14 percent). 

Ethiopia's estimated livestock population of about 78.4 million 
in 1988 was believed to be Africa's largest. There were approxi- 
mately 31 million cattle, 23.4 million sheep, 17.5 million goats, 
5.5 million horses and mules, 1 million camels, and 57 million 
poultry. Livestock was distributed throughout the country, with 
the greatest concentration in the highlands, where more than 90 
percent of these animals were located. The raising of livestock al- 
ways has been largely a subsistence activity. 

Ethiopia has great potential for increased livestock production, 
both for local use and for export. However, expansion was con- 
strained by inadequate nutrition, disease, a lack of support ser- 
vices such as extension services, insufficient data with which to plan 
improved services, and inadequate information on how to improve 
animal breeding, marketing, and processing. The high concentra- 
tion of animals in the highlands, together with the fact that cattle 
are often kept for status, reduces the economic potential of Ethio- 
pian livestock. 

Both the imperial and the Marxist governments tried to improve 
livestock production by instituting programs such as free vaccina- 
tion, well-digging, construction of feeder roads, and improvement 
of pastureland, largely through international organizations such 
as the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Men- 
gistu regime also opened veterinary stations at Bahir Dar, Buno 
Bedele, and Debre Zeyit to provide treatment and vaccination 
services. 

Cattle in Ethiopia are almost entirely of the zebu type and are 
poor sources of milk and meat. However, these cattle do relatively 
well under the traditional production system. About 70 percent of 
the cattle in 1987 were in the highlands, and the remaining 30 per- 
cent were kept by nomadic pastoralists in the lowland areas. Meat 
and milk yields are low and losses high, especially among calves 
and young stock. Contagious diseases and parasitic infections are 



181 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

major causes of death, factors that are exacerbated by malnutri- 
tion and starvation. Recurring drought takes a heavy toll on the 
animal population, although it is difficult to determine the extent 
of losses. Practically all animals are range-fed. During the rainy 
seasons, water and grass are generally plentiful, but with the onset 
of the dry season, forage is generally insufficient to keep animals 
nourished and able to resist disease. 

Most of Ethiopia's estimated 41 million sheep and goats are raised 
by small farmers who used them as a major source of meat and 
cash income. About three-quarters of the total sheep flock is in the 
highlands, whereas lowland pastoralists maintain about three- 
quarters of the goat herd. Both animals have high sales value in 
urban centers, particularly during holidays such as Easter and New 
Year's Day. 

Most of the estimated 7 million equines (horses, mules, and don- 
keys) are used to transport produce and other agricultural goods. 
Camels also play a key role as pack animals in areas below 1,500 
meters in elevation. Additionally, camels provide pastoralists in 
those areas with milk and meat. 

Poultry farming is widely practiced in Ethiopia; almost every 
farmstead keeps some poultry for consumption and for cash sale. 
The highest concentration of poultry is in Shewa, in central Welo, 
and in northwestern Tigray. Individual poultry farms supply eggs 
and meat to urban dwellers. By 1990 the state had begun to de- 
velop large poultry farms, mostly around Addis Ababa, to supply 
hotels and government institutions. 

Fishing 

Ethiopia's many lakes, rivers, and reservoirs and its approxi- 
mately 960 kilometers of Red Sea coastline are fertile fishing 
grounds. However, fishing contributed less than 1 percent of GDP 
in 1987. The ten-year plan in 1983/84 estimated that the country 
had the potential to produce more than 92,000 tons offish — 66,000 
tons from the Red Sea and the remaining 26,000 tons from lakes 
and rivers. But actual production in 1983/84 was estimated at 600 
to 1,200 tons. 

Fresh fish are consumed along the Red Sea coast, in Asmera, 
and in the vicinity of the Great Rift Valley lakes. Outside these 
areas, however, the domestic market for fish is small. Two factors 
account for this low level of local fish consumption. First, fish has 
not been integrated into the diet of most of the population. Second, 
because of religious influences on consumption patterns, the de- 
mand for fish is only seasonal. During Lent, for example, Chris- 
tians who abstain from eating meat, milk, and eggs consume fish. 



182 



The Economy 



There was considerable commercial fishing activity in the Red 
Sea prior to 1974, chiefly consisting of private foreign companies 
that exported most of their catch after processing the fish onshore. 
For instance, in 1970 private companies exported about 9, 140 tons 
of fish. After the 1974 revolution, most commercial fishing com- 
panies left Ethiopia, which reduced fish exports. 

The Mengistu regime encouraged the establishment of fishery 
associations and cooperatives along the Red Sea coast and in the 
Great Rift Valley lakes area. In 1978 the government established 
the Fish Production and Marketing Corporation (FPMC) to help 
improve the Ethiopian fish industry. The following year, the Minis- 
try of Agriculture created the Fisheries Resources Development 
Department to help improve fish breeding, control, and market- 
ing. The FPMC received loans from the Agricultural and Indus- 
trial Development Bank and aid from the European Community 
(EC) to purchase various types of transportation equipment and 
to establish modern shops and cold storage. 

In late 1990, the Red Sea Fishery Resources Development 
Project, which is managed by the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations (FAO), received funding from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Capi- 
tal Development Fund to purchase motor boats, fishing nets, and 
other accessories for five fishermen's cooperatives in Aseb. The 
government hoped this equipment would help increase production 
and eventually enable the five cooperatives to extract 450 tons of 
fish annually. Nevertheless, the 1988/89 fish production of sixty 
tons fell by more than half in 1989/90 because of security problems 
in the area. 

Forestry 

In the late nineteenth century, about 30 percent of the country 
was covered with forest. The clearing of land for agricultural use 
and the cutting of trees for fuel gradually changed the scene, and 
today forest areas have dwindled to less than 4 percent of Ethio- 
pia's total land. The northern parts of the highlands are almost 
devoid of trees. However, about 4.5 million hectares of dense forest 
exist in the southern and southwestern sections of the highlands. 
Some of these include coniferous forests, found at elevations above 
1,600 meters, but a majority of the forestland consists primarily 
of woodlands found in drier areas of the highlands and in the drier 
areas bordering the highlands. 

Lumber from the coniferous forests is important to the con- 
struction industry. The broadleaf evergreen forests furnish timber 
that is used in construction and in the production of plywood. The 



183 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

woodlands are a major source of firewood and charcoal. Certain 
trees — boswellia and species of commiphora — are of special eco- 
nomic significance. Both grow in the arid lowlands and produce 
gums that are the bases for frankincense and myrrh. A species of 
acacia found in several parts of the country is a source of gum arabic 
used in the manufacture of adhesives, pharmaceutical products, 
and confectionery. The eucalyptus, an exotic tree introduced in 
the late nineteenth century and grown mainly near urban areas, 
is a valuable source of telephone and telegraph poles, tool handles, 
furniture, and firewood. It is also a major source of the material 
from which fiberboard and particleboard are made. 

Data on forestry's contribution to the economy are not readily 
available, largely because most GDP tables aggregate data on fore- 
stry, fishing, and hunting. In 1980/81 forestry accounted for 2.5 
percent of GDP at constant 1960/61 factor cost and 5.4 percent 
of the share attributable to the agricultural sector. 

Before 1974 about half of the forestland was privately owned or 
claimed, and roughly half was held by the government. There was 
little government control of forestry operations prior to the revo- 
lution. The 1975 land reform nationalized forestland and sawmills, 
which existed mostly in the south. The government controlled har- 
vesting of forestland, and in some cases individuals had to secure 
permits from local peasant associations to cut trees. But this mea- 
sure encouraged illegal logging and accelerated the destruction of 
Ethiopia's remaining forests. To ensure that conservation activity 
conformed with government policy and directives on land use, 
reforestation programs were organized through the Ministry of 
Agriculture or district offices that planed, coordinated, and moni- 
tored all work. The local peasant associations lacked decision- 
making authority. 

Reforestation programs resulted in the planting of millions of 
seedlings in community forests throughout Ethiopia. A variety of 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which had to organize 
their activities through the local peasant association, supplemented 
government efforts to rehabilitate Ethiopia's forests. However, crit- 
ics maintain that both systems caused communal resources to be 
developed at the expense of private needs. As a result, reforesta- 
tion programs did not perform well. Seedling survival rates varied 
from as low as 5 to 20 percent in some areas to 40 percent in others, 
largely because of inadequate care and premature cutting by 
peasants. In late 1990, Addis Ababa was in the process of launch- 
ing the Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan (EFAP) to improve fores- 
try conservation, increase public participation in reforestation 
projects, and prevent further depletion of existing forest resources. 



184 



The Economy 



It remained to be seen whether this plan would improve the state 
of Ethiopia's forests. 

Government Marketing Operations 

Private traders and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation 
(AMC), established in 1976, marketed Ethiopia's agricultural out- 
put. The AMC was a government agency whose objective was to 
influence the supply and price of crops. It purchased grain from 
peasant associations at fixed prices. The AMC set quotas of grain 
purchases to be delivered by peasant associations and cooperatives 
and also bought from private wholesalers, who were required to 
sell half of their purchases at predetermined prices. State farms sold 
their output to the AMC. Although the AMC had agents in all 
regions, it was particularly active in the major cereal-producing 
regions, namely, Gojam, Shewa, Arsi, and Gonder. In 1981/82, 
out of the AMC's purchases of 257,000 tons of grain, Gojam ac- 
counted for 32 percent of the purchases, and Arsi, Shewa, and 
Gonder accounted for 23, 22, and 10 percent, respectively. The 
government's price controls and the AMC's operations had led to 
the development of different price systems at various levels. For 
instance, the 1984/85 official procurement price for 100 kilograms 
of teff was 42 birr at the farm level and 60 birr when the AMC 
purchased it from wholesalers. But the same quantity of teff retailed 
at 81 birr at food stores belonging to the urban dwellers' associa- 
tions (kebeles — see Glossary) in Addis Ababa and sold for as much 
as 181 birr in the open market. Such wide price variations created 
food shortages because farmers as well as private merchants with- 
held crops to sell on the black market at higher prices. 

Industry and Energy 
Manufacturing 

Prior to 1957, when Ethiopia initiated a series of five-year de- 
velopment plans, cottage and handicraft industries met most of the 
population's needs for manufactured goods such as clothes, cer- 
amics, machine tools, and leather goods. Various factors — including 
the lack of basic infrastructure, the dearth of private and public 
investment, and the lack of any consistent public policy aimed at 
promoting industrial development — contributed to the insignifi- 
cance of manufacturing. Throughout much of the 1960s and early 
1970s, manufacturing activity increased as the government's five- 
year plans diversified the economy by encouraging agro-industrial 
activity and by substituting domestically produced goods for im- 
ported items. Thus, according to the World Bank, manufacturing 



185 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

production increased at an annual rate of 6.1 percent between 1965 
and 1973. During the same period, agriculture grew at an annual 
2.1 percent rate, and services grew at an annual 6.7 percent rate. 
Despite this favorable growth rate, manufacturing in 1975 ac- 
counted for less than 5 percent of GDP and employed only about 
60,000 people. Handicrafts, such as weaving, pottery, blacksmith- 
ing, leather working, and jewelry making, along with other small- 
scale industries, accounted for another 5 percent of GDP. In 1984/85 
manufacturing and handicrafts together accounted for 11.4 per- 
cent of GDP. 

In 1975 the PMAC nationalized more than 100 industries and 
took partial control of some of them. The main characteristics of 
the manufacturing sector inherited by the revolution included a 
predominance of foreign ownership and foreign managerial, profes- 
sional, and technical staffing; heavy emphasis on light industries; 
inward orientation and relatively high tariffs; capital-intensiveness; 
underutilized capacity; minimal linkage among the different sec- 
tors; and excessive geographical concentration of industries in Addis 
Ababa. 

After nationalization, there was an exodus of foreigners who had 
owned and operated the industrial enterprises. The war in Eritrea 
and labor strikes and demonstrations also closed the approximately 
30 percent of the country's plants that had been located in that 
region. 

The economic dislocation that followed the revolution had a sig- 
nificant impact on the manufacturing sector. Private-sector capi- 
tal investment ceased, and labor's marginal productivity began to 
decline. In performance terms, the manufacturing sector's output 
after 1975 grew haltingly. Manufacturing had grown at an aver- 
age annual rate of 6.1 percent between 1965 and 1973. A period 
of decline from 1974/75 to 1977/78 and an average annual growth 
rate of 18.9 percent for 1978/79 and 1979/80 were followed by a 
reduction of the growth rate to about 3 . 1 percent per annum be- 
tween 1980/81 and 1984/85 and 3.8 percent per annum from 
1985/86 to 1988/89. 

The manufacturing sector's performance paralleled developments 
in other parts of the country. In the revolution's early days, the 
dislocation caused by nationalization, the flight of managers, the 
wars in Eritrea and the Ogaden, and local strife in many areas 
disrupted production and hurt productivity. Zemecha production 
campaigns, which focused on increasing capacity utilization, charac- 
terized the late 1970s. As a result of these campaigns, Ethiopia 
achieved growth rates of 27.3 and 10.5 percent, respectively, in 
1978/79 and 1979/80. By 1985 capacity utilization estimates of many 



186 



Coffee seedlings at Bulbulo Nursery near Agaro, in Kefa 

Courtesy Paul Henze 

industries ranged between 70 and 100 percent, and many plants 
operated in three shifts. These figures were high by African 
standards. 

Manufacturing productivity began to decline by 1980 because 
of a downturn in agricultural production and a shortage of foreign 
exchange to import raw materials. Analysts expected the manufac- 
turing sector's productivity to decline further in the 1990s as equip- 
ment aged and spare-parts shortages grew. In response to the 
downward trend, in 1987/88 the government planned to invest 342 
million birr in industrial enterprises to increase production capac- 
ity. In 1989 the government issued Proclamation No. 11, which 
enunciated policies intended to attract foreign investment. Finally, 
in March 1990 Mengistu announced the replacement of Ethiopia's 
socialist economic system with a mixed economy. Among the pro- 
posed changes were that private investors would by permitted to 
participate in all parts of the economy with no limit on the amount 
of capital invested (see Role of Government, this ch.). 

Industrial Development Policy 

Between 1950 and 1960, the imperial government enacted legis- 
lation and implemented a new policy to encourage foreign invest- 
ment. This new policy provided investor benefits in the form of 



187 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

tax exemptions, remittances of foreign exchange, import and ex- 
port duty relief, tax exemptions on dividends, and the provision 
of financing through the Ethiopian Investment Corporation and 
the Development Bank of Ethiopia. In addition, the government 
guaranteed protection to industrial enterprises by instituting high 
tariffs and by banning the importation of commodities that might 
adversely affect production of domestic goods. Protected items in- 
cluded sugar, textiles, furniture, and metal. The government also 
participated through direct investment in enterprises that had high 
capital costs, such as oil refineries and the paper and pulp, glass 
and bottle, tire, and cement industries. In 1963, with the Second 
Five- Year Plan under way, the government enacted Proclamation 
No. 51 . The proclamation's objective was to consolidate other in- 
vestment policies enacted up to that period, to extend benefits to 
Ethiopian investors (previous legislation had limited the benefits 
to foreigners only), and to create an Investment Committee that 
would oversee investment programs. In 1966 Addis Ababa enacted 
Proclamation No. 242, which elevated the Investment Commit- 
tee's status as an advisory council to that of an authorized body 
empowered to make independent investment decisions. Thus, by 
the early 1970s, Ethiopia's industrialization policy included a range 
of fiscal incentives, direct government investment, and equity par- 
ticipation in private enterprises. 

The government's policy attracted considerable foreign invest- 
ment to the industrial sector. For instance, in 1971/72 the share 
of foreign capital in manufacturing industries amounted to 41 per- 
cent of the total paid-up capital. Many foreign enterprises oper- 
ated as private limited companies, usually as a branch or subsidiary 
of multinational corporations. The Dutch had a major investment 
(close to 80 percent) in the sugar industry. Italian and Japanese 
investors participated in textiles; and Greeks maintained an interest 
in shoes and beverages. Italian investors also worked in building, 
construction, and agricultural industries. 

In 1975 the PMAC nationalized most industries and subsequently 
reorganized them into state-owned corporations. On February 7, 
1975, the government released a document outlining socialist Ethio- 
pia's economic policy. The policy identified three manufacturing 
areas slated for state involvement: basic industries that produced 
goods serving other industries and that had the capacity to create 
linkages in the economy; industries that produced essential goods 
for the general population; and industries that made drugs, medi- 
cine, tobacco, and beverages. The policy also grouped areas of the 
public and private sectors into activities reserved for the state, 



188 



The Economy 



activities where state and private capital could operate jointly, and 
activities left to the private sector. 

The 1975 nationalization of major industries scared off foreign 
private investment. Private direct investment, according to the Na- 
tional Bank of Ethiopia, declined from 65 million birr in 1974 to 
12 million birr in 1977. As compensation negotiations between the 
Ethiopian government and foreign nationals dragged on, foreign 
investment virtually ceased. The United States Congress invoked 
the Hickenlooper Amendment, which had the effect of prohibit- 
ing the use of United States funds for development purposes until 
Ethiopia had settled compensation issues with United States na- 
tionals. During 1982 and 1983, the Mengistu regime settled claims 
made by Italian, Dutch, Japanese, and British nationals. Negoti- 
ation to settle compensation claims by United States nationals con- 
tinued until 1985, when Ethiopia agreed to pay about US$7 million 
in installments to compensate United States companies. 

Issued in 1983, the PMAC's Proclamation No. 235 (the Joint 
Venture Proclamation) signaled Ethiopia's renewed interest in at- 
tracting foreign capital. The proclamation offered incentives such 
as a five-year period of income tax relief for new projects, import 
and export duty relief, tariff protection, and repatriation of profits 
and capital. It limited foreign holdings to a maximum of 49 per- 
cent and the duration of any joint venture to twenty-five years. 
Although the proclamation protected investors' interests from ex- 
propriation, the government reserved the right to purchase all shares 
in a joint venture "for reasons of national interest." The procla- 
mation failed to attract foreign investment, largely because foreign 
businesses were hesitant to invest in a country whose government 
recently had nationalized foreign industries without a level of com- 
pensation these businesses considered satisfactory. 

In 1989 the government issued Special Decree No. 11, a revi- 
sion of the 1983 proclamation. The decree allowed majority for- 
eign ownership in many sectors, except in those related to public 
utilities, banking and finance, trade, transportation, and commu- 
nications, where joint ventures were not allowed. The decree also 
removed all restrictions on profit repatriation and attempted to pro- 
vide more extensive legal protection of investors than had the 1983 
proclamation. 

President Mengistu's March 1990 speech to the Central Com- 
mittee of the WPE was a turning point in Ethiopia's recent eco- 
nomic history. Acknowledging that socialism had failed, Mengistu 
proposed implementing a mixed economy. Under the new system, 
the private sector would be able to participate in all parts of the 
economy with no limit on capital investment (Ethiopia had a 



189 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

US$250,000 ceiling on private investment); developers would be 
allowed to build houses, apartments, and office buildings for rent 
or sale; and commercial enterprises would be permitted to develop 
industries, hotels, and a range of other enterprises on government- 
owned land to be leased on a concessionary basis. Additionally, 
state-owned industries and businesses would be required to oper- 
ate on a profit basis, with those continuing to lose money to be 
sold or closed. Farmers would receive legal ownership of land they 
tilled and the right to sell their produce in a free market. Whereas 
there were many areas yet to be addressed, such as privatization 
of state enterprises and compensation for citizens whose land and 
property had been confiscated, these proposals generated optimism 
among some economists about Ethiopia's economic future. 
However, some observers pointed out that Mengistu's proposals 
only amounted to recognition of existing practices in the under- 
ground economy. 

Energy Resources 

Ethiopia is one of the few African countries with the potential 
to produce hydroelectric and geothermal power. As of mid- 1991, 
however, no comprehensive assessment of this potential was avail- 
able, although some estimates indicated that the total potential could 
be as much as 143 billion kilowatts. The main sources of this poten- 
tial were thought to be the Abay (Blue Nile; 79.9 billion kilowatts), 
the Shebele (21.6 billion kilowatts), and the Omo (16.1 billion 
kilowatts). The remaining 25.9 billion kilowatts would come from 
rivers such as the Tekeze, Awash, Baro, Genale, and Mereb. 

Ethiopia's first large hydroelectric generating facilities were con- 
structed in the Awash River basin. The three plants — Awash I 
(Koka) with 54,000 kilowatts capacity, Awash II with 32,000 
kilowatts capacity, and Awash III with 32,000 kilowatts capacity — 
were finished between 1960 and 1972. In 1974 the Fincha River 
facility in central Welega opened with a generating capacity of 
84,000 kilowatts. Other major power- generating facilities included 
those at Bahir Dar (7,680 kilowatts) and Aba Samuel (6,560 
kilowatts). The total installed capacity of thermal generating units 
amounted to 210,084 kilowatts in 1985/86. 

Electric power production in 1985/86 totaled 998.7 million 
kilowatt-hours, 83 percent of which was produced by hydroelec- 
tric power installations. Thermal generating units produced the 
remaining 17 percent. The thermal generating units in the public 
utility system, many of which were comparatively small, had a 
generating capacity of 95,635 kilowatts in 1985. Major units were 



190 



The Economy 



located close to Asmera (31,900 kilowatts), Dire Dawa (4,500 
kilowatts), Addis Ababa (3,100 kilowatts), and Aseb (3,100 
kilowatts). In 1985/86 various business enterprises and local com- 
munities owned electrical generators of unspecified capacity. 

The regional electrical distribution system included an intercon- 
nected system and a self-contained system. By 1988 most power 
generating sources, including all major hydroelectric power plants, 
were interconnected in a power grid. The interconnected system 
served more than 100 towns. Power from the Awash, Fincha, and 
Aba Samuel stations ran the central system, the largest compo- 
nent of the interconnected system. The Bahir Dar interconnected 
system, which served parts of Gojam and Gonder, and the Eritrean 
Region Electricity Supply Agency (ERESA) were two of the other 
major systems. A majority of the self-contained systems got their 
power from thermal power plants, with the power often being used 
for domestic purposes and to run small mills. 

The Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (ELPA), a 
government corporation, operated most of the country's power 
systems. Prior to the revolution, ELPA incorporated more than 
forty electric power stations and generated about 80 percent of the 
nation's total electrical output. Two Italian firms, Societa Elet- 
trica dell' Africa Orientale and Compagnia Nazionale Impresse 
Elettriche, chiefly serving Eritrea, produced another 16.5 percent 
of the country's electrical energy. Independent stations generated 
the remaining 3 to 4 percent. In 1975 the government national- 
ized all private utility companies and placed them under ELPA. 
Since then, utility services have been reserved exclusively to the 
state. In 1987 ELPA served about 170 towns and produced about 
92 percent of the national electrical output. Mass organizations, 
sugar factories, and the Aseb refinery administered the remaining 
8 percent. 

In 1985/86, of the total 847.7 million kilowatt-hours of power 
sold by ELPA, 59 percent was for industrial use, 29 percent for 
domestic use, 10 percent for commercial use, and the remaining 
2 percent for other uses such as street lighting and agriculture. By 
1987 about 9 percent of the total population (4.3 million people) 
were using electricity. 

Ethiopia's second commercial energy resource is oil. Despite 
reports of natural gas reserves and traces of petroleum, Ethiopia 
still depends on imported crude oil, which accounted for an aver- 
age of about 12 percent of the value of imports during the period 
1982/83 to 1987/88. Exploration for petroleum and natural gas 
in the Ogaden and the Red Sea basin has been going on for 
many years. In May 1988, International Petroleum, a subsidiary 



191 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



of Canada's International Petroleum Corporation (IPC), signed 
a production sharing and exploration license for the Denakil block, 
which covers 34,000 square kilometers on and off shore along the 
Red Sea coast. The IPC also has conducted geothermal studies and 
undertaken mapping projects. In late 1990, the government an- 
nounced that geologists had discovered oil in western Ilubabor, with 
an expected deposit ranging from 100 million to 120 million tons. 

Since the early 1970s, there has been exploration and develop- 
ment of geothermal resources in the Great Rift Valley. In early 
1972, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) con- 
ducted preliminary explorations in the area and detected what ap- 
peared to be one of the world's largest potential sources of 
geothermal power. In mid- 1979 the EEC, assisted by the UNDP, 
provided a grant to aid exploration in the valley's lake region. In 
1984 Ethiopia reported the discovery of a promising geothermal 
source in the Lake Langano area. However, no indication has been 
provided as to when production will start. The primary energy 
sources for most Ethiopians are charcoal, animal manure, and fire- 
wood. Some estimates indicate that as much as 96 percent of the 
country's total energy consumption is based on these traditional 
sources. 

Mining 

Ethiopia's minerals industry has been only of minor importance, 
contributing an average of less than 0.2 percent of GDP at con- 
stant factor cost between 1984/85 and 1988/89. Although it had 
reported the existence of a wide range of minerals throughout the 
country, the government had authorized little exploration. Thus, 
there are no reliable estimates of the extent of mineral resources. 
However, there has been some small-scale mining for minerals such 
as gold, platinum, salt, limestone, and clay. Gold has been mined 
at Adola (in Sidamo) for many years. In 1981/82 output at this 
site in southern Ethiopia averaged around 500 kilograms per 
annum. However, by 1985/86 production had dropped to 293 kilo- 
grams. In 1987 the government reported the discovery of large gold 
deposits in Lege Dimbi, also in Sidamo. Observers believed that 
prospectors mined an annual average of 7 . 5 to 8 kilograms of plati- 
num in the Yubdo area in Welega. 

Stretching inland from the Red Sea coast, the Denakil Depres- 
sion has large salt deposits. Production averaged some 20,000 tons 
annually. Other major salt sources are found at Aseb and around 
Mitsiwa, also on the Red Sea. According to some estimates, Ethio- 
pia produces about 300,000 tons of marine and mined salt annually. 



192 



The Economy 



However, this supply fails to satisfy domestic needs because the 
government exports salt to improve its hard-currency reserves. 

A large potash deposit, estimated at 140 to 150 million tons, is 
located in Tigray's Dallol area. Production has averaged less than 
1 million tons per year. 

Large iron ore deposits are scattered throughout the country. 
During the Italian colonial period, a few companies started iron- 
mining operations in Eritrea but abandoned them after the Italian 
occupation ended in 1941. In the late 1980s, prospectors identi- 
fied iron ore deposits estimated at 20 million tons in the Agametta 
region (near Mitsiwa) and another 160,00 tons of iron ore in Welega 
and Bale. 

Copper, lead, and zinc deposits are found near Debarwa, thirty- 
five kilometers southwest of Asmera. In 1973 the Ethio-Nippon 
Mining Share Company started mining copper in Debarwa. 
However, the Eritrean war forced an end to operations two years 
later. 

Limestone is excavated near Mitsiwa, Dire Dawa, and Addis 
Ababa. The limestone is used chiefly at the cement works operat- 
ing in those cities. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

A lack of resources, coupled with military and political instabil- 
ity, has retarded the growth of a transportation infrastructure in 
Ethiopia, even though development of such a system traditionally 
has been a government objective. The Haile Selassie regime allo- 
cated an average of 700 million birr of the planned budget for the 
development of transportation during the three five-year develop- 
ment plans (1957-74). In 1975, when the PMAC articulated its 
socialist economic policy, the government assumed control of all 
transportation and communication facilities. The military govern- 
ment continued to expand and improve the transportation infra- 
structure by using its own funds and by securing loans from 
international organizations such as the World Bank. In 1991 the 
transportation system included 13,000 kilometers of all-weather 
roads, a 781 -kilometer railroad connecting Addis Ababa and 
Djibouti, twenty-five airports, and another twenty airfields (see fig. 
10). 

Roads 

Road transport was the means of movement for about 93 per- 
cent of freight and 95 percent of all passengers. In 1991, in addi- 
tion to the 13,000 kilometers of all-weather roads, of which about 
4,000 were asphalted and 8,900 were all-weather gravel roads, there 



193 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

were 4,900 kilometers of rural dirt roads, making a total of nearly 
18,000 kilometers of all types of roads. Centered in Addis Ababa, 
the road system radiated in all directions in a spoke-like pattern. 
However, substantial parts of the country, notably in the west, 
southwest, and southeast, still lacked all-weather connections to 
this network. Only about 12 percent of the population had ready 
access to roads. Most roads in the national network were concen- 
trated in the central, eastern, and northern highlands. 

During the 1936-41 Italian occupation, road building increased. 
Mobility helped Italy consolidate its rule over Ethiopia, initiate de- 
velopment projects, and pacify unstable areas. By 1941 there were 
about 7,000 kilometers of roads, of which about half were surfaced 
with asphalt. After liberation, road construction and maintenance 
stagnated because of a lack of funds, equipment, and expertise until 
1951, when the government established the Imperial Highway 
Authority. With the help of World Bank funds and with technical 
assistance from the United States Bureau of Public Roads, the de- 
velopment of Ethiopia's highway system continued. 

The Imperial Highway Authority played a major role in the con- 
struction of roads until the revolution. The Derg restructured the 
Imperial Highway Authority as the Ethiopian Road Authority and 
the Rural Roads Task Force. The government created the latter 
to develop rural roads outside the main system and to extend feeder 
roads within the main system. The World Bank, which had financed 
four previous highway programs, funded this project. In addition, 
the African Development Bank and the EC provided assistance for 
road construction and maintenance. Despite these efforts, Ethio- 
pia's road network remained primitive and quite limited, even by 
African standards. This shortcoming had tragic consequences dur- 
ing the 1984-85 famine, when the lack of good roads contributed 
to Ethiopia's inability to distribute food to famine victims. As a 
result, many thousands of Ethiopians perished. In 1991 comple- 
tion of an adequate nationwide highway system continued to be 
one of Ethiopia's major development challenges. 

Railroads 

Ethiopia's two original rail systems were the Franco-Ethiopian 
Railroad (FER) and the Akordat-Mitsiwa railroad. A French com- 
pany, the Compagnie Imperiale des Chemins de Fers Ethiopiens, 
built the FER by authority of Emperor Menelik II. Construction 
began in 1897 at the port city of Djibouti, and the final link reached 
Addis Ababa in 1917. In 1959 the Ethiopian government acquired 
a 50 percent holding in the line. 



194 



jAk( 



Gonder 

Lake 
'tana 



q 



t 

Nekemte 
Metu d 
Tepi 



Jima 




v 



Figure 10. Transportation Syster 
196 



The Economy 



By the early 1960s, however, Ethiopia had taken steps to reduce 
its dependence on the FER, which could be disrupted by natural 
disaster or an attack by antigovernment forces. Nevertheless, Ethio- 
pia suffered economically when sabotage associated with the 
1977-78 Ogaden War temporarily closed the FER. As an alter- 
nate to the FER, the government expanded the port of Aseb and 
constructed a highway between Addis Ababa and Aseb. The open- 
ing of the Addis Ababa-Aseb highway prompted the FER to im- 
prove the railroad to remain competitive. In particular, the FER 
expanded investment in diesel locomotion, new rolling stock, and 
track. Despite these efforts, competition between the rail and road 
systems remained intense. For example, in 1986/87 the FER moved 
335,400 tons of freight compared with a high of 375,000 tons in 
the mid-1960s. One of the major reasons for the decline was at- 
tacks on the rail line by rebel groups. 

An Italian company completed construction of the Akordat- 
Mitsiwa line in 1922. The Ethiopian government acquired owner- 
ship of the line after World War II. In the mid-1960s, the volume 
of freight and passenger traffic stagnated. By the early 1970s, the 
railroad's equipment was old, and the line was in need of track 
improvements. In the mid-1970s, operation ceased to be viable be- 
cause of the threat posed by Eritrean guerrillas and the realization 
that existing road facilities could handle the railroad's traffic. For 
these reasons, the government closed the line in 1976, and it was 
partially destroyed in later fighting. 

Ports 

Ethiopia had two major ports, Aseb and Mitsiwa, on the Red 
Sea coast. These ports accounted for about 93 percent of Ethio- 
pia's export-import trade. The port of Djibouti, which operated 
as a free port, handled the remaining 7 percent of Ethiopia's sea- 
borne freight. All three ports handled deep-sea vessels, possessed 
some mechanized cargo-handling equipment, and offered covered 
and open storage facilities. 

The port of Aseb was connected by road with Addis Ababa. De- 
veloped by the imperial government in the late 1950s, Aseb, 
together with Djibouti, principally served Ethiopia's central and 
southern areas. In 1988 Aseb handled about 71 percent of the 
export-import trade. In EFY 1986/87, more than 2.8 million tons 
of cargo transited Aseb, of which about 66 percent consisted of im- 
ports, including about 792,000 tons of crude oil for Aseb's refinery. 
Although the port of Aseb was not threatened, antigovernment 
forces repeatedly attacked the Addis Ababa-Aseb highway. 

Mitsiwa was connected to Asmera by road and by rail. Until 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) captured Mitsiwa 



197 



The Economy 



By the early 1960s, however, Ethiopia had taken steps to reduce 
its dependence on the FER, which could be disrupted by natural 
disaster or an attack by antigovernment forces. Nevertheless, Ethio- 
pia suffered economically when sabotage associated with the 
1977-78 Ogaden War temporarily closed the FER. As an alter- 
nate to the FER, the government expanded the port of Aseb and 
constructed a highway between Addis Ababa and Aseb. The open- 
ing of the Addis Ababa-Aseb highway prompted the FER to im- 
prove the railroad to remain competitive. In particular, the FER 
expanded investment in diesel locomotion, new rolling stock, and 
track. Despite these efforts, competition between the rail and road 
systems remained intense. For example, in 1986/87 the FER moved 
335,400 tons of freight compared with a high of 375,000 tons in 
the mid-1960s. One of the major reasons for the decline was at- 
tacks on the rail line by rebel groups. 

An Italian company completed construction of the Akordat- 
Mitsiwa line in 1922. The Ethiopian government acquired owner- 
ship of the line after World War II. In the mid-1960s, the volume 
of freight and passenger traffic stagnated. By the early 1970s, the 
railroad's equipment was old, and the line was in need of track 
improvements. In the mid-1970s, operation ceased to be viable be- 
cause of the threat posed by Eritrean guerrillas and the realization 
that existing road facilities could handle the railroad's traffic. For 
these reasons, the government closed the line in 1976, and it was 
partially destroyed in later fighting. 

Ports 

Ethiopia had two major ports, Aseb and Mitsiwa, on the Red 
Sea coast. These ports accounted for about 93 percent of Ethio- 
pia's export-import trade. The port of Djibouti, which operated 
as a free port, handled the remaining 7 percent of Ethiopia's sea- 
borne freight. All three ports handled deep-sea vessels, possessed 
some mechanized cargo-handling equipment, and offered covered 
and open storage facilities. 

The port of Aseb was connected by road with Addis Ababa. De- 
veloped by the imperial government in the late 1950s, Aseb, 
together with Djibouti, principally served Ethiopia's central and 
southern areas. In 1988 Aseb handled about 71 percent of the 
export-import trade. In EFY 1986/87, more than 2.8 million tons 
of cargo transited Aseb, of which about 66 percent consisted of im- 
ports, including about 792,000 tons of crude oil for Aseb's refinery. 
Although the port of Aseb was not threatened, antigovernment 
forces repeatedly attacked the Addis Ababa-Aseb highway. 

Mitsiwa was connected to Asmera by road and by rail. Until 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) captured Mitsiwa 



197 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

in early 1990, the port handled traffic bound mainly for the north- 
ern part of the country. Also, the Ethiopian navy had stationed 
most of its ships at Mitsiwa. In EFY 1986/87, Mitsiwa handled 
about 470,000 tons of cargo, of which imports made up about 14 
percent. 

Developments during the 1986-87 drought, when food aid do- 
nated to Ethiopia rotted in storage facilities and ships waited for 
weeks to unload their cargo, demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
port of Aseb. In 1988 the government announced plans to build 
a new terminal at Aseb with a US$1 1 million loan from the Euro- 
pean Investment Bank. This multipurpose terminal for general 
cargo, container ships, and roll-on/roll-off vessels was to consist 
of a 6,400-square-meter transit shed. The government expected 
the first berth to be completed in 1991 and the rest of the work 
to be done by 1992. 

In addition to the major ports, there is a limited inland water 
transportation system. The Baro River is navigable and is used 
to transport goods to Sudan. Traders also transport local goods 
on Lake Tana in the northwest and Lake Abaya and Lake Chamo 
in the south. In EFY 1986/87, about 2,000 tons of cargo transited 
local waterways. A total of 98 percent of this activity was on Lake 
Tana. 

Air Transport 

Distance, terrain, and an underdeveloped road system made air 
transport an important part of Ethiopia's transportation network. 
Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), a government-owned corporation that 
began operations in 1946, provided domestic and international air 
service. The airline served some forty-five cities and towns in Ethio- 
pia and operated international flights that, in early 1991, included 
service to twenty-one cities in eighteen African countries; to western 
European destinations such as London, Paris, Frankfurt, Rome, 
and Athens; and to India and China. Many international and sev- 
eral regional airlines also provided regular service between Ethio- 
pia and other countries. 

International airports were located at Addis Ababa, Asmera, and 
Dire Dawa. Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport served more 
than 195,000 passengers in EFY 1986/87, while the Asmera and 
Dire Dawa airports handled 108,000 and 81,000 passengers, respec- 
tively, during the same period. Bole International Airport and the 
airport at Asmera were capable of handling larger aircraft, such 
as the Boeing 747. 

EAL had an excellent reputation because of its safety record. 
It was also one of the few profitable African airlines. EAL also had 



198 



The Economy 



provided training and maintenance services to more than a dozen 
other African and Middle Eastern airlines. In late 1986, EAL as- 
sembled the first agro-aircraft to support the nation's agricultural 
development and the agro-aviational needs of other African coun- 
tries. New facilities included an expanded catering network, a gas 
production plant, and base maintenance shops for ground equip- 
ment. EAL also had an ongoing program to automate airline ac- 
tivities such as maintenance and engineering, ticket accounting, 
and crew and corporate data management. 

Although it refrained from interfering in EAL operations, the 
Mengistu government opposed the airline's plans to expand into 
areas such as hotel construction and management, tourism, and 
catering, which the government reserved for state corporations, 
which operated at a loss. In June 1989, EAL announced plans to 
spend US$1.2 billion on new aircraft; in early 1991, EAL received 
Western credits to acquire five new Boeing 757s and to refinance 
two Boeing 767s. 

Telecommunications 

Ethiopia's telecommunications system was rudimentary. Broad- 
cast facilities were concentrated in a few cities, and telephones were 
limited primarily to government offices and businesses in Addis 
Ababa and regional capitals. Long-distance and international com- 
munications to two neighboring countries went via two radio-relay 
links: a modern 960-channel system that went south from Addis 
Ababa to Nairobi, and an older, twenty-four-channel system that 
paralleled the railroad line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. Other 
parts of the country were linked by old and unreliable open-wire 
lines. International service, other than to Kenya and Djibouti, 
passed through the Atlantic Ocean satellite of the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) via a ground 
station just north of the capital. This ground station was capable 
of providing over 100 simultaneous high-quality telephone, data, 
and television links with the rest of the world. 

In 1989 Ethiopia counted only 109,000 telephones, or two sets 
per 1,000 inhabitants, one of the lowest per capita figures in the 
world. Only 84 percent of service was automatic; the rest still used 
outdated manual systems. Over two-thirds of the telephones were 
in Addis Ababa or Asmera; the remainder were scattered through- 
out a few of the larger towns or regional capitals. Most users were 
either government offices or businesses. International direct dial 
was available to some users in Addis Ababa. Local or long-distance 
calling was difficult, however, with frequent busy signals for un- 
completed calls. 



199 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Broadcast service was also limited. In mid- 1991 the country 
counted four medium-wave AM radio stations, two in Addis Ababa 
and one each in Asmera and Harer. A shortwave transmitter south 
of the capital broadcast "Voice of Ethiopia" programming in En- 
glish, French, Amharic, Arabic, and Somali to surrounding coun- 
tries. Ten cities had low-power television stations. In mid- 1991 the 
nation had an estimated 9 million radio receivers and 100,000 tele- 
vision sets. 

Foreign Trade 

Both the imperial and the Marxist governments tried to improve 
Ethiopia's balance of trade, the former by encouraging exports and 
the latter by curtailing imports. However, Ethiopia's foreign trade 
balance has basically been in deficit since 1953, with the exception 
of 1975, when a combination of unusually large receipts from sales 
of oilseeds and pulses resulted in a surplus. In general, foreign trade 
has grown faster than the national economy, particularly in the 
early 1970s, but it has accounted for only a small percentage of 
the national economy. In EFY 1972/73, exports and imports ac- 
counted for 13 and 12 percent of GDP, respectively. By EFY 
1988/89, exports had declined to 8 percent of GDP, and imports 
had jumped to 21 percent. Virtually all machinery and equipment 
had to be imported, as well as intermediate goods for agriculture 
and industry, including fertilizer and fuel. Increased cereal ship- 
ments accounted for the growth in imports. In the 1980s, Ethio- 
pia faced several famines and droughts. Consequently, the country, 
which had been virtually self-sufficient in food supplies in the 1970s, 
became a net importer of food worth as much as 243 million birr 
annually during the period EFY 1983/84 to EFY 1987/88. The mili- 
tary government failed to correct the country's historical trade 
deficit, despite efforts to regulate exports and imports. Conse- 
quently, during the 1980s the trade picture worsened as imports 
grew rapidly and foreign aid slowed. 

Exports 

Ethiopia's exports in EFY 1988/89 were primarily agricultural 
products (see table 14, Appendix). The only significant nonagricul- 
tural exports were petroleum products such as heating oil, which 
had no use in Ethiopia, from the Aseb refinery. 

The value of exports increased during the 1980s, and by EFY 
1988/89 exports had almost twice the value they had in 1973. 
However, the composition of exports had remained essentially the 
same, although the relative share of the various agricultural ex- 
ports had changed. Coffee, the major export, still averaged about 



200 



The Economy 



63 percent of the value of exports during the five years ending in 
EFY 1988/89. The relative share of oilseeds and pulses, however, 
had changed dramatically. Pulses and oilseeds, which accounted 
for about 15 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of the total value 
of exports in EFY 1974/75, dropped to 1.9 and 1.4 percent, respec- 
tively, of the total value of exports in EFY 1988/89. Droughts, fam- 
ines, the peasants' preference for cereals and other staples, and the 
rising cost of producing pulses and oilseeds accounted for the decline 
in the export of these two products. Exports of livestock and livestock 
products averaged 18 percent of the value of exports for the five 
years ending in EFY 1988/89, which was slightly higher than the 
prerevolution share of 16 percent. 

After the 1974 revolution, exports' relative share of GDP 
declined, largely because domestic production grew more slowly 
than total demand. This could be attributed to the agricultural crisis 
associated with the country's recurring droughts and famines and 
the dislocation of the farm economy resulting from the revolu- 
tion. Total domestic production, measured by GDP, grew at an 
average annual rate of 0.9 percent per year during the 1980- 
87 period while exports declined at an average annual rate of 
0.6 percent. During the same period, the population grew at an 
average 2.4 percent annual rate. Consequently, Ethiopia's export 
share of 8 percent of GDP in EFY 1988/89 was one of the world's 
lowest. 

The direction of Ethiopia's post- 1974 exports remained essen- 
tially the same as in the prerevolution period, despite the govern- 
ment's change of policy and realignment with the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. About 79 percent of Ethiopia's exports went 
to Western countries, primarily the United States, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Japan. Ethiopia's ex- 
port trade with the Soviet Union, one of its major allies, was less 
than 4 percent in the five years ending in 1987; prior to 1974, the 
Soviet Union had accounted for less than 1 percent of Ethiopia's 
imports. Beginning in 1979, Addis Ababa sought to encourage ex- 
ports to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by encourag- 
ing barter and countertrade. Ethiopia used this technique to market 
products such as spices, natural gums, some pulses, frozen meats, 
and handicraft items, which are not reliable hard-currency earn- 
ers. In exchange, Ethiopia usually received consumer goods, in- 
dustrial machinery, or construction machinery. Although reliable 
figures on the volume of barter and countertrade were unavail- 
able, it appeared unlikely that the figure exceeded US$50 to US$55 
million in any year. 



201 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 
Imports 

Ethiopia's major category of import items was consumer goods, 
which accounted for about one-third of the value of imports dur- 
ing the period EFY 1984/85 to EFY 1988/89. Capital goods, primar- 
ily machinery and transportation equipment, accounted for another 
39 percent, with fuel, semifinished goods, and durable consumer 
goods accounting for the other third of the value of imports. A major 
structural change in Ethiopia's imports was the relative increase 
in the importation of food items. During the three years ending 
in EFY 1986/87, cereals and other food items accounted for 22 per- 
cent of the total value of imports; in 1974 cereal and food items 
had accounted for only 4.6 percent. As a result, the share of non- 
durable consumer items jumped from 16.8 percent in 1974 to 34.2 
percent in 1985. It dropped to 24.9 percent in EFY 1986/87. 

Imports provided the capital and intermediate goods upon which 
industry depended. Imports also satisfied most of the country's de- 
mand for nonfood consumer goods, such as automobiles, radios, 
televisions, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. In the five years ending 
in EFY 1986/87, the relative share of the value of transportation 
and transportation equipment increased, reflecting the country's 
increasing demand for trucks and other heavy road vehicles needed 
to transport food to areas affected by drought and famine. 

Most of Ethiopia's imports came from Western countries. Italy, 
the United States, West Germany, and Japan, in order of impor- 
tance, accounted for 45 percent of total imports in 1987. The Soviet 
Union accounted for 16 percent of the value of imports in 1987. 
By contrast, Ethiopia's exports to the Soviet Union amounted to 
only 5 percent of total exports in 1987. The relatively high propor- 
tion of imports from the Soviet Union was largely because of oil; 
in 1987 Ethiopia received virtually all its crude petroleum from 
the Soviet Union. In 1987 the United States remained Ethiopia's 
major trading partner despite cool relationships between the two 
countries; the United States ranked first in buying Ethiopia's ex- 
ports and third in satisfying Ethiopia's import needs. 

Balance of Payments and Foreign Assistance 

Ethiopia has experienced chronic balance of payments difficul- 
ties since 1953, with the exception of a few years. The major fac- 
tor in the deteriorating balance of payments was the worsening 
situation of merchandise trade. The trade deficit that existed dur- 
ing the imperial years continued to grow after the revolution, despite 
the introduction of import controls. Since EFY 1981/82, the value 
of merchandise imports has been roughly double the value of ex- 
ports (see table 15, Appendix). 



202 



The Economy 



Since 1974 there has been low growth in the overall volume and 
value of exports. Coffee, Ethiopia's principal export, accounted 
for about 60 percent of total merchandise exports, although this 
level fluctuated in the 1980s. Coffee exports reached an all-time 
high of 98,000 tons in EFY 1983/84 but dropped to 73,000 tons 
in EFY 1987/88. Similarly, coffee receipts declined as the world 
price of coffee plummeted. The share of noncoffee exports has not 
shown any significant change. Exports of oilseeds and pulses have 
declined since imperial times. Industrial exports consistently con- 
tributed only about 8 percent of the total value of merchandise ex- 
ports. In contrast to the slow increase in the volume and value of 
exports, imports grew by nearly 7 percent during the decade end- 
ing in EFY 1988/89. This trend reflected Ethiopia's growing de- 
pendence on imports and the decline of foreign-financed investment 
and domestic savings. A high growth rate in import prices accom- 
panied the high growth rate in imports. The result of these deteri- 
orating terms of trade was a severe trade balance problem. 

To finance its trade deficit, the government has depended on 
foreign aid. These import finance funds were in addition to the 
large volume of development project aid and commodity assistance 
the international community has provided to Ethiopia since the 
end of World War II. The volume of official development assistance 
jumped from US$134 million in 1975 to US$212 million in 1980 
and to US$635 million in 1987. Most external financial assistance 
came from Western nations. By the late 1980s, Ethiopia was the 
principal African recipient of concessionary funding and the larg- 
est recipient of EC aid. In 1988 Ethiopia received US$141 million 
from the EC under the provisions of the Lome Convention (see 
Glossary). An additional US$230 million was later allocated under 
the Lome Convention. Bilateral assistance, mainly from European 
countries, also increased in the late 1980s. World Bank lending 
for various projects covering agriculture, education, housing, road 
construction, and power development reached US$400 to US$500 
million by 1988. Despite this aid, however, Ethiopia still received 
the smallest amount of aid per capita of all developing countries. 
The 1987 per capita aid level was US$14, compared with a US$23 
group average for all developing countries. 

Reliance on foreign aid has created economic problems for Addis 
Ababa. In 1987 Ethiopia's total external debt amounted to US$2.6 
billion, of which US$2.4 billion was long-term debt (excluding mil- 
itary debt). Addis Ababa owed more than one-third of the total 
to multinational agencies and the remainder to bilateral cred- 
itors. Economists estimated the EFY 1986/87 cost of servicing this 



203 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

long-term debt to be 28.4 percent of export earnings and projected 
the figure to rise to 40 percent of export earnings by 1990. 

Economic Prospects 

Under the imperial regime, economic progress was sluggish. The 
country's agricultural and industrial performance was poor. Ef- 
forts by the emperor to bring Ethiopia into the twentieth century 
enjoyed some success in limited areas, such as the emergence of 
Ethiopian Airlines; however, on the whole, imperial Ethiopia's eco- 
nomic policies must be judged a failure. As a result, many Ethio- 
pians supported the 1974 revolution in hopes that it would improve 
their standard of living. 

Between 1974 and 1975, Ethiopia's Marxist government car- 
ried out a wide range of political, economic, and social reforms. 
Unfortunately, these reforms promised more than they delivered. 
Gradually, the country's economy deteriorated. By 1990-91 Ethio- 
pia's economy was in a steep decline, from which recovery will be 
difficult. During the last year of the military government, GDP 
declined by 5 percent in real terms, and inflation soared. Defense 
expenditures accounted for 40 to 60 percent of the national bud- 
get. Merchandise exports fell to their lowest level since 1974, and 
a collapse in international coffee prices (during the 1979-89 pe- 
riod, coffee accounted for an average of 55 percent of total exports) 
reduced foreign-exchange reserves to an all-time low. More im- 
portant, insurgencies had spread to new areas of central and north- 
ern Ethiopia; recurring cycles of drought and famine again 
threatened millions of Ethiopians; and ill-conceived Marxist eco- 
nomic policies further eroded the country's economic performance. 
As a result of these and numerous other problems, the World Bank 
classified Ethiopia as the world's poorest country. Mengistu's early 
1990 adoption of a new economic policy failed to reinvigorate Ethio- 
pia's ailing economy. Without massive and genuine political, eco- 
nomic, and social reforms, it appeared unlikely that Ethiopia could 
harness its resources and improve the lives of its citizens anytime 
soon. 

j * , - $ J ; 

Much of the literature about Ethiopia's economy examines land 
tenure and land reform. Some of the more useful works about the 
imperial era include John Markakis's Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Tradi- 
tional Polity and John M. Cohen and Dov Weintraub's Land and 
Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia. A considerable amount of literature 
deals with land reform in the post- 1974 period. Essential studies 



204 



The Economy 



include Dessalegn Rahmato's Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, Haile 
Yesus Abegaz's The Organization of State Farms in Ethiopia after the 
Land Reform of 1975, Keith Griffin and Roger Hay's ''Problems 
of Agricultural Development in Socialist Ethiopia," and Ajit Kumar 
Ghose's "Transforming Feudal Agriculture." Kidane Mengisteab's 
Ethiopia: Failure of Land Reform and Agricultural Crisis analyzes the 
relationship between inadequate land reform policies and recur- 
ring famines during the imperial and revolutionary periods. Ma- 
rina Ottaway's The Political Economy of Ethiopia includes chapters 
that offer a critical analysis of Ethiopia's economic crisis. 

For general statistical materials, the best sources are the annual 
Ethiopia: Statistical Abstract published by the Ethiopian government's 
Central Statistical Authority and the Annual Report of the National 
Bank of Ethiopia. The most up-to-date data are available in the 
bank's Quarterly Bulletin. The Country Reports published quarterly 
and the Country Profiles published annually by the Economist In- 
telligence Unit also contain a great deal of useful economic in- 
formation. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



205 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Main gate of Jubilee Palace, Addis Ababa 



THE FINAL CONGRESS of Ethiopia's Provisional Military Ad- 
ministrative Council marked a watershed in modern Ethiopian his- 
tory. The congress, held in the capital city of Addis Ababa, was 
the prelude to the inauguration, in 1987, of the People's Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, which would be guided by a vanguard 
Marxist-Leninist party and regime. At least nominally, thirteen 
years of rule by the military regime were at an end. When the Provi- 
sional Military Administrative Council had assumed power in 1974, 
there were no clear signs that it was committed to a Marxist-Leninist 
model of social transformation; neither was there any indication 
that it was sincere about its pledge to return Ethiopia to civilian 
rule. In fact, within months of seizing power, the new regime began 
systematically to buttress the already preeminent role of the mili- 
tary as the vanguard of the revolution. 

Until its collapse in 1974, the Ethiopian imperial state had at- 
tempted to construct an absolutist but modernizing autocracy, a 
regime committed to preserving tradition while carefully guiding 
society into the twentieth century. Emperor Haile Selassie I, who 
ruled the country from 1930 to 1974, portrayed himself as a strong 
but compassionate leader, a model for all African statesmen. How- 
ever, at a very fundamental level, the imperial state constructed 
by Haile Selassie was tenuously held together by a top-heavy, secular- 
ized bureaucracy and an imperial myth. Once the myth that the 
emperor was unassailable had been broken, the new regime began 
the process of reconstituting state institutions. This process was 
slow but methodical, and by 1989 the fruits of this institutional 
transformation were definitely in evidence. 

The tasks of social, political, and economic reconstruction fac- 
ing the new regime in 1974 were formidable. To meet these 
challenges, the regime attempted to fashion a new ideological foun- 
dation for society. The Provisional Military Administrative Council 
favored a Marxist-Leninist development model because of the or- 
ganizational power it promised. The approach taken was statist 
and based on the principles of scientific socialism as interpreted 
in the Soviet Union from the time of Joseph Stalin to that of Leonid 
Brezhnev. At an operational level, this choice required the state's 
reorganization and reconstitution, the redistribution of wealth and 
property, the creation of a capacity for central planning, the pur- 
suit of a state socialist development strategy under the guidance 



209 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



of a vanguard party of "revolutionary democrats, ' ' and the estab- 
lishment of a constitutionally based "people's republic." 

Ethiopia's turn toward Marxism-Leninism first became evident 
in early 1976 with the enunciation of the Program for the National 
Democratic Revolution. This document, which reflected the views 
of those regime members who espoused Marxism- Leninism long 
before they seized power, committed the regime to a noncapitalist 
approach to development based on the principles of scientific so- 
cialism. For the next decade, the ruling group used ideology and 
new socialist institutions to implement and legitimize its policies. 
Even when particular economic strategies were chosen, the regime 
seemed to be motivated by political objectives rather than driven 
by ideological zeal. Chief among the objectives were establishing 
the regime's political control and securing popular legitimacy. 

By 1989 it was evident that the government had failed to con- 
solidate its rule. Natural catastrophes such as drought and famine 
had taken a heavy toll. Furthermore, the regime not only was un- 
able to control the general population, but also dozens of top- 
ranking officials had defected to the West, where they bitterly 
denounced the government. With military morale at its lowest point 
since 1974, disaffected senior officers attempted a coup d'etat in 
May 1989. In addition, numerous opposition groups waged mili- 
tary campaigns against the government. Most notable among these 
were the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigray Peo- 
ple's Liberation Front, the latter operating with several other anti- 
government groups in an umbrella organization known as the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. By early 1991, 
these groups controlled large stretches of territory in north-central 
Ethiopia and were poised to seize even more. 

Moreover, by this time the Soviet Union, in the spirit of Mik- 
hail Gorbachev's glasnost (openness), had abandoned its uncritical 
support of Ethiopia's revolution. The winds of democracy that were 
sweeping across much of the communist world also meant that 
Ethiopia could no longer rely on its Soviet and East European al- 
lies for military and economic assistance. These developments forced 
the government to reconsider its efforts to deal with its opponents 
through military rather than political means. However, by early 
1991 the government had failed to reach a negotiated settlement 
with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Ethiopian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Democratic Front. Thereafter, both groups 
launched renewed attacks that by late May brought the insurgents 
to power. The leaders of both insurgencies disavowed the state so- 
cialism of the military government and pledged themselves to 



210 



Government and Politics 



democratic principles and free-market economics. Eritrea was also 
expected to become an independent country. 

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia 
Toward Party Formation 

As early as 1976, the Soviet Union had encouraged Addis 
Ababa's new leaders to create a civilian-based vanguard party. The 
Ethiopian head of state and leader of the Provisional Military Ad- 
ministrative Council (PMAC; also known as the Derg — see Glos- 
sary), Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, initially had 
resisted, arguing that the revolution had taken place without such 
a party and that there was no need for haste in creating one. 
However, in the late 1970s, in the wake of the regime's near col- 
lapse under the weight of armed opposition to its rule, Mengistu 
believed the creation of a vanguard party would accomplish the 
regime's goals of gaining political control over the general popu- 
lation and of securing popular legitimacy. Therefore, in Decem- 
ber 1979 Mengistu announced the creation of the Commission to 
Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE). 

The establishment of mass organizations, such as the All-Ethiopia 
Trade Union, the All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Association, and 
the All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association, preceded the creation of 
COPWE. The Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association, the 
Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association, the Working Peo- 
ple's Control Committees, and various professional associations 
were instituted after COPWE's establishment. The idea behind 
the proliferation of mass organizations was to create a party that 
would neutralize "narrow nationalism," or sectarianism, and that 
would be based on broad, yet clearly defined, class interests. In 
response to the fiasco that resulted from efforts to create a union 
of Marxist- Leninist organizations in the mid-1970s, the Derg de- 
termined that the party should be one of individuals, not of politi- 
cal organizations. To the extent that individual interests were 
represented, this was to be done through mass organizations. 

Mass organizations not only represented their membership at 
party congresses but also guarded their interests on an everyday 
basis. The mass organizations had educational and developmental 
roles. The basic units of political consciousness and involvement, 
then, would be party cells at work sites or in mass organizations. 
Individuals could belong to more than one mass organization at 
a time. 

In determining COPWE membership, the regime tried to give 
the impression that a broadly representative organization had been 



211 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

created. Between 1,200 and 1,500 delegates from all regions and 
all walks of life attended the three congresses. However, the diversity 
of the delegates was questionable. For example, at COPWE's first 
congress, in 1980, more than a third of the delegates were mem- 
bers of the armed forces or residents of the Addis Ababa area. 

The first congress unveiled the membership of the COPWE Cen- 
tral Committee and the Secretariat. The Secretariat, which was 
supervised by the top Derg leadership, consisted mainly of civilian 
ideologues. The Secretariat was responsible for the day-to-day ad- 
ministration of Central Committee business. Regional branches 
under the direction of military officers in each region complemented 
COPWE's central leadership. However, the positions of chief 
regional administrator and COPWE representative were divided 
in late 1981, with the party posts assuming greater importance. 
Within a year of the first congress, it was clear that COPWE was 
being transformed into a party that could be used by the state as 
an instrument of control. 

By ( mid- 1983 the COPWE bureaucracy stretched from the na- 
tional center to the fourteen regions and thence to the subregional 
level, to peasant associations and urban dwellers' associations 
(kebeles — see Glossary), and on down to the party cell level. At that 
time, there were an estimated 6,500 COPWE party cells, with a 
total membership estimated at 30,000 to 50,000. 

Party membership, however, was not open to all. The main 
criterion for acceptability was loyalty to the regime rather than ideo- 
logical sophistication. Although Mengistu had stressed the need 
for ideological purity and for only a few "committed communists," 
concern over ideological purity appeared to be a facade for the 
Derg's efforts to neutralize or preempt its opponents and thus es- 
tablish the party's exclusive role in defining the normative order. 

Once COPWE was in place, the Derg projected itself into the 
most important sectors of the central bureaucracy. Derg members 
served as the administrators of twelve of the fourteen regions. An 
additional thirty Derg members took up influential posts in 
subregional administration and in central ministries. After 1978 
the presence of military personnel in the bureaucracy expanded 
so greatly that not only members of the Derg but also other trusted 
military men served in such roles. 

The organizational model followed by COPWE was Soviet in- 
spired. Even though there was tension between self-styled com- 
munists and nationalists in the Derg, there was an understanding 
that their collective position as a ruling group was unassailable. 
This could be seen in the distribution of power within COPWE. 
The most important policy-making bodies in COPWE were the 



212 



Government and Politics 



Executive Committee, whose seven members all came from the 
Derg, and the Central Committee, which consisted of ninety-three 
full members and thirty alternates. Of the 123 members of the Cen- 
tral Committee, seventy-nine were military men or police officers. 
There were at least twenty Derg members in this group, and others 
held important regional posts in the bureaucracy as well as in 
COPWE. At the time of COPWE's demise, military personnel 
represented more than 50 percent of the congress that established 
the vanguard party. 

The Vanguard Party 

The government announced the formation of the Workers' Party 
of Ethiopia (WPE) on September 12, 1984, the tenth anniversary 
of the revolution. Regional and local COPWE branches were trans- 
formed into WPE instruments, and it was announced that party 
congresses would be held at five-year intervals. These congresses 
would be responsible for electing the party Central Committee, 
a body of 183 members as of 1987. The Central Committee nor- 
mally met twice a year. Among its duties was the election of the 
WPE's Political Bureau, the general secretary, and members of 
the WPE Secretariat. However, the Central Committee was too 
large and diverse to serve as an effective decision-making body. 
Although in the late 1980s more than half of the Central Commit- 
tee's full members were former police or former military person- 
nel, the Central Committee also included peasants, workers, trade 
union members, and representatives of various mass organizations. 

The WPE Political Bureau had eleven full members and six alter- 
nate members. The Derg's Standing Committee and the COPWE 
Executive Committee had comprised the Derg's seven most influen- 
tial members. The additional four members appointed to the WPE 
were two civilian ideologues and two career technocrats, who in 
the years leading up to the WPE's inauguration had become respon- 
sible for the day-to-day direction of party matters and who evi- 
dently had Mengistu's confidence. 

The WPE's Political Bureau was the country's most important 
decision-making body. Although the Political Bureau's decisions 
were always made in secret, there was evidence that General Secre- 
tary Mengistu's wishes generally prevailed, no matter what the op- 
position. One observer suggested that whatever power or influence 
other Political Bureau members exerted was owed more to their 
closeness to Mengistu than to any formal positions they might oc- 
cupy or to their personal qualities. The Political Bureau, there- 
fore, was little more than a forum for the articulation of policies 
already determined personally by Mengistu. 



213 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The paramount position of the WPE was enshrined in the 1987 
constitution, which stated that the party should be "the formula- 
tor of the country's development process and the leading force of 
the state and in society." Indeed, the WPE had become more im- 
portant than the central government in determining the direction 
of national and local policies. Local party leaders sometimes pos- 
sessed a great deal of latitude in determining approaches to policy 
in their regions as long as their decisions did not conflict with ob- 
jectives determined in Addis Ababa. At the national level, highly 
politicized party representatives often exercised greater influence 
than the Western-trained bureaucrats in government ministries. 
It appeared that the government bureaucracy had to follow the lead 
of the party and often found its policies and procedures overrid- 
den by political decisions. 

At the national level, individuals from the military, the govern- 
ment bureaucracy, and those ethnic groups (especially Amhara and 
Tigray) that had historically endorsed the notion of a unitary, 
"Greater Ethiopia" dominated the WPE. However, below the level 
of the regional first secretary of the WPE, the military and ethnic 
origins of party leadership became less important. 

The 1987 Constitution 

The primary task facing the WPE following its formation in 1984 
was to devise the new national constitution that would inaugurate 
the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). In March 
1986, a 343-member Constitutional Commission was formed to 
draft a new constitution based on the principles of scientific social- 
ism. Eventually, the 122 full and alternate members of the WPE 
Central Committee who had been appointed to its membership 
dominated the commission. 

The Constitutional Commission had its origins in the Institute 
for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, which the Derg had es- 
tablished in March 1983 to find solutions to problems resulting from 
Ethiopia's extreme ethnic diversity. The institute was staffed mostly 
by academics from Addis Ababa University, who continued to serve 
as advisers to the Constitutional Commission. The commission's 
diverse membership included religious leaders, artists, writers, doc- 
tors, academics, athletes, workers, and former nobility. There was 
also an attempt by those who chose appointees to the commission 
to make sure that all major ethnic nationalities had representation 
in the body. 

For about six months, the commission debated the details of the 
new constitution. In June 1986, it issued a 120-article draft docu- 
ment. The government printed and distributed 1 million copies 



214 



City Hall, Addis Ababa 
Courtesy Thomas Ofcansky 



to kebeles and peasant associations throughout the country. During 
the next two months, the draft was discussed at about 25,000 loca- 
tions. The regime used this method of discussion to legitimize the 
constitution-making process and to test the mood of the populace. 
In some cases, people attended constitutional discussion sessions 
only after pressure from local WPE cadres, but in other cases at- 
tendance was voluntary. Where popular interest was apparent, it 
centered on issues such as taxes, the role of religion, marriage, the 
organization of elections, and citizenship rights and obligations. 
By far the most controversial draft provision was the one that out- 
lawed polygamy, which caused a furor among Muslims. Few ques- 
tions were raised about the document's failure to address the 
nationalities problem and the right to self-determination. Accord- 
ing to government officials, the citizenry submitted more than 
500,000 suggested revisions. In August the commission reconvened 
to consider proposed amendments. In all, the commission accepted 
ninety-five amendments to the original draft. Most of the changes, 
however, were cosmetic. 

The referendum on the constitution was held on February 1, 
1987, and Mengistu announced the results three weeks later. He re- 
ported that 96 percent of the 1 4 million people eligible to participate 
(adults eighteen years of age and older) actually voted. Eighty-one 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

percent of the electorate endorsed the constitution, while 18 per- 
cent opposed it (1 percent of the ballots were invalid). Although 
this was the first election in Ethiopia's history based on universal 
suffrage, the presence of communist cadres throughout the coun- 
try ensured that the constitution would be adopted. In Tigray and 
Eritrea, however, the regime held referenda only in urban centers 
because much of these territories was controlled by the Tigray Peo- 
ple's Liberation Front and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, 
respectively (see Political Dynamics, this ch.). In other places, such 
as parts of Welo and Gonder regions, the vote took place amid 
heightened security measures. 

The constitution officially took effect on February 22, 1987, when 
the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was proclaimed, 
although it was not until September that the new government was 
fully in place and the PMAC formally abolished (see The People's 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ch. 1). The document, which 
established the normative foundations of the republic, consisted 
of seventeen chapters and 119 articles. The preamble traced Ethio- 
pia's origins back to antiquity, proclaimed the historical heroism 
of its people, praised the country's substantial natural and human 
resources, and pledged to continue the struggle against imperial- 
ism, poverty, and hunger. The government's primary concern was 
proclaimed to be the country's development through the implemen- 
tation of the Program for the National Democratic Revolution 
(PNDR). In the process, it was assumed that the material and tech- 
nical bases necessary for establishing socialism would be created. 

The constitution attempted to situate Ethiopia in the context of 
the worldwide movement of so-called "progressive states" and made 
no direct reference to Africa. Critics claim that the constitution 
was no more than an abridged version of the 1977 Soviet constitu- 
tion, with the exception that strong powers were assigned to the 
newly created office of the president. A second difference between 
the Ethiopian and Soviet constitutions is that the former declared 
the country to be a unitary state rather than a union of republics. 
It was reported that the problem of nationalities was hotly debated 
in the Constitutional Commission, as well as in the WPE Central 
Committee, but the regime would not abandon its desire to create 
a single multiethnic state rather than a federation. 

The Social Order 

Chapter 1 of the constitution defined Ethiopia's social order. The 
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) was declared to 
be "a state of working peasants in which the intelligentsia, the revolu- 
tionary army, artisans, and other democratic sections of society 



216 



Government and Politics 



participate." The commitment to socialist construction was 
reaffirmed, as was the idea of egalitarianism within the context of 
a unitary state. The official language remained Amharic. The func- 
tioning and organization of the country was proclaimed to be based 
on the principles of democratic centralism, under which represen- 
tative party and state organs are elected by lower bodies. The van- 
guard character of the WPE was asserted, and its roles as well as 
those of mass organizations were spelled out. 

Chapter 2 dealt with the country's economic system. The state 
was dedicated to the creation of a "highly interdependent and in- 
tegrated national economy" and to the establishment of conditions 
favorable to development. In addition, the constitution commit- 
ted the state to central planning; state ownership of the means of 
production, distribution, and exchange; and expansion of cooper- 
ative ownership among the general population. 

Chapter 3 addressed social issues, ranging from education and 
the family to historical preservation and cultural heritage. The fam- 
ily was described as the basis of society and therefore deserving 
of special attention by means of the joint efforts of state and soci- 
ety. In addition, the constitution pledged that health insurance and 
other social services would be expanded through state leadership. 

National defense was the subject of Chapter 4. The first article 
asserted the nation's need to defend its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and to safeguard the accomplishments of the revolution. 
It was declared that the Ethiopian people had a historical respon- 
sibility to defend the country. The defense force was to be the army 
of the country's working people. The army's fundamental role 
would be to secure peace and socialism. 

Foreign policy objectives were spelled out in four brief articles 
in Chapter 5 and were based on the principles of proletarian in- 
ternationalism, peaceful coexistence, and nonalignment. In many 
respects, the language of this section resembled that of a constitu- 
tion of a Warsaw Pact country in the days before glasnost. 

Citizenship, Freedoms, Rights, and Duties 

Chapters 6 and 7 were concerned with defining citizenship and 
spelling out the freedoms, rights, and duties of citizens. The lan- 
guage was egalitarian, and Ethiopians were declared to be equal 
before the law, regardless of nationality, sex, religion, occupation, 
and social or other status. They had the right to marry, to work, 
to rest, to receive free education, and to have access to health care 
and to a fair trial. Ethiopians were guaranteed freedom of conscience 
and religion. As was not the case in imperial Ethiopia, religion and 
the state were proclaimed to be separate institutions. Citizens were 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

assured the freedoms of movement, speech, press, assembly, peace- 
ful demonstration, and association. Regarding political participa- 
tion, citizens had the right to vote and the right to be elected to 
political office. Their duties included national military service, pro- 
tection of socialist state property, protection of the environment, 
and observance of the constitution and laws of the country. 

In spite of the attention the constitution paid to basic freedoms, 
until the last days of the regime international human rights organi- 
zations were virtually unanimous in condemning the Mengistu re- 
gime. Summary execution, political detention, torture, and forced 
migration represented only some of the violations cited by these 
groups (see Human Rights, ch. 5). 

National Shengo (National Assembly) 

The constitution's most detailed sections related to the central 
government's organization and activities. In these sections, the 
document described the various state organs and explained their 
relationship to one another. 

The supreme organ of state power was the National Shengo 
(National Assembly). Its responsibilities included amending the con- 
stitution; determining foreign, defense, and security policy; estab- 
lishing the boundaries, status, and accountability of administrative 
regions; and approving economic plans. The National Shengo was 
also responsible for establishing the Council of State; the Council 
of Ministers, ministries, state committees, commissions, and state 
authorities; the Supreme Court; the Office of the Prosecutor Gen- 
eral; the National Workers' Control Committee; and the Office 
of the Auditor General. In addition, the National Shengo elected 
the president and officials of the Council of State and approved 
the appointment of other high-ranking authorities. 

Candidates to the National Shengo had to be nominated by 
regional branches of the WPE, mass organizations, military units, 
and other associations recognized by law. Balloting for seats in the 
National Shengo was required to be secret, and all individuals eigh- 
teen years of age and above were eligible to vote. Elected mem- 
bers served five-year terms, and the body met in regular session 
once each year. These sessions were usually public but might on 
occasion be held in camera. In 1987 the National Shengo had 835 
members. 

Council of State 

The Council of State, consisting of the president of the repub- 
lic, several vice presidents, a secretary, and other members, was 
an organ of the National Shengo. The Council of State served as 



218 



Government and Politics 



the most active oversight arm of the government, and it exercised 
the national legislative role when the National Shengo was not in 
session. In addition to its normal functions, the Council of State 
was empowered to establish a defense council and might be assigned 
special duties by the National Shengo (see Command and Force 
Structure, ch. 5). The Council of State had the further authority 
to issue decrees in the pursuit of the duties stipulated by law or 
assigned by the National Shengo. The power of this organ was evi- 
dent in the constitutional provision that stated, "When compel- 
ling circumstances warrant it, the Council of State may, between 
sessions of the National Shengo, proclaim a state of emergency, 
war, martial law, mobilization or peace." 

The President 

The 1987 constitution established the office of president. Theo- 
retically, the Council of State ruled along with the president and 
exercised legislative oversight in relation to other branches of 
government. In reality, however, the office of the president in par- 
ticular and the executive branch in general were the most power- 
ful branches of government. The president was able to act with 
considerable independence from the National Shengo. 

Although the constitution stipulated that the president was ac- 
countable to the National Shengo, Mengistu demonstrated repeat- 
edly that there was no authority higher than his own office. By law 
he was responsible for presenting members of his executive staff 
and the Supreme Court to the National Shengo for election. At 
the same time, the president, "when compelling circumstances war- 
rant it' i between sessions of the National Shengo, could appoint 
or relieve the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, and other 
members of the Council of Ministers; the president, the vice presi- 
dent, and Supreme Court judges; the prosecutor general; the chair- 
man of the National Workers' Control Committee; and the auditor 
general. The National Shengo was by law supposed to act on such 
decrees in its next regular session, but this appeared to be only 
pro forma. 

The president, who could be elected to an indefinite number of 
successive five-year terms, had to submit nominations for appoint- 
ment to the Council of Ministers (his cabinet) to the National 
Shengo for approval. However, by the time nominations reached 
the National Shengo for consideration, their appointment was a 
foregone conclusion. In practice, President Mengistu would chose 
individuals for particular offices without any apparent input from 
the National Shengo, the WPE, or the Council of State. 



219 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The president, who was also commander in chief of the armed 
forces, was also responsible for implementing foreign and domes- 
tic policy, concluding international treaties, and establishing diplo- 
matic missions. If he deemed it necessary, the president could rule 
by decree. 

Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers, defined in the constitution as "the 
Government," was the government's highest executive and ad- 
ministrative organ. The body consisted of the prime minister, the 
deputy prime minister, the ministers, and other members as deter- 
mined by law. Members were accountable to the National Shengo, 
but between sessions they were accountable to the president and 
the Council of State. Members of this council were chosen from 
regularly elected members of the National Shengo and served five- 
year terms, unless they resigned or were removed by the president. 
For example, in early November 1989 Prime Minister Fikre- Selassie 
Wogderes resigned his office, allegedly for health reasons. However, 
some reports maintained that he was forced out by Mengistu be- 
cause of his apparent loss of enthusiasm for the regime's policies. 
At the same time, Mengistu reshuffled his cabinet. Significantly, 
these events occurred weeks after the annual session of the National 
Shengo had concluded. 

The Council of Ministers was responsible for the implementa- 
tion of laws and regulations and for the normal administrative func- 
tions of national government. It prepared social and economic 
development plans, the annual budget, and proposals concerning 
foreign relations. In their respective areas of responsibility, mem- 
bers of the Council of Ministers were the direct representatives of 
the president and the government; and because they typically held 
parallel offices within the WPE, as a group they tended to be the 
most significant political actors in the government. 

In 1991 there were twenty-one ministries. Portfolios consisted 
of the Ministry in Charge of the General Plan and the ministries 
of agriculture; coffee and tea development; communications and 
transport; construction; culture and sports affairs; domestic trade; 
education and fine arts; finance; foreign affairs; foreign trade; 
health; industry; information; internal affairs; labor and social 
affairs; law and justice; mines, energy, and water resources; na- 
tional defense; state farms; and urban development and housing. 
In addition to these ministries, there were several other important 
state authorities, such as the Office of the National Council for Cen- 
tral Planning, the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, 



220 



Government and Politics 



the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, and the National Bank 
of Ethiopia. 

Judicial System 

The constitution provided for Ethiopia's first independent 
judiciary. Traditionally, the Supreme Court and various lower 
courts were the responsibility of the Ministry of Law and Justice. 
After Haile Selassie's overthrow, much of the formal structure of 
the existing judicial structure remained intact. Over the years, 
regional and district level courts were reformed somewhat. How- 
ever, the new constitutional provisions had the potential to change 
Ethiopia's national judicial system significantly. 

The constitution stipulated that judicial authority was vested in 
"one Supreme Court, courts of administrative and autonomous 
regions, and other courts established by law." Supreme Court 
judges were elected by the National Shengo; those who served at 
the regional level were elected by regional shengos (assemblies). In 
each case, the judges served terms concurrent with that of the shengo 
that elected them. The Supreme Court and higher courts at the 
regional level were independent of the Ministry of Law and Justice, 
but judges could be recalled by the relevant shengo. 

The Supreme Court was responsible for administering the na- 
tional judicial system. The court's powers were expanded to over- 
see all judicial aspects of lesser courts, not just cases appealed to 
it. At the request of the prosecutor general or the president of the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court could review any case from 
another court. Noteworthy is the fact that, in addition to separate 
civil and criminal sections, the court had a military section. In the 
late 1980s, it was thought that this development might bring the 
military justice system, which had been independent, into the nor- 
mal judicial system. However, it became evident that it would be 
some time before the Supreme Court could begin to serve this func- 
tion adequately. 

Between 1987 and 1989, the government undertook a restruc- 
turing of the Supreme Court with the intent of improving the su- 
pervision of judges and of making the administration of justice fairer 
and more efficient. The Supreme Court Council was responsible 
for overseeing the court's work relating to the registration and train- 
ing of judges and lawyers. The Supreme Court Council's first an- 
nual meeting was held in August 1988, at which time it passed rules 
of procedure and rules and regulations forjudges. Although the 
government reported that the courts were becoming more efficient, 
it admitted that there was much to be done before the heavy case 
burden of the courts could be relieved. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Chapter 15 of the constitution established the Office of the Pros- 
ecutor General, which was responsible for ensuring the uniform 
application and enforcement of law by all state organs, mass or- 
ganizations, and other bodies. The prosecutor general was elected 
by the National Shengo for a five-year term and was responsible 
for appointing and supervising prosecutors at all levels. In carry- 
ing out their responsibilities, these officials were independent of 
local government offices. 

Local tribunals, such as kebele tribunals and peasant association 
tribunals, were not affected by the 1987 constitution. People's courts 
were originally established under the jurisdiction of peasant associ- 
ations and kebeles. All matters relating to land redistribution and 
expropriation were removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Law and Justice and placed under the jurisdiction of the peasant 
association tribunals, whose members were elected by association 
members. In addition, such tribunals had jurisdiction over a num- 
ber of minor criminal offenses, including intimidation, violation 
of the privacy of domicile, and infractions of peasant association 
regulations. The tribunals also had jurisdiction in disputes involv- 
ing small sums of money and in conflicts between peasant associa- 
tions, their members, and other associations. Appeals from people's 
tribunals could be filed with regional courts. Kebele tribunals had 
powers similar to those of their counterparts in peasant associations. 

Regional and Local Government 
Regional Administration 

When it assumed power in 1974, the Derg only slightly reor- 
dered the imperial regime's pattern of administrative organization 
at the national level. By contrast, the new regime saw existing local 
administration as anathema to the objectives of socialist construc- 
tion, and its reform efforts were initially more evident on the local 
level than in the central bureaucracy. 

Immediately after assuming power, the Derg reorganized Ethio- 
pia' s fourteen provincial administrations and replaced all serving 
governors general. The fourteen provinces (teklay ghizats) were re- 
labeled regions (kifle hagers) and were divided into 102 subregions 
(awrajas) and 556 districts (weredas). (By 1981 the number of ad- 
ministrative divisions had increased to sixteen with the addition 
of Addis Ababa and Aseb.) The restructuring was a major step 
toward dismantling feudal privilege. Moreover, all new appoin- 
tees were either military men or university-educated individuals 
who were considered progressives. 

The main charge of these new administrators initially was to pro- 
mote development, and the maintenance of law and order was 



222 



Government and Politics 



considered only of secondary importance. Despite the commitment 
to rural development and to the staffing of regional administrative 
positions with young, dynamic, educated people, not much could 
be done to accelerate the process of change. Field bureaucrats had 
few resources to work with, their staffs were small, and their budgets 
were committed almost exclusively to salaries. By the mid-1980s, 
the relief and rehabilitation contributions of foreign private volun- 
tary organizations in some cases made more resources available 
at the local level than did the regional administrations. 

After having concentrated on a gradual transformation of the 
state's administrative structure, with the promulgation of the 1987 
constitution the Mengistu regime prepared for a further reorganiza- 
tion of regional administration. Hence, at its inaugural session, the 
National Shengo enacted a government plan for the administrative 
reorganization of regional government. As a result, twenty-five ad- 
ministrative regions and five autonomous regions were created (see 
fig. 1; fig. 2). The autonomous regions consisted of Eritrea (broken fur- 
ther into three subregions in the north, west, and south), Aseb, Tigray, 
Dire Dawa, and Ogaden. The change promised to alter significantiy 
Ethiopia's traditional pattern of administrative organization. 

If the plan were to be fully implemented, this reorganization would 
have required a dramatic expansion in the government and party 
bureaucracy. Relatively new institutions, like regional planning bod- 
ies, would have been eliminated and replaced with new planning 
agencies in the various regions. Some observers suggested that this 
plan was initially endorsed to pursue a Soviet- style approach to the 
nationalities problem. They argued that the regime was trying to 
organize regional administration along ethnic lines. Consequently, 
this reform had little positive effect on enhancing the regime's 
legitimacy and in fact limited its control over the general population. 

The primary organs of state power at the regional level were 
regional shengos. These bodies were responsible mainly for im- 
plementing the central government's laws and decisions. Regional 
shengos could draft their own budgets and development plans, but 
these had to be approved by the National Shengo. Regional shengos 
also possessed some latitude in devising and enforcing local laws 
and regulations and in electing local judges. By the summer of 1989, 
however, regional shengos had been elected in only eleven of the 
twenty-five newly designated administrative regions and in only 
three of the five regions designated as "autonomous." 

Peasant Associations 

During its thirteen-year existence (1974 to 1987), the Derg 
worked to spread administrative reform down to the lowest echelons 



223 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

of regional administration. To this end, it took several important 
steps in 1975. 

With its Land Reform Proclamation in March 1975, the Derg 
abolished the lowest level of rural administration, the balabat (see 
Glossary), and called for the formation of peasant associations that 
would be responsible for the implementation and enforcement of 
the land reform measures. Later in the year, the Derg issued Procla- 
mation No. 71, which gave peasant associations legal status and 
authorized them to create "conditions facilitating the complete de- 
struction of the feudal order." It also empowered the associations' 
executive committees to draft internal regulations that would, in 
theory, devolve more power to local communities. These asso- 
ciations were to be guided initially by students in the Develop- 
ment Through Cooperation Campaign (commonly referred to as 
zemecha — see Glossary), who were expected to teach peasants about 
the revolution's goals. Students were also supposed to help local 
communities plan and implement development programs in their 
areas. 

Initially, it was not clear how much power, authority, or auton- 
omy the regime intended to devolve to local institutions. Conse- 
quently, state agents often came into conflict with local organizations 
under the guidance of students who were often more radical and 
politically astute than government functionaries. By 1976, to bring 
local communities under tighter central control, the Derg introduced 
laws spelling out the rights and obligations of peasant associations 
and kebeles. 

To the extent that peasant associations maintained some of their 
initial autonomy, they did so almost exclusively with regard to local 
issues. On national issues, the regime, through the party and other 
agencies, manipulated peasant associations to suit its purposes. After 
1978, for example, production cadres and political cadres of the 
National Revolutionary Development Campaign (and later the 
WPE) played important roles in motivating peasant production and 
in political indoctrination. State control of local associations was 
also a natural by-product of the villagization and resettlement pro- 
grams of the mid- to late 1980s (see The Politics of Development, 
this ch.; Government Rural Programs, ch. 3). 

By 1990 there were more than 20,000 peasant associations 
throughout the country. They represented the lowest level of govern- 
ment administration and, in collaboration with the local WPE office, 
were responsible for processing and interpreting national policies, 
maintaining law and order, and planning and implementing cer- 
tain local development policies. State control grew further in 1975 
when the Derg promoted the formation of the All-Ethiopia Peasants' 



224 



"Cash for Work" project sponsored by United Nations Children's Fund 

and Ethiopian government 
Courtesy United Nations Children's Fund (Bert Demmers) 

Peasant association meeting 
Courtesy Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (F. Botts) 



225 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Association (AEPA), a national association having district offices 
responsible for overseeing the activities of local associations. Be- 
fore the WPE's formation, AEPA district representatives exercised 
supervisory powers over the associations under their jurisdiction. 
The management of elections, investigations into allegations of mis- 
management, changes to association boundaries, and organization 
of political meetings all came under the purview of the AEPA dis- 
trict representative. However, by 1989 WPE cadres were active in 
monitoring and providing guidance to local peasant associations. 

Kebeles 

In July 1975, the Derg issued Proclamation No. 47, which es- 
tablished kebeles, or urban dwellers' associations, in Addis Ababa 
and five other urban centers. Organized similarly to peasant as- 
sociations, Addis Ababa's 291 kebeles possessed neighborhood con- 
stituencies ranging from 3,000 to 12,000 residents each. Like the 
peasant associations in the countryside, the kebeles were initially 
responsible only for the collection of rent, the establishment of local 
judicial tribunals, and the provision of basic health, education, and 
other social services in their neighborhoods. Kebele powers were ex- 
panded in late 1976 to include the collection of local taxes and the 
registration of houses, residents, births, deaths, and marriages. 

During the height of the Red Terror (see Glossary), kebeles were 
responsible for ensuring neighborhood defense. Neighborhood 
defense squads patrolled their communities day and night and some- 
times operated outside the control of the central authorities. Many 
brutal excesses were attributed to kebele defense squads between 1976 
and 1978, but they were more closely monitored thereafter (see 
Political Struggles Within the Government, ch. 1; People's Pro- 
tection Brigades, ch. 5). 

In April 1981, the Derg issued Proclamation No. 25, which 
provided kebeles with extended powers and a more elaborate ad- 
ministrative structure. According to this new structure, the general 
assembly, composed of all kebele residents, was empowered to elect 
a policy committee, which in turn was authorized to appoint the 
executive committee, the revolution defense committee, and the 
judicial tribunal. At the time of this proclamation, there were 1,260 
kebeles in 315 towns. 

The government estimated national kebele membership in the late 
1980s at 4.4 million. The All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Associa- 
tion (AEUDA) linked kebeles throughout the country. This organi- 
zation's bureaucracy extended, in layers that paralleled the central 
bureaucracy, down to the neighborhood level. However, as in the 
countryside, the WPE had become the most important political 



226 



Government and Politics 



institution, capable of overriding decisions taken by kebeles as well 
as by peasant associations. 

Civil Service 

Upon assuming power in 1974, the Derg decided to undertake 
extensive reforms of the central administration. Rather than en- 
gage in immediate, wholesale reorganization, the Derg concentrated 
on replacing career bureaucrats in the key ministries of interior, 
community development, and justice. If the Derg had purged the 
upper echelons of the entire civil service after 1974, there would 
have been insufficient numbers of educated, skilled, and experienced 
managers to conduct the normal affairs of government. 

In general, the Derg allowed most bureaucrats who had served 
the emperor to remain at their posts and appointed army officers 
to monitor their activities in every ministry. At the same time, the 
Derg attempted to recruit into the civil service former high school 
and college students who were then serving in the zemecha. This 
group tended to be committed to revolutionary change, but it often 
lacked the bureaucratic skills to achieve this goal. Moreover, al- 
though the campaigners generally favored the revolution, many 
opposed military rule, and once in positions of authority they under- 
mined rather than promoted the regime's goals. 

Eventually, the Derg required all civil servants and political ap- 
pointees to undergo reeducation to acquire the proper socialist orien- 
tation. Many civil servants, as well as military personnel, traveled 
to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba for ideological 
training. After the establishment in 1976 of the Yekatit '66 Ideo- 
logical School and after the creation of COPWE in 1979, hundreds 
more could be taught Marxist-Leninist doctrine inside Ethiopia. 
Some became party cadres and served in various parts of the country 
to encourage and monitor the political education and economic 
productivity of both government agencies and the citizenry at large. 

In the early days of the revolution, the central bureaucracy was 
characterized by constant bickering among the various ministries 
and a general lack of interministerial coordination. This situation 
forced the Derg to create the Ministry of National Resource De- 
velopment in 1975 to promote agricultural development as a pos- 
sible solution to interministerial coordination problems and to 
address the problem of low productivity within society at large. 
By 1976 this strategy had failed, and the functions of the Ministry 
of National Resource Development were distributed among several 
ministries and parastatal bodies. The creation of the Central Plan- 
ning Supreme Council in 1978 represented a more concerted at- 
tempt to coordinate bureaucratic participation in development. This 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

strategy worked for a brief time, but by the late 1980s bureaucratic 
inefficiency had returned. 

Starting in 1978, the Mengistu regime systematically attempted 
to enhance its ability to control the general population, and to a 
certain extent it used the civil service for this purpose. The state 
bureaucracy expanded enormously in the first decade of the revo- 
lution, and control by the military deepened and expanded in the 
process. This bureaucratic expansion increased the coercive capacity 
of the state and laid the groundwork for the establishment of the 
all-embracing vanguard party. After the creation of the WPE in 
1984, the regime established a wide array of government institu- 
tions that radiated from the center out to the regional and local 
levels. Leadership positions in these new institutions were used as 
patronage by the regime to reward loyal supporters or to co-opt 
potential adversaries in the military. Although patronage had been 
employed by Haile Selassie, it was different under the Mengistu 
regime in that it was not rooted in the traditional social order but 
rather in the spoils accruing to a transitional state that controlled 
access to wealth and power. 

The inauguration of the WPE resulted in a blurring of the lines 
between party and state. As noted previously, party operatives 
tended to interject themselves freely into the areas of administra- 
tion and government policy. For example, party cadres had im- 
portant political and intelligence-gathering roles in the workplace. 
The Working People's Control Committees (WPCCs), created in 
1981, had come to serve as a somewhat threatening "watchdog" 
over productive activities. WPCCs were supposed to be involved 
in the implementation, supervision, and follow-up of government 
policies, regulations, and directives. WPCCs also could audit the 
accounts of any government institution, mass organization, or pri- 
vate individual. By 1984 the regime was crediting WPCCs with 
having uncovered numerous incidents of fraud, corruption, waste, 
and counterrevolution. For all its authoritarianism, the Haile Selas- 
sie regime was never able to achieve such tight surveillance. The 
Derg's capacity in this area was an indication of the effectiveness 
of the training provided by security advisers from the Soviet Union 
and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (see For- 
eign Military Assistance, ch. 5). 

Although it was difficult to calculate its actual size, the central 
bureaucracy evidently grew tremendously after the revolution. The 
dimensions of this growth can be deduced from an analysis of con- 
sumption expenditures, which include wages and salaries. Figures 
available in late 1989 indicated that between 1974 and 1980 such 
expenditure grew from about 5 billion birr (for value of the birr — see 



228 



Government and Politics 



Glossary) to almost 8 billion birr, an increase of 60 percent. Cen- 
tral administration and defense accounted for about 80 percent of 
the 1980 figures. The growth of the public bureaucracy, even when 
the party bureaucracy was excluded, represented a tremendous 
drain on the resources available for development. Moreover, it ap- 
peared that if the regional reforms announced in 1987 were to be 
implemented fully, the civil service would have to expand even 
further. 

The Politics of Development 

During the 1980s, the government attempted to consolidate the 
revolution both structurally and ideologically. When it assumed 
power in 1974, the Derg pledged immediate attention to the social 
injustices that had been perpetrated by the imperial regime. In the 
revolution's earliest stages, the Derg's commitment to this pledge 
was manifested in particular by policies such as the nationaliza- 
tion of rural and urban property. The first year and a half of the 
new order could be described as a " phase of redistribution." In 
the name of the "people," the "toiling masses," and the "oppressed 
tillers of the soil," the government confiscated property previously 
owned by the nobility and other persons of wealth and redistrib- 
uted it to peasants, tenants, and renters. 

Peasants and workers expected that the new order would bring 
about a fundamental change in their circumstances, and to a cer- 
tain extent this did happen. They also expected to be involved in 
determining their own fate; this, however, did not occur. The Derg 
quickly declared its own preeminent role as the vanguard of the 
revolution, causing concern among urban workers that their role 
was being minimized. When labor tried to become more instrumen- 
tal in the changes that were beginning to take place, the govern- 
ment suppressed the workers' movement. The Derg condemned 
the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) as re- 
actionary and disbanded it in late 1975. In its place, in 1977 the 
regime created the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), a confeder- 
ation of 1,700 unions whose rank and file numbered more than 
300,000 in 1984 (see Labor Unions, ch. 3). The regime thus co- 
opted the labor movement, and after 1976 the government seemed 
free to devise its own social development strategy without much 
input from the groups that would be most affected. 

The Derg tried to develop a social policy strategy to enhance 
its power and legitimacy. To this end, the government achieved 
progress in fields such as education and health care. In 1979, for 
example, Ethiopia launched a massive rural literacy campaign; the 
government also established hundreds of health stations to provide 



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minimal health care to the citizenry. However, it proved unable 
to effect dramatic improvements in the quality of life among broad 
segments of the population. In part, this was because Ethiopia had 
long been one of the world's poorest countries. At the same time, 
two additional factors greatly affected the performance of the 
Mengistu regime: the interaction of natural catastrophes and civil 
unrest, and misguided development policies such as resettlement 
and villagization. 

The Politics of Drought and Famine 

The Derg's limited ability to lead development and to respond 
to crises was dramatically demonstrated by the government's reli- 
ance on foreign famine relief between 1984 and 1989. By 1983 
armed conflict between the government and opposition movements 
in the north had combined with drought to contribute to mass star- 
vation in Eritrea, Tigray, and Welo. Meanwhile, drought alone 
was having a devastating impact on an additional nine regions. 
This natural disaster far exceeded the drought of 1973-74, which 
had contributed to the demise of the Haile Selassie regime. By early 
1985, some 7.7 million people were suffering from drought and 
food shortages. Of that number, 2.5 million were at immediate 
risk of starving. More than 300,000 died in 1984 alone, more than 
twice the number that died in the drought a decade before. Before 
the worst was over, 1 million Ethiopians had died from drought 
and famine in the 1980s (see Refugees, Drought, and Famine, 
ch. 2). 

As it had in the past, in the mid-1980s the international com- 
munity responded generously to Ethiopia's tragedy once the dimen- 
sions of the crisis became understood. Bilateral, multilateral, and 
private donations of food and other relief supplies poured into the 
country by late 1984. Contributions ranged from food to trans- 
port trucks, antibiotics, well-drilling equipment, and technical 
assistance. Fund raising by spontaneously created volunteer organi- 
zations in the West, such as USA for Africa, BandAid, and nu- 
merous church and humanitarian groups, was instrumental to the 
provision of substantial nongovernment famine relief. Most of the 
money and supplies sent to Ethiopia, however, were provided 
by Western governments, in particular those of Britain, Canada, 
Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States. Ethio- 
pia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), at the time 
headed by an Ethiopian official named Dawit Wolde Giorgis, coor- 
dinated delivery of this assistance. Although Mengistu and other 
members of the Derg were nervous about the prospect of so many 



230 



Relief camp in Kwiha, near Mekele, 1985 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (D. Gignoux) 

Westerners flooding into the country and having access to areas 
where the regime was not popular, Dawit apparently was able to 
develop enough trust in the international aid community to bring 
the catastrophe under control by late 1986 (Dawit later defected 
to the United States). 

By 1987 the physical impact of this massive influx of aid over 
such a short time was noticeable not only in the abatement of fam- 
ine but also in what seemed to be the permanent establishment 
of local offices by various donor agencies. Although many foreign 
relief workers had returned home by 1987, some relief agencies 
remained to attempt to begin the rehabilitation and development 
processes. These would have been difficult tasks under the best of 
circumstances, but in the context of a regime pursuing a specific 
political agenda in spite of the unprecedented humanitarian im- 
peratives involved in the situation, those agencies that remained 
had difficulty engaging in effective rehabilitation and development. 
In the countryside, the WPE often closely regulated the activities 
of foreign and local nongovernment agencies. At one point in the 
spring of 1989, the WPE forbade the International Committee of 
the Red Cross to operate in areas most severely ravaged by war. 
Before the year was out, drought and war again threatened the 
lives of more than 7 million people. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Despite drought and famine of unprecedented proportions in 
modern Ethiopian history, the Derg persisted on its controversial 
political course. If the famine had a positive side for the govern- 
ment, it was that the flood of famine relief assistance during the 
period of party construction and constitution-making allowed the 
regime to devote more of its budget to suppression of the rebel- 
lions in Eritrea and Tigray. However, by late 1989 drought, fam- 
ine, and war, combined with so-called "aid fatigue" among many 
donors, forced the regime to take desperate measures. The govern- 
ment reinstated national conscription, required workers to give one 
month's salary to aid in combating famine and war, and halved 
the development budget as funds were diverted to defense. 

The Politics of Resettlement 

The Derg's policies appear to have been driven more by politi- 
cal imperatives than by perceived economic objectives. A case in 
point was the controversial policy of resettling the victims of the 
drought and famine outside their home areas. At the height of the 
drought and famine in 1984, the regime set in motion a resettle- 
ment policy that was initially designed to relocate 1.5 million peo- 
ple from areas in the north most severely affected by drought to 
areas in the west and south that had experienced adequate rain- 
fall. By 1988, despite the resettlement program's obvious failure, 
President Mengistu repeatedly asserted that the program would 
continue. He estimated that eventually 7 million of Ethiopia's ap- 
proximately 48 million people would be resettled. The government 
claimed that it was carrying out the program for humanitarian rea- 
sons, contending that it would remove the people from exhausted 
and unproductive land and place them in settlements with rich 
agricultural potential. In addition, the government argued that the 
new settlements would greatly facilitate its efforts to provide social 
services. 

Initially, settlers were chosen from feeding centers in Welo, 
Tigray, and northern Shewa and transported by trucks, buses, and 
cargo aircraft to resettlement sites in Kefa, Gojam, Gonder, Welega, 
and Ilubabor. The government was poorly prepared for the oper- 
ation, and the first settlers experienced tremendous hardships in 
alien, underdeveloped, and disease-infested areas. Some peasants 
moved voluntarily, but many more were forced to move. Many 
of those forcibly resetded were able to escape. Some fled into Sudan 
or Somalia, and others took shelter in refugee camps or walked 
thousands of miles to reenter their native regions. Still others joined 
opposition groups dedicated to overthrowing the regime. Those 
who remained in resettled areas were often resented by the local 



232 



Government and Politics 



residents, many of whom had been impressed into building com- 
munity infrastructure and donating materials. 

Some critics rejected the government's argument that resettle- 
ment was driven by humanitarian considerations. Instead, they 
contended that the government's motives were political. The pol- 
icy led to a depopulation of areas that harbored groups that militarily 
opposed the regime, such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF), the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). 

Critics within the international community charged that the 
Ethiopian government's resettiement program served as an obsta- 
cle to dealing more effectively with the problems of, drought and 
famine relief. Moving victims to settlements far from their home 
areas merely made them inordinately dependent on the govern- 
ment. In addition, they claimed that fundamental human rights 
were sacrificed in the name of political expediency. 

Regardless of the real motive for the resettlement policy, its net 
effect was to increase government control over large segments of 
society. In each resettlement site, WPE cadres carried out politi- 
cal education and attempted to stimulate the population to be more 
productive. The government insisted that it was not trying to en- 
force collectivized agricultural production but rather was trying to 
encourage more efficient activities. However, in actual practice, 
cadres pressured peasants to form collectives. The main value of 
this policy for the regime seems to have been the political control 
it promised. 

The Politics of Villagization 

Further evidence of the Ethiopian government's desire to en- 
hance its control over the citizenry was its villagization program. 
The idea of clustering villages was introduced in the Land Reform 
Proclamation of 1975; however, there was no immediate effort to 
implement such a policy on a large scale. The first area to become 
the object of serious government efforts was Bale, following the 
onset of the Ogaden War of 1977-78 (see The Somali, ch. 5). At 
that time, ethnic Somali and Oromo living in Bale were forced by 
the Ethiopian government into strategically clustered villages. The 
official objective of the move was to provide social services more 
efficiently and to stimulate voluntary self-help among villagers. By 
1983 there were 519 villagized communities ranging in population 
from 300 to 7,000. 

The government did not introduce a comprehensive villagiza- 
tion plan until 1985. In January of that year, the villagization 
process began in earnest in Harerge, and by May there were some 



233 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

2,000 villagized communities there. That summer, the process was 
begun in Shewa and Arsi, and in 1986 small-scale villagization ef- 
forts were begun in Gojam, Welega, Kefa, Sidamo, and Ilubabor. 
The National Villagization Coordinating Committee of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, in collaboration with the WPE, organized and 
managed the project. By March 1987, it was estimated that there 
were as many as 10,000 villagized communities throughout the 
country. The long-term goal of the program was the movement 
of 33 million rural residents — approximately two-thirds of the na- 
tion's population — into villagized settlements by 1994. By late 1989, 
however, only about 13 million peasants had been villagized. 

The WPE introduced guidelines for site selection, village lay- 
out, and related matters. At the regional level, a committee planned, 
coordinated, and monitored the program through a network of 
subcommittees (planning and programming; site selection and sur- 
veying; material procurement, transportation, and logistics; con- 
struction; propaganda and training; monitoring and evaluation; 
and security). This structure was replicated in successive adminis- 
trative layers down to the peasant associations — the level with ulti- 
mate responsibility for implementation. 

In some regions of the country, the decision to villagize was a 
voluntary one, but in others the process was compulsory. In either 
case, peasants were required to dismantle their homes and, where 
possible, transport the housing materials to the new village site. 
Campaigners were usually brought in by the party and govern- 
ment to help the people physically reconstruct their communities. 

Like resettlement, villagization generally caused a good deal of 
social disruption. Families usually were required to move from their 
traditional locations, close to their customary farming plots, into 
clustered villages where the land to be cultivated often was on frag- 
mented plots far from the homestead. 

The villagization program was most successful in the central high- 
lands and southern lowlands, regions such as central Shewa, Arsi, 
and highland Harerge that were firmly under government control. 
Government efforts to villagize parts of western Shewa, the Harerge 
lowlands, and Gojam met with resistance. In the case of Gojam 
and western Shewa, this resistance in large measure was attrib- 
uted to the fact that the TPLF and the Ethiopian People's Demo- 
cratic Movement (EPDM) were most active in those regions. The 
Harerge lowlands were populated by ethnic Somali who were not 
as cooperative with the government as were the highlanders, who 
tended to be Oromo. 

But not all Oromo peasants readily supported the villagization 
program. Many fled from new villages in Harerge after 1986, taking 



234 



Government and Politics 



refuge in camps in Somalia. By June 1986, an estimated 50,000 
such refugees had fled resettlement, mainly for political reasons. 
Some refugees complained that they were forced to abandon their 
traditional patterns of cultivation and to move into villages where 
they had to farm collectively and to participate in "food for work" 
programs. Private humanitarian agencies and bilateral and multi- 
lateral development agencies were apparently aware of alleged, as 
well as real, violations of human rights associated with the villagi- 
zation program. Nonetheless, by early 1987 many seem to have 
turned a blind eye to such incidents and to have concentrated on 
the humanitarian dimensions of their work. 

On purely technical grounds, villagization, like resettlement, 
seemed to make sense. The official goal was to improve the access 
of rural residents to social services and to strengthen the ability 
of rural communities to defend themselves. Another motive, how- 
ever, seemed to be the conversion of villagized communities into 
producers' cooperatives or collectives, as well as into centers for 
military recruitment. 

Political Dynamics 

Modern Ethiopian political history has been shaped and domi- 
nated by intense conflict. As the revolution unfolded in 1973 and 
1974, the political environment appeared to liberalize, and politi- 
cal discourse became more open than at any other time in Ethio- 
pian history. This was particularly true in urban centers, such as 
the capital city of Addis Ababa. In the rural areas, groups incor- 
porated into Ethiopia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
such as the Oromo, Afar, Somali, and Eritreans, began to step 
up their demands for self-determination. Several of these groups 
questioned the very legitimacy of the Ethiopian state. The Derg 
was in essence being challenged to devise a survival strategy that 
would enhance its control over government and politics and cre- 
ate a basis for popular legitimacy. Various reorganizational and 
institution-building policies, such as the establishment of the Pro- 
gram for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR), the crea- 
tion of the WPE, and the promulgation of the 1987 constitution, 
were all designed to achieve these ends. 

Political Participation and Repression 

The period immediately following the overthrow of Haile Selassie 
was a time of open political debate. The new regime did not have 
a clearly defined ideology, but it was swept along by the growing 
radical discourse among members of the civilian left. Initially, the 
Derg tried to win the support of the Ethiopian left by declaring 



235 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

its socialist intentions in its program statement, Ethiopia Tikdem 
(Ethiopia First). The economic and social policies articulated in 
this document were populist in tone and did little to co-opt the 
civilian left. 

Once it became clear that the Derg had assigned to itself the van- 
guard role in the revolution, elements in the civilian left began to 
criticize the new regime. Chief among such critics was the Ethio- 
pian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). By 1976 the EPRP 
had become engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine and 
discredit the Derg. The party was successful in infiltrating the 
zemecha, the CELU, and even the Provisional Office for Mass Or- 
ganizational Affairs (POMOA), the precursor to the Yekatit '66 
Ideological School. At the height of its activities, the EPRP included 
students, intellectuals, teachers, merchants, and government 
bureaucrats. It even had sympathizers within the military. 

During the late 1970s, apart from the military, the Derg relied 
for support on the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (whose Am- 
haric acronym was MEISON). Rather than challenge the vanguard 
role of the military, MEISON entered into a strategic alliance with 
the Derg, accepting its hegemony at least for the short term. In 
the highly charged political climate of the moment, MEISON en- 
gaged in vigorous debate with the EPRP over the most appropriate 
strategy for reconstructing Ethiopian society. The debate between 
the two groups first took place in their organizations' newspapers 
and in pamphlets but later moved to the streets in the form of bloody 
assassination and counterassassination campaigns. The differences 
between MEISON and the EPRP were fundamental. The EPRP 
pressed uncompromisingly for a genuine "people's democracy," 
whereas MEISON favored "controlled democracy" and was pre- 
pared to give the Derg some time to return to the barracks. 

The friction between the two groups inspired the Derg to be- 
come more radical in its ideology and public policies. The regime 
determined that to survive it would have to alter its program and 
co-opt or destroy its civilian opponents. It pursued both goals simul- 
taneously by setting up three organizations: the PNDR, the Yekatit 
'66 Ideological School, and a political advisory body called the Polit- 
buro (not to be confused with the Political Bureau of the WPE). 

The Derg seemed hesitant to permit free and open political com- 
petition, although it attempted to create the impression of open- 
ness by allowing political groups to operate in a limited fashion. 
Organizations resembling political parties were not allowed to or- 
ganize on a mass basis, but they could participate in politics through 
representation on the Politburo; in fact, both the EPRP and 
MEISON were represented on the Politburo. Also represented were 



236 



Government and Politics 



Abyot Seded (Revolutionary Flame), founded in 1976 by mem- 
bers of the armed forces and led by Mengistu himself; the Waz 
(Labor) League, which claimed a working-class base and shared 
the EPRP's radical populist tendencies; and the Revolutionary 
Struggle of the Ethiopian Masses (whose Amharic acronym was 
ECHAAT), a largely Oromo political organization. The Politburo 
provided a forum where the differences among the various politi- 
cal groupings could be clarified and where the Derg could moni- 
tor the tendencies of its opponents. 

By late 1976, MEISON had become the most influential civil- 
ian group on the Politburo. However, the growing power of Abyot 
Seded was also evident, as it challenged MEISON and the EPRP 
within the Politburo and in grass-roots institutions such as kebeles 
and peasant associations. To counter this threat, the Derg began 
to prepare Abyot Seded to assume the role of chief adviser on ideo- 
logical, political, and organizational matters. The aim seems to have 
been the creation of a cadre of Abyot Seded members with suffi- 
cient ideological sophistication to neutralize all civilian opponents, 
including MEISON. Abyot Seded members received ideological 
training in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba. On their 
return, they were assigned the task of politicizing the rank and file 
of the military. 

The EPRP's efforts to discredit and undermine the Derg and 
its MEISON collaborators escalated in the fall of 1976. It targeted 
public buildings and other symbols of state authority for bomb- 
ings and assassinated numerous Abyot Seded and MEISON mem- 
bers, as well as public officials at all levels. The Derg, which 
countered with its own Red Terror campaign, labeled the EPRP's 
tactics the White Terror. Mengistu asserted that all "progressives" 
were given "freedom of action" in helping root out the revolu- 
tion's enemies, and his wrath was particularly directed toward the 
EPRP. Peasants, workers, public officials, and even students 
thought to be loyal to the Mengistu regime were provided with arms 
to accomplish this task. 

Mengistu 's decision resulted in fratricidal chaos. Many civilians 
he armed were EPRP sympathizers rather than supporters of 
MEISON or the Derg. Between early 1977 and late 1978, roughly 
5,000 people were killed. In the process, the Derg became estranged 
from civilian groups, including MEISON. By early 1979, Abyot 
Seded stood alone as the only officially recognized political organi- 
zation; the others were branded enemies of the revolution. Grow- 
ing human rights violations prompted the United States, Ethiopia's 
superpower patron, to counsel moderation. However, the Derg 



237 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

continued to use extreme measures against its real and perceived 
opponents to ensure its survival. 

When he assumed office in early 1977, United States president 
Jimmy Carter curtailed arms sales to Ethiopia because of its human 
rights abuses. In response, Mengistu severely curtailed relations 
with the United States, ordering all United States military personnel 
and most embassy staff to leave the country. In search of an alter- 
nate source of military aid, Mengistu eventually turned to the Soviet 
Union. However, before the Soviet Union and its allies could es- 
tablish an effective presence in Ethiopia, opposition groups stepped 
up their campaigns against the Derg. 

In addition to the urban guerrilla warfare being waged by the 
EPRP, nationalist movements such as the EPLF, the OLF, the 
TPLF, and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) also 
stepped up their military campaigns in the countryside. By the end 
of 1976, the Eritreans had made substantial gains in rural areas, 
forcing Ethiopian troops into garrisons and urban centers in Eritrea. 
Meanwhile, armed groups such as the OLF and the TPLF were 
severely testing the regime, and in 1977 the WSLF, with the as- 
sistance of Somali troops, occupied most of the Ogaden. The Ethio- 
pian government, however, with aid from the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
and Eastern Europe, reasserted its authority over contested areas 
by the following spring (see External and Internal Opponents, 
ch. 5). 

Once it had reestablished control, the Derg resumed the crea- 
tion of institutions that would enhance its political hegemony and 
legitimacy. After having almost met its demise, the Derg decided 
to form a vanguard party. In June 1978, the Derg announced that 
Abyot Seded would be joined with the factional remnants of the 
Waz League and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organiza- 
tion (whose Amharic acronym was MALERED), a small splinter 
group of MEISON, in the all-embracing Union of Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Organizations (whose Amharic acronym was 
EMALEDEH). The task of the front was to identify strategies for 
the creation of a vanguard party. The following year, Mengistu 
announced that he would form a commission to develop a frame- 
work for the long-awaited vanguard party. 

By 1978 all civilian opposition groups had been destroyed or 
forced underground. The EPRP had been driven out of the cities 
and into the mountains of the central highlands, where it tried un- 
successfully to develop the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army 
(EPRA). The OLF had been driven into refugee camps in Sudan 
and Somalia; the WSLF had sought refuge in Somalia; the TPLF 
and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), a group of former 



238 



Government and Politics 



nobility and officials of the Haile Selassie government, had been 
pushed into Sudan; and the EPLF had been forced back into its 
strongholds along the Sudanese border. The task then facing the 
Derg was to establish its popular legitimacy among the various eth- 
nic communities opposed to its rule. The most vigorous opposi- 
tion came from the EPLF and the TPLF. The OLF, the EPRP, 
and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) were experiencing revivals 
but had yet to become militarily effective. 

The Eritrean Movement 

Eritrea and the Imperial Regime 

Eritrean separatism had its roots in World War II. In 1941, in 
the Battle of Keren, the Allies drove Italian forces out of Eritrea, 
which had been under Italy's rule since the end of the nineteenth 
century. Administration of the region was then entrusted to the 
British military until its fate could be determined by the Allies. 
Britain, however, sought to divide Eritrea along religious lines, giv- 
ing the coast and highland areas to Ethiopia and the Muslim- 
inhabited northern and western lowlands to British-ruled Sudan. 

In 1952 the United Nations (UN) tried to satisfy the demand 
for self-determination by creating an Eritrean-Ethiopian federa- 
tion. In 1962, however, Haile Selassie unilaterally abolished the 
federation and imposed imperial rule throughout Eritrea. 

Radical opposition to the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia 
had begun in 1958 with the founding of the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement (ELM), an organization made up mainly of students, 
intellectuals, and urban wage laborers. The ELM engaged in clan- 
destine political activities intended to cultivate resistance to the cen- 
tralizing policies of the imperial state. By 1962, however, the ELM 
had been discovered and destroyed by imperial authorities. 

Even as the ELM was being neutralized, a new organization of 
Eritrean nationalists was forming. In 1960 Eritrean exiles in Cairo 
founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). In contrast to the 
ELM, from the outset the ELF was bent on waging armed strug- 
gle on behalf of Eritrean independence. The ELF was composed 
mainly of Eritrean Muslims from the rural lowlands on the western 
edge of the territory. In 1961 the ELF's political character was 
vague, but radical Arab states such as Syria and Iraq sympathized 
with Eritrea as a predominantly Muslim region struggling to es- 
cape oppression and imperial domination. These two countries 
therefore supplied military and financial assistance to the ELF. 

The ELF initiated military operations in 1961 . These operations 
intensified in response to the 1962 dissolution of the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian federation. The ELF claimed that the process by which 



239 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

this act took place violated the Eritrean federal constitution and 
denied the Eritrean people their right to self-determination. By this 
time, the movement claimed to be multiethnic, involving individuals 
from Eritrea's nine major ethnic groups. 

The ELF's first several years of guerrilla activity in Eritrea were 
characterized by poor preparation, poor leadership, and poor mili- 
tary performance. By 1967, however, the ELF had gained con- 
siderable support among peasants, particularly in Eritrea's north 
and west, and around the port city of Mitsiwa. Haile Selassie at- 
tempted to calm the growing unrest by visiting Eritrea and assur- 
ing its inhabitants that they would be treated as equals under the 
new arrangements. Although he doled out offices, money, and titles 
in early 1967 in hopes of co-opting would-be Eritrean opponents, 
the resistance intensified. 

From the beginning, a serious problem confronting the ELF was 
the development of a base of popular support and a cohesive mili- 
tary wing. The front divided Eritrea into five military regions, giv- 
ing regional commanders considerable latitude in carrying out the 
struggle in their respective zones. Perhaps just as debilitating were 
internal disputes over strategy and tactics. These disagreements 
eventually led to the ELF's fragmentation and the founding in 1972 
of another group, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). 
The leadership of this multiethnic movement came to be dominated 
by leftist, Christian intellectuals who spoke Tigrinya, Eritrea's 
predominant language. Sporadic armed conflict ensued between 
the two groups from 1972 to 1974, even as they fought the Ethio- 
pian forces. The various organizations, each waging a separate cam- 
paign against the Haile Selassie regime, had become such a serious 
threat that the emperor declared martial law in Eritrea and deployed 
half his army to contain the struggle. But the Eritrean insurgents 
fiercely resisted. In January 1974, the EPLF handed Haile Selassie's 
forces a crushing defeat at Asmera, severely affecting the army's 
morale and exposing the crown's ever- weakening position. 

Eritrea and the Mengistu Regime 

After the emperor was deposed, the Derg stated its desire to 
resolve the Eritrean question once and for all. There were those 
in the Derg's ranks who pressed for a decisive military solution, 
while others favored some form of negotiated settlement. Influential 
Derg nationalists continued to endorse, as had the imperial regime 
before them, the ideal of a "Greater Ethiopia," a unitary, multi- 
ethnic state. They pressed for a military solution while claiming to 
support the right of all Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination. 



240 



Government and Politics 



This position was first articulated in the PNDR in 1976 and clari- 
fied later that year by the Nine Point Statement on Eritrea. Sub- 
sequently, the regime made other attempts at dealing, at least 
rhetorically and symbolically, with the Eritrean problem. 

In 1976 Osman Salah Sabbe, an Eritrean who had helped found 
both the ELM and the ELF, attempted to reconcile the two move- 
ments to form a united front. But after this effort failed, Osman 
formed a third front, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liber- 
ation Front (ELF-PLF). In later years, the Derg sought to exploit 
the internecine Eritrean disputes. 

Disagreements among the various Eritrean factions continued 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These differences were mainly 
ideological. At the time, the EPLF and the ELF could best be 
described in ideological terms as leftist-nationalist and the ELF- 
PLF as moderate nationalist. Although the EPLF and the ELF- 
PLF consistently called for Eritrea's independence, the main ELF 
faction never closed the door to the possibility of an equitable fed- 
eral union. As subtle as the differences among these groups ap- 
peared, they were enough to prevent the formation of a united front 
against Addis Ababa. 

In addition to its highly disciplined combatants, the EPLF 
benefited from its broad base of popular support and its political 
organization. The EPLF became a de facto government in areas 
it controlled. It was a highly structured political and military in- 
stitution involved not only in training its fighters militarily but also 
in educating them politically. The EPLF's basic units for political 
participation were national unions. The Eritrean national congress 
was the paramount political organ of the EPLF and was made up 
of the Central Committee, delegates elected by the national unions, 
and the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA). The congress 
defined general policy and elected the Central Committee (com- 
posed in the late 1980s of seventy-one full members and seven al- 
ternates), which in turn elected the general secretary and the 
Political Bureau's eight members. The EPLF charter called for na- 
tional congresses to be held every three years unless circumstances 
dictated otherwise. Between congressional sessions, the EPLF Cen- 
tral Committee was the highest authority within the front. It met 
every nine months and was responsible for developing the EPLF 
political agenda and for overseeing policy implementation. The Po- 
litical Bureau was the EPLF's primary executive organ. It met every 
three months and had broad administrative powers. When the Po- 
litical Bureau was not in session, the general secretary, aided by 
a secretariat, possessed wide executive authority. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

In March 1987, the EPLF held its second congress in areas of 
Eritrea that it controlled. The first congress had been held ten years 
earlier after Eritrean forces had captured almost all of Eritrea. At 
that time, the euphoric Eritreans expected that their goal of an in- 
dependent Eritrea was about to be realized. However, they subse- 
quently suffered a series of reversals from which it took the EPLF 
almost a decade to recover. Like that earlier meeting, the 1987 
gathering was also a unity congress. It resulted in resolution of the 
difference between the EPLF and another splinter group, the 
Eritrean Liberation Front-Central Command (ELF-CC), at the 
time the most prominent remaining ELF faction. 

Following the EPLF unity congress, the organization stepped 
up military pressure against the Ethiopian regime. By March 1988, 
the EPLF had scored some impressive battlefield successes. The 
EPLF broke out of entrenched positions in the Nakfa area of north- 
ern Eritrea and occupied the important garrison town of Afabet. 
Afabet's fall forced the Ethiopian army to evacuate the urban centers 
of Barca, Teseney, Barentu, and Akordat. The government also 
ordered all foreign relief workers out of Eritrea and Tigray, declared 
states of emergency in both regions, and redeployed troops from 
the Ogaden to Eritrea. The highly disciplined Eritrean forces faced 
much larger and better equipped Ethiopian units, but the Ethio- 
pian troops, many of whom were teenagers, had become war weary 
and demoralized. By early 1991, the EPLF controlled most of 
Eritrea except for some urban centers. 

The most significant attempt to address the Eritrean issue was 
embodied in the 1987 constitution, which allowed for the possibil- 
ity of regional autonomy. At its inaugural session, the National 
Shengo acted on this provision and endorsed a plan for regional 
autonomy (see Regional and Local Government, this ch.). Among 
autonomous regions, the plan accorded Eritrea the greatest degree 
of autonomy. In particular, the plan assigned Eritrea's regional 
government broader powers than those assigned to the other four 
autonomous regions, especially in the areas of industrial develop- 
ment and education. Under the plan, Eritrea also was distinguished 
from other autonomous regions in that it was to have three ad- 
ministrative subregions: one in the north, made up of Akordat, 
Keren, and Sahel awrajas; one in the south-central part of histori- 
cal Eritrea, consisting of Hamasen, Mitsiwa, Seraye, and Akale 
Guzay awrajas; and one encompassing the western awraja of Gashe 
na Setit. By creating Aseb Autonomous Region, the government 
in Addis Ababa appeared to be attempting to ensure itself a se- 
cure path to the Red Sea. Aseb Autonomous Region comprised 



242 



United Nations Commission to Eritrea, 1950. The commissioner listens to 
representatives of the Muslim League qfMitsiwa argue for Eritrean independence. 

Courtesy United Nations 

Aseb awraja of historical Eritrea, along with parts of eastern Welo 
and Tigray regions. 

By 1991, however, administrative reorganization in the north- 
central part of the country was a reality only on paper. Since 1988 
the area had been under a state of emergency. The regime had 
been unable to establish the necessary party and administrative in- 
frastructure to implement the plan, mostly because of the escala- 
tion of opposition in Eritrea and Tigray since the promulgation 
of the 1987 constitution. The EPLF, for example, rejected the re- 
organization plan, terming it "old wine in new bottles." The ELF 
expressed particular outrage over the creation of Aseb Autonomous 
Region, viewing it as another WPE attempt to annex a significant 
part of the historical colony of Eritrea to Ethiopia. The ELF called 
for the Ethiopian government to agree to immediate negotiations 
without preconditions with a unified Eritrean delegation. 

Even as the EPLF recorded its most significant battiefield suc- 
cess in 1988-89, a rift was developing between that organization 
and ELF splinter groups. This rift revolved around religion, as the 
ELF's conservative, primarily Islamic elements came to distrust 
the EPLF's predominantly Christian leadership. The EPLF also 
espoused a much more explicitly socialist program than did the 



243 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

ELF factions. To encourage further divisions among the Eritreans, 
the Mengistu regime in late 1988 met with five former ELF mem- 
bers (who claimed to represent 750,000 Eritreans) to accept their 
proposal for the creation of an autonomous Eritrean region in the 
predominantly Muslim lowlands. These five men rejected the 
EPLF's claim that it represented all Eritreans. Mengistu forwarded 
the proposal to the National Shengo for consideration, but the re- 
gime collapsed before action could be taken. 

The Tigrayan Movement 

Tigrayan opposition to the Ethiopian government started dur- 
ing Emperor Menelik's reign. In 1896 Menelik, who opposed Italy's 
territorial designs on Ethiopia, deployed an 80,000-man army into 
Tigray without adequate provisions, thereby forcing the soldiers 
to live off the land. According to Tigrayan nationalists, the Tigray 
who died protecting their homes against Menelik's troops outnum- 
bered the defeated Italians who died at the Battle of Adwa that year. 
Forty years later, when fascist Italy's forces invaded Ethiopia, the 
main battlefield was again in Tigray, and once again the inhabi- 
tants suffered. In 1943, after the Allied Powers had defeated Italy 
and Haile Selassie had returned to Ethiopia, Tigrayan peasants 
revolted against the imperial regime (see Discontent in Tigray, 
ch. 1). Government forces, supported by British units, suppressed 
the revolt. The emperor then imposed a harsh peace on Tigray. 

The first sign of open resistance to the Mengistu regime in Tigray 
(where the rebellion became known as the Weyane, the same as 
the 1943 revolt) occurred in October 1974. At that time, the Derg 
ordered Ras Mengesha Seyoum — governor general of Tigray, 
member of the Tigrayan royal family, and grandson-in-law of the 
emperor — to relinquish his office and surrender to the authorities. 
Rather than submit, he fled to the bush and organized the Tigray 
Liberation Organization (TLO). The TLO operated in clandes- 
tine political cells and engaged in a program of systematic agita- 
tion. During the tumultuous mid-1970s, the TLO established cells 
in various parts of the country. In early 1975, Mengesha left Tigray 
and, with other aristocrats, formed the Ethiopian Democratic Union 
(EDU). Members of the TLO who remained in Tigray and who 
came under the influence of the EPLF formed the Tigray People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF), whose goals included the overthrow of 
the Mengistu regime, the establishment of a "more democratic" 
government, and the removal of all foreign military bases from Ethio- 
pia (see The Tigray, ch. 5). The TPLF also condemned Mengesha, 
accepted Marxism-Leninism, and argued for an independent 
Eritrean-Tigrayan federation. Eventually, the TPLF neutralized the 



244 



Government and Politics 



TLO by killing many of its leaders and by jailing and executing 
others. 

At the time, the TPLF shared the field with the more conserva- 
tive Tigray-based EDU and the Ethiopian People's Revolution- 
ary Party (EPRP). However, the Red Terror had decimated both 
of these organizations, and by 1978 they had ceased to be a factor. 
The TPLF was also severely weakened but, with the assistance of 
the EPLF, developed into an effective fighting force. Its ranks were 
expanded initially by the absorption of former EPRP members. 

Beginning in 1980, the TPLF sought to establish local self- 
administration in areas under its control. The basic administra- 
tive unit was the people's council (baito), which was typically in- 
troduced in two stages. In the first stage, representatives from mass 
associations were elected to form the provisional administrative 
council. The second stage involved the establishment of a full- 
fledged people's council. Council members were elected to two- 
year terms. All members of a number of mass associations who 
were at least sixteen years of age had the right to vote and to stand 
for election to a people's council. People's councils were responsi- 
ble for local administrative, economic, and social affairs. By late 
1989, however, this structure had not grown much beyond the pilot 
stage in most of Tigray. 

In the 1980s, the TPLF drew almost exclusively from among 
the Tigrayan population of north-central Ethiopia for its support, 
although it claimed to be dedicated toward building a united na- 
tional front representing all groups and nationalities struggling 
against the Mengistu regime. On May 8, 1984, the TPLF issued 
a proposal calling for the formation of a united front based on a 
"minimum program," whose sole objective was the overthrow of 
the Mengistu regime. By 1984 the TPLF was active throughout 
Tigray and in parts of Welo and Gojam. Although its political pro- 
gram continued to have a populist orientation, the dominant ideo- 
logues within the organization claimed to be dedicated to constructing 
the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. Observers likened this 
group's strident rhetoric to that of Albania's Stalinist ideologues. 

On the eve of its thirteenth anniversary in February 1988, the 
TPLF was engaged in its largest offensive against Ethiopian forces. 
Over the next year and a half, the TPLF captured all of Tigray, 
including urban centers such as Aksum, Inda Silase, and Mekele. 
By May 1989, the Ethiopian army had withdrawn completely from 
Tigray. 

The TPLF's efforts to develop a united front began to bear fruit 
just as its major offensive was unfolding. In January 1989, it entered 



245 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

into an alliance with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement 
(EPDM), an organization composed mainly of Amhara from Welo, 
Gonder, and the northern part of Shewa, many of whom had once 
belonged to the EPRP. The two groups had cooperated in mili- 
tary activities for several years, but they had not had a formal alli- 
ance. It was estimated that by the fall of 1989, there were 2.5 million 
people in EPDM-controlled areas. The EPDM, like the TPLF, 
supported the right of all nationalities to self-determination and 
the formation of a democratic state once the Mengestu regime had 
been overthrown. 

The TPLF and EPDM called their alliance the Ethiopian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF 's 
charter borrowed from the TPLF charter. It called for the estab- 
lishment of a democratic government, the elimination of the last 
vestiges of feudalism and imperialism, the formation of a genuine 
people's government based on people's councils, the guarantee of 
basic human and civil rights, and self-determination for all op- 
pressed nationalities. Subsequently, several other dissident groups, 
some created specifically by the EPRDF, also joined the alliance. 

By the fall of 1989, the EPRDF had moved from its strongholds 
in Tigray, Welo, and Gonder and threatened parts of northern 
Shewa. At the time, the force seemed more capable of pushing back 
the beleaguered Ethiopian troops than of setting up any type of 
permanent political structures. During a six- week period begin- 
ning in August 1989, the EPRDF wounded or captured an esti- 
mated 20,000 government soldiers, seized vast stocks of military 
hardware, and pushed the battle line between the two sides down 
to northern Shewa. In part, these advances were facilitated by the 
demoralization of the Ethiopian military following the abortive coup 
of May 1989 (see Regime Stability and Peace Negotiations, this 
ch.). Some Ethiopian troops defected to the opposition, significantly 
improving the military capabilities of the EPRDF. 

Other Movements and Fronts 

The EPLF, the TPLF, the EPDM, and the EPRDF were the 
most militarily significant opposition movements challenging the 
Mengistu regime in 1991 . In addition, several other groups, com- 
posed mainly of ethnic Oromo, Afar, and Somali, were also active. 

Oromo Groups 

The Oromo, representing about 40 percent of the population, 
occupy areas in south and central Ethiopia that only became part 
of modern Ethiopia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The people in these areas largely became tenants on their 



246 



Government and Politics 



own land as the empire consolidated its rule. Many Oromo resented 
the alien rule of Amhara and Tigray from the highland core of the 
empire. Haile Selassie tried to win Oromo loyalty by developing 
alliances with key Oromo leaders. Although this strategy enabled 
the emperor to co-opt many Oromo into the imperial system, it 
failed to end Oromo resistance. Examples of this opposition to Addis 
Ababa included the Azebo-Raya revolt of 1928-30; the 1936 Oromo 
Independence Movement; and the establishment in 1965 of the 
Mecha-Tulema, an Oromo self-help organization. 

From 1964 to 1970, a revolt in Bale presented the most serious 
challenge to the Ethiopian government. During that time, separate 
Oromo rebel groups in Bale conducted hit-and-run raids against 
military garrisons and police stations. Until 1969 the Somali govern- 
ment provided military assistance to these rebels as part of its strat- 
egy of reestablishing a "Greater Somalia." In addition, Oromo 
rebels attempted to coordinate their military activities with the 
Western Somali Liberation Front. After Mahammad Siad Barre 
took over the Somali government in 1969, the Oromo rebels lost 
Somali support and found it impossible to sustain their campaigns 
in southeastern Ethiopia. In 1970 the rebels agreed to a truce with 
the Haile Selassie regime. 

In 1973 Oromo dissidents formed the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF), an organization dedicated to the "total liberation of the 
entire Oromo nation from Ethiopian colonialism" (see The Oromo, 
ch. 5). The OLF began an offensive against the Ethiopian govern- 
ment in Harerge in 1974, but sustained activities did not begin 
until 1976. The OLF subsequently extended its sphere of activity 
to Welega. 

Young, educated Oromo from Arsi initially composed the OLF 
leadership, but by 1976 the organization claimed a broad-based 
leadership with a following from all Oromo areas. Beyond national 
liberation, the OLF's program called for the establishment of an 
independent Democratic Republic of Oromia, which would include 
all of central and southern Ethiopia, excluding the Ogaden and 
Omo River regions. 

In late 1989, the OLF had approximately 200 combatants in 
Harerge and about 5,000 in Welega. OLF troops were poorly armed 
and unable to pose a serious threat to the Ethiopian army. In ad- 
dition, the OLF had been unable to mobilize popular support 
against the Ethiopian government. This failure resulted from the 
OLF's inability to organize an effective antigovernment movement, 
to convince the majority of Oromo people that separatism was a 
viable political alternative, or to sustain military operations in the 
geographically separated areas of Welega, Arsi, and Harerge. In 



247 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

spite of these difficulties, in 1989 the OLF announced several mili- 
tary successes against the Ethiopian armed forces, especially in 
Asosa, a town on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border. 

On the political side, in February 1988 the OLF convened its 
first national congress at Begi in newly created Asosa Region. Apart 
from expressing support for the EPLF and the TPLF, the congress 
condemned the Mengistu regime and voiced opposition to the 
government's villagization and resettlement policies. 

Afar Groups 

The Afar people, numbering about 3 million in Ethiopia, re- 
side in the area bordering Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Although 
there were other factions claiming to represent the Afar, the most 
prominent organization was the Afar Liberation Front (ALF; also 
called the Afar Sultanate Liberation Front), headed by Ali Mirah. 
The ALF was dedicated to maintaining the political, cultural, and 
religious autonomy of the Afar people. Ali Mirah directed his move- 
ment's sporadic activities from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The ALF 
was one of the few opposition movements to express some interest 
in Mengistu 's plan for creating autonomous regions, primarily be- 
cause most Afar inhabited the area that was to become Aseb Auton- 
omous Region. 

Somali Groups 

Somali guerrilla activity in the Ogaden and in the Haud area 
east of Harer flared sporadically after Somalia gained its indepen- 
dence in 1960, but the guerrilla activity remained essentially a police 
concern until a border war erupted in 1964. When he seized power 
in Mogadishu in 1969, Siad Barre thwarted attempts at an under- 
standing between Ethiopia and Somalia. He pledged to renew ef- 
forts to establish a "Greater Somalia" that would encompass about 
one- third of Ethiopia's territory. Encouraged by the breakdown 
of authority in Addis Ababa after the 1974 overthrow of Haile 
Selassie, Somalia provided materiel, moral, and organizational sup- 
port to insurgent movements in the Ogaden and southern Ethiopia. 

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which operated 
in the Ogaden, supported the "Greater Somalia" concept. The 
Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) maintained links to the 
WSLF. Its sphere of operations was in Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi, 
where it advocated union with Somalia or the creation of an in- 
dependent state. Somalia equipped both groups with Soviet arms; 
both also received aid and training from various Arab and com- 
munist nations, including Cuba. 



248 



Government and Politics 



After the 1977-78 Ogaden War, the WSLF was routed, and its 
troops flocked to camps in Somalia (see The Somali, ch. 5). The 
Somali government subsequently forbade the WSLF to use its ter- 
ritory to launch attacks into Ethiopia. By 1989 the WSLF had ceased 
to be an effective guerrilla organization within Ethiopia. Siad 
Barre's decision to restrict the WSLF led to the formation of a 
WSLF splinter group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), whose headquarters were in Kuwait. Elements of the 
ONLF slipped back into the Ogaden in 1988 but failed to gener- 
ate a significant military capability. 

Leftist Groups 

Although the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) 
and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (whose Amharic acro- 
nym was MEISON) were crippled during the Red Terror, they 
were not completely eliminated. In 1989 the EPRP had its main 
base in Sudan. It claimed to have had its ranks augmented in the 
late 1980s by 20,000 peasants fleeing villagization in Shewa. The 
EPRP and MEISON continued to exist as political organizations, 
but they appeared to have little military significance. 

Regime Stability and Peace Negotiations 

The WPE regime's attempt to create conditions for popular ac- 
ceptance of its legitimacy failed. Testimony to this was the attempted 
coup that began on May 16, 1989. The coup was the result of 
months of planning by senior officers, some of whom may have 
been members of the Free Ethiopia Soldiers' Movement, an op- 
position group that involved active-duty military officers and former 
officers in exile. The coup began shortly after Mengistu left for 
a state visit to East Germany. Top generals invited colleagues to 
attend a meeting at the Ministry of National Defense, where they 
delivered an ultimatum to the defense minister, Major General 
Haile Giorgis Habte Mariam, to join them or be jailed. Haile 
Giorgis refused and was shot dead. The shots were heard by two 
senior officers loyal to Mengistu, who ordered army tanks to en- 
circle the ministry and guard the road to the airport. 

Officers commanding units in Eritrea and Tigray also joined in 
the coup. They initially seized the Asmera radio station and is- 
sued a call to the "broad masses" to join in the effort to bring down 
the "tyrannical and dictatorial regime of Mengistu." However, 
Mengistu returned to the country and, with the support of the 
Presidential Guard and other loyal troops, regained control three 
days after the coup began. 



249 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The plotters' aim had been to establish a transitional military 
government. Exiled supporters of the Free Ethiopia Soldiers' Move- 
ment claimed that the coup-makers planned to negotiate a settle- 
ment in Eritrea, establish a ruling council, and return the military 
to their barracks. Senior officers had become desperate for a polit- 
ical settlement of the wars raging in the north. Pamphlets express- 
ing their discontent had been distributed to the military rank and 
file by junior and middle ranking officers sympathetic to their cause. 
The new leader reportedly was to have been Major General Seyoum 
Mekonnen, the former head of military intelligence. 

To wipe out his enemies in the military, Mengistu purged the 
officer corps. At least twelve generals were executed or committed 
suicide rather than be captured, and 300 to 400 officers suspected 
of being involved in the coup were arrested. Nearly all generals, 
division commanders, and political commissars assigned to units 
stationed in the north reportedly were detained. These individuals 
were replaced by Mengistu loyalists, many of whom lacked ex- 
perience as military leaders. 

The attempted coup and continuing problems related to war, 
drought, and famine caused considerable instability in the WPE's 
upper levels. Council of State members became increasingly criti- 
cal of Mengistu 's policies, and some even suggested that he step 
down. However, Mengistu mustered enough support to retain 
power. At the same time, by mid- 1989 the success of opposition 
forces, the Soviet Union's refusal to increase military assistance 
to Ethiopia, and pressure from Moscow had forced Mengistu to 
seek negotiated settlements to Ethiopia's various wars. The loss 
of East German military support because of the democratization 
movement that occurred later in the year also softened the govern- 
ment 's stance toward negotiations. 

On June 5, 1989, the National Shengo, in a special session, en- 
dorsed a proposal calling for unconditional peace talks with the 
EPLF. The EPLF accepted, and the two sides agreed that former 
United States president Jimmy Carter would mediate the negoti- 
ations. The first talks were held at the Carter Presidential Center 
of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, in early September. WPE 
Central Committee member Ashagre Yigletu headed the Ethio- 
pian delegation, and Al Amin Muhammad Sayyid led the Eritrean 
team. The two sides agreed on several procedural issues and set 
the next round of talks for November 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya. 

At the second meeting, additional procedural issues were re- 
solved, and former Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere was 
asked to co-chair further talks with former President Carter. The 
most difficult issue resolved in the eight-day talks was determining 



250 



Commuters line up for a bus at a busy pick-up point in Addis Ababa. 

Courtesy United Nations (Ray Witlin) 

who would serve as international observers for the main negotia- 
tions. Seven observers were invited — each side had two unrestricted 
choices, and three others were chosen by mutual consent. The par- 
ties also concluded that additional observers could be invited later 
upon mutual agreement. At the end of the session, six observers 
had accepted invitations: Kenya, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zim- 
babwe, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). A seventh 
invitation was proposed for the UN, but because Ethiopia, a UN 
member, refused to endorse the idea, the UN declined to partici- 
pate. Subsequent meetings in Washington in October 1990 and 
February 1991 , chaired by United States Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs Herman Cohen, failed to resolve this issue. Even 
so, both sides agreed to continue their dialogue, with the next meet- 
ing tentatively scheduled for May in London. 

The Ethiopian regime also agreed to peace negotiations with the 
TPLF, to be convened by the Italian government. Preliminary talks 
began in Rome on November 4, 1989. Ashagre Yigletu led the Ethio- 
pian team, and Central Committee chairman Meles Zenawi headed 
the TPLF delegation. Because its troops were advancing on the 
battlefield, the TPLF refrained from making a cease-fire a precon- 
dition for participating in the talks. The TPLF called for the estab- 
lishment of a provisional government made up of representatives 



251 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

from all major nationality groups and political organizations. The 
main task of this provisional government would be to draft a 
democratic constitution and prepare for free elections. Before the 
talks began, the Ethiopian government rejected the idea of a provi- 
sional government, claiming that the Ethiopian people had approved 
the 1987 constitution in a fair referendum and that a popularly 
elected parliament had put the new government in place. 

The first round of talks lasted one week and ended with agree- 
ment only on procedural points. Although the TPLF had called 
for a national united front, it represented only itself at the Rome 
talks. It suggested, however, that the main item on the agenda 
should be its peace proposal. The Ethiopian delegation rejected 
this idea but offered no counterproposal. 

The second round of preliminary talks opened in Rome on De- 
cember 12, 1989. The two sides reached an agreement whereby 
Italy and Kenya would act as mediators and Nigeria, Sweden, 
Sudan, and Uganda would act as observers in future peace negotia- 
tions. The Italian minister of foreign affairs announced that the 
third round of preliminary talks would open in Rome on March 20, 
1990. 

Unfortunately, the Ethiopian delegation terminated these dis- 
cussions nine days after they began. According to rebel spokes- 
men, the talks failed because Ethiopia insisted that the TPLF deal 
only with questions pertaining "to the autonomous region of 
Tigray" rather than with Ethiopia as a whole. Moreover, Ethio- 
pia refused to accept a joint TPLF-EPDM delegation at the main 
peace talks. The TPLF maintained that the EPDM, its ally in war, 
also should be its ally in peace. As a result of these differences, 
the negotiating process between the TPLF and Ethiopia ended. 

On the military front, the TPLF pressed its offensive through- 
out the fall of 1989. By the beginning of 1990, its advances had 
bogged down, and the Ethiopian army had begun a counteroffen- 
sive. By mid-June 1990, however, the TPLF, operating as part 
of the EPRDF, had taken up positions within 160 kilometers of 
Addis Ababa. By contrast, the EPLF had reduced its military oper- 
ations over the same period, perhaps to regroup. In February 1990, 
however, the EPLF mounted a major drive aimed at capturing the 
port city of Mitsiwa, the entry point for much of Ethiopia's food 
and military supplies. By mid-February the EPLF had overrun the 
port and severed the traffic that flowed from Mitsiwa via Asmera 
to the strategic garrison town of Keren. A few months later, 
however, Mitsiwa resumed operation in accordance with an agree- 
ment between the EPLF and government forces. By the end of the 
year, the EPLF had started conducting military operations in the 



252 



Government and Politics 



vicinity of the Dahlak Islands and initiated an offensive toward the 
port of Aseb. 

Mass Media 

Before and after the 1974 revolution, the government controlled 
Ethiopia's mass communications. However, after 1974 the ideo- 
logical orientation of mass media in Ethiopia underwent a substan- 
tial change insofar as they became vehicles for spreading Marxist 
dogma. 

The Ministry of Information and National Guidance published 
two daily newspapers: the English-language Ethiopian Herald, with 
a circulation of 6,000, and the Amharic-language Addis Zemen, with 
a circulation of 37,000. The ministry also printed Hibret, a Tigrinya- 
language newspaper published in Asmera that had a daily circula- 
tion of 4,000. The ministry closely controlled the contents of these 
publications, and it used their editorial pages to analyze certain 
events and policies from the perspective of scientific socialism. 

There were about a dozen periodicals published in Ethiopia. The 
WPE issued Serto Ader, an Amharic-language newsletter with a 
weekly circulation of about 100,000. Two other periodicals were 
the magazine Yekatit Quarterly and the ideological journal Meskerem 
(circulation 100,000). Both publications were printed in English 
as well as in Amharic. Marxist-Leninist in tone, the Yekatit Quar- 
terly reported mainly on the "accomplishments of the revolution." 
Meskerem was viewed specifically as an instrument of political edu- 
cation. 

Foreign Policy 

The foreign relations of the modern Ethiopian state were driven 
by the government's quest to establish this multiethnic polity as 
a viable nation- state and to maintain its territorial integrity. In many 
respects, then, the foreign policy pursued by the leaders of post- 
revolutionary Ethiopia was consistent with the foreign policy of the 
old imperial regime. The aspect that changed from one era to the 
next was Ethiopia's ideological alignment. Whereas the regime of 
Emperor Haile Selassie had relied heavily on the patronage of the 
United States, that of President Mengistu Haile Mariam cast its 
fate with the Soviet Union. Both the pre- and post- 1974 govern- 
ments used economic and military aid from their respective super- 
power patrons to augment their own meager material resources, 
thus enhancing the ability of the regime to pursue not only certain 
foreign policy objectives but also specific domestic policies. Anal- 
ysis of Ethiopia's foreign policy, both past and contemporary, sug- 
gests that, rather than serving as the pawns of one superpower or 



253 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

another, Ethiopia's leaders consistently placed their perceptions of 
what was best for Ethiopia before all else. 

Diplomacy and State Building in Imperial Ethiopia 

As one of only two African states that have never been perma- 
nently colonized (the other is Liberia), Ethiopia has a long diplo- 
matic tradition. Tewodros II, who reigned in the mid-nineteenth 
century, was the first modern Ethiopian leader to try to develop a 
foreign policy that transcended the Horn region (see The Making 
of Modern Ethiopia, ch. 1). His successor, Yohannis IV, followed 
a less dynamic course and was greatly troubled by European ex- 
pansionism in general and penetration by Italy in particular. Menelik 
II, who succeeded Yohannis in 1889, failed to find a peaceful solu- 
tion to Italy's encroachments. He had greater success, however, in 
the military sphere, defeating the Italian army at Adwa in 1896. 

Menelik died in 1913, and it was not until 1930 that another 
strong emperor, Haile Selassie I, assumed the throne. Haile Selassie 
quickly demonstrated that he was committed to the creation of a 
strong, modern, bureaucratic empire that would command unques- 
tioned international respect. As early as 1923, while serving as re- 
gent, he negotiated Ethiopia's admission into the League of Nations. 
The Italian occupation of Ethiopia between 1936 and 1941 briefly 
halted his efforts to establish Ethiopia's position in the world com- 
munity (see Italian Rule and World War II, ch. 1). However, when 
he reassumed the throne in 1941, he renewed his efforts to bolster 
Ethiopia's international standing. 

After World War II, Haile Selassie achieved considerable in- 
ternational success primarily because of his active participation in 
the UN, his alignment with the West, and his vocal support for 
the African independence movement. As a UN member, Ethio- 
pia committed troops to the peacekeeping mission in Korea from 
1950 to 1953 and to the Congo (present-day Zaire) in 1960. 
Moreover, Ethiopia's military and diplomatic relationship with the 
United States provided it with a superpower ally (see United States, 
ch. 5). Finally, Haile Selassie took the lead in pressing for a reso- 
lution establishing the territorial integrity of the independent states 
of Africa. Over the years, he developed a reputation as a sage voice 
of moderation on a continent filled with militant nationalists. It 
was in this capacity that he offered to host the headquarters of the 
OAU upon its founding in the early 1960s, once again demonstrat- 
ing his diplomatic acumen. 

The Foreign Policy of the Derg 

The foreign policy of Ethiopia did not change immediately upon 
the demise of the imperial regime. Initially, the country's new 



254 



Government and Politics 



leaders maintained the general thrust of the foreign policy devel- 
oped under Haile Selassie and concentrated mainly on consolidat- 
ing their rule. Nonetheless, the Marxist ideology of the Derg and 
its civilian allies made conflict with Ethiopia's superpower patron, 
the United States, inevitable. 

By the mid-1970s, Kagnew station, the communications monitor- 
ing base in Asmera granted under terms of the 1953 Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement between Ethiopia and the United States, had 
largely lost its value. Advances in satellite technology had rendered 
land-based facilities like Kagnew station less important for long- 
range communications monitoring. Yet the United States felt the 
need to maintain a presence in this strategically important part of 
Africa, particularly because the Soviet Union was beginning to be- 
come active in the area. The administration of President Gerald 
Ford (1974-77) wanted to avoid an embarrassment similar to that 
experienced by the United States in Angola in 1975, when covert 
United States aid to anticommunist combatants failed to dislodge 
the pro-Moscow Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. 
Even though President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kis- 
singer indicated uneasiness with Ethiopia's violations of human 
rights and growing leftist tendencies, they did no more than cau- 
tiously encourage the Derg to moderate its human rights policies. 

The United States began to express concern over the Derg's 
human rights violations when on November 23, 1974, a day that 
came to be known as "Bloody Saturday," fifty-nine officials who 
had served in the old regime were executed. Official United States 
concern intensified two months later when the Derg mobilized a 
force consisting of regular military units and the hastily assembled 
People's Militia in an effort to resolve the Eritrean question through 
military means (see People's Militia, ch. 5). But Eritrean forces 
attacked first, surprising the Ethiopian forces in their base camps 
and scoring an impressive victory. 

Whereas the administration of President Ford had been reluc- 
tant to impose sanctions on Ethiopia because of its human rights 
record, President Jimmy Carter made human rights a central con- 
cern of his administration (1977-81). On February 25, 1977, Carter 
announced that because of continued human rights violations, cer- 
tain governments that were receiving Washington's military aid 
(including Ethiopia) would receive reduced assistance in the fol- 
lowing fiscal year. Consequently, the Derg began to cast about for 
alternative sources of military assistance. Among the countries 
Ethiopia turned to were China and the Soviet Union. At first, the 
actual assistance provided by these superpowers was minimal, and 
the United States maintained its presence in the country. However, 



255 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

relations between the United States and Ethiopia deteriorated 
rapidly. By April 1977, Mengistu had demanded that Washing- 
ton close down Kagnew station and most other installations; only 
a small staff was allowed to remain at the United States embassy. 
By then, the first supplies of Soviet military hardware had begun to 
arrive. 

Having its military presence in Ethiopia ended, and with ten- 
sions mounting in the Middle East and Iran, the United States 
began to cultivate alliances in northeast Africa that could facilitate 
the development of a long-range military strike capability. These 
developments coincided with an escalation of tensions in the Horn 
region in general. The United States eventually began the systematic 
pursuit of a strategy that amounted to encircling the Arabian Penin- 
sula. The United States asked Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and 
Oman to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for 
the fledgling Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which later became 
the United States Central Command. The Soviet Union's clients 
in the region — Ethiopia, Libya, and the People's Democratic Re- 
public of Yemen (South Yemen) — perceiving Washington's action 
as a threat, signed a tripartite agreement in 1981 and pledged to 
repulse any effort to intervene in their respective countries. How- 
ever, this alliance never played a significant role in the region. 

The Derg, the Soviet Union, and the Communist World 

Apparently sensing that the Mengistu regime was in desperate 
trouble, internal and external enemies took action to hasten its 
demise (see External and Internal Opponents, ch. 5). Most im- 
portant, civilian opposition groups began to wage urban guerrilla 
campaigns to demoralize and discredit the Derg, and Somalia com- 
mitted regular troops to assist ethnic Somali living in Ethiopia's 
Ogaden region in their efforts to separate from Ethiopia. Simul- 
taneously, the Somali government expressed concern over the grow- 
ing Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia. Until then, Somalia 
had been an ally of the Soviet Union. After the Somali National 
Army (SNA) invaded the Ogaden region in July 1977, the Soviet 
Union withdrew its 1,000 advisers from Somalia. In November 
Somalia announced that it had abrogated the 1974 Treaty of Friend- 
ship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and that it had sus- 
pended diplomatic relations with Cuba. At that point, the Soviet 
Union adopted Ethiopia as its main ally in the Horn of Africa. In 
late November, it launched a massive airlift and sealift of arms and 
other military equipment to Ethiopia. Over the next several months, 
about 17,000 Cuban and 1,000 Soviet military personnel arrived 



256 



Government and Politics 



in the country and were deployed to the Ogaden front. This aid 
turned the tide in favor of Ethiopia by early 1978. 

As had the regime of Haile Selassie, the Derg accorded its in- 
ternational image and territorial integrity the highest priority in 
its foreign policy. Opposition groups had forced the regime to rely 
extensively on the Soviet Union to maintain itself in power and 
to preserve the country's territorial integrity. From 1977 to 1990, 
Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia was estimated to be as much 
as US$13 billion. However, by 1987 there was evidence that the 
Soviet Union had decided to cut back military assistance to Ethio- 
pia and to press for political solutions to that country's several civil 
conflicts. By that time, there were fewer than 1 ,800 Soviet advisers 
in Ethiopia and a total of about 2,000 advisers from Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Poland. Further- 
more, all Cuban troops in the Ogaden had withdrawn, and the 
Cuban military presence in Ethiopia had dropped to fewer than 
2,000. 

Although Ethiopia was dependent on the Soviet Union for mili- 
tary assistance and sided with it in the international diplomatic 
arena, Addis Ababa on numerous occasions demonstrated its in- 
dependence in the area of domestic policy and international eco- 
nomic policy. For instance, the Derg procrastinated in setting up 
a vanguard party despite Soviet pressure to do so. Once the party 
was formed, it was dominated by former military personnel, again 
contrary to Soviet wishes. In the economic sphere, Addis Ababa 
had close aid and trade relations with the West and pursued a prag- 
matic investment policy. 

Although Mengistu eschewed any talk of Ethiopian-style glas- 
nost, Ethiopia could not escape the global impact of Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. When Mengistu visited the Soviet 
Union in 1988, Gorbachev told him that if Moscow's support were 
to continue, the Soviet Union would have to see dramatic changes 
in Ethiopia's agricultural priorities, coupled with political liber- 
alization. The Soviet leader also refused to continue unqualified 
military and economic support of the Mengistu regime. A combi- 
nation of economic realities and Soviet pressure encouraged the 
Mengistu regime in 1989 to retreat at least partially from its dog- 
matically statist approach to economic development (see Role of 
Government, ch. 3). By late 1990, the Soviet-Ethiopian alliance 
had ended. As a result, Addis Ababa looked to several other na- 
tions, including Israel and China, for military assistance. None 
of these nations, however, was capable of replacing the amount 
of military equipment the Soviet Union had supplied to Ethiopia. 



257 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The Derg and the West 

Although the Derg depended on the Soviet Union and its allies 
for military aid, it was just as reliant on the West for economic 
development and relief aid (see Balance of Payments and Foreign 
Assistance, ch. 3). For example, the European Community (EC) 
was Ethiopia's most significant source of economic aid. In the early 
1980s, Western sources accounted for more than 90 percent of 
Ethiopia's economic aid, most of which came from the EC. Since 
then, communist countries had increased their proportion of total 
aid to Ethiopia to about 20 percent. Other multilateral and bilateral 
donors also had provided increased aid. For example, after refrain- 
ing from giving aid to Addis Ababa between 1975 and 1981, the 
World Bank (see Glossary) pledged more than US$250 million in 
project aid, the European Development Fund promised about 
US$300 million, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF- 
see Glossary) agreed to a loan of almost US$100 million. The re- 
gime accepted the IMF loan even though it claimed to disagree 
with IMF policies. Moreover, a joint venture law in 1983 and a 
foreign investment policy initiated in 1988 had stimulated the gradu- 
al return of private investors, although the level of such investments 
remained low. 

Even though Ethiopia was dependent on Western economic aid, 
no Western donor was able to influence day-to-day economic policy 
on a regular basis. For instance, the Swedish International Develop- 
ment Authority, the United States Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID), the World Bank, and other donor agencies 
historically had favored the development of agricultural coopera- 
tives if they were organized on free-market principles. However, 
the Ethiopian regime attempted to guide the development of cooper- 
atives so that they might be transformed into socialist collectives 
compatible with a centrally planned and directed economy. Like 
the imperial government before it, the Derg attempted to play off 
a multiplicity of donors against one another and thereby maximize 
certain benefits without surrendering its sovereignty. 

Ethiopia's Border Politics 

As the Mengistu regime attempted to consolidate its rule, it had 
to cope with serious border problems, particularly with Somalia 
and Sudan. The point at issue with Somalia was the Ogaden region, 
an area that Mogadishu claimed as part of the historical Somali 
nation that had been seized by the Ethiopians during the colonial 
partition of the Horn of Africa. In fact, Ethiopia's only unde- 
fined boundary was the border it shared with the former Italian 



258 




Africa Hall, headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa. 
The Organization of African Unity conducted its first meeting at this site. 

Courtesy United Nations 

Somaliland. On maps drawn after 1950, this boundary is termed 
"Administrative Line" (see fig. 1). Upon gaining independence 
from European colonial rule in 1960, the inhabitants of the Republic 
of Somalia nurtured the hope that all Somali eventually would be 
united in a modern nation-state. Somali claims to the Ogaden, 
Djibouti, and parts of Kenya, however, had been consistently re- 
jected by the UN, the OAU, and most of the world's sovereign 
states. Still, Somalia's leadership remained unwilling to forsake these 
claims publicly. 

In 1961, less than a year after Somalia gained independence, its 
troops clashed with Ethiopian soldiers along their common border. 
In 1964 renewed tensions erupted into a minor regional war. In both 
cases, Somalia was defeated. Ethnic Somali in Kenya's northeast 
also unsuccessfully challenged that country's new government in the 
early 1960s. Pan-Somalism, then, served as a basis for the continu- 
ance of cooperative relations between Nairobi and Addis Ababa, 
despite the change of regime in Ethiopia. The two countries first 
signed a mutual defense agreement in 1 964 that resulted in the cre- 
ation of the Ethiopia-Kenya Border Administration Commission. 

The Ogaden War (1977-78) was the most serious border conflict 
between Ethiopia and Somalia (see The Somali, ch. 5). Beginning 



259 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

in the early summer of 1977, SNA units and WSLF guerrillas, a 
movement of ethnic Somali opposed to incorporation in Ethiopia, 
occupied vast tracts of the Ogaden and forced the Ethiopian army 
into fortresses at Jijiga, Harer, and Dire Dawa for almost eight 
months. The intention was to separate the Ogaden from Ethiopia 
to set the stage for ethnic Somali in the region to decide their own 
future. 

It was only with Soviet and Cuban assistance that the Derg 
regained control over the region by early 1978. The Soviet Union 
not only provided massive amounts of military equipment but also 
advisers, who trained Ethiopian soldiers and pilots. Moreover, 
Cuban troops spearheaded the counteroffensive that began in March 
1978. Cuban and Ethiopian troops quickly defeated the SNA and 
WSLF once the counteroffensive began. Many WSLF fighters 
returned to their villages or took refuge inside Somalia. In addi- 
tion, some 650,000 Somali and Oromo fled from southeastern 
Ethiopia into Somalia by early 1978 to escape unsettled local con- 
ditions and repression by Ethiopian armed forces. After the defeat, 
Somali opposition reverted to sporadic guerrilla ambushes and oc- 
casional acts of sabotage. 

On April 4, 1988, after several preparatory meetings, Ethiopia 
and Somalia signed a joint communique that supposedly ended the 
Ogaden conflict. According to the communique's terms, the two 
countries committed themselves to withdrawing their military forces 
fifteen kilometers from the border, exchanging prisoners of war, 
restoring diplomatic relations, and refraining from supporting each 
other's antigovernment guerrilla groups. Reportedly, a separate 
secret accord contained a Somali renunciation of all claims to the 
Ogaden region. From Mengistu's point of view, the joint commu- 
nique secured Ethiopia's southeastern border, thereby enabling 
Addis Ababa to devote more resources to the struggle against the 
EPLF and TPLF in northern Ethiopia. 

Nevertheless, by 1991 it had become evident that Ethiopia had 
failed to honor the provisions of the joint communique. The Men- 
gistu regime allowed the anti-Siad Barre Somali National Move- 
ment (SNM) to maintain offices in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa 
and to operate five training camps near Dire Dawa. Additionally, 
the Ethiopian government still provided materiel and logistical sup- 
port to the SNM. Despite these violations, Somalia refrained from 
reinitiating hostilities with Ethiopia. 

Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan were generally good until 
the mid-1980s, when the Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA) emerged to challenge the hegemony of Khartoum. Em- 
peror Haile Selassie had been instrumental in mediating an end 



260 



Government and Politics 



to the Sudanese civil war in 1972. However, Ethiopia regularly 
expressed disappointment that the Sudanese government had not 
prevented Eritrean guerrillas from operating out of its territory. 
Sudan attempted to negotiate an end to the Eritrean conflict in 
1975 but was unsuccessful. When Ethiopia turned to the Soviet 
Union and away from the United States, Sudan's government be- 
came concerned. Sudanese president Jaafar an Nimeiri had accused 
the Soviet Union of having inspired coup attempts against his re- 
gime in 1971 and 1976. Sudan recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia 
in January 1977, and for several years serious border tensions ex- 
isted between the two countries. 

Ethiopia's turn toward the Soviet Union caused Sudan to seek 
the support of new allies in preparing for the possibility of exter- 
nal invasions sponsored by Khartoum's regional enemies. Nimeiri 
decided to openly support certain Eritrean liberation movements. 
In addition, he supported Somalia during the Ogaden War. Nimeiri 
claimed that he wanted to build a "high wall against communism" 
in the Horn of Africa and agreed to participate with the United 
States, Kenya, Egypt, Somalia, and Oman in the development of 
the RDF. By 1980 the tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia had 
abated, however, with the signing of a peace treaty calling for the 
mutual respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
two countries. 

The 1981 tripartite agreement among Ethiopia, Libya, and South 
Yemen undermined relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum. 
For some time, the Libyan government had been trying to over- 
throw Nimeiri. Now Ethiopia appeared to be joining the Libyan 
effort. Border tensions between the two countries also increased 
after Ethiopia started supporting the SPLA. 

After Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985, Sadiq al Mahdi's regime 
made it clear that it wanted to improve relations with Ethiopia and 
Libya. Supposedly, this was the first step in the resolution of Sudan's 
civil war. The change in regimes in Sudan also prompted a deteri- 
oration in United States-Sudanese relations, manifested by Khar- 
toum's cancellation of the agreement calling for the participation 
of Sudanese troops in the Operation Bright Star exercises. Despite 
Sudan's estrangement from the United States and Mahdi's grow- 
ing closeness to Libya after 1985, there was no substantive improve- 
ment in Ethiopian-Sudanese relations. The problem continued to 
center on Sudan's support for Eritrean rebels and Mengistu's con- 
tinued support of the SPLA. By 1989, following the overthrow of 
Sadiq al Mahdi, Khartoum and Addis Ababa had offered to negoti- 
ate their respective internal conflicts, but nothing tangible came 
of this. 



261 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Addis Ababa and the Middle East 

To undermine regional support for the Eritrean movements, after 
1987 the Ethiopian government tried to develop better relations 
with several Arab countries. Between 1987 and 1989, high-level 
Ethiopian delegations visited Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia. In the fall of 1988, Mengistu paid a two-day visit to Syria 
to explain to President Hafiz al Assad the various reforms the Ethio- 
pian regime had recently made, including the creation of autono- 
mous regions, designed to be responsive to the desires of groups 
like the Eritreans. Prime Minister Fikre-Selassie Wogderes made 
a visit to Cairo in November 1988 to seek improved relations with 
Egypt and to express support for Egypt's offer to negotiate a settle- 
ment of the Eritrean conflict. Despite these moves, Ethiopia's re- 
lations with the Middle East remained minimal. 

By 1989 the lack of progress toward improved relations with Arab 
countries and the desperate need for arms appeared to have in- 
spired Ethiopia to develop closer ties with Israel. Subsequently, 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, which had been 
broken off at the time of the October 1973 War, were restored. 
Approximately 10,000 Beta Israel (Ethiopian Jews; also called 
Falasha) had been spirited out of Ethiopia to Israel in 1984 in a 
secret airlift known as Operation Moses, and Israel remained com- 
mitted to securing the emigration of the remaining Beta Israel. In 
return, Israel agreed to provide the Mengistu regime with mili- 
tary assistance (see Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language, ch. 2). 

Israel obtained the release of an additional large number of Beta 
Israel in May 1991 in the midst of the collapse of the Mengistu 
regime. Negotiations for another Beta Israel exodus were already 
under way, and large numbers of them had already been brought 
to Addis Ababa when the military government came under intense 
pressure from EPRDF forces. At the behest of both Israel and the 
United States, the government agreed to release the Beta Israel 
against an Israeli payment of US$35 million. On May 24-26, in 
what was called Operation Solomon, some 15,000 Beta Israel were 
airlifted from Ethiopia to Israel, leaving an estimated 5,000 be- 
hind, mostly around Gonder. 

The Demise of the Military Government 

In retrospect, perhaps the two crucial factors in the fall of the 
Mengistu regime were the abortive coup of May 1989 and the loss 
of Soviet military and political support. In the aftermath of quell- 
ing the coup, disaffection spread throughout the army. Thereafter, 
whole military units defected, taking their arms and equipment 



262 



Government and Politics 



with them as they joined insurgent groups. At the same time, Soviet 
military deliveries dwindled and then ceased, a source of supply 
that Mengistu was never able to replace, leaving government forces 
still further weakened and demoralized. It was these developments 
that led Mengistu to attempt economic reforms in 1989 and 1990 
and to initiate peace talks with the EPLF and EPRDF under Italian 
and United States auspices. 

During the early months of 1991 , both the military and the po- 
litical outlooks darkened considerably for the government. The 
EPLF pressed its sweep down the Red Sea coast with the aim of 
capturing Aseb (see The Eritreans, ch. 5). In February and March, 
EPRDF forces overran large portions of Gonder, Gojam, and 
Welega, threatening Addis Ababa from the northwest and west (see 
The Tigray, ch. 5). In mid- April the National Shengo proposed 
talks with all political groups that would lead to a transitional 
government, a cease-fire, and amnesty for all political prisoners. 
At the same time, the National Shengo tempered its peace initia- 
tive by calling for the mobilization of all adults over the age of eigh- 
teen and for the strengthening of the WPE. A few days later, on 
April 26, Mengistu, in a gesture to his opponents, reshuffled the 
government, dropping several hard-liners and replacing them with 
moderates. Among the latter were Lieutenant General Tesfaye 
Gebre-Kidan, one of the army's commanders in Eritrea, who was 
promoted to vice president, and Tesfaye Dinka, former foreign 
minister, who became prime minister. Both belonged to a group 
of advisers who had been urging Mengistu to compromise with 
the Eritreans and the Tigray. 

The main opposition parties — the EPLF, EPRDF, and OLF — 
rebuffed the National Shengo' s offer. During the next month, as 
all parties prepared for the next round of talks scheduled for Lon- 
don in late May, the EPLF and EPRDF pressed hard on the mili- 
tary front. In late April, EPRDF forces were reported to be some 
100 kilometers west of Addis Ababa and still advancing; in Eritrea 
the EPLF made gains along the Red Sea coast and closed in on 
Keren and Asmera. In mid-May the last major government strong- 
holds north of Addis Ababa — Dese and Kembolcha in southern 
Welo — fell to the EPRDF. With little but demoralized and fleeing 
troops between the capital and the EPRDF forces, Mengistu 
resigned the presidency and fled the country on May 21 . His exit, 
widely regarded as essential if the upcoming negotiations were to 
succeed, was secured in part through the efforts of Assistant Secre- 
tary of State Herman Cohen, who pressured Mengistu to resign 
and arranged for his exile in Zimbabwe. 



263 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Lieutenant General Tesfaye, now head of state, called for a cease- 
fire; he also offered to share power with his opponents and went 
so far as to begin releasing political prisoners, but to no avail. 
EPRDF fighters continued their advance on the virtually defense- 
less capital and announced that they could enter it at will. Mean- 
while, on May 24, the EPLF received the surrender of Keren and 
the 120,000-member garrison in Asmera, which brought the whole 
of Eritrea under its control except for Aseb, which fell the next day. 
The goal of independence from Ethiopia, for which Eritreans had 
fought for three decades, now seemed a virtual certainty. 

Against the background of these events, the London conference 
opened on May 27. The main contending parties were all in at- 
tendance: the government party headed by Tesfaye Dinka, the 
EPLF under Issaias Afwerki, the EPRDF under TPLF leader Meles 
Zenawi, and the OLF under its deputy secretary general, Lencho 
Letta. Assistant Secretary Cohen served as a mutually acceptable 
mediator. Ostensibly, the conference was supposed to explore ways 
to set up a transitional government in Addis Ababa, but its proceed- 
ings were soon overtaken by events on the ground. The talks had 
hardly gotten under way when Cohen received a message to the 
effect that Lieutenant General Tesfaye had lost control of the 
government's remaining armed units and that Addis Ababa was 
threatened with a complete breakdown of law and order. To pre- 
vent uncontrolled destruction and looting, Cohen recommended 
that EPRDF forces immediately move into Addis Ababa and es- 
tablish control. Tesfaye Dinka strenuously objected, but he spoke 
from a position of weakness and could not prevail; he subsequently 
withdrew from the conference. On the night of May 27-28, EPRDF 
forces marched into Addis Ababa and assumed control of the city 
and national government. 

The next day, Cohen again met with leaders of the EPLF, 
EPRDF, and OLF, but now as an adviser and not as a mediator. 
The insurgent leaders committed themselves to a pluralist demo- 
cratic society and government for Ethiopia and agreed that Eritreans 
would be free to determine their own future, including indepen- 
dence if they wished. They also agreed that the EPRDF should 
continue to exercise temporary control in Addis Ababa. The task 
of constructing a transitional government, however, was postponed 
until early July, when a national conference broadly representa- 
tive of all major political groups would convene in Addis Ababa 
to take up the matter. With these agreements in hand, the Lon- 
don conference adjourned, but not before Cohen stressed the need 
for fundamental reforms and conditioned future United States aid 
upon construction of a democratic political system. 



264 



Government and Politics 



By early June, the EPRDF claimed that it had established ef- 
fective control over most of the country, the last remaining govern- 
ment troops in Dire Dawa and Harer having surrendered along 
with some 300 officials and military officers of the former regime. 
The new rulers faced a number of daunting problems, among them 
famine and starvation affecting several million people, a severely 
dislocated economy and society, the prospect of Eritrean indepen- 
dence and with it the loss of direct access to the Red Sea, and the 
thorny and far from settled question of ethnicity. The explosive 
potential of these problems was immediately apparent when, only 
a day after having marched into Addis Ababa, EPRDF soldiers 
shot or wounded several demonstrators protesting the EPRDF 
takeover, agreements affecting Eritrea, and United States policies 
toward the country. Even so, there was much hope and optimism 
about the future among a war- weary population, as well as a pal- 
pable sense of relief that seventeen years of despised military rule 
had at last come to an end. 

* * * 

One of the first accounts of the Ethiopian revolution, and still 
a valuable book for understanding the earlier phases of the process, 
is Marina and David Ottaway's Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution. In 
recent years, there have been a number of outstanding scholarly 
works on the Ethiopian revolution. The best among these are 
Christopher S. Clapham's Transformation and Continuity in Revolu- 
tionary Ethiopia, a richly detailed institutional analysis of the revolu- 
tion; Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux's The Ethiopian Revolution, 
a scholarly Marxian interpretation of the first five years of the revo- 
lution; John W. Harbeson's The Ethiopian Transformation, a study 
of the revolution and its military foundations; Edmond J. Keller's 
Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic, a compre- 
hensive analysis of the underlying and precipitating causes of the 
revolution and its consequences; John Markakis's National and Class 
Conflict in the Horn of Africa, a critical, Marxian analysis of the re- 
gional political dimensions of the revolution; and Mulatu Wub- 
neh and Yohannis Abate 's Ethiopia: Transition and Development in 
the Horn of Africa, an overview of Ethiopian politics, economy, and 
society up to the late 1980s. There are few good inside accounts 
of the revolution, but two works stand out: Dawit Wolde Giorgis's 
Red Tears, an insightful account of the inner workings of the Men- 
gistu regime, written by a former member of the WPE Central 
Committee and head of the RRC; and David A. Korn's Ethiopia, 
the United States , and the Soviet Union, which describes the revolution 



265 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

as seen from the perspective of a United States diplomat living in 
Ethiopia. 

Useful accounts of the various liberation movements are scanty. 
Among the more notable recent works are Bereket Habte Selassie's 
Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, James Firebrace's Never 
Kneel Down, and Jordan Gebre-Medhin's Peasants and Nationalism 
in Eritrea. Each of these is best on the Eritrean struggle. The most 
comprehensive discussion of the TPLF can be found in Markakis's 
National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



266 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Lancers, adapted from an eighteenth- century religious manuscript. Tradi 
tional Ethiopian art depicts righteous warriors in full face, the enemy in profile 



For centuries, most Ethiopians understood that 

every able-bodied male might be called upon to perform military 
service. Despite the importance of a career as a warrior in Ethio- 
pian society, however, it was not until 1942 that the country pos- 
sessed truly national armed forces. To modernize the Ethiopian 
army, Emperor Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930-74) relied on for- 
eign military assistance and advisers. From 1942 to 1952, Britain 
was Ethiopia's major arms supplier as a result of its role in the 
liberation of Ethiopia. Between 1953 and 1976, the United States 
provided Ethiopia with most of its weapons and training. Starting 
in 1977, the Soviet Union was the country's closest military partner. 

In 1974 Haile Selassie's imperial regime collapsed. Eventually, 
a Marxist dictatorship took power in Ethiopia. Having assumed 
the roles of chief of state and commander in chief, Mengistu Haile 
Mariam consolidated his hold on the armed forces by eliminating 
both real and imagined political opponents. Despite the transfor- 
mation of the country's military establishment from an imperial 
force to an instrument of Marxist policy in the "vanguard of the 
revolution," the Mengistu regime continued to observe Ethiopian 
traditions concerning the preeminent role of the soldier in state and 
society. 

In mid- 1991 Ethiopia had the largest combined military and 
paramilitary force in sub-Saharan Africa (438,000 personnel) and, 
with 150 modern combat aircraft and about 1,300 tanks, certainly 
one of the best equipped. Although not an integral part of the 
defense establishment, the Mobile Emergency Police Force par- 
ticipated in counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the govern- 
ment had transformed armed civilian People's Protection Brigades 
from vigilante groups into local law enforcement units. 

Competing nationalisms that confront each other in the Horn 
of Africa have posed the most serious threat to Ethiopia's national 
security. Since 1961, the Ethiopian armed forces have been fight- 
ing secessionists in Eritrea and, since 1974, insurgents in Tigray. 
Ethiopia, aided by a large Cuban combat force and Soviet logisti- 
cal support, also fought a conventional war against Somalia over 
the Ogaden in 1977-78. 

After the Provisional Military Administrative Council seized power 
in 1974, Ethiopia relied almost exclusively on the Soviet Union and 
its allies to prosecute its various wars. By the late 1980s, however, 
Moscow was no longer willing to provide unlimited amounts of 



269 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

military assistance to Ethiopia. Instead, the Soviet Union urged 
the Mengistu regime to seek a negotiated settlement with Eritrean 
secessionists and Tigrayan rebels. Cuba, having played a vital role 
in Ethiopia's 1978 victory over Somalia in the Ogaden, had with- 
drawn all its military personnel from the country. Moreover, the 
dramatic events of 1989 in Eastern Europe had prompted the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania to cancel all military agreements with the Ethiopian 
government. As a result, Ethiopia was seeking alternative sources 
of military assistance from nations such as the Democratic Peo- 
ple's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel. This strategy, 
however, failed to enable the Mengistu regime to defeat the Eritrean 
secessionists and Tigrayan rebels or even to ensure the survival 
of the regime in the new decade. 

Military Tradition in National Life 

Wars, insurrections, and rebellions have punctuated Ethiopia's 
history. Kings and nobles raised and maintained armies to defend 
the "Christian island" against Muslim invasion or to conquer 
neighboring territories. Even after consolidation of centralized 
authority under "Solomonic" emperors in the thirteenth century, 
subordinate neguses (kings) and powerful nobles, some of whom later 
carried the high military title of ras (roughly, marshal; literally, 
head in Amharic), ruled different regions of the kingdom and com- 
manded their own armies as they struggled for power and posi- 
tion. According to a seventeenth-century European, only nature 
could temper the bellicosity of the Ethiopians, whom he described 
as "a warlike people and continually exercised in war" except dur- 
ing respites "caused by the winter, at which time by reason of in- 
undation of the rivers they are forced to be quiet." 

From the time of its establishment in the thirteenth century, the 
Christian kingdom of Ethiopia was fundamentally a warrior soci- 
ety. Both the Amhara and the Tigray, the two dominant peoples 
of the kingdom, were imbued with a military ethos that placed great 
value on achievement in battle and the spoils to be gained thereby. 
Military values influenced the political, economic, and social or- 
ganization of the Christian kingdom, while senior state officers often 
bore military titles. Additionally, military symbolism and themes 
occur frequently in Amhara and Tigray art, literature, and folk- 
lore of the period. Other ethnic groups, particularly the Oromo, 
also had warrior traditions and admired courage in combat, 
although the social systems that encouraged these values differed 
substantially from those of the Amhara and the Tigray. 



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Generally, soldiering has been the surest path to social advance- 
ment and economic reward in Ethiopia. Kings and nobles tradi- 
tionally awarded land, titles, and political appointments to those 
who proved their loyalty, competence, and courage on the battle- 
field. As a result, warriors traditionally gave allegiance to that com- 
mander who could assure the fruits of victory to his followers, rather 
than to an abstract notion of the state or to government authority. 

In early times, the army's command structure, like the nation's 
social structure, resembled a pyramid with the emperor at its apex 
as supreme military leader. In the field, a hierarchy of warlords 
led the army. Each was subordinate to a warlord of a higher rank 
and commanded others at a lower rank according to a system of 
vertical personal loyalties that bound them all to the emperor. At 
each command level, the military drew troops from three sources. 
Each warlord, from the emperor to a minor noble, had a standing 
corps of armed retainers that varied in size according to the lead- 
er's importance. Many landholders also served several months each 
year in the local lord's retinue in lieu of paying taxes. Most troops, 
however, came from the mass of able-bodied adult freemen, clergy 
alone excepted, who could be summoned by proclamation on an 
ad hoc basis when and where their service was required. 

Each man provided his own weapon and was expected to ac- 
quire skill in its use on his own initiative. He brought his own food 
for the march or foraged en route. Often a soldier brought his wife 
or a female servant to cook and tend mules. Indeed, the authori- 
ties recognized women as an integral part of the Ethiopian army 
insofar as many officers believed that their presence discouraged 
cowardice among the men. More important, women formed an 
unofficial quartermaster corps because men believed it was beneath 
their dignity to prepare food. 

In an environment in which war was the government's regular 
business, the mobile army camp became the capital of its leader, 
whether emperor, negus, or ras. Only rarely before the late nine- 
teenth century did a ruler maintain his court at a fixed location 
throughout the year. Constantly moving over his domain, a ruler 
took his court with him, issuing laws and decrees from the army 
camp, collecting and consuming taxes paid in kind, and supervis- 
ing trade. So integrated was military command with government 
that army officers also functioned in civil capacities. 

The organization of military camps remained virtually unchanged 
for centuries. In the royal camp, the emperor's tent, customarily 
pitched on an elevation, marked the center of the encampment. 
The tents of his immediate retinue surrounded the royal tent. The 
bodyguard was posted in front of the camp, thus indicating the 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

direction of march. The highest ranking subordinate in the royal 
army was the dejazmatch (general of the door), who was in charge 
of the center of the battle formation. The gannazmatch (general of 
the right wing) and the gerazmatch (general of the left wing) and 
their troops camped to the right and left, respectively. At the rear 
of the main encampment was the rear guard, whose commander 
usually was a trustworthy counselor and the leader's chief minister. 
Subordinate warlords and their troops camped around the em- 
peror's compound in small-scale replicas of the royal camp. The 
advance guard was a standard feature of this mobile army, and 
in times of war it might travel several days' march ahead of the 
main body. 

Although infantrymen made up the bulk of the army, cavalry 
participated in most military operations. The standard attack for- 
mation was a crescent- shaped mass of foot soldiers in which both 
wings advanced to outflank and envelop the enemy's defenses. Once 
engaged, the individual soldier was the army's basic fighting unit, 
and a final charge to bring the enemy to hand-to-hand combat 
usually decided a battle. Mutilating slain enemies and abandon- 
ing the wounded and dead on the batdefield were accepted practices. 

Leadership, especially among emperors and powerful nobles, was 
intensely personal, and commanders at all levels led their men in 
combat. Success or failure often depended on the leader's fate; upon 
his death, whole armies frequently scattered and fled. 

The army lived off the ruler's subjects wherever it camped in 
his domain. When troops exhausted food and firewood, they struck 
their tents and moved on. Often, soldiers turned to brigandage. 
During Emperor Menelik II' s reign (1889-1913), for example, 
many Ethiopians complained that soldiers "eat, drink, sleep, and 
grow fat at the expense of what the poor have." Popular feeling 
against the military was strong in newly conquered territories, where 
at least a portion of the army would settle as colonists. The grant- 
ing of tracts of conquered land to soldiers survived into the 1930s. 
Soldiers benefiting from this system became the landlords and the 
tax collectors in areas they had conquered. Not surprisingly, the 
army's demands on local populations often prompted rebellions. 

The titles of rank in the traditional military system indicated po- 
sition in society at large. Soldiers won promotions — and therefore 
enhancement of their social status — by demonstrating military abil- 
ity. Titles were not inherited, and distinctions had to be earned. 
Even those starting at the bottom of the social scale could attain 
wealth and position if they could draw attention to themselves by 
displays of loyalty, valor, and ruthlessness. The traditional system's 
strength and weakness lay in the fact that every warrior strove to 



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become great and as such saw himself the potential equal of the 
greatest warrior or noble. 

Modernization of the Ethiopian army started during the regency 
of Tafari Mekonnen (who took the throne name of Haile Selassie 
I when crowned emperor in 1930). In 1917 he formed the Imper- 
ial Bodyguard as a regular standing force, recruiting into it some 
Ethiopian veterans of the British campaign in German East Africa 
(present-day Tanzania). The regent also hired foreign officers to 
develop training programs (see Training, this ch.). In the 1920s, 
he sent Ethiopian officers to the French military academy at Saint- 
Cyr and arranged for a Belgian military mission to train the Imperial 
Bodyguard. In January 1935, with Swedish assistance, Ethiopia 
established a military school at Holeta to turn out officers quali- 
fied in modern techniques. The first class, which had been sched- 
uled to complete a sixteen-month course, never graduated because 
of mounting tensions with Ethiopia's nemesis, Italy, this time under 
the fascist leadership of Benito Mussolini. 

When Mussolini's forces crossed into Ethiopia from the Italian 
colony of Eritrea and from Italian Somaliland in 1935 without a 
declaration of war, provincial armies raised by the nobility moved 
and fought against the mechanized Italian forces in traditional 
fashion. Haile Selassie's mobilization order typified the Ethiopian 
way of waging war: everyone would be mobilized, and all males 
old enough to carry a spear would be sent to Addis Ababa. Mar- 
ried men would bring their wives to carry food and to cook. Those 
without wives would take any woman without a husband. Women 
with small babies were not required to go. Men who were blind 
or who could not carry a spear were exempted. 

At the time of the Italian invasion, the regular Ethiopian army 
had only a few units trained in European warfare and led by officers 
schooled in modern fighting. These included the Imperial Bodyguard 
and the Harer garrison. About 5,000 strong in combat against the 
Italians, many of these troops failed to implement tactics they had 
learned during training exercises. Most of the army that opposed 
the Italian invasion consisted of traditional warriors from the provin- 
cial militia, armed with spears and obsolete rifles and led by the 
provincial nobility. Even the 25,000-member regular army marched 
barefoot and lacked a logistical support system. By early 1936, the 
Italians — who used chemical weapons and air power with deadly 
accuracy — had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ethiopians. 

After the country's liberation by allied forces in 1941, Haile 
Selassie started to transform Ethiopia into a centralized monar- 
chical state. The creation of a strong national army was an impor- 
tant part of that transformation. The imperial regime abolished 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

the ancient military hierarchy and abandoned the traditional method 
of raising armies by provincial levies. In 1942 the emperor signed 
a military convention with London under which the British govern- 
ment agreed to provide a military mission to assist in organizing 
and training an army that would be capable of restoring order 
throughout the country. Under the terms of the convention, the 
British assumed responsibility for policing Addis Ababa and for 
exercising military control over the country's principal towns (see 
Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). 

Another aspect of Haile Selassie's transformation strategy was 
the creation of the Territorial Army, whose mission was to disarm 
the numerous guerrilla bands that were roaming the countryside 
after the war and engaging in banditry. The emperor authorized 
the recruitment of many shifta (bandits) into the Territorial Army, 
provided they brought their weapons with them. The Territorial 
Army was never anything more than a loosely organized auxiliary 
forces; when and where it existed, it served mostly to aid in local 
police work and not in national defense. 

In the immediate postwar period, the Ethiopian government ex- 
pended about 40 percent of its annual budget on defense and in- 
ternal security. Haile Selassie also diversified his sources of foreign 
military assistance. Over several years, he appointed Swedish 
officers to train Ethiopia's air force, asked Norwegian naval per- 
sonnel to organize and develop a small coastal navy, signed a mili- 
tary assistance agreement with the United States, invited Israeli 
advisers to train paratroopers and counterinsurgency units, and 
arranged for an Indian military mission to staff the faculty of the 
military academy at Harer. During this period, a number of Ethio- 
pian officers attended military schools in the United States, Brit- 
ain, and Yugoslavia (see Training, this ch.). 

After their modernization, Ethiopia's security forces saw action 
in several foreign conflicts. For example, upon the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950, Haile Selassie raised a volunteer bat- 
talion from the Imperial Bodyguard and authorized its deployment 
to Korea with the United Nations (UN) forces. The Kagnew Bat- 
talion, as the unit was known, reached Korea the next year and 
joined the United States Seventh Division. Before the 1953 cease- 
fire, three Ethiopian battalions, totaling 5,000 men, had rotated 
to Korea, where they fought with distinction. 

From 1960 to 1964, some 3,000 Imperial Bodyguard person- 
nel — about 10 percent of the Ethiopian army's entire strength at 
that time — and part of an air force squadron served with the UN 
peacekeeping force in the Congo (present-day Zaire). In 1967 four 
Ethiopian air force F-86 fighter-bombers were deployed to Zaire 



274 



Haile Selassie I inspects Ethiopian troops before their departure to 
join a United Nations peacekeeping force in the 
former Belgian Congo in 1960. 
Courtesy United Nations 

to help dislodge a concentration of European mercenaries fighting 
there on behalf of secessionists in Katanga Province (present-day 
Shaba Region). 

The reforms instituted by Haile Selassie, including the estab- 
lishment of a relatively large professional standing army, separated 
military and civilian functions in a way that was unique in the coun- 
try's history. By 1974 much of the population maintained an am- 
bivalent attitude toward the reorganized and modernized military 
establishment. On the one hand, civilians, many of whom were 
university students, often complained that the military drained the 
national budget and failed to help the country develop. On the other 
hand, many Ethiopians expressed pride in the armed forces' abil- 
ity to maintain the country's territorial integrity. Much of the 
civilian sector also believed that the military represented the best 
chance for change in Ethiopia. 

After the 1974 revolution, the Provisional Military Administra- 
tive Council (PMAC; also known as the Derg — see Glossary) desig- 
nated the armed forces as the "vanguard of the revolution" and 
apparently had expectations that military personnel would become 
involved in social and economic development programs. The drain 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

on manpower and materiel caused by the wars in Eritrea, Tigray, 
and the Ogaden prevented the realization of this objective. How- 
ever, military cadres became active in peasant associations, politi- 
cal organizing, drought relief, and other duties once assigned to 
the regular police. The army also undertook projects to improve 
the country's transportation infrastructure. 

Despite the repressiveness of the Mengistu regime, public demon- 
strations of discontent with the armed forces grew in frequency in 
the 1980s. The army's inability to achieve victory in Eritrea and 
Tigray disillusioned many who had supported the 1974 revolution, 
and the conflicts in north-central Ethiopia caused divisions within 
the military itself. On May 16, 1989, a group of senior officers 
attempted a coup against President Mengistu. The coup failed, but 
it was a key factor in the fall of the military government in late 
May 1991. 

The Armed Forces 

In mid- 1991 the Ethiopian armed forces, with about 438,000 
personnel in uniform, constituted one of the largest and best- 
equipped militaries in sub-Saharan Africa. The defense establish- 
ment included the 230,000-member conscript army, supplement- 
ed by the 200,000-member People's Militia; the air force, with a 
personnel strength of 4,500; and the navy, with a personnel strength 
of 3,500, which included a marine contingent. Not included in these 
figures were the 9,000-member Mobile Emergency Police Force 
and an unknown number of border guards. In addition to its duties 
as protector of the country's territorial integrity, the armed forces 
engaged in internal security and counterinsurgency operations 
against the government's political opponents. 

The 1987 Constitution and the Armed Forces 

The constitution, which took effect on February 22, 1987, made 
several explicit references to the history, missions, and organiza- 
tion of the armed forces. The preamble took note of Ethiopia's 
"great victory at Adwa over [Italy's] modern colonialist army" 
and recalled that "the army, being an integral part of the peo- 
ple . . . [laid] . . . the foundations of the new people's system by 
eliminating the monarchy and taking various revolutionary steps. ' ' 
Chapter 4 of the constitution was devoted to defense issues. It called 
for the government, through its defense force, to defend and safe- 
guard the revolution, and it reminded the people that these duties 
were their responsibilities. Accordingly, the constitution stated that 
the government would implement national service, and in a later 
chapter it stipulated that "national military service is the right and 



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National Security 



obligation of every Ethiopian. Its implementation shall be decided 
on by law." 

In terms of civilian control of the armed forces, the constitution 
stated that the highest body in the government, the National Shengo 
(National Assembly), was responsible for determining defense and 
security policy and for declaring states of war and peace. Subor- 
dinate to this body was the Council of State, charged with im- 
plementing decisions of the National Shengo. The president of the 
Council of State was also the president of Ethiopia and commander 
in chief of the armed forces. The Council of State was empowered 
to establish a national-level Defense Council (whose duties and 
responsibilities were not, however, spelled out). The president 
chaired the Defense Council and appointed its members. He also 
was entitled to "appoint senior state, civil, and military ranks." 

Command and Force Structure 

Political requirements largely determined the military's organiza- 
tional structure in the first years after the 1974 revolution. Begin- 
ning in 1977, the military adopted Soviet command procedures, 
which reflected Moscow's influence. It should be pointed out, 
however, that Mengistu made all major military decisions in his 
capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces. 

Military policy and all important decisions emanated from 
PMAC committees designated to deal with political and military 
affairs, defense, militia affairs, and security. The Council of 
Ministers, through the ministries of defense, interior, and public 
and national security, administered national security policy. The 
armed forces chain of command ran from the PMAC through the 
Ministry of Defense to the chiefs of staff of the army, air force, 
and navy and through the Ministry of Interior to the chief of the 
People's Militia. Service commanders, who operated from individ- 
ual headquarters without an intermediate chairman, reported di- 
rectly to Mengistu. Four regional commanders coordinated joint 
operations. 

In August 1977, the PMAC established the National Revolu- 
tionary Operations Command (NROC) in response to unrest in 
the armed forces, political resistance from leftist opponents of the 
regime, and the deteriorating situation in Eritrea and the Ogaden. 
The NROC replaced the revolution and development committees 
founded earlier in 1977 to mobilize militia units on a regional basis 
and to direct regional security operations against "reactionaries." 
Although the new command initially coordinated the recruiting, 
training, and equipping of the People's Militia, it eventually 
emerged as the central command structure and assumed sweeping 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

civilian and military powers. Headed by a twenty-eight-member 
council — consisting of representatives from the PMAC, the Council 
of Ministers, the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs 
(POMOA), and the official All-Ethiopia Trade Union, as well as 
the services' chiefs of staff — the NROC assumed command of the 
armed forces and responsibility for commandeering resources, pub- 
lic utilities, and manpower for the war effort. Mengistu served as 
its chairman. 

In December 1977, the PMAC also created the Supreme Mili- 
tary Strategic Committee (SMSC) to formulate counterinsurgency 
strategy for Eritrea and the Ogaden and to direct military opera- 
tions elsewhere in the country. Subsequently, the SMSC assumed 
responsibility for improving the armed forces' technical efficien- 
cy. The SMSC included eight Soviet, three Cuban, and seven 
Ethiopian representatives. 

In April 1983, the government established the National Defense 
and Security Council, which was empowered to devise the coun- 
try's military and civilian defense policies. This council included 
the head of state, the secretary general of the PMAC, and the 
ministers of defense, interior, and public and national security. The 
council's goal was to improve defense strategies and coordination 
among the army, the People's Militia, and the civilian population 
in times of war or natural disaster. 

Army 

Constituting about 97 percent of the uniformed services, the army 
was the backbone of the armed forces. In early 1991 , the army was 
organized into five revolutionary armies, which included thirty- 
one infantry divisions supported by thirty-two tank battalions, forty 
artillery battalions, twelve air defense battalions, and eight com- 
mando brigades. The army had expanded in size from 41,000 in 
1974 to 50,000 in 1977, 65,000 in 1979, and 230,000 in early 1991 . 
Ground order of battle was difficult to ascertain because of the ar- 
my 's rapid increase in size, frequent reorganization and redeploy- 
ment of units, and constant reshuffling within the command 
structure. Units from the 200,000-member People's Militia aug- 
mented army divisions, especially in Eritrea and Tigray. The First 
Revolutionary Army had headquarters in Harer, the Second 
Revolutionary Army in Asmera, the Third Revolutionary Army 
in Kembolcha, the Fourth Revolutionary Army in Nekemte, and 
the Fifth Revolutionary Army in Gonder. 

Ethiopian armored and mechanized units had approximately 
1,200 T-54/55 tanks and 100 T-62 tanks, all of Soviet manufac- 
ture, and about 1,100 armored personnel carriers (APCs), most 



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National Security 



of which were of Soviet origin. However, combat losses and con- 
stant resupply by the Soviet Union, East Germany, North Korea, 
and other communist nations reduced the reliability of these esti- 
mates. Artillery units possessed a variety of Soviet-manufactured 
light and medium guns and howitzers, rocket launchers, and heavy 
mortars. Air defense units had quick-firing antiaircraft guns and 
surface-to-air missiles. 

Because training in maintenance techniques had failed to keep 
pace with the influx of new equipment, weapons maintenance by 
the army was poor. Moreover, Ethiopian troops often deployed 
new weapons systems without understanding how to operate them. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ethiopia relied on Soviet 
and Cuban technicians to maintain military equipment and to pro- 
vide logistical support. However, because of the reduction in mili- 
tary assistance, spare parts, and Soviet military advisers, as well 
as the withdrawal of all Cuban troops in the late 1980s, the army's 
maintenance ability again deteriorated. By 1991 most army equip- 
ment was operational only about 30 percent of the time. 

Air Force 

Ethiopian military aviation dates from 1929, when Tafari Mekon- 
nen (before he came to the throne as Haile Selassie) hired two 
French pilots and purchased four French biplanes. By the time of 
the Italian invasion of 1935, the air force had four pilots and thir- 
teen aircraft. After World War II, Haile Selassie authorized the 
expansion of the air force. In 1947 he named a Swedish general 
as air force commander and contracted for a Swedish training team, 
equipped with eighteen Saab trainers and two squadrons of Saab- 17 
light bombers, to develop the air force. A Swedish officer com- 
manded the air force until 1962, at which time Brigadier General 
Asefa Ayene assumed command. 

The 1953 United States-Ethiopian Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement resulted in the delivery of a squadron of F-86 jet fight- 
ers in 1960. Beginning in 1966 and continuing until the early 1970s, 
the United States delivered Northrop F-5A/B/E fighters, which 
became the mainstays of the air force until the late 1970s. Begin- 
ning in 1977, the Soviet Union supplied aircraft and instructors 
to Ethiopia. 

In early 1991, some 4,500 officers and airmen operated approx- 
imately 150 combat aircraft, most of them Soviet-manufactured 
fighter-bombers. A small number of the aircraft were transports 
and armed helicopters. The air force's tactical organization included 
seven fighter-ground attack squadrons, one transport squadron, 
and one training squadron. Approximately seventy-nine helicopters 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

performed reconnaissance, transport, and ground support missions. 
Military analysts generally considered the air force competent. Dur- 
ing the Ogaden War, the air force quickly destroyed its Somali 
counterpart. By the late 1980s, the air force had become vital to 
the Mengistu regime's war effort in northern Ethiopia. According 
to an Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) spokesman in the 
United States, the air force was almost singlehandedly preventing 
the EPLF from expelling the army from Eritrea (see The Eritreans, 
this ch.). In fact, most rebel organizations in north-central Ethio- 
pia confined their activities to nighttime because of the daytime 
threat posed by the air force. 

Apart from its performance as a military unit, the air force often 
has been involved in antigovernment activities. In May 1989, for 
example, several senior air force officers participated in a coup at- 
tempt against Mengistu. The purge that followed this action deci- 
mated the service's leadership ranks. Mengistu not only replaced 
many senior officers but also temporarily grounded the air force. 
Within a few weeks, the combat victories of the rebels forced Men- 
gistu to rescind his grounding order. By 1991 it was evident that 
the air force was suffering from low morale and that internal divi- 
sions continued to plague its units. 

The air force's command headquarters was south of Addis Ababa 
at Debre Zeyit, the site of the major air base, training center, and 
maintenance workshop. Other air bases were at Asmera, Bahir Dar, 
Azezo, Goba, Dire Dawa, and Jijiga. (A base at Mekele had been 
captured by the Tigray People's Liberation Front in 1989.) 

Navy 

In 1958 the Ethiopian navy became an autonomous branch of 
the armed forces, operating as a coast guard within the territorial 
waters off Eritrea. Until 1974 a small contingent of retired British 
naval personnel served as advisers and training supervisors. In 1974 
Addis Ababa and Oslo signed an agreement whereby Norway or- 
ganized and trained a modest maritime force. Starting in 1978, 
Soviet advisers were attached to the Ethiopian navy. 

In early 1991, Ethiopia's 3,500-member navy remained modest 
and had seen little combat. Its inventory included two frigates, eight 
missile craft, six torpedo craft, six patrol boats, two amphibious 
craft, and two support/training craft. 

Ethiopia's principal naval bases were at Mitsiwa and Aseb. The 
base at Aseb included a ship-repair facility. In the past, the navy 
had cooperated with elements of the Soviet fleet operating in the 
Red Sea. Soviet naval vessels also made frequent calls at Ethiopian 
ports to resupply and refit. Moreover, the Soviet Union maintained 



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naval facilities in the Dahlak Islands off the coast of Eritrea. The 
Soviet Union had an anchorage and stationed a naval infantry 
detachment there; it reportedly also operated intelligence facilities 
there. After they were expelled from Somalia in 1977 for siding 
with Ethiopia, Soviet personnel moved a dry dock they had oper- 
ated at Berbera in Somalia to Aseb and later positioned it off the 
coast in the Dahlak Islands. At one time, they also had several 11-38 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Asmera, but by 1989 
these aircraft had been moved to Aden because the EPLF had de- 
stroyed one of the Soviet aircraft in a daring raid. 

People's Militia 

Proclamation No. 71, issued by the Derg in 1975, established 
the People's Militia to "safeguard the revolution." The govern- 
ment intended to raise a representative force on a regional basis 
to carry out police duties, to protect collectivized property and crops, 
and to enforce the decisions of peasant association tribunals. 
However, the militia remained largely a rural organization, despite 
the fact that Addis Ababa had directed urban dwellers' associa- 
tions (kebeles — see Glossary) and workers' associations to "elect" 
constituents to serve in the militia. 

In May 1976, the government conscripted 30,000 to 40,000 
peasants into the People's Militia from the predominantly Amhara 
areas of Shewa, Welo, and Gojam. After only two weeks of train- 
ing, Addis Ababa dispatched the militia, armed with World War 
II- vintage rifles, to Eritrea. There, the militia's mission was to repel 
the "invading Arab infidel." A month later, Eritrean guerrillas, 
carrying relatively modern arms, decimated this force by launch- 
ing a preemptive attack on the Zela Anbesa militia camp. In the 
spring of 1977, Mengistu reconstituted the People's Militia as the 
so-called Red Army and authorized its expansion. He armed the 
militia with modern weapons and ordered all conscripts to under- 
go a twelve-week basic training and weapons familiarization course 
at camps in Tatek, Shashemene, Awash, Fiche, and Azezo. The 
government then deployed People's Militia units to Eritrea and 
the Ogaden to serve with the regular army. This decision proved 
to be disastrous because, in fighting against Eritrean guerrillas in 
northern Ethiopia and against the Somali National Army in the 
Ogaden, the People's Militia suffered heavy casualties. On occa- 
sion, antigovernment elements in the militia experienced bloody 
confrontations with Ethiopian army regulars (see Morale and Dis- 
cipline, this ch.). In addition, captured militiamen often denounced 
the government's military strategy to foreign journalists. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

By 1980 the People's Militia numbered 150,000 troops organized 
into ten divisions. Those assigned to Eritrea were known as the 
Northern People's Divisions; those in the Ogaden were known as 
the Eastern People's Divisions. Militia units were usually equipped 
with AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and most 
units possessed mortars and antitank weapons. Cuban advisers 
provided infantry and artillery training. 

During the early and mid-1980s, the People's Militia declined 
in importance, largely because of increased pressure for equal pay 
and survivor benefits. The May 1983 enactment of the National 
Military Service Proclamation required all able-bodied Ethiopian 
men aged eighteen to thirty to undergo six months of military train- 
ing followed by two years of active duty. After their terms of ac- 
tive duty ended, these men would be placed on reserve status until 
age fifty. National military service negated the necessity for the 
large-scale militia call-ups that had been common in the late 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the government continued training militia recruits, 
especially from resettlement villages in frontier areas such as Asosa 
in Welega (see The Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4). 

By 1991 the People's Militia numbered about 200,000 but no 
longer had to contend with a serious threat in the Ogaden. How- 
ever, the deteriorating situation in Eritrea and Tigray required that 
militia units support the regular army's counterinsurgency opera- 
tions. At the end of 1989, Addis Ababa mobilized the militia to 
stop the advance of the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the 
Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement. These and several other 
groups had joined forces and became known as the Ethiopian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Democratic Front. 

Training 

Systematic military training in Ethiopia began in 1919 when, 
as regent, Tafari Mekonnen appointed a small group of Russian 
officers and some Ethiopians who had served in the British-led 
King's African Rifles to train Ethiopian troops. Some Ethiopian 
officers subsequently received instruction in France at the Saint- 
Cyr military academy. Between 1929 and 1935, a Belgian mili- 
tary mission trained the Imperial Bodyguard. In 1934 a Swedish 
delegation of five officers was invited to Ethiopia to open the Haile 
Selassie I Military Training Center at Holeta (also known as Genet 
Military School). Although this training helped Ethiopia field an 
army to resist the Italian invasion, the development of a modern 
army started only after liberation from Italian occupation in 1941, 
with British advisers primarily responsible for the training. Under 
a 1942 convention, Britain engaged in a ten-year military training 



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mission to Ethiopia. In 1946, however, Addis Ababa diluted Brit- 
ish influence somewhat by accepting a new team of Swedish mili- 
tary advisers. In 1953 a United States Military Assistance Advisory 
Group arrived in Ethiopia to train various branches of the Ethio- 
pian security forces. Four years later, an Indian military mission 
came to establish and manage the Haile Selassie I Military Academy 
at Harer. 

In 1991 there were five major military schools in Ethiopia, in- 
cluding the Harer Military Academy (formerly known as the Haile 
Selassie I Military Academy), the Holeta Military Training Center, 
the Air Force Training Center at Debre Zeyit, and the Naval Col- 
lege in Asmera. 

In October 1987, the Ethiopian government announced the open- 
ing of the Armed Forces Staff Academy near Addis Ababa. Accord- 
ing to an official statement, the academy's student body included 
senior officers (generals and colonels) from all branches of the armed 
forces. During the academy's year-long course, officers studied and 
conducted research on national defense issues. Initially, Soviet per- 
sonnel staffed the academy's faculty; however, Addis Ababa 
planned to replace them eventually with Ethiopian instructors. 

The Harer Military Academy provided a three-year academic 
and military course for officer cadets. Military instruction included 
tactics, political indoctrination, engineering, intelligence, and secu- 
rity. Academic courses included physical and social sciences, pub- 
lic administration, and foreign languages, such as Russian and 
English. Graduates received commissions as second lieutenants, 
and they were eligible to receive the equivalent of a bachelor's degree 
after completing one year of additional study at Addis Ababa 
University. The Holeta Military Training Center also conferred 
commissions as second lieutenants on students who had completed 
courses lasting from six to nine months that were devoted to mili- 
tary subjects. Holeta' s officer candidates normally were promis- 
ing noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or volunteers who lacked 
a secondary school education. 

Before 1974, Harer graduates belonged to a ''military aristoc- 
racy," which monopolized high-ranking army positions. By con- 
trast, Holeta graduates were reputed to be the products of an inferior 
education and were considered the "poor cousins" of the officer 
corps. Few of them ever rose higher than the middle ranks. But 
after the 1974 revolution, Holeta graduates began to establish their 
dominance over the army and expelled many Harer graduates, in- 
cluding those who had been members of various armed forces com- 
mittees at the beginning of the revolution. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Although the two officer training installations had maintained 
separate facilities and programs, they merged after 1974 and were 
subsequendy operated as branches of the Genet Military Academy. 
This training complex, initially staffed by Soviet and Cuban in- 
structors, also incorporated advanced infantry, armor, artillery, 
and communications schools for officers. 

The Air Force Training Center at Debre Zeyit offered cadets 
a four-year course of study and training. Officer candidates, all 
of whom were volunteers, underwent four months of basic mili- 
tary training and, upon entering the academy, signed a ten-year 
service contract. Separate curricula led to degrees in aeronautical 
engineering, electrical engineering, and administration. Graduates 
received commissions as second lieutenants. Those selected as pilots 
attended a flight training program at Dire Dawa. In 1984 Dornier, 
the West German aircraft manufacturer, provided pilot training 
at Debre Zeyit. Pilots and mechanics also received training in Brit- 
ain. The air force operated technical schools for enlisted person- 
nel at Debre Zeyit that trained aircraft maintenance and electronics 
technicians, communications operators, and weapons specialists. 
Upon entering these courses, which lasted eighteen months to two 
years, recruits committed themselves to remain on active duty for 
ten years. 

Students at the Naval College in Asmera pursued a fifty-two- 
month course of instruction that led to a naval science degree and 
a commission in the navy. The Naval College academic curricu- 
lum was broader than the army and air force programs and was 
supplemented by training at sea. In 1984 some forty-eight ensigns, 
belonging to the twenty-fourth graduating class, received diplo- 
mas; subsequent classes were of comparable size. Some naval 
officers received training abroad, notably at the naval academy in 
Leghorn, Italy, and at the Leningrad naval academy in the Soviet 
Union. The navy maintained training centers in the Mitsiwa area 
for seamen, technicians, and marines; recruits enlisted for seven 
years. 

Officers received specialized in-service instruction at training 
centers throughout the country. Most of these centers' staffs included 
Soviet, East German, and — until Havana's 1989 decision to with- 
draw its forces from Ethiopia — Cuban advisers. These advanced 
schools emphasized preparation for the supervision of technical per- 
sonnel responsible for maintaining Soviet-supplied weapons, com- 
munications equipment, and electronic gear. Senior officers attended 
a two-month command and leadership course, which, based on 
Marxist-Leninist principles, stressed the need to develop "political 
consciousness" in the ranks as well as the technical mastery of 



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weapons and equipment. There also was instruction in interna- 
tional relations and public speaking. 

Army recruits underwent twelve weeks of basic training before 
being assigned to line units or to technical schools for specialized 
training. The largest technical school was at Genet, where NCOs 
studied tactics, engineering, logistics, and communications. Genet 
also offered courses in technical and secondary-level academic sub- 
jects to a limited number of students prior to their assignment as 
NCOs to operational units. Soviet instructors at the Genet armory 
school taught six-month advanced courses in weapons and vehicle 
maintenance. The size of each class ranged from 100 to 150 stu- 
dents. Genet also was the training center for women's army corps 
recruits. The government assigned uniformed political commissars 
to all units for the political education of enlisted personnel. 

Morale and Discipline 

Before the February 1974 unrest that led to the ouster of the em- 
peror, military morale was thought to be high. Although the de- 
mands for redress of professional grievances that precipitated the 
1974 coup had created doubts about the level of military morale, 
the public's basic respect for the fighting man and the enduring 
belief that military life was an avenue of advancement helped sus- 
tain the military profession's somewhat diminished stature. Also, 
when the revolutionary government designated the armed forces 
as the "vanguard of the revolution," many officers consequently 
were able to assume senior military and political positions relatively 
early in their careers. In addition, the pay, benefits, and privileges 
enjoyed by Ethiopian service personnel gave them an above- average 
standard of living. Despite the political turmoil that accompanied 
the establishment of a revolutionary Marxist government, as well 
as the insecurity caused by purges within the military and the 
dangers of combat, military life still managed to attract enough 
volunteers to staff the uniformed services. 

However, the uncertainties caused by the events of 1974 and 
the subsequent turnover in command personnel caused a crisis of 
confidence that would last until the introduction of large numbers 
of Soviet and Cuban advisers in training and command positions 
in the late 1970s. Prolonged exposure to combat and political dis- 
affection contributed to desertion, attacks on officers, and war-zone 
atrocities. Incompetence among commanders in the field was also 
a problem. For instance, in 1975 the government tried and executed 
several officers for indiscipline and for a lack of military judgment 
resulting in the death of soldiers in battle. From 1976 to 1978, the 
command leadership crisis grew worse because of the army's rapid 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

expansion. As a result of this growth, junior officers and NCOs 
often advanced to field- grade rank without adequate preparation. 
Purges and defections by officers of Eritrean origin were also fac- 
tors in the poor quality of field leadership. Growing disaffection 
throughout the army prompted several mutinies by front-line troops, 
including one at Jijiga in 1977, during which officers and NCOs 
demanded Mengistu's resignation. Further, the disparity in pay 
and lack of survivor benefits embittered the People's Militia. 

Although the 1978 victory over Somalia in the Ogaden War and 
the Soviet Union's growing support of the Ethiopian armed forces 
enhanced morale, troops in war zones still questioned or criticized 
the government's national security policy. However, a correlation 
existed between the quality of a unit's training and equipment and 
the state of its morale. The best-trained and best-equipped units — 
the air force and the army engineers — also had the highest morale. 

During 1978 and 1979, the government reorganized units in 
Eritrea and the Ogaden in an effort to reduce dissatisfaction and 
prevent conspiracies. This strategy backfired because many sol- 
diers resented having to leave their original units. The threat of 
radical land reform that affected the holdings of military person- 
nel also caused bitterness. Additionally, combat units found it 
difficult to sustain high morale in a war of attrition in Eritrea that 
permitted few clear-cut victories. After the 1979 government defeat 
at Nakfa, troops in Asmera distributed antigovernment pamphlets. 
Western journalists also reported that large numbers of Ethiopian 
soldiers had switched sides, deserted, or surrendered, sometimes 
as units, without resistance to the Eritreans. Throughout this period, 
Ethiopian authorities refused to recognize the existence of the pris- 
oners of war, who numbered about 6,000, held by Eritrean seces- 
sionist forces. To make matters worse, Mengistu told combatants 
who faced capture by the enemy to "die [in battle] or kill your- 
selves." 

Tension between regular army and People's Militia units existed 
on all fighting fronts. One of the factors that led to the 1977 Jijiga 
mutiny concerned complaints that the government had issued better 
weapons, including AK-47 assault rifles, to militia units. For their 
part, militia personnel complained about low pay, inadequate med- 
ical attention, and inferior food. Furthermore, they charged that 
regulars often refused to give them supporting fire during com- 
bined operations. 

During the government's large-scale 1982 Red Star campaign 
in Eritrea, the EPLF victory further lowered the morale of govern- 
ment forces and prompted many Ethiopian army units to mutiny. 
For example, in late October 1982 the Ninth Brigade, which was 



286 



A patrol boat at the naval base at Mitsiwa 

serving on the Nakfa front, reported fighting between mutineers 
and loyal troops at Third Division headquarters. In February 1983, 
units stationed at Kudo Felasi, near Adi Ugri, also mutinied. There 
was also unrest among People's Militia conscripts. Throughout the 
1982 Red Star campaign, thousands of government troops fled to 
Sudan to avoid combat. 

Over the next few years, a series of battlefield reversals, cou- 
pled with the government's refusal to abandon its goal of military 
victory in Eritrea and Tigray, kept the armed forces demoralized. 
In October 1986, army officers held prisoner by the EPLF formed 
the Free Ethiopia Soldiers' Movement. Apart from distributing anti- 
Mengistu pamphlets in Ethiopia and abroad, the Free Ethiopia 
Soldiers' Movement sought "to organize men in uniform and pre- 
pare them for an overthrow of the government and a search for 
an alliance with all democratic forces." This organization also called 
for the creation of democracy in Ethiopia and a peaceful resolu- 
tion of the Eritrean problem. 

The next major mutiny occurred in mid-February 1988, when 
elements of the Second Revolutionary Army revolted in Asmera. 
Mengistu responded to this crisis by making a much-publicized 
sixteen-day tour of units stationed in the north and by ordering 
the arrest and execution of several NCOs and officers, including 
at least five generals. Morale fell further after the EPLF won a 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

victory at Afabet in March. By the end of that year, veterans and 
discontented soldiers, many of whom had war injuries, demon- 
strated in Addis Ababa to pressure the Mengistu regime to end 
the war and increase veterans' benefits. The government suppressed 
the demonstration, killing several men in the process. 

Continued battlefield setbacks in Eritrea and Tigray through- 
out early 1989 demoralized many senior officers who previously 
had been supporters of Mengistu 's military policy in northern Ethio- 
pia. On May 16, members of the armed forces staged a coup to 
oust Mengistu. With the exception of the minister of defense, Major 
General Haile Giorgis Habte Mariam, those directly implicated 
in the coup, or at least not hostile to the decision to oust Mengistu, 
included the entire army command structure from the chief of staff 
on down. The commanders of the air force and the first, second, 
third, and fourth revolutionary armies also supported the coup. 
After returning to Ethiopia, Mengistu, who had been in East Ger- 
many on an official visit, used his Presidential Guard and other 
loyal military personnel to reestablish his authority. Subsequently, 
he ordered the arrest or execution of hundreds of senior officers. 
Mengistu then named many of his political supporters, some of 
whom lacked any military experience, to replace those who had 
been purged. Although Mengistu succeeded in eliminating effec- 
tive opposition in the armed forces (at least for the short term), 
morale problems continued to plague most military units, espe- 
cially those assigned to war zones in northern Ethiopia, whose ranks 
were often filled with teenagers. In late 1989, for example, thou- 
sands of government soldiers deserted, and scores of units disin- 
tegrated after the TPLF launched a major offensive. 

Manpower Considerations 

Although volunteers made up a large part of the regular army, 
the government had to rely increasingly on conscripts to fill the 
lower ranks. In mid- 1991 approximately 6 million Ethiopian males 
aged eighteen to thirty- two were eligible for military service. This 
number constituted an adequate source of personnel for the coun- 
try's defense needs and in fact was more than the country could 
support logistically or train effectively. 

Under the National Military Service Proclamation of May 1983, 
all Ethiopians aged eighteen to thirty were required to undergo six 
months' military training followed by two years' active service and 
assignment to reserve status until age fifty. In reality, the national 
call-up, which was administered by regional military commissars, 
was selective rather than universal. According to the conscription 
law, each peasant association or kebele was required to forward lists 



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of eligible recruits to the Ministry of Internal Affairs military com- 
missariat. The ministry then would issue call-up orders, after which 
the peasant associations were required to ensure that conscripts 
reported for duty. 

The first two national call-ups occurred in May 1984 and Janu- 
ary 1985. Each raised about 60,000 recruits. The armed forces used 
the first group mainly for back-up duties and the second for duty 
in Eritrea. The EPLF captured many soldiers belonging to the sec- 
ond group around the Nakfa front. The third national call-up, which 
sought to recruit 120,000 men, took place in December 1985. Grow- 
ing public disaffection with the wars in northern Ethiopia manifested 
itself in popular resistance to the call-up. Many young men moved 
in with relatives outside the kebeles where they were registered. To 
prevent desertions, the government sent conscripts from Addis 
Ababa to training camps in outlying regions such as Kefa and 
Welega and transported Eritrean and Tigrayan recruits by air to 
Addis Ababa. 

After the November 1986 national call-up, which also prompted 
widespread opposition, the Mengistu regime increasingly had to 
resort to force to satisfy military manpower requirements. In 
mid- 1989, for example, armed press gangs often roamed the streets 
of Addis Ababa and other major cities looking for males as young 
as thirteen years old, or they held families at the local kebele office 
and then inducted their sons when family members went to the 
authorities to report their relatives missing. Parents who could af- 
ford to do so sent their sons abroad or to remote areas in Ethiopia 
where chances of escaping the call-up were greater. 

A number of debilitating conditions, such as dietary deficien- 
cies, endemic diseases, and illiteracy, often affected the quality of 
the available manpower. Despite these factors, the average soldier, 
with proper training and guidance, appeared capable of using 
modern equipment. 

The ratio of officers to enlisted personnel was approximately one 
to twenty. Officers generally were committed to active service until 
they retired or were released from duty because of incapacity. Re- 
tirement benefits were modest, but officers received many perqui- 
sites, particularly in housing and transportation. 

At the time of the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, a genera- 
tional cleavage existed between older, conservative field- grade 
officers and younger, better- trained, and increasingly radical officers 
who had joined the military in the 1950s and 1960s. Another fac- 
tor in these differences was the variety of countries in which Ethio- 
pian officers had been trained. By 1989 this problem had 
diminished, as an increasing number of officers had the shared 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

experience of being trained by Soviet, East German, or Cuban mili- 
tary advisers. However, opposition to Mengistu and the wars in 
northern Ethiopia continued to cause cleavages throughout the 
armed forces. 

The officer corps was composed largely of volunteers and included 
many who had risen from the enlisted ranks. Since the early 1950s, 
however, a significant proportion of officer candidates had been 
conscripted into military service for life (or until retired or physi- 
cally incapacitated) from the upper levels of secondary school grad- 
uating classes and from among the most promising first-year 
university students. Not all of those selected in this manner were 
suited for military life, and many resented not being allowed to 
pursue civilian careers. Prior to 1974, an estimated 10 percent of 
all Ethiopians educated beyond secondary school level were mem- 
bers of the armed forces. 

The officers who were among the Derg's original members came 
largely from the junior-grade ranks. Although many subsequently 
received promotions to mid-level grades, rank alone did not neces- 
sarily indicate an officer's importance. Many lieutenants and cap- 
tains, for example, received assignments to important government 
posts. Mengistu himself became a lieutenant colonel only in 1976. 
In early 1977, be became chairman of the Derg. Starting with Revo- 
lution Day 1979, however, he was referred to as "commander in 
chief. ' ' When he appeared in uniform as commander in chief, he 
wore shoulder insignia identical to those worn by field marshals 
of the old imperial army. 

Up-to-date official information on the ethnic composition of the 
officer corps was not available in mid- 1991. However, in the early 
1970s about 65 percent of officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel 
and above were Amhara, whereas 20 percent were Oromo, the latter 
proportion having nearly doubled during the previous decade. 
Below lieutenant colonel, the percentage who were Amhara was 
60 percent, while 30 percent were Oromo. Estimates published in 
the late 1970s suggested that 50 percent of the officer corps was 
Amhara, 20 percent Tigray, and 30 percent Oromo and Eritrean 
(see Ethiopia's Peoples, ch. 2). 

Many enlisted personnel had joined the military because it offered 
steady, well-paid employment, service-connected benefits, and the 
opportunity for advancement. Others enlisted because they could 
not find suitable work in the cities. Basic pay for the lowest-ranking 
personnel in the armed forces equaled that of an experienced skilled 
worker in industry. In the late 1970s, the ethnic composition of 
the enlisted ranks in the army was about 33 percent Amhara, 33 
percent Oromo, and 25 percent Tigray, with the remainder coming 



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from other groups. The proportion of Eritreans serving in the air 
force and navy was greater than in the army, the result of better 
access to higher education, which made Eritreans more suited for 
technical training. 

Defense Costs 

During World War II, when major military expansion programs 
began, the government devoted approximately 38 percent of the 
national budget to defense. From 1948 to 1958, the proportion of 
the budget dedicated to defense dropped from 27 to 17 percent of 
the total, not because of a decrease in military expenditures but 
because the size of the overall national budget had increased sharply. 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, money for defense remained 
the largest single item in the budget, varying from 19 to 24 per- 
cent of the total funds appropriated for all national programs. 

Beginning in the mid-1970s, defense expenditures started to rise. 
In 1974 Addis Ababa allocated the equivalent of US$80 million 
for defense, in 1976 US$103 million, and in 1979, US$526 mil- 
lion. By 1987-88 defense expenditures had declined to approxi- 
mately US$472 million; however, it should be pointed out that 
between 1977 and 1990, the Soviet Union had provided approxi- 
mately US$13 billion in military assistance to the Mengistu regime. 

Foreign Military Assistance 

The use of foreign military advisers has a long history in Ethio- 
pia, going back to the arrival of a Portuguese military expedition 
in the 1530s. French, Russian, Belgian, and Swedish advisers all 
contributed to efforts before World War II to build a modern army 
(see Training, this ch.). Following the war, Britain, Sweden, Nor- 
way, Israel, and the United States assumed responsibility for train- 
ing and equipping the Ethiopian armed forces. 

After the 1977-78 Ogaden War, the Soviet Union became Ethio- 
pia's major military supplier. Addis Ababa also received military 
assistance from a number of other communist nations, including 
Cuba, East Germany, and North Korea. In addition, by late 1989 
Israel had resumed its military relationship with Ethiopia, which 
the imperial government had broken off at the time of the Arab- 
Israeli October 1973 War. 

United States 

On May 22, 1953, the United States and Ethiopia concluded 
an agreement that gave the United States a twenty-five-year lease 
on the Kagnew communications station in Asmera. At the time, 
Kagnew was one of the largest radio relay and communications 



291 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

monitoring stations in the world. The United States later devel- 
oped its facilities, which were manned by 4,000 American mili- 
tary personnel, to monitor Soviet radio communications throughout 
the region. The two countries also signed a Mutual Defense Assis- 
tance Agreement, whereby the United States pledged to provide 
US$5 million to equip and train three 6,000-member Ethiopian 
divisions. A United States Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) was sent to Ethiopia to administer this program. By 
March 31, 1954, the United States had delivered US$3.8 million 
worth of small arms, vehicles, and artillery to Ethiopia. In October 
1954, Washington granted another US$5 million in aid to Ethio- 
pia; and in November 1955, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 
agreed that Addis Ababa needed a minimum of US$5 million a 
year in military assistance supplemented by the direct sale of air 
force and naval equipment. Despite these increases, the Ethiopian 
government complained that this military aid was insufficient to 
satisfy its defense needs. In early 1956, Addis Ababa therefore ap- 
pealed to Washington for "a combination of grants and long-term 
military credits to support the country's defense needs," which in- 
cluded the suppression of Eritrean dissenters. In October 1956, 
the United States National Security Council responded to this re- 
quest by issuing a report that included a recommendation that 
United States assistance to Ethiopia be increased. 

After 1960 — a year in which Washington promised to provide 
support for a 40,000-member Ethiopian army — United States mili- 
tary aid to Ethiopia gradually increased. In the 1960s, at the peak 
of United States involvement, more than 300 American personnel 
were serving in the MAAG. In addition, nearly 23,000 Ethiopian 
service personnel, including at least twenty who subsequently be- 
came members of the Derg, received advanced training directly 
from United States personnel. About 4,000 of these troops were 
trained at facilities in the United States, Mengistu Haile Mariam 
among them. By 1974 Ethiopia's armed forces had become totally 
dependent on the United States for military hardware and spare 
parts. 

United States assistance initially continued without interruption 
after the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974, although it was ac- 
companied by proposals for a negotiated settlement in Eritrea. After 
the execution of a large number of high-ranking officals of the im- 
perial regime in November 1974, the United States postponed the 
signing of a pending aid agreement, but shipments of aircraft and 
tanks doubled the dollar value of military assistance in 1975. Cit- 
ing the "arms imbalance in the region" resulting from Soviet aid 
to Somalia, Washington proposed to update Ethiopia's arms 



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inventory over a three-year period by turning over US$200 mil- 
lion worth of surplus materiel originally designated for the Republic 
of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The United States also authorized 
the transfer of an F-5 fighter aircraft squadron from Iran to Ethio- 
pia. Total United States arms sales to Ethiopia in 1974 and 1975 
amounted to US$35 million. 

During 1976, tensions developed between Washington and Ad- 
dis Ababa over the ongoing Military Assistance Program. The Derg 
rejected a new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit agreement be- 
cause Washington had imposed a higher interest rate. The Ethio- 
pian government also complained about delays in arms delivery 
schedules in the face of growing Soviet military assistance to Soma- 
lia. Meanwhile, the United States refused to approve a US$60 mil- 
lion program to replace equipment lost in Eritrea. Despite the 
growing rift, a United States Department of State official testify- 
ing before a congressional committee characterized the Ethiopian 
government as "not systematically or intrinsically anti-U.S." 

The first significant shift in relations between the two countries 
came in December 1976, when a Derg delegation headed by Men- 
gistu visited Moscow and concluded an arms agreement with the 
Soviet Union valued at US$385 million that was designed to end 
Washington's virtual monopoly on arms supplies to Ethiopia. Then, 
in testimony before a congressional committee in February 1977, 
United States secretary of state Cyrus Vance recommended a ces- 
sation of grant military assistance to Ethiopia because of Addis 
Ababa's human rights violations. (Grant military assistance 
represented only a small portion of the Military Assistance Pro- 
gram, which totaled US$26 million in United States fiscal year 1976 
and was scheduled to total US$62 million in United States fiscal 
year 1977. These figures contrasted with an annual average of 
US$10 million in military assistance to the imperial regime.) The 
United States also informed the Derg in February that it intended 
to reduce the size of the United States military mission and to close 
the Kagnew communications station, where activities already were 
being phased out, by the end of September 1977. 

As a result of these actions, the Ethiopian government, believ- 
ing that all United States military assistance eventually would be 
eliminated, responded in April 1977 by closing United States mili- 
tary installations and giving MAAG personnel a week's notice to 
leave the country. A large store of equipment remained behind in 
the rapid American departure. Ethiopia then abrogated the 1953 
United States-Ethiopian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and 
terminated the lease on Kagnew station. In the absence of a bilateral 
agreement, the United States had no legal basis for the delivery 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

of aircraft, armored vehicles, ships, and a number of air-to- surface 
and air-to-air missiles that had been approved for delivery and on 
which the Derg had made partial down payment. Thus was ter- 
minated the military relationship between Washington and Addis 
Ababa. 

Soviet Union 

In 1976, after receiving Moscow's assurance of military as- 
sistance, Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate, vice chairman of the 
Derg, announced that Ethiopia would restrict its future purchases 
to "socialist countries." By the time Somali forces captured Jijiga 
in September 1977, Moscow already had decided to supply mili- 
tary assistance to the Mengistu regime. 

Within three months of this decision, the Soviet Union had in- 
itiated a massive arms transfer program. Approximately fifty Soviet 
ships had passed through the Suez Canal on the way to the port 
of Aseb to unload crated fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, and 
munitions — an estimated 60,000 tons of hardware — for delivery 
to the Ogaden front. Moscow shipped additional equipment from 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). At 
the height of the buildup, between November 1977 and February 
1978, Soviet transport aircraft, including giant An-22s, landed at 
twenty-five-minute intervals at Ethiopian airports. An estimated 
225 transports — about 15 percent of the Soviet air fleet — partici- 
pated in the operation. 

The 1977-78 Soviet supply operation impressed Western observ- 
ers, who admitted that the display of Soviet transport capability 
had added a "new strategic element" to the East- West balance. 
The Soviet Union drew on large stockpiles of equipment created 
by high production levels. Soviet aid — which included eighty air- 
craft, 600 tanks, and 300 APCs — had an estimated value of US$1 
billion, surpassing in a matter of months the total value of United 
States aid provided to Ethiopia between 1953 and 1977. One-fourth 
of the Soviet assistance was a gift; reportedly, the Libyan govern- 
ment financed a small portion. 

In November 1978, a few months after the end of the Ogaden 
War, Addis Ababa and Moscow signed a twenty-year Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation. Among other things, the treaty called 
for close military cooperation. With the promise of future arms 
deliveries, the Mengistu regime continued to pursue military vic- 
tory against Eritrean and Tigrayan separatists in northern Ethio- 
pia. In July 1979, for example, the Soviet Union underwrote 
Ethiopia's fifth offensive against Eritrea by shipping military hard- 
ware to Ethiopian army garrisons at Mersa Teklay and Asmera. 



294 



A United States airman trains an Ethiopian 
air force technician in meteorology, 1967. 

Courtesy United States Air Force 

Moreover, Soviet officers reportedly commanded Ethiopian field 
units. However, like the four earlier ones between 1974 and 1978, 
this offensive failed to bring rebel areas under government control. 

By mid- 1980 Ethiopia's military and economic debt to the Soviet 
Union had grown dramatically. The total value to be repaid was 
US$1 .7 billion, to be spread over ten years beginning in 1984, with 
2 percent interest to be paid concurrently on the principal. In addi- 
tion, Ethiopia agreed to repay a US$300 million commercial debt 
to the Soviet Union for items such as trucks and cranes. Addis 
Ababa met these obligations by sending coffee to the Soviet Union 
and by making foreign-exchange payments from export earnings 
elsewhere. 

Throughout the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union's military com- 
mitment to Ethiopia continued to grow, despite Moscow's pur- 
ported encouragement of a political settlement of the Eritrean 
problem. In 1982, for example, Moscow provided about US$2 bil- 
lion worth of weapons to support Ethiopia's various Red Star cam- 
paigns in Eritrea. The Red Star campaigns were planned jointly 
by Soviet military advisers and their Ethiopian counterparts. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Although the 1982 campaign failed to produce a military victory 
in Eritrea, the Soviet Union remained committed to the Mengistu 
regime. By 1984 Moscow had provided more than US$4 billion 
in military assistance to Ethiopia, with arms deliveries in 1984 
(worth approximately US$1.2 billion) at their highest level since 
the Ogaden War. The number of Soviet and East European mili- 
tary advisers in Ethiopia also grew from about 1,900 in 1981 to 
approximately 2,600 in 1984. Additionally, by 1984 more than 
1,600 Ethiopian military personnel had received training in the 
Soviet Union. 

After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, Soviet 
policy toward Ethiopia underwent a fundamental change. The value 
of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union and its East European 
allies declined to US$774 million in 1985 and to US$292 million 
in 1986. The number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia also 
declined, to about 1,400 in 1988, although it returned to normal 
levels of approximately 1,700 in 1989. 

More important, Gorbachev told Mengistu during a July 26, 
1988, meeting in Moscow that the Soviet Union was unwilling to 
increase military assistance to Ethiopia. Instead, the Soviet leader 
encouraged a "just solution" to the disputes in northern Ethio- 
pia. In subsequent meetings between Soviet and Ethiopian offi- 
cials, Moscow refused Addis Ababa's request to reschedule its debt 
and declined to indicate whether it would conclude another arms 
agreement after the one in force in 1989 expired in 1991. 

As further evidence of the Soviet Union's interest in a negotiated 
settlement of the Eritrean issue, in early July 1989 Yuri Yukalov, 
director of the African department at the Soviet Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs, met with Issaias Afwerki, secretary general of the 
EPLF, to discuss Ethiopia's future. Additionally, the Soviet Union 
expressed support for the peace talks taking place in 1989 between 
the Ethiopian government and the EPLF and TPLF. 

Throughout 1990 Moscow continued to reduce its military com- 
mitment to Addis Ababa. In March 1990, for example, the Soviet 
Union announced the withdrawal of its military advisers from all 
combat zones. Despite Ethiopia's growing need for helicopters and 
other counterinsurgency equipment, Moscow refused to conclude 
any new weapons contracts with the Mengistu regime. It should 
be pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union honored all com- 
mitments set forth in the military assistance agreement, which was 
to expire at the beginning of 1991. 

Cuba 

Cuba's involvement with Ethiopia paralleled that of the Soviet 
Union. Prior to the outbreak of the Ogaden War, Havana, like 



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Moscow, had been an ally of Somalia. After a series of Somali 
armed incursions into the Ogaden ruptured already tense relations 
between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, Cuban president Fidel Cas- 
tro Ruz visited the Horn of Africa and urged the two countries 
to join in forming a regional federation that also would include 
South Yemen, an "autonomous" Ogaden, an "autonomous" 
Eritrea, and Djibouti. After the failure of this initiative, Cuba began 
moving closer to Ethiopia, abandoning its ties with Somalia in the 
process. 

In November 1977, two months after Somali forces had captured 
Jijiga, Cuban military advisers started to arrive in Ethiopia. By 
the end of the month, the Soviet Union had also begun a six- week 
airlift, later supplemented by a sealift, of Cuban troops. From the 
end of November 1977 to February 1978, Havana deployed ap- 
proximately 17,000 troops to Ethiopia, including three combat 
brigades. Some of these troops had previously been stationed in 
Angola. 

The Cuban presence was crucial to Ethiopia's victory over Soma- 
lia. During the Derg's early 1978 counteroffensive in the Ogaden, 
Cuban troops fought alongside their Ethiopian counterparts. With 
Cuban support, Ethiopian units quickly scored several impres- 
sive victories. As a result, on March 9, 1978, Somali president 
Mahammad Siad Barre announced that his army was withdraw- 
ing from the Ogaden. 

After the Ethiopian victory in the Ogaden, attention shifted to 
Eritrea. By early 1978, the EPLF had succeeded in gaining con- 
trol of almost all of Eritrea except the city of Asmera and the ports 
of Mitsiwa and Aseb. After redeploying its forces from the Ogaden 
to northern Ethiopia, Addis Ababa launched a counteroffensive 
against the EPLF during late 1978. 

Although there is some disagreement, most military observers 
believe that Cuba refused to participate in the operation in Eritrea 
because Castro considered the Eritrean conflict an internal war 
rather than a case of external aggression. However, the continued 
presence of Cuban troops in the Ogaden enabled the Mengistu re- 
gime to redeploy many of its troops to northern Ethiopia. 

A large Cuban contingent, believed to number about 12,000, 
remained in Ethiopia after the Ogaden War. However, by mid- 1984 
Havana had reduced its troop strength in Ethiopia to approximately 
3,000. In 1988 a Cuban brigade, equipped with tanks and APCs, 
was stationed in Dire Dawa to guard the road and railroad between 
Ethiopia and Djibouti, following attacks by Somali- supported rebels. 
A mobile battalion of various military advisers and an unknown 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

number of Cuban instructors who were on the Harer Military 
Academy faculty also remained in Ethiopia. 

After Ethiopia and Somalia signed an April 1 988 joint commu- 
nique intended to reduce tensions, Cuba decided to end its military 
presence in Ethiopia. The last Cuban troops left on September 17, 
1989, thus terminating twelve years of military cooperation. 

East Germany 

Of all the East European nations that provided military assistance 
to Ethiopia, none played a more vital role than East Germany. 
Its importance to Addis Ababa derived not so much from its con- 
ventional military support, which at times was crucial to Ethio- 
pian security, as from its involvement in Ethiopia's intelligence and 
security services. 

East Germany's military relationship with the Mengistu regime 
started in 1977, when Socialist Unity Party of Germany leader 
Werner Lamberz visited Ethiopia three times (February, June, and 
December) to coordinate and direct the operations of the approxi- 
mately 2,000 South Yemeni soldiers who were fighting against 
Somali forces in the Ogaden. East Germany also provided sup- 
port to Soviet and Cuban pilots who flew helicopters and fighter- 
bombers on combat missions during the Ogaden War. Moreover, 
East Germany agreed to give ideological training to hundreds of 
Ethiopian officers. Even after the end of the Ogaden War, East 
Germany remained militarily active in Ethiopia. During the 1978 
Ethiopian offensive against the EPLF, East German engineers, 
working in conjunction with their Soviet counterparts, reportedly 
built flanking roads, enabling Ethiopian tanks to come up behind 
EPLF lines. In addition, East German military advisers manned 
artillery and rocket units in Eritrea. Interestingly, in 1978 East Ger- 
many also sponsored unsuccessful peace talks between Ethiopia and 
the EPLF. When these discussions failed, the East German govern- 
ment abandoned diplomacy in favor of a military solution to the 
problem of Eritrean and Tigrayan separatism. 

In May 1979, East Germany and Ethiopia signed an agreement 
formalizing military relations between the two countries. Then, 
on November 15, 1979, East German head of state Erich Honecker 
visited Ethiopia and signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation. In addition to calling for greater cooperation in poli- 
tics, economics, trade, science, culture, and technology, the 1979 
treaty also laid the groundwork for increased military assistance. 

For most of the 1980s, East Germany, through its National Peo- 
ple's Army and its State Security Service, provided Ethiopia with 
diverse forms of military and intelligence assistance. Apart from 



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military aid, such as automatic rifles, ammunition, artillery, and 
heavy vehicles, East Germany provided up to five months' train- 
ing in military and police tactics to members of the People's Pro- 
tection Brigades, which concentrated on routine police duties at 
the local level (see People's Protection Brigades, this ch.). In 1982 
East German intelligence advisers participated in that year's Red 
Star campaign against Eritrean separatists. East German person- 
nel often assumed control of Ethiopian army communications sites 
as, for instance, they did in mid- 1988 in Asmera. In addition, East 
German security advisers reportedly acted as Mengistu's personal 
bodyguard. 

Even after the Soviet Union altered its policy toward Ethiopia 
in the late 1980s, East Germany remained Mengistu's staunch ally. 
In mid- 1989, for example, Honecker promised Mengistu fifty to 
sixty T-54/55 tanks that had been scheduled to be scrapped in a 
force reduction. However, after Honecker' s resignation and the 
emergence of a more broadly based government in late 1989, East 
German officials informed Addis Ababa that the military relation- 
ship between the two countries had been terminated and that all 
future arms deliveries had been canceled. In 1990 the 550 East Ger- 
man advisers and technicians stationed in Ethiopia were withdrawn. 
The end of the alliance between Ethiopia and East Germany fur- 
ther isolated the Mengistu regime and reduced the Ethiopian army's 
ability to achieve a military solution in Eritrea and Tigray. 

North Korea 

Given the change in Soviet policy toward Ethiopia, Addis 
Ababa's relations with North Korea took on added importance as 
the 1990s began. There was little information on the nature and 
scope of North Korean military assistance to Ethiopia, but most 
Western military observers agreed that it would be impossible for 
North Korea to duplicate the quantity and quality of weapons that 
the Soviet Union had been providing to the Mengistu regime. 
Nonetheless, beginning in 1985 P'yongyang deployed hundreds 
of military advisers to Ethiopia and provided an array of small arms, 
ammunition, and other materiel to the Mengistu regime. 

In November 1985, North Korea provided Ethiopia a 6 million 
birr (for value of the birr — see Glossary) interest-free loan to be 
used to purchase equipment with which to construct a shipyard 
on Haleb Island, off Aseb. Planners expected the shipyard to 
produce wooden-hulled and steel-hulled craft ranging in size from 
5,000 to 150,000 tons displacement. (As of 1991, the shipyard had 
not been completed.) North Korea also had paid for the training 
of a 20,000-man special operations force at the Tatek military camp. 



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Israel 

Israel has been one of Ethiopia's most reliable suppliers of mili- 
tary assistance, largely because Tel Aviv believed that if it sup- 
ported Ethiopia, hostile Arab nations would be unable to exert 
control over the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb, which forms 
its southern outlet. During the imperial era, Israeli advisers trained 
paratroops and counterinsurgency units belonging to the Fifth Di- 
vision (also called the Nebelbal — or Flame — Division). In the early 
1960s, Israel started helping the Ethiopian government in its cam- 
paigns against the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 

Even after Ethiopia broke diplomatic relations with Israel at the 
time of the October 1973 War, Israel quietly continued to supply 
military aid to Ethiopia. This assistance continued after Mengistu 
came to power in 1974 and included spare parts and ammunition 
for United States-made weapons and service for United States-made 
F-5 jet fighters. Israel also maintained a small group of military 
advisers in Addis Ababa. 

In 1978, however, when former Israeli minister of foreign af- 
fairs Moshe Dayan admitted that Israel had been providing secu- 
rity assistance to Ethiopia, Mengistu expelled all Israelis so that 
he might preserve his relationship with radical Arab countries such 
as Libya and South Yemen. Nonetheless, although Addis Ababa 
claimed it had terminated its military relationship with Israel, mili- 
tary cooperation continued. In 1983, for example, Israel provided 
communications training, and in 1984 Israeli advisers trained the 
Presidential Guard and Israeli technical personnel served with the 
police. Some Western observers believed that Israel provided mili- 
tary assistance to Ethiopia in exchange for Mengistu 's tacit cooper- 
ation during Operation Moses in 1984, in which 10,000 Beta Israel 
(Ethiopian Jews; also called Falasha) were evacuated to Israel (see 
Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, and Language, ch. 2). In 1985 Tel Aviv 
reportedly sold Addis Ababa at least US$20 million in Soviet-made 
munitions and spare parts captured from Palestinians in Lebanon. 
According to the EPLF, the Mengistu regime received US$83 mil- 
lion worth of Israeli military aid in 1987, and Israel deployed some 
300 military advisers to Ethiopia. Additionally, the EPLF claimed 
that thirty-eight Ethiopian pilots had gone to Israel for training. 

In late 1989, Israel reportedly finalized a secret agreement to 
provide increased military assistance to Addis Ababa in exchange 
for Mengistu 's promise to allow Ethiopia's remaining Beta Israel 
to emigrate to Israel. In addition, the two nations agreed to re- 
store diplomatic relations (Israel opened an embassy in Addis Ababa 



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on December 17, 1989) and to increase intelligence cooperation. 
Mengistu apparently believed that Israel — unlike the Soviet Union, 
whose military advisers emphasized conventional tactics — could 
provide the training and materiel needed to transform the Ethio- 
pian army into a counterinsurgency force capable of defeating 
Eritrean and Tigrayan separatists. 

During 1990 Israeli-Ethiopian relations continued to prosper. 
According to a New York Times report, Tel Aviv furnished an array 
of military assistance to Addis Ababa, including 150,000 rifles, 
cluster bombs, ten to twenty military advisers to train Mengistu 's 
Presidential Guard, and an unknown number of instructors to work 
with Ethiopian commando units. Unconfirmed reports also sug- 
gested that Israel had provided the Ethiopian air force with sur- 
veillance cameras and had agreed to train Ethiopian pilots. 

In return for this aid, Ethiopia permitted the emigration of the 
Beta Israel. Departures in the spring reached about 500 people a 
month before Ethiopian officials adopted new emigration proce- 
dures that reduced the figure by more than two-thirds. The fol- 
lowing year, Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa negotiated another 
agreement whereby Israel provided agricultural, economic, and 
health assistance. Also, in May 1991, as the Mengistu regime neared 
its end, Israel paid US$35 million in cash for permission to fly nearly 
15,000 Beta Israel from Ethiopia to Israel. 

External and Internal Opponents 

After the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, the Mengistu regime 
confronted several internal rebellions and one major external oppo- 
nent. These internal rebellions consisted of threats posed by Eritrean 
secessionists, Tigrayan rebels, and other, less active guerrilla move- 
ments in the center and south of the country. Whatever the politi- 
cal orientation or ethnic composition of these insurgent groups, the 
Ethiopian government characterized them variously as "traitors," 
"counterrevolutionaries," "feudalists," "shifta" (bandits), or "paid 
agents of the CIA." By 1991 the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) had 
emerged as the strongest guerrilla groups opposed to the government. 

Since the end of World War II, Somalia has posed the only seri- 
ous external threat to Ethiopia. In the late 1980s, however, the na- 
ture of this threat changed, perhaps permanently, as the Somali 
government became more involved with maintaining its internal 
security and less capable of recreating a "Greater Somalia." 

The Eritreans 

A variety of Eritrean secessionist groups have used convention- 
al means and guerrilla tactics to defy the forces of both the imperial 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

and the revolutionary governments (see The Eritrean Movement, 
ch. 4). The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a nationalist organi- 
zation committed to self-rule for Eritrea, commenced a small-scale 
insurgency in 1961 against imperial security forces. Throughout 
the 1960s, the level of hostilities accelerated steadily, leading to the 
1971 imposition of martial law. Ethiopian army personnel deployed 
to Eritrea during this period numbered about 20,000, roughly half 
the force's total, but much of the burden of counterinsurgency oper- 
ations fell on the paramilitary mobile police. 

Ideological and ethnic differences split the ELF in 1970 and re- 
sulted in the formation of the Marxist-oriented Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF). From 1972 to 1974, a civil war ensued 
between the two groups. Eventually, the EPLF, which advocated 
"revolution before unity," emerged victorious. Many ELF mem- 
bers, and sometimes entire units, then fled into eastern Sudan, fur- 
ther weakening the organization in Eritrea. After establishing its 
dominance, the EPLF used its increased popularity to expand its 
personnel strength. By 1977, when secessionists controlled the coun- 
tryside and most population centers, the EPLF had approximately 
15,000 troops in the field. The ELF, however, still had numerical 
superiority, with about 20,000 troops in its ranks. Therefore, to 
further discredit and isolate the ELF, the EPLF and a group of 
former ELF cadres who had reorganized themselves as the Eritrean 
Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council issued a joint statement 
indicating that they were "the sole representatives of the Eritrean 
people and the only legal spokesmen on all issues concerning the 
Eritrean people's struggle." 

In May 1978, a 100,000-member Ethiopian force was deployed 
in a counteroffensive whose objective was the eradication of the 
Eritrean revolution. Even though the EPLF and ELF succeeded 
in making some preemptive attacks against government units and 
in defending Eritrea's southern border, the ferocity of the govern- 
ment counteroffensive forced the rebels to undertake a "strategic 
withdrawal" to their base area. As a result, the Ethiopian army 
reoccupied most towns and cities that had been taken by the re- 
bels. Government troops also dealt a crippling blow to the ELF, 
causing many of its personnel to flee into eastern Sudan, where 
many of them remained. 

The only government setback occurred at the EPLF-held town 
of Nakfa, which eventually became a symbol of Eritrean determi- 
nation to resist government control. After retreating EPLF units 
had reached Nakfa, they built heavy fortifications, including a forty- 
kilometer-long defensive trench in the surrounding mountains. 
Despite repeated attempts, the Ethiopian army was unable to 



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dislodge the EPLF from Nakfa. Between 1978 and 1981, the Derg 
unleashed five large-scale military campaigns against the EPLF, 
none of which resulted in a government victory. 

In February 1982, the Mengistu regime embarked on its sixth 
counteroffensive against the EPLF. Dubbed Red Star, the cam- 
paign involved 120,000 government troops. The campaign failed 
to drive the EPLF from Nakfa and resulted in the deaths of more 
than 40,000 Ethiopian troops. Although Addis Ababa managed 
to consolidate its hold over the Eritrean highlands, it was unable 
to eliminate the EPLF, which still possessed the capacity to make 
hit-and-run strikes against government positions. 

Once the 1982 Red Star offensive ended, the EPLF regrouped 
its forces to seize the military initiative. In January 1984, the EPLF 
captured the town of Teseney in southwestern Eritrea, and two 
months later the rebels overran the port of Mersa Teklay, thereby 
establishing an EPLF presence on the northeastern coast. During 
this battie, the rebels also captured a significant number of weapons, 
which they used to take the strategic hilltop town of Barentu in 
early July 1985. Once again, the rebels captured an array of mili- 
tary equipment, including fifteen T-54/55 tanks and dozens of 
trucks and artillery pieces. In May 1984, EPLF commandos at- 
tacked the Asmera air base and reportedly destroyed two Soviet 
11-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. 

When news of the EPLF's victory at Barentu reached Addis 
Ababa, the Mengistu regime ordered the redeployment of two di- 
visions (about 30,000 troops) from the Ogaden to northern Ethio- 
pia and formed a new armored division to help retake the town. 
The Ethiopian army then made perhaps as many as thirteen at- 
tempts to recapture the town, losing 2,000 soldiers killed or wounded 
in the process. After the Ethiopian air force started bombing 
Barentu, the EPLF guerrillas withdrew from the town on Au- 
gust 24, 1985, taking with them at least thirteen T-55 tanks, twelve 
artillery pieces, and several APCs. According to the EPLF, their 
units killed or captured 11,250 Ethiopian soldiers during several 
battles fought before the withdrawal. 

Within days of reoccupying Barentu, the Ethiopian army recap- 
tured Teseney, thereby cutting off the EPLF's western territorial 
flank. Additional government victories forced the rebels to fall back 
to their Nakfa stronghold. Over the next several weeks, the Ethio- 
pian armed forces used tanks and other armored vehicles, cluster 
bombs, napalm, and fighter-bombers to support the ground attack 
on Nakfa. By the summer of 1986, the government offensive had 
ended; Nakfa, however, was still in rebel hands, and the EPLF 
had extended its area of control southward along the Eritrean coast. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

On October 10, 1985, the Derg launched another anti-EPLF 
offensive, whose objective was the capture of Nakfa "within five 
days." The operation involved sixty aircraft and thirty helicopter 
gunships. For the first time, the Ethiopian air force dropped air- 
borne units behind rebel lines in northeast Sahel awraja (subregion). 
When Ethiopian forces failed to capture the city, the Mengistu re- 
gime ordered two more attacks on Nakfa, each of which ended in 
the government's defeat. 

In 1986 the EPLF relied on more traditional guerrilla tactics in 
its operations against the Ethiopian armed forces. On January 14, 
1986, for example, a rebel commando unit, armed with rocket 
launchers and hand grenades, again penetrated the Asmera air base, 
destroying more than forty aircraft and burning the installation's 
ammunition and fuel depots. Apart from the impact on the Ethio- 
pian air force, this attack caused the Soviet Union to terminate 
its reconnaissance flights to and from Asmera. The following May, 
EPLF artillery units bombarded Ethiopian positions in and around 
Mitsiwa, destroying fuel tanks and tankers. Regular units also over- 
ran government garrisons located about thirty kilometers south of 
Asmera. 

Concurrent with these military operations, the EPLF continued 
its political offensive against the Mengistu regime. On September 
23, 1986, the rebels celebrated their twenty-fifth year of resistance 
by calling on the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League 
of Arab States (Arab League), the UN, and the Nonaligned Move- 
ment to recognize the legitimacy of their claim to nationhood. Then, 
on November 25, the EPLF announced that it had merged with 
an ELF faction that had severed ties with its parent group. The 
EPLF also continued efforts to reach an accommodation with 
another ELF faction, the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary 
Council, led by Ahmad Nasir. 

The armed struggle in Eritrea entered 1987 with neither the 
EPLF nor the Ethiopian government willing to abandon the use 
of military force to achieve their political objectives. However, the 
Mengistu regime abandoned its costly strategy of launching an- 
nual major counteroffensives in Eritrea, preferring instead a pol- 
icy of defensive containment while rebuilding its army, which still 
had not recovered from the October 1985 offensive. 

The EPLF also kept its military activities to a minimum. Apart 
from various hit-and-run operations, one of the largest rebel en- 
gagements occurred on March 20, when the EPLF clashed with 
four Ethiopian army brigades in Eritrea's northern zone. In the 
two-day battle, the EPLF claimed government forces suffered 650 
casualties. 



304 



Women veterans who have been decorated for their service to the state 

The following year, the EPLF, which by then had approximately 
30,000 full-time fighters plus an unknown number of part-time per- 
sonnel, stepped up its military activities in Eritrea. On March 19, 
1988, the rebels inflicted a defeat on Ethiopia's Second Revolu- 
tionary Army at the garrison town of Afabet. According to British 
historian and Africa specialist Basil Davidson, the Afabet victory 
was one of the biggest ever scored by any liberation movement any- 
where since Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. Rebel spokesmen 
indicated that the EPLF had destroyed an Ethiopian army corps, 
comprising three divisions totaling 18,000 to 20,000 personnel. The 
rebels also had captured several thousand Ethiopian soldiers, three 
Soviet military advisers, and an array of equipment. 

The Ethiopian government, which launched an unsuccessful 
counteroffensive in June 1988 against the EPLF, eventually or- 
dered the evacuation of all foreign personnel working for humanitar- 
ian and relief organizations in Eritrea. Additionally, Addis Ababa 
told these organizations to relinquish all food and nonfood assistance 
to the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). 
Many Western governments, including that of the United States, 
objected to this decision because they feared Mengistu would resort 
to using food as a weapon against Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels 
and their sympathizers. 

Another development associated with the Eritrean triumph at 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Afabet was the EPLF's and TPLF's acknowledgment of each other's 
military victories, something that had not happened since a dis- 
agreement between the two groups in 1985 (see The Tigray, this 
ch.). In addition, the two groups issued a reconciliation statement 
in Damascus, Syria, and promised to coordinate future military 
actions to bring an end to the Mengistu regime. However, the 
EPLF-TPLF relationship continued to experience difficulties, 
largely because of disagreement over strategy and tactics, over the 
next several years. 

Apart from further demoralizing the Ethiopian army, the Afabet 
victory also gave impetus to the peace process. In early July 1989, 
Yuri Yukalov, director of the African department at the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with EPLF secretary general Issaias 
Afwerki. The meeting was significant because it was the first seri- 
ous contact between the Soviet Union and the EPLF and because 
it demonstrated to Mengistu that Moscow was no longer willing 
to provide unlimited military assistance to support his military 
strategy in northern Ethiopia. 

The EPLF sustained its military pressure on the Mengistu re- 
gime in 1989. On January 17, rebel units launched a preemptive 
attack against Ethiopian troops located northwest of the Asmera- 
Mitsiwa road. During the two-day battle, the EPLF claimed to have 
killed, wounded, or captured some 2,600 Ethiopian soldiers, in the 
process destroying twenty-one tanks and capturing eight others, 
together with a variety of small- and medium- caliber weapons. On 
February 19, EPLF units, operating in conjunction with the TPLF, 
struck and captured the town of Inda Silase in Tigray. Over the 
next few months, the EPLF defeated an Ethiopian contingent at 
Adi Kwala, a town ninety kilometers south of Asmera (March 15); 
repulsed an Ethiopian army attempt to cut off the EPLF fortifica- 
tions around Keren (March 22-29); and killed or wounded approxi- 
mately 1,000 Ethiopian soldiers at Adi Goroto (March 27-29). 

In mid- 1989, after Mengistu had succeeded in thwarting a coup 
attempt, the EPLF and the Ethiopian government agreed to enter 
into negotiations mediated by former United States president Jimmy 
Carter. After a round of preliminary negotiations, which opened 
on September 7, 1989, at the Carter Presidential Center at Emory 
University in Atlanta, Georgia, the two sides agreed to hold another 
round of peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, beginning on November 
20, 1989. These talks failed to produce a peace agreement. Subse- 
quent meetings in Washington, chaired by United States assistant 
secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen, also accom- 
plished little. 



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Meanwhile, government forces continued to suffer battlefield 
defeats. On February 10, 1990, the EPLF captured the port of 
Mitsiwa. The fall of this strategically important port isolated Ethio- 
pia's Second Revolutionary Army and eventually resulted in the 
loss of Eritrea. Additionally, the EPLF used its small fleet of armed 
speed boats to sink or cripple most Ethiopian navy ships anchored 
in Mitsiwa harbor. Then, in August, the EPLF launched an offen- 
sive along the Dekemhare front, south of Asmera. During this oper- 
ation, the rebels killed or wounded more than 1 1 ,000 government 
soldiers and captured two tanks, many vehicles, and more than 
1 ,000 medium and light weapons. Although government forces en- 
joyed a few minor victories at the end of 1990, the EPLF remained 
in control of most of Eritrea. 

In early 1991, the rebels started their final offensive against 
government forces by driving south along the Red Sea coast, a 
movement that by early April brought them to the gates of Aseb. 
At the same time, they formed an alliance with other rebel groups 
operating as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) and contributed at least eight brigades to the 
EPRDF to aid in military operations in Gonder and Gojam. By 
the end of April, the EPLF controlled nearly all of Eritrea, the major 
exceptions being Keren, Asmera, and Aseb. In late May, the EPLF 
assumed control of these towns without heavy fighting and without 
Ethiopian government reprisals against civilians. The 120,000- 
member Second Revolutionary Army surrendered in Asmera on 
May 24, the same day that Keren capitulated, the garrison at Aseb 
following suit the next day. Having occupied all of Eritrea, the 
EPLF announced its intention to repatriate all Ethiopian soldiers, 
security personnel, WPE members, and ordinary citizens back to 
Ethiopia. Shortly thereafter, EPLF leader Issaias Afwerki indicated 
that as far as he was concerned, Eritrea was an independent state. 

The Tigray 

Formed in 1975, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 
was dedicated to the overthrow of the Mengistu regime (see The 
Tigrayan Movement, ch. 4). It survived during its early years only 
because of the money and weapons it received from the EPLF. The 
EPLF supported the TPLF because the latter formed a buffer be- 
tween the Ethiopian army and Eritrea. Despite subsequent politi- 
cal and ideological rifts between the groups, the EPLF always 
maintained this buffer strategy. 

On February 18, 1976, the TPLF convened its first congress, 
at Dima. The group of about 170 people in attendance elected a 
seven-member Central Committee. During May and June 1976, 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

the rebels gained international attention by kidnapping a British 
family and a British journalist. By the end of the year, the TPLF 
had about 1,000 full-time fighters. It confined its military activi- 
ties to attacking traffic along the main road between Mekele, the 
Tigrayan capital, and Asmera. Within two years, however, the 
TPLF had increased its strength to the point where the group con- 
trolled large parts of the countryside and threatened the Ethiopian 
army's supply lines. 

Throughout the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Tigray, like 
Eritrea, suffered from the Derg's annual military counteroffensives 
in north-central Ethiopia. During these operations, the TPLF and 
the EPLF coordinated many of their military actions against govern- 
ment forces. However, in 1983 a rift developed between the groups 
after the TPLF proposed a unification of all anti-Mengistu elements, 
including the EPLF. Relations further deteriorated when the EPLF 
failed to inform the TPLF that it had started secret peace talks with 
Addis Ababa. As a result, the TPLF refrained from supporting 
the EPLF during the government's 1985 counteroffensive in north- 
ern Ethiopia. Although there was a brief reconciliation after the 
EPLF's victory at Afabet, the TPLF-EPLF estrangement continued 
for the next several years. In March 1987, for example, the TPLF 
refused to be represented at the EPLF's Unity Congress. 

In February 1989, the TPLF, which by then included at least 
20,000 full-time fighters plus an unknown number of part-time 
fighters, abandoned hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. The TPLF, with 
support from the EPLF, which wanted to open a second front 
against Mengistu, launched a conventional attack against the town 
of Inda Silase in western Tigray. The TPLF destroyed a 20,000- 
member Ethiopian army force . Ethiopian military units then with- 
drew from Mekele and the rest of Tigray without a fight. This defeat 
undoubtedly helped trigger the unsuccessful May 1989 coup against 
Mengistu. 

Although government troops subsequently returned to southern 
Tigray and reoccupied a few towns and villages, the political and 
military initiative remained with the TPLF. On March 10, 1989, 
the TPLF opened its third congress. Apart from passing numer- 
ous antigovernment resolutions, the delegates pledged to support 
the EPRDF, which had been formed earlier in the year by the TPLF 
and a group known as the Ethiopian People's Democratic Move- 
ment (EPDM), whose members were primarily Amhara. In time, 
the EPRDF also included the Oromo People's Democratic Organi- 
zation (OPDO) and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers' Revolu- 
tionary Movement, both of which had been created by the TPLF 



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in May 1990. Tigrayan strategists hoped the unification of these 
groups eventually would enable the TPLF to widen its base of sup- 
port beyond Tigray. Elements in support of the government, 
however, denounced the EPRDF as nothing more than a TPLF 
organization in Amhara clothing. 

In August and September 1989, TPLF forces, operating within 
the framework of the EPRDF, moved south into Welo. They over- 
ran towns along the main road, routed numerous Ethiopian units, 
captured an array of Ethiopian army equipment, and forced the 
temporary evacuation of the regional capital of Dese. By the end 
of 1989, the EPRDF had succeeded in defeating an Ethiopian gar- 
rison at Debre Tabor. This victory enabled Tigrayan forces to cut 
the road between the cities of Gonder and Bahir Dar and to force 
their way into northern Shewa, less than 160 kilometers from Addis 
Ababa. Mengistu responded to these developments by persuad- 
ing the National Shengo to order the mobilization of all former 
soldiers and police up to age seventy. Additionally, the National 
Shengo authorized increased military spending, assigned all trans- 
port to the war effort, and armed local populations in war zones. 
However, these actions failed to improve the government's battle- 
field performance against the EPRDF. 

During 1990 the EPRDF, which controlled all of Tigray with 
the exception of one small government outpost, concentrated on 
consolidating the gains it had made the previous year, although 
in June the insurgents repulsed a major offensive by the Ethiopian 
army. The year 1991, however, saw the EPRDF launch three offen- 
sives in rapid succession that destroyed the Ethiopian army and 
the Mengistu regime. On February 23, the rebels began Opera- 
tion Tewodros to drive the government out of Gonder and Gojam, 
and they succeeded after only two weeks of fighting. The inhabi- 
tants of both regions supported the operation largely because of 
their opposition to the heavy conscription campaign of the previ- 
ous year and because of their hatred of the villagization program. 

In March the EPRDF launched Operation Dula Billisuma 
Welkita into Welega, which resulted in the capture of the regional 
military headquarters in Nekemte. Insurgent units then advanced 
south and east and soon occupied Fincha, site of an electric power 
station that served Addis Ababa. In mid-May Operation Walle- 
lign was begun along the Welo front. Within hours the rebels had 
overrun Dese and Kembolcha. By May 20, the EPRDF had cap- 
tured all government positions in southern Welo and northern 
Shewa and were advancing on Addis Ababa from the west. The 
next morning, Mengistu fled the country. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

In the aftermath of these three campaigns, the Ethiopian armed 
forces disintegrated. Tens of thousands of soldiers crowded into Addis 
Ababa and sold their weapons or used them to rob civilians. Count- 
less other soldiers went home, while many senior army and air force 
officers fled to Djibouti, Kenya, or Sudan. Ethiopian naval person- 
nel and vessels dispersed to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Djibouti. 

During the final week of the war, the EPRDF slowly advanced 
toward Addis Ababa, capturing the air force base at Debre Zeyit 
along the way. The final battie for the capital occurred on the morn- 
ing of May 28, when the EPRDF entered the city. Resistance to 
the takeover consisted largely of street fighting and a low-level clash 
at the Grand (Menelik's) Palace. About 600 to 800 people, both 
civilians and combatants, reportedly died during the operation. For 
the TPLF, the long road from the hills of Tigray had finally ended 
in victory. 

The Oromo 

Created in July 1973, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) set 
forth as its goals Oromo liberation from " Ethiopian colonialism" 
and the establishment of an independent Democratic Republic of 
Oromia in southern Ethiopia (see Other Movements and Fronts, 
ch. 4). The following year, the OLF began an offensive against 
the Ethiopian army in Harerge. After the collapse of the imperial 
regime in 1974, the OLF increased its military activities after it 
became evident that the Mengistu regime would not allow the 
Oromo to elect their own representatives to run peasant associa- 
tions or to use their own language in schools and newspapers. 
However, the OLF had little success in mobilizing support in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. 

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the OLF experienced a resurgence. 
According to spokesmen, the organization had 5,000 fighters and 
more than 10,000 militia personnel; most other sources, however, 
suggested that the OLF's personnel strength was much lower. In 
1985 the OLF overran the gold-mining town of Agubela and 
"freed" about 1,000 mine workers. The rebels also confiscated 
coffee valued at approximately US$2 million from the Ethiopian 
Coffee Marketing Board. 

In early 1988, the Ethiopian army attacked OLF forces in Welega. 
Fierce fighting occurred around the garrison towns in Kelem and 
Gimbi awraja. Shortly after these battles, the OLF acknowledged 
that it had received support from the EPLF and the TPLF. Despite 
this activity, however, some Western observers believed that the 
OLF was still in the fledgling stage of its growth. Its chief weak- 
ness remained its inability to mobilize and coordinate the activities 



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of its eastern wing in Harerge, Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi. As a result, 
another organization, the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), competed with the OLF for the loyalty and support of 
the peoples living in the east (see The Somali, this ch.). 

On June 10, 1989, the OLF reported that it had "disarmed" 
an unspecified number of Ethiopian soldiers and freed more than 
2,000 Oromo prisoners by destroying five "concentration camps" 
in Gara Muleta awraja in Harerge. The following October, the OLF 
also engaged the Ethiopian army in Welega and Harerge. From 
November 10 to November 17, 1989, the OLF held its second con- 
gress in Golelola in Harerge. Besides adopting many antigovern- 
ment resolutions, the congress promised increased military activities 
against the Mengistu regime. A few weeks later, in December, OLF 
units, with EPLF support, launched an offensive that eventually 
resulted in the capture of the town of Asosa along the Ethiopian- 
Sudanese border. The OLF also escalated activities in Harerge after 
many Ethiopian army units redeployed to other locations in Ethio- 
pia. 

After occupying Asosa in January 1990, the OLF launched no 
further offensives against Mengistu 's army until the end of the year, 
when OLF units saw action at several locations in western parts 
of the country. In 1991 the OLF remained largely in the background 
as the EPRDF and the EPLF fought their final battles against 
government forces. The OLF's last military action before the demise 
of the Mengistu regime occurred at Dembi Dolo in southerwestern 
Welega, when some of its units reportedly killed more than 700 
government soldiers. 

Relations between the OLF and the EPRDF seem to have been 
ambivalent even at the best of times because the Oromo were deeply 
suspicious of the ultimate designs of the Tigrayan leadership. These 
relations hardly improved during 1990 when the OLF was con- 
fronted by a rival group, the Oromo People's Democratic Organi- 
zation (OPDO), sponsored by the TPLF as a member of the 
EPRDF umbrella organization. OLF spokesmen also repeatedly 
denounced EPRDF claims that it was the EPRDF that had freed 
the Oromo from the regime's domination. Actions such as these 
further alienated the OLF and helped account for the rift that de- 
veloped shortly after the occupation of Addis Ababa between the 
OLF and the EPRDF over the composition of a new government — a 
disagreement that did not augur well for the future. 

The Somali 

The most significant antigovernment force operating in the 
Ogaden was the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF; see 



311 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 




'n...^ KENYA Boundary representation 

/ not necessarily authoritative 



International boundary 

Administrative line 

Regional boundary 




Somali advances, July 1977- 
January 1978 

Ethiopian advances, February- 
March 1 978 


® National capital 


€DMfl) 


Mountain chain 


• Populated place 




Mountain pass 


' 1 h Railroad 




Helicopter assault 


Road 









75 150 Kilometers 







75 1 50 Miles 



Figure 11. The Ogaden War, 1977-78 



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National Security 



Other Movements and Fronts, ch. 4). WSLF guerrillas first en- 
gaged Ethiopian troops in combat in 1975, systematically attack- 
ing police posts and army garrisons from base camps across the 
border in Somalia. In June 1977, the WSLF, supported by the 
Somali government and joined by Somali National Army (SNA) 
' 'volunteers," succeeded in cutting the railroad bridges between 
Addis Ababa and Djibouti, which carried about a third of Ethio- 
pia's external trade, and in establishing control over 60 percent 
of the Ogaden. At that time, the WSLF numbered about 6,000 
troops. As the tempo of the conflict increased, the WSLF relied 
more and more on Somalia's armored and artillery capabilities. 

In July 1977, mechanized units of the SNA army invaded Ethio- 
pia in a preemptive thrust at Harer — the Ogaden region's mili- 
tary command center — that was intended to decide the Ogaden 
issue before promised Soviet military equipment arrived in Ethio- 
pia (see fig. 11). Jijiga fell to Somali forces in September, when 
the Ethiopian mechanized unit defending it mutinied and fled in 
panic. The Somali forces then focused their efforts on the strategic 
Marda (also known as Karamarda) Pass, carrying the attack into 
the unfamiliar highlands to block Ethiopian reinforcements com- 
ing into Harerge. The move diverted Ethiopian forces from the 
main offensive aimed at Harer and Dire Dawa, site of the air base 
from which strikes were flown against targets inside Somalia. 

After weeks of being bogged down by bad weather, in January 
1978 the SNA pressed a three-pronged attack on Harer, where 
nearly 50,000 Ethiopian troops had regrouped, backed by Soviet- 
supplied heavy artillery and reinforced by 10,000 Cuban troops 
from units hurriedly flown in from Angola. Early in February 1978, 
the Ethiopians launched a two- stage counterattack toward Jijiga 
that had been planned and directed by Soviet advisers and backed 
by Cuban troops. Moving east and south from Dire Dawa, an 
Ethiopian column crossed the highlands between Jijiga and the 
Somali border, bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda 
Pass. In the second offensive strike, joined by Cuban troops, the 
Ethiopian army trapped the Somali forces around Jijiga between 
helicopter-borne tanks that had landed to their rear and a deter- 
mined frontal assault from Harer. On March 5, the Ethiopians 
retook Jijiga after two days of fierce fighting in which they defeated 
four Somali brigades and killed 3,000 Somali troops. Within a week, 
the Ethiopian army had reestablished control over all the region's 
major towns. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian air force's F-5 fighters had 
won air superiority in engagements against Soviet-made Somali 
jets. On March 9, Siad Barre ended the undeclared war by an- 
nouncing that he had recalled all SNA troops from the Ogaden. 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 

The introduction of Soviet equipment and 17,000 Cuban troops 
had decisively altered the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. 

After the withdrawal of the Somali regulars, the WSLF reverted 
to classic guerrilla tactics against the Ethiopian army, whose sol- 
diers they characterized as black colonialist troops. Western jour- 
nalists visiting the region in early 1980 confirmed that the WSLF 
once again controlled the countryside and many of the main roads. 
Also, "volunteers," believed by many to have been troops of the 
SNA, reportedly had rejoined the WSLF. Renewed fighting oc- 
curred in June and July 1980, when, according to an official spokes- 
man in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian troops repelled an incursion by 
a mechanized Somali force. Meanwhile, Ethiopia had started train- 
ing and equipping the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) 
and later the Somali National Movement (SNM), both of which 
began launching raids inside Somalia against the Siad Barre re- 
gime. The renewed conflict forced Mogadishu to declare a state 
of emergency in October 1980. 

Another major incident occurred on June 30, 1983, when Ethio- 
pian troops staged a two-pronged operation against Somalia. Part 
of the invading Ethiopian force intended to capture high ground 
in Hiiraan Region near Feerfeer on the Ethiopia- Somalia frontier. 
However, the SNA garrison at Beledweyne repulsed the Ethiopian 
attack. Farther north, an Ethiopian armored column overran a 
Somali settlement in Galguduud Region. On July 17, Ethiopian 
warplanes bombed and strafed the airstrip and other parts of Gal- 
caio, the capital of Mudug Region. Ethiopian armored columns 
also crossed the border to the north and west of Galcaio and oc- 
cupied the village of Galdogob. Until late 1983, there were numer- 
ous clashes between Ethiopian and Somali units, especially near 
Balumbale and in the northwest around Hargeysa. However, the 
Somali forces were unable to dislodge the Ethiopians from Balum- 
bale and Galdogob. 

For two more years, Ethiopian-Somali relations remained tense. 
In July 1985, Mengistu and Siad Barre held discussions at the OAU 
summit in Addis Ababa in order to lay the groundwork for a peace- 
ful resolution of the Ogaden problem. Although Ethiopian and 
Somali officials held several more meetings, they were unable to 
reach a setdement. In mid-January 1986, a meeting between Men- 
gistu and Siad Barre in Djibouti resulted in a "general understand- 
ing" on the Ogaden issue. This "understanding" was undermined 
on February 12, 1987, when Ethiopia launched ground and air raids 
on areas of western Somalia three weeks after protests and mass 
arrests cut off Hargeysa from the rest of the country. Although an 
agreement to end hostilities was signed in April 1988, the dispute 



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National Security 



remained unresolved because of Addis Ababa's continued support 
of the SNM. After the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in Janu- 
ary 1991 , tens of thousands of Somali refugees fled to the Ogaden. 
This exodus only added to eastern Ethiopia's increasing instabil- 
ity during the final months of the Mengistu regime. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

As a result of insurgencies affecting a large part of the country 
in the 1970s and after, questions of internal security and public 
order became inseparable from the general problem of national secu- 
rity. Revisions made to the penal code in 1976 helped blur the dis- 
tinction between political opposition to the government (defined 
as criminal activity) and categories of crime against persons and 
property. Army security services and counterinsurgency units as- 
sumed many functions formerly assigned to the national police's 
paramilitary and constabulary units, and local law enforcement was 
delegated largely to the civilian paramilitary People's Protection 
Brigades, drawn from peasant association and kebele defense squads. 
Although criminal investigation remained an important part of the 
mission of the national police, units of its heavily armed Mobile 
Emergency Police Force were employed in pursuing insurgents and 
rooting out political dissidents. The gradual isolation of the Men- 
gistu regime during the 1980s meant that these and other mea- 
sures designed to suppress internal dissent remained in force until 
the military government collapsed. 

The National Police 

In traditional Ethiopian society, customary law resolved conflicts, 
and families usually avenged wrongs committed against their mem- 
bers. The private armies of the nobility enforced law in the coun- 
tryside according to the will of their leaders. In 1916 the imperial 
government formed a civilian municipal guard in Addis Ababa to 
ensure obedience to legal proclamations. The general public 
despised the municipal guard, nearly all of whose members were 
inefficient at preserving public order or investigating criminal ac- 
tivities. 

In 1935 the emperor authorized the establishment of formal, 
British-trained police forces in Addis Ababa and four other cities. 
Seven years later, he organized the Imperial Ethiopian Police under 
British tutelage as a centralized national force with paramilitary 
and constabulary units. In 1946 the authorities opened the Ethio- 
pian Police College at Sendafa. In 1956 the imperial government 
amalgamated the separate city police forces with the national police 
force. Initially administered as a department of the Ministry of 



315 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Interior, the national police had evolved, by the early 1970s, into 
an independent agency commanded by a police commissioner 
responsible to the emperor. 

Local control over police was minimal, despite imperial procla- 
mations that granted police authority to governors general of the 
provinces. Assistant police commissioners in each of the fourteen 
provinces worked in conjunction with the governors general, but 
for the most part Addis Ababa directed administration. The Ter- 
ritorial Army's provincial units, commanded by the governor gen- 
eral and by an unpaid civilian auxiliary in areas where police were 
scarce, assisted the national police force. Police posts were found 
in all cities and larger towns and at strategic points along the main 
roads in the countryside. The police usually recruited local men 
who were familiar with the social values of the areas in which they 
served; however, the populace rarely looked upon such individ- 
uals with affection. Police operations generally emphasized punish- 
ment rather than prevention. 

In 1974 the national police numbered approximately 28,000 in 
all branches, including 6,000 in the Mobile Emergency Police Force; 
1,200 frontier guards; and a 3,200-member commando unit with 
rapid reaction capability. The Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) supplied the paramilitary police with weapons and ve- 
hicles and installed a nationwide teleprinter system, while Israeli 
counterinsurgency specialists trained commandos and frontier 
guards. About 5,000 constabulary police, mostly recruited locally, 
served in Eritrea, as did 2,500 commandos. 

After the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, the new Marxist 
government severely circumscribed the authority of the national 
police, which had been identified with the old regime and regional 
interests. The authorities accused constables of protecting landown- 
ers against peasants in the countryside, of arresting supporters of 
the military regime in Addis Ababa, and of being members of the 
' 'rightist opposition." In Eritrea, however, the army already had 
taken over police functions in January 1975 from local police units 
suspected of being sympathetic to the secessionists. The Asmera 
police voluntarily stayed at their posts for some time after their 
dismissal to protect civilians from attack by unruly soldiers. 

In 1977 the Mengistu regime reorganized the national police, 
placing a politically reliable commissioner in command. A secu- 
rity committee formulated policy, which then was implemented by 
the Ministry of Interior. The army assumed a larger role in crimi- 
nal investigation and in maintaining public order. People's Pro- 
tection Brigades took over local law enforcement duties previously 
assigned to the constabulary. As a result of these changes, by 1982 



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National Security 



the strength of the national police had declined to about 17,000. 
Mengistu also created the army's new Eighth Division from police 
commando units. Other special units joined the augmented 
9,000-member paramilitary Mobile Emergency Police Force for 
employment in counterinsurgency operations. 

The Directorate of Police, which reported to the commissioner, 
included the special Criminal Investigation Branch, which had the 
role in directing police counterinsurgency activities through regional 
branch offices. Another branch of the directorate investigated eco- 
nomic crimes, particularly smuggling and other forms of illicit com- 
merce. The Revolutionary Operations Coordinating Committee, 
organized at the subregion level, cooperated with the police in 
battling smuggling and economic sabotage. 

The Marxist regime stressed that the mission of the national 
police was essentially political — more involved with suppressing po- 
litical dissent as the local law enforcement role shifted to People's 
Protection Brigades. Mengistu described the police mission as con- 
tributing to the "intensification of the class struggle." 

The government adopted a policy whereby police constables were 
recruited at an early age and trained in their native regions. Train- 
ing was designed to allow police stationed in remote areas to be 
self-sufficient in building and maintaining their posts. Training stan- 
dards were not uniform, and, unless it took place in Addis Ababa, 
in-service or specialized training was limited. In politically stable 
rural areas where duty requirements and supervision were less ex- 
acting, the police were less efficient than their urban counterparts. 
A high percentage of rural constables could neither read nor write 
and therefore did not keep records of their activities. Many crimes 
were considered to be matters concerning only the persons involved 
and were often ignored by the police unless one of the interested 
parties filed a complaint. 

The Addis Ababa police, by contrast, were organized into 
uniformed, detective, and traffic units; a riot squad, or "flying 
column"; and a police laboratory — organizational refinements not 
found in regional police units. A small number of women served 
in police units in large cities. Generally, they were employed in 
administrative positions or as guards for female prisoners. National 
police officers were paid according to the same standardized wage 
scale that applied to members of the armed forces. 

As a rule, police in constabulary units were armed only with ba- 
tons. Small arms usually were kept in designated armories and were 
issued for specific duties. Materiel used by paramilitary units in- 
cluded heavy machine guns, submachine guns, automatic rifles, 
side arms, mortars, grenades, tear gas, light armored vehicles, and 



317 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

other equipment adaptable to riot control and counterinsurgency 
operations. Larger police units, such as the one in Addis Ababa, 
were also equipped with modern military vehicles, which were used 
as patrol cars and police vans. In many rural areas, however, horses 
and mules were often the sole means of transportation for constables. 

Officers usually were commissioned after completion of a cadet 
course at the Ethiopian Police College at Sendafa, near Addis 
Ababa. Staffed by Swedish instructors, the school opened in 1946, 
but since 1 960 the faculty had consisted entirely of Ethiopians who 
were police college graduates. Candidates for the two-year course 
had to have a secondary school education or its equivalent. After 
the Derg took power, the government increased enrollment to bring 
new blood into the national police; from 1974 to 1979, about 800 
graduates received commissions as second lieutenants. 

Instruction at the college included general courses in police 
science, criminal law, tactics, traffic control, sociology, criminol- 
ogy, physical education, and first aid, as well as political indoctri- 
nation. Practical training was offered midway in the program and 
sometimes entailed field service in troubled areas. Those few cadets 
who had passed their final examinations with distinction were se- 
lected for further specialized training. The police college also offered 
short-term courses and refresher training for service officers. It 
cooperated with the army in training military police in traffic con- 
trol and criminal investigation techniques. By the end of 1990, the 
police college had graduated a total of 3,951 officer cadets in the 
years since its establishment in 1946. 

People's Protection Brigades 

Soon after the overthrow of the imperial regime, the Derg moved 
to consolidate the revolution at the grass-roots level by promoting 
the creation of peasant associations and kebeles (see Peasant Associ- 
ations; Kebeles, ch. 4). These associations had tribunals that per- 
mitted them to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over legal 
matters (see The Legal System, this ch.). More important, the 
government also legitimized local defense squads, granting them 
police powers within designated areas. Defense squads also pro- 
tected public property and enforced land reform measures, but their 
original function was the essentially political one of rounding up — 
and often disposing of — suspected government opponents. Dur- 
ing the Red Terror (see Glossary) campaign of 1977-78, the power 
of the kebeles was virtually unrestricted, and the defense squads 
emerged as the regime's chief instruments of coercion within the 
capital. However, in reaction to the defense squads' excessive use 
of violence, Mengistu curbed their powers in April 1978. 



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National Security 



In 1978 the People's Protection Brigades were created from an 
estimated 10,000 defense squad vigilantes. Their function was to 
act as local law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of each 
peasant association and kebele. Although promoted as instruments 
of decentralization, the brigades answered to the security chief of 
the Central Committee of the Commission to Organize the Party 
of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE; see Toward Party Forma- 
tion, ch. 4). Although the People's Protection Brigades retained 
a political role, after 1980 these paramilitary units concentrated 
on local police duties. Brigade members received up to five months' 
training in police and military tactics from East German instruc- 
tors. Some brigade personnel had served on active duty in Eritrea, 
Tigray, and the Ogaden. 

Crime and Punishment 
The Legal System 

Although Ethiopians have long depended on written laws, the 
criminal legal system observed at the time of the 1974 revolution 
was of relatively recent origin. The first integrated legal code, the 
Fetha Nagast (Law of Kings), was translated from Arabic in the mid- 
fifteenth century. Attributed to a thirteenth- century Egyptian Coptic 
scholar, it was inspired by the Pentateuch (the first five books of 
the Old Testament), the New Testament, canons of the Christi- 
ans' early church councils, Roman civil law, and tenets of Quranic 
law. However, the Fetha Nagast applied only to Christians. Mus- 
lims who became subject to Ethiopian rule through conquest con- 
tinued to be judged in their own courts according to sharia law 
(see Islam, ch. 2). Also, outside the ordinary judicial system, clan 
and tribal courts exercised unofficial but effective coercive pow- 
ers, and people rarely appealed their decisions to regular courts. 

The Fetha Nagast and customary laws remained the basis of crimi- 
nal judicial procedure until 1930, when Haile Selassie introduced 
a penal code, which, although primitive in its application, strove 
for modernity in its articulation. Unlike the old system, the 1930 
penal code set down specific punishments for precisely defined 
offenses. It was a legal principle that a person who performed an 
act not prohibited by law committed no crime; nor were acts of omis- 
sion punishable by law. The code made distinctions among prepara- 
tory acts, attempted crimes, and completed offenses. Preparation 
in itself was not considered criminal, nor were unsuccessful attempts, 
especially ones in which commission of the offense was judged to 
be "absolutely impossible." Courts did not inflict punishment if the 
accused acted out of superstition or "simplicity of mind." 



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Ethiopia: A Country Study 



The penal code was strong on retribution, but the courts deter- 
mined penalties according to the degree of individual guilt. In ad- 
dition, the courts took into consideration an offender's background, 
education, and motives, as well as the offense's gravity and the 
circumstances of its commission. In theory, the courts meted out 
the most severe punishments to persons of title and wealth on the 
premise that such offenders had less reasonable motives for crimi- 
nal action than did persons of lower station. Among the complaints 
of ethnic dissidents, however, was the allegation that any offense 
against an Amhara resulted in more severe punishment than an 
Amhara's offense against a non- Amhara. The new code abolished 
mutilation but retained capital punishment and permitted flogging. 
Although more sophisticated than the Fetha Nagast, from which it 
ostensibly was derived, the 1930 penal code lacked a comprehen- 
sive approach to the disposition and treatment of offenders. 

In 1958 a Swiss legal expert drafted a revised penal code to meet 
the needs of a developing nation. A 1961 criminal procedures code, 
drafted by a British jurist, augmented the 1930 penal code. The 
former was based on the Swiss penal code and many secondary 
sources; the latter reflected the influence of English common law. 

For virtually every offense listed in the revised penal code, there 
were upper and lower limits of punishment. The effect was to stress 
acceptance of the concept of degrees of culpability, as well as the 
concept of extenuating and aggravating circumstances. Separate 
provisions existed for juveniles. Nevertheless, the commission ap- 
pointed to approve the revision repeatedly expressed the traditional 
view that "punishment should remain the pillar of Ethiopian crimi- 
nal law." 

Following the 1974 revolution, a normal legal process theoreti- 
cally was in effect for dealing with criminal offenses. Existing parallel 
to it was a "revolutionary" system of neighborhood justice. In prac- 
tice, it was impossible to distinguish between criminal acts and po- 
litical offenses according to the definitions adopted in post- 1974 
revisions of the penal code. 

A November 1974 decree introduced martial law, which set up 
a system of military tribunals empowered to impose the death 
penalty or long prison terms for a wide range of political offenses. 
The decree applied the law retroactively to the old regime's offi- 
cials who had been accused of responsibility for famine deaths, cor- 
ruption, and maladministration and who had been held without 
formal charges since earlier in the year. Special three-member mili- 
tary tribunals sat in Addis Ababa and in each of the country's four- 
teen administrative regions. 



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National Security 



In July 1976, the government amended the penal code to insti- 
tute the death penalty for "antirevolutionary activities" and eco- 
nomic crimes. Investigation of political crimes came under the 
overall direction of the Revolutionary Operations Coordinating 
Committee in each awraja. In political cases, the courts waived 
search warrants required by the criminal procedures code. The 
government transferred jurisdiction from the military tribunals, 
which had been inactive for some time, to kebele and peasant as- 
sociation tribunals. Political trials constituted the main business 
of these tribunals well into 1978. 

More generally, the 1976 revision of the penal code empowered 
association tribunals to deal with criminal offenses but limited their 
jurisdiction to their urban neighborhood or rural area. Elected 
magistrates, without formal legal training, conducted criminal trials. 
Procedures, precedents, and punishments varied widely from 
tribunal to tribunal, depending on the imperatives of the associa- 
tion involved. Peasant association tribunals accepted appeals at the 
wereda (district) level. Appellate decisions were final, but decisions 
disputed between associations could be brought before peasant as- 
sociation courts at the awraja level. In cities, kebele tribunals were 
similarly organized in a three-tier system. Change of venue was 
arranged if a defendant committed an offense in another juris- 
diction. 

The judicial system was designed to be flexible. Magistrates could 
decide not to hear a case if the defendant pleaded guilty to minor 
charges and made a public apology. Nonetheless, torture was some- 
times used to compel suspects and witnesses to testify. Penalties 
imposed at the local association level included fines of up to 300 
birr, compensation to victims in amounts determined by the 
tribunal, imprisonment for up to three months, and hard labor for 
up to fifteen days. Serious criminal cases were held over, depend- 
ing on their gravity, for association tribunals sitting at the awraja 
or wereda level, which were qualified to hand down stiffer sentences. 
In theory, death sentences were reviewed by government officials, 
but little effort was made to interfere with the administration of 
local justice. Tribunal decisions were implemented through an as- 
sociation's public safety committee and were enforced by the local 
People's Protection Brigade. Without effective review of their ac- 
tions, tribunals were known to order indefinite jailings, during 
which their suspects sometimes disappeared, as well as summary 
executions. On rare occasions, the government would condemn 
association officials for murder and torture committed in the course 
of dispensing "revolutionary justice." 



321 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



The 1976 revision of the penal code also created new categories 
of so-called economic crimes. The list included hoarding, overcharg- 
ing, and interfering with the distribution of consumer commodi- 
ties. More serious offenses concerned engaging in sabotage at the 
work place or of agricultural production, conspiring to confuse work 
force members, and destroying vehicles and public property. Secu- 
rity sections of the Revolutionary Operations Coordinating Com- 
mittee investigated economic crimes at the awraja level and enforced 
land reform provisions through the peasant associations. These com- 
mittees were empowered to indict suspects and hold them for trial 
before local tribunals. Penalties could entail confiscation of property, 
a long prison term, or a death sentence. 

In 1981 the Amended Special Penal Code replaced the Special 
Penal Code. This amended code included offenses against the 
government and the head of state, such as crimes against the state's 
independence and territorial integrity, armed uprising, and com- 
mission of "counterrevolutionary" acts (these provisions also were 
in the earlier Special Penal Code); breach of trust by public officials 
and economic offenses, including grain hoarding, illegal currency 
transactions, and corruption; and abuse of authority, including "im- 
proper or brutal" treatment of a prisoner, unlawful detention of 
a prisoner, and creating or failing to control famine. 

The Amended Special Penal Code also abolished the Special Mili- 
tary Courts and created new Special Courts to try offenses under 
the Amended Special Penal Code. Special Courts consisted of three 
civilian judges and applied the existing criminal and civil proce- 
dure codes. Defendants had the right to legal representation and 
to appeal to a Special Appeal Court. 

Prisons 

Detailed information on Ethiopia's prison system was limited. 
Only generalized data were available on prison installations. 

Although the imperial regime achieved some progress in the field 
of prison reform, most prisons failed to adopt modern penological 
methods. Government-published figures on prison populations since 
1974 were considered incomplete and misleading. Amnesty Inter- 
national, the London-based human rights organization, and a few 
individuals who survived detention and escaped from the country 
have described prison conditions in a critical light. 

The administrator of prisons managed the national penal sys- 
tem. Each administrative unit — including kifle hager (region), awraja 
(subregion), and wereda (district) — had at least one prison. Addis 
Ababa's Akaki (or Central) Prison, considered Ethiopia's most 
modern penal facility in 1974, was the central prison for Shewa. 



322 



Somali troops in the Ogaden 



Akaki had separate facilities for female political prisoners. The larg- 
est number of political prisoners, approximately 1 ,500 in 1989, was 
housed in Akaki 's maximum security section. Reportedly, the 
government had jailed political dissidents at numerous other pris- 
ons in Addis Ababa, including Fourth Division headquarters; the 
Third Police Station, which also served as national police head- 
quarters and an interrogation center; and the Grand (Menelik's) 
Palace. Asmera, another center for political prisoners, had penal 
facilities at three locations. Most police stations and army garri- 
sons also had jails. Each kebele and peasant association operated 
a jail in its jurisdiction. Association headquarters in each wereda 
and awraja also had prisons. 

A prison farm at Robi in Arsi provided facilities for about 850 
prisoners. In 1978 the government proposed a plan for deploying 
large numbers of inmates imprisoned for minor offenses to work 
on minimum-security state farms as part of the agricultural de- 
velopment plan. A single institution oversaw the rehabilitation of 
male juvenile criminal offenders. There was no comparable facil- 
ity for female juvenile offenders, who usually were placed in the 
custody of their parents or guardians. In exceptional pre-1974 cases, 
the authorities jailed juveniles in larger prisons. After the emer- 
gence of the Marxist regime, a large but unspecified number of 
youthful political detainees of both genders were held in prisons 



323 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

and association jails. Many were released after a period of "politi- 
cal rehabilitation." 

Historically, prison life in Ethiopia was gloomy and for political 
prisoners extremely brutal. The so-called process of rehabilitation 
often consisted of severe beatings, exhausting work and calisthen- 
ics, and political indoctrination. A public confession normally was 
proof of rehabilitation; in some cases, a political detainee's will- 
ingness to torture fellow prisoners was regarded as an indication 
of his penitence. Recreational facilities were rare, and no program 
existed to assist prisoners after their release. Punishment was the 
major concern of prison officials. Conditions in smaller, more re- 
mote prisons were worse than in the prisons of Addis Ababa, and 
peasant association jails were worse yet. As part of a program in 
the late 1970s to expand and improve the Ethiopian prison sys- 
tem, the Cuban government reportedly constructed new prisons 
that included facilities for solitary confinement. 

In its 1978 report on human rights violations in Ethiopia, Am- 
nesty International stated that Ethiopian prisons had failed to abide 
by UN regulations for the treatment of prisoners. A large number 
of prisoners might share a common cell. In the Central Prison's 
maximum security section, for example, Amnesty International 
reported that as many as fifty prisoners shared cells measuring four 
meters by four meters. Ad hoc committees — organized in each cell 
for self-imposed discipline, food distribution, care of the sick and 
aged, and orientation of new inmates — often communalized food 
and luxuries, such as tea and tobacco, donated by relatives. Com- 
plaints reached Amnesty International that cells were infested with 
pests and were unventilated and lacking the most basic sanitary 
facilities. Medical attention was generally inadequate and not even 
available at all facilities. Even seriously ill prisoners rarely received 
hospital treatment, and many died of natural causes aggravated 
by their imprisonment. Cell mates viewed death as a means of 
relieving the gross overcrowding typical of facilities housing polit- 
ical prisoners during the late 1970s. The authorities usually in- 
formed families of the death of their relatives by telling them "food 
is no longer necessary." 

Although conditions in Addis Ababa's Central Prison improved 
somewhat by the late 1980s, most prison facilities remained sub- 
standard. In 1989 Amnesty International reported that individuals 
incarcerated in government-operated prisons were held in poor and 
sometimes harsh conditions. However, the report noted that pris- 
ons were subject to formal regulations, and there were few reports 
of torture. 



324 



National Security 



The human rights organization also indicated that conditions 
in the Central Prison, which Menelik II had built in the nineteenth 
century, had improved in the 1980s. The prison's 4,500 inmates 
were allowed regular family visits, and relatives were permitted 
to send food, laundry, books, medicine, and other "comfort" items 
to jailed family members. Although the Central Prison provided 
basic medical treatment, the authorities authorized prisoners to see 
an independent physician or to seek treatment at local hospitals. 
During daylight hours, prisoners were free to associate with each 
other. The Central Prison opened a shop where small items were 
sold; a nursery and a primary school were established for children 
who stayed with their imprisoned mothers; and a secondary school 
was created where prisoners taught or studied. Additionally, 
prisoners were free to open their own recreational and educational 
facilities. Despite these findings, however, Amnesty International 
concluded that the Central Prison suffered from "inadequate med- 
ical care, poor hygiene, delays in obtaining professional medical 
or hospital treatment, overcrowding of cells . . . [and] . . . epi- 
demics of cholera and meningitis." In addition, conditions at other 
special detention centers were substandard. 

In regional prisons, Amnesty International found prison condi- 
tions to be much worse than those in Addis Ababa because of greater 
overcrowding and poorer hygiene and medical facilities. Prison 
authorities in Asmera, Mekele, and Harer subjected inmates to 
harsher restrictions than did authorities in the capital. In Harer 
and other unstable areas, civilian political prisoners often were held 
in military custody at military facilities under more severe condi- 
tions than were found in other prisons. 

Emphasis- in larger prisons was placed on work during confine- 
ment for criminal offenders, but these activities generally were lim- 
ited to individuals serving long sentences. Priority was given to 
production, and there was little effort to provide vocational train- 
ing. The largest prison industry was weaving, which was usually 
done on primitive looms. The prison weavers produced cotton 
material used for making clothes and rugs. Carpentry was a high- 
ly developed prison industry, and inmates produced articles of rela- 
tively good quality. Other prison industries included blacksmithing, 
metalworking, jewelry making, basket weaving, flour milling, and 
baking. Those short-term prisoners not absorbed into established 
prison industries worked in gardens that provided food for some 
of the penal institutions. 

Income from materials produced by prison labor was applied 
to the upkeep of penal facilities. Prisoners received about 10 per- 
cent of the proceeds derived from the sale of items, but typically 



325 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

most of these funds were dedicated to communal projects intended 
to improve prison amenities. Although prison industries were not 
geared to rehabilitation, some inmates acquired useful skills. In 
certain cases, the government permitted work furloughs for some 
classes of political prisoners. 

Most prison guards were military veterans who had received small 
plots of land in exchange for temporary duty at a prison. Under 
this system, the guards changed frequently as the duty rotated 
among a number of such persons living in the vicinity of a penal 
institution. 

Human Rights 

Despite much rhetoric on the part of the Mengistu government 
to the contrary and an entire chapter of the 1987 constitution de- 
voted to "basic freedoms and rights," Ethiopia under Mengistu 
had one of the worst human rights records in the world. Haile 
Selassie's modernization of the penal code and the introduction 
of legal guarantees in the 1955 constitution indicated at least a recog- 
nition of the human rights problem. But Amnesty International 
described subsequent improvements in human rights conditions 
as "severely qualified." Human rights violations after 1974 in- 
creased dramatically, despite the regime's assurances to the UN 
that political prisoners received "fair trials" and obtained adequate 
food and clothing from their families. According to reports issued 
by Amnesty International, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, and the testimony of refugees, the human rights situation 
deteriorated still further from 1976 to 1978. Although human rights 
organizations often lacked verification of the exact extent of viola- 
tions, many observers made repeated charges that Ethiopian troops 
had massacred civilians and committed atrocities in Eritrea and 
that the Ethiopian government had perpetrated human rights vio- 
lations throughout the country, including arbitrary arrests, im- 
prisonment without due process, torture, summary executions, and 
mass killings during the Red Terror. 

In a report based on the observations of a 1976 fact-finding visit 
to Ethiopia, Amnesty International stated that, since 1974, "there 
has developed a consistent pattern of widespread gross human rights 
violations," and it singled out the association tribunals for the most 
egregious disregard of basic human values. Addis Ababa responded 
to this charge by labeling the evidence presented by Amnesty In- 
ternational as "imperialist propaganda [against] authentic socialist 
revolution" and claimed that actions taken against political dissi- 
dents during the Red Terror were "justified" for the elimination 
of "counterrevolutionaries. " Official sources subsequently added 



326 



National Security 



that the human rights enjoyed by the "broad masses" were greater 
than they had been before the revolution and dismissed the "in- 
dividual human rights" concept that was the premise of Western 
criticism of the regime as being irrelevant to a revolutionary govern- 
ment building a Marxist society. 

The enormity of government-sponsored operations against sus- 
pected political opponents during the Red Terror has defied ac- 
curate analysis and has made attempts at quantification of casualties 
irrelevant. Amnesty International, for example, concluded that 
"this campaign resulted in several thousand to perhaps tens of thou- 
sands of men, women, and children, killed, tortured, and impri- 
soned." Other sources estimated that, during 1977-78, about 
30,000 people had perished as a result of the Red Terror and harsh 
conditions in prisons, kebele jails, and concentration camps. Ethio- 
pian sources opposed to the Marxist regime claimed that the secu- 
rity forces had killed 2,000 teachers and students in a pre-May Day 
1978 massacre in Addis Ababa. The authorities also executed 
hundreds of unarmed Eritrean civilians in Asmera while the city 
was under siege by secessionists in December 1977. In a single sweep 
in Addis Ababa the same month, troops killed about 1,000 stu- 
dents for distributing antigovernment leaflets. 

During the Red Terror in Addis Ababa, security forces frequently 
mutilated the bodies of political dissidents, dumping them along 
roads or stacking them on street corners. They also forced some 
victims to dig their own graves before being executed. The govern- 
ment required families to pay a "bullet fee" of about 125 birr to 
retrieve bodies of relatives, when they could be found and identi- 
fied. Sweden's Save the Children Fund lodged a protest in early 
1978 alleging the execution of about 1,000 children, many below 
the age of thirteen, whom the government had labeled "liaison 
agents of the counterrevolutionaries." Based on its assessment of 
the human rights situation in Ethiopia in 1979, the United States 
Department of State reported to congressional committees in Febru- 
ary 1980 that "serious violations of individual rights and civil and 
political liberties take place in Ethiopia amidst a restructed eco- 
nomic and social system that is aimed at improving the basic liv- 
ing conditions of the great majority of the country's poor." 

During the 1984-85 famine in northern Ethiopia, the Mengistu 
regime devised a scheme to resettle 1 . 5 million people onto so-called 
virgin lands in southern Ethiopia. The government forcibly moved 
people who resisted the plan, and many of those who were reset- 
tled fled to Sudan and took refuge in camps or tried to walk back 
to their northern homelands (see Resettlement and Villagization, 
ch. 2; The Politics of Resettlement, ch. 4). According to a report 



327 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



issued by an international medical group, 100,000 people died as 
a result of Mengistu's resettlement policy; Cultural Survival, 
another humanitarian organization, estimated that 50,000 to 
100,000 died. To make matters worse, Mengistu refused to allow 
food to be distributed in areas where inhabitants were sympathe- 
tic to the EPLF, TPLF, or other antigovernment groups, a strat- 
egy that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands. 

When a new famine emerged in late 1989, threatening the lives 
of 2 million to 5 million people, Mengistu again used food as a 
weapon by banning the movement of relief supplies along the main 
road north from Addis Ababa to Tigray and also along the road 
from Mitsiwa into Eritrea and south into Tigray. As a result, food 
relief vehicles had to travel overland from Port Sudan, the major 
Red Sea port of Sudan, through guerrilla territory into northern 
Ethiopia. After an international outcry against his policy, Mengistu 
reversed his decision, but international relief agencies were unable 
to move significant amounts of food aid into Eritrea and Tigray 
via Ethiopian ports. By 1990 there also were many reports that 
the Ethiopian air force had bombed relief convoys and that the 
Ethiopian armed forces had used napalm and cluster bombs against 
separatists in Eritrea and Tigray. The EPLF, too, attacked food 
convoys, claiming that the regime was using them to ship weapons 
to its troops. 

Due process of law and legal guarantees prohibiting abuse of 
power basically did not exist in revolutionary Ethiopia. After re- 
vision of the penal code and the criminal procedures code in 1976, 
judicial warrants were no longer required for house searches or for 
the arbitrary off- the- street arrests that became the norm in the late 
1970s. Specific charges were not necessarily brought against de- 
tainees after politically motivated arrests, and those held had no 
right to counsel. The bulk of noncriminal arrests involved suspects 
seized at the discretion of authorities on charges of nonparticipa- 
tion in mandatory political activities, curfew violations, and par- 
ticipation in unauthorized meetings. In most cases, those arrested 
or summoned to association tribunals for questioning would be 
released after a scare or a roughing up, but many would disap- 
pear without a trace. Whole families — including young children — 
would be taken into custody and held for indefinite periods in lieu 
of a missing relative who was a suspect. 

In Addis Ababa, special security force squads, assisted by kebele 
defense squads, would arrest political suspects, who would then 
be taken to police headquarters for interrogation by officials. After 
questioning, often accompanied by torture, the authorities would 
assign suspects to a prison to await trial or hold them in detention 



328 



National Security 



camps without charges. Under these circumstances, many detainees 
welcomed sentencing, even if it was for a long period. The govern- 
ment confiscated a suspect's possessions after arrest and required 
families to search prisons to locate their relatives. 

According to a variety of estimates, there were 6,000 to 10,000 
political prisoners, including surviving officials of the former im- 
perial regime, in Ethiopian prisons in 1976. During the Red Ter- 
ror, as many as 100,000 persons may have passed through Ethiopian 
jails. Appeals by Amnesty International in support of approximately 
3,000 known political detainees in 1978 had no effect, and most 
of these individuals were believed to have been killed while in cus- 
tody. Other sources put the number of political prisoners at 8,000, 
of whom half eventually were released. 

Categories of political prisoners still held in 1991 included former 
government officials; prominent civil servants and businessmen; 
armed forces officers, including those implicated in the May 1989 
coup attempt against Mengistu; students and teachers; members 
of ethnic, regional, and separatist groups; leaders of professional 
and women's groups and trade unionists who resisted government 
takeover of their organizations; churchmen; suspected members 
of the EPLF, TPLF, or other guerrilla movements; and others ar- 
rested on various pretexts on orders from the government or from 
kebeles or peasant associations. Political prisoners generally included 
a large number of young persons and educated professionals, a high 
proportion of them Eritrean or Oromo. 

Censorship, openly imposed under the old regime, became even 
harsher after 1974. The press, radio, and television were controlled 
by the state and were considered instruments of government pol- 
icy (see Mass Media, ch. 4). Independent media outlets, such as 
the Lutheran broadcasting station in Addis Ababa, were seized by 
the Mengistu government. Censorship guidelines for the press were 
vague, but many Ethiopian journalists were imprisoned for less 
than enthusiastic cooperation with the Mengistu regime. All reports 
to the foreign press had to be transmitted through the Ethiopian 
News Agency. After 1975 government authorities expelled many 
Western journalists for "mischief and distortion" in their report- 
ing. The Mengistu government also banned songs, books, and peri- 
odicals that were judged to be contrary to the spirit of the revolution. 

Because of the limited access to Ethiopia afforded Western ob- 
servers and the secrecy surrounding almost all of the Mengistu 
government's activities, accurate and consistent information and 



329 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

statistics pertaining to the Mengistu regime are difficult to obtain. 
In 1991 there still were no definitive studies describing in suffi- 
cient detail the entire scope of national security problems in con- 
temporary Ethiopia. Those interested in Ethiopian national security 
affairs therefore must rely on a variety of periodicals, including 
Africa Research Bulletin, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Third World 
Reports, and Africa Confidential. The International Institute for Stra- 
tegic Studies' annuals, The Military Balance and Strategic Survey, also 
are essential for anyone who wishes to understand the evolution 
of Ethiopia's security forces. The same is true of the annuals Africa 
Contemporary Record and World Armaments and Disarmament, the lat- 
ter published by the Stockholm International Peace Research In- 
stitute. 

Harold G. Marcus' 's Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States , 
1941-1974 provides an excellent analysis of the historical evolu- 
tion of the Ethiopian armed forces. Other useful historical sources 
include Donald N. Levine's "The Military in Ethiopian Politics"; 
Richard A. Caulk's "The Army and Society in Ethiopia"; and 
Yohannis Abate's "Civil-Military Relations in Ethiopia." Marina 
and David Ottaway's Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution also is essential 
for an understanding of the military's role in contemporary 
Ethiopia. 

Material on human rights practices in Ethiopia can be found 
in the annual Amnesty International Report and in other Amnesty In- 
ternational publications, such as Ethiopia: Human Rights Violations, 
Ethiopia: Political Imprisonment and Torture, and Ethiopia: Political Im- 
prisonment. Although dated (1979), Bekele Mesfin's "Prison Con- 
ditions in Ethiopia" remains a valuable first-hand account of the 
life of a political prisoner in Mengistu 's Ethiopia. For an analysis 
of the human costs of Mengistu's resettlement policy, Jason W. 
Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb's Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, 
1984-1985 is fundamental. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



330 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population by Urban-Rural Breakdown and by Region and 

Addis Ababa, May 1988 

3 Area, Population, and Population Density by Region and 

Addis Ababa, 1975 and 1987 

4 Population of Largest Cities and Towns, 1967, 1975, and 1987 

5 Number of Schools by Grade Level and by Region and Addis 

Ababa, Ethiopian Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1985/86 

6 Number of Students by Grade Level and Sex, Ethiopian 

Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1985/86 

7 Number of Teachers by Grade Level and by Region and Addis 

Ababa, Ethiopian Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1985/86 

8 Medical Facilities by Region and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian 

Calendar Years 1975/76 and 1983/84 

9 Medical Personnel by Region and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian 

Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1983/84 

10 Key Economic Indicators, Ethiopian Fiscal Years 1974/75 to 

1988/89 

11 Average Annual Income, Retail Price Index, and Real In- 

come, Selected Ethiopian Calendar Years, 1970/71 to 
1987/88 

12 Retail Price Index for Addis Ababa, Selected Ethiopian Calen- 

dar Years, 1970/71 to 1987/88 

13 Production of Major Crops, Selected Ethiopian Calendar 

Years, 1974/75 to 1988/89 

14 Value of Principal Exports, Selected Ethiopian Fiscal Years, 

1974/75 to 1988/89 

15 Balance of Payments, Selected Ethiopian Fiscal Years, 1980/81 

to 1988/89 



331 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Population by Urban-Rural Breakdown 
and by Region and Addis Ababa, May 1988 



Region Urban Rural Total 



Arsi 127,547 1,733,059 1,860,606 

Bale 79,159 1,047,538 1,126,697 

Eritrea 440,875 2,497,238 2,938,113 

Gamo Gofa 61,015 1,334,316 1,395,331 

Gojam . 252,042 3,380,234 3,632,276 

Gonder 239,010 3,031,430 3,270,440 

Harerge 321,202 4,336,657 4,657,859 

Ilubabor 59,454 1,018,854 1,078,308 

Kefa 145,205 2,595,568 2,740,773 

Shewa 701,294 8,358,623 9,059,917 

Sidamo 267,093 3,974,734 4,241,827 

Tigray 261,890 2,439,031 2,700,921 

Welega 141,043 2,629,555 2,770,598 

Welo 264,697 3,811,262 4,075,959 

Aseb Administration * 36,348 65,004 101,352 

Addis Ababa * 1,654,327 n.a. 1,654,327 



TOTAL 5,052,201 42,253,103 47,305,304 



n.a. — not applicable. 

* In 1988 Aseb and Addis Ababa were both separate administrative divisions. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Census Supple- 
ment, I, Addis Ababa, 1989, Table 1-2. 



333 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

Table 3. Area, Population, and Population Density by Region 
and Addis Ababa, 1975 and 1987 



Population 





Area (in 






Density (persons 




thousands 


Popu 


ation 


per square 






of square 


(in thousands) 


kilometer) 




Region 


kilometers) 


1975 


1987 


1975 


1987 


Arsi 


23.7 


1,337.8 


1,808.5 


56.4 


76.3 


Bale 


127.1 


810.7 


1,095.1 


6.4 


8.6 


Eritrea 


93.7 


2,107.9 


2,852.9 


22.5 


30.4 


Gamo Gofa 


40.3 


1,005.3 


1,356.7 


24.9 


33.7 




61.2 


2,612.4 


3,530.5 


42.7 


57.7 




79.6 


2,350.1 


3,178.7 


29.5 


39.9 




272.6 


3,348.5 


4,527.4 


12.3 


16.6 


Ilubabor 


46.5 


775.6 


1,048.3 


16.7 


22.5 


Kefa 


56.6 


1,971.5 


2,664.6 


34.8 


47.1 




85.1 


6,512.0 


8,805.3 


76.5 


103.5 




119.7 


3,052.4 


4,123.3 


25.5 


34.4 


Tigray 


64.9 


1,938.9 


2,624.4 


29.9 


40.4 




70.5 


1,993.1 


2,693.6 


28.3 


38.2 


Welo 


82.1 


2,931.7 


3,962.0 


35.7 


48.3 


Aseb Administration 1 


27.5 


73.8 


98.2 


2.7 


3.6 


Addis Ababa 2 


0.2 


1,136.6 


1,589.2 


5,683.6 7,946.0 


ETHIOPIA 


1,251.3 


33,958.3 


45,958.7 


27.1 


36.7 



1 Aseb Administration was carved out of southern Eritrea and made into a separate administrative di- 
vision in 1981. 

2 Addis Ababa was part of Shewa in 1975 but is listed separately for comparative purposes. By 1981 
Addis Ababa had become an administrative division of its own. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 7-1, 22. 



334 



Appendix 



Table 4. Population of Largest Cities and Towns, 
1967, 1975, and 1987 



City or Town 1967 1975 1987 



Addis Ababa 644,190 1,136,600 1,589,176 

Asmera 178,537 221,801 309,807 

Dire Dawa 50,733 76,639 107,150 

Harer 42,771 48,559 67,892 

Dese 40,619 56,849 79,458 

Gonder 36,309 64,562 90,220 

Jima 30,580 49,044 68,618 

Nazret 27,812 59,176 82,725 

Mekele 23,105 47,157 65,581 

Debre Zeyit 22,055 39,675 55,461 

Debre Markos 21,536 31,842 44,410 

Asela 13,886 29,637 41,313 

Nekemte 12,691 23,342 32,637 

Bahir Dar 12,463 43,826 61,121 

Dila 11,287 18,898 26,392 

Aseb 10,945 25,000 39,917 

Akaki 10,924 42,002 58,717 

Sodo 10,842 19,414 27,116 

Debre Birhan 9,188 19,978 27,929 

Agaro 8,995 15,090 21,107 

Shashemene 7,837 24,459 34,193 

Goba 7,304 18,515 25,835 

Awasa 5,575 27,517 39,827 

Metu 4,060 10,057 14,042 

Jijiga 4,031 18,111 25,320 

Arba Minch 2,890 14,261 26,711 

Wonji n.a. n.a. 38,408 

Keren n.a. n.a. 29,416 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Ethiopia: Statistical 
Abstract, 1967 and 1968, Addis Ababa, 1969, 30-36; and Ethiopia, Central Statisti- 
cal Authority, Facts and Figures, Addis Ababa, 1987, 25-28. 



335 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Table 5. Number of Schools by Grade Level 
and by Region and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian 
Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1985/86 1 







1974/75 












VJl aucs 


Cxr3.clcs 


v_xr3.QCS 


— — 

\_Tr3.QCS 


Grades 


— — — 


ivcffion 


1-6 


7-8 


9-12 


1-6 


7-8 


9-12 




1 ^ 


1 Q 


3 


JJJ 




1 A 


T5 „]„ 


fit 


o 
o 


1 
1 


3 i n 


1 « 
1 o 


c 

3 




a nn 


do 


1 A 

14 




3D 


1 o 

18 




77 


Q 

o 


o 
3 


393 
3 A3 


1 Q 


c 
J 




. . . 135 


14 


4 


676 


58 


17 




, . . 184 


21 


4 


578 


33 


18 


Harerge 


214 


47 


7 


659 


65 


13 


Ilubabor 


137 


14 


4 


405 


35 


10 


Kefa 


93 


11 


3 


499 


40 


9 




. . . 538 


100 


25 


1,443 


246 


50 




. , . 148 


31 


6 


786 


56 


13 


Tigray 


. . . 178 


19 


7 


82 


24 


11 




... 463 


28 


10 


723 


100 


15 


Welo 


. . . 158 


23 


3 


649 


45 


15 


Aseb Administration 2 . . . 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


12 


1 


1 


Addis Ababa 3 


225 


98 


30 


197 


127 


31 


TOTAL 


, , . 3,196 


507 


124 


7,900 


964 


245 



n.a. — not available. 

1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. 

2 Aseb Administration was carved out of southern Eritrea and made into a separate administrative di- 
vision in 1981. 

3 Addis Ababa was part of Shewa in 1974/75 but is listed separately for comparative purposes. By 1981 
Addis Ababa had become an administrative division of its own. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 16-3, 107. 



Table 6. Number of Students by Grade Level 
and Sex, Ethiopian Calendar Years 
1974/75 and 1985/86 * 



1974/75 1985/86 

Grade Level Male Female Total Male Female Total 



Grades 1-6 651,893 305,408 957,301 1,491,015 957,763 2,448,778 

Grades 7-8 85,286 39,298 124,584 221,102 142,030 363,132 

Grades 9-12 47,439 16,774 64,213 178,699 113,686 292,385 

University 523 72 595 16,438 1,998 18,436 

TOTAL 785,141 361,552 1,146,693 1,907,254 1,215,477 3,122,731 



* For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 61-1, 105. 



336 



Appendix 



Table 7. Number of Teachers by Grade Level 
and by Region and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian 
Calendar Years 1974/75 and 1985/86 1 







1974/75 






1985/86 






Grades 


Grades 


Grades 


Grades 


Grades 


Grades 


Region 


1-6 


7-8 


9-12 


1-6 


7-8 


9-12 


Arsi 


874 


126 


66 


2,864 


373 


311 


Bale 


514 


53 


24 


2,050 


210 


191 




2 307 


480 


355 


2,471 


561 


604 




605 


64 


39 


2 155 


167 


197 




1,124 


167 


100 


3,415 


430 


413 




1,104 


148 


71 


2,919 


321 


367 


T-J o rprrrf 


1 384 


242 


153 


3 444 


41 1 


362 




739 


92 


32 


2^463 


207 


182 


Kefa 


678 


109 


55 


3,190 


172 


265 


Shewa 


3,094 


613 


357 


6,856 


1,309 


1,277 


Sidamo 


1,341 


238 


110 


5,234 


641 


578 


Tigray 


3,105 


175 


152 


1,879 


280 


302 


Welega 


1,709 


177 


148 


4,238 


526 


508 


Welo 


1,187 


172 


96 


3,542 


371 


487 


Aseb Administration 2 . . 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


128 


14 


22 


Addis Ababa 3 


. . 3,086 


852 


770 


4,074 


1,322 


1,837 


TOTAL 


22,851 


3,708 


2,528 


50,922 


7,315 


7,903 



n.a. — not available. 

1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. 

2 Aseb Administration was carved out of southern Eritrea and made into a separate administrative division 
in 1981. 

3 Addis Ababa was part of Shewa in 1974/75 but is listed separately for comparative purposes. By 1981 
Addis Ababa had become an administrative division of its own. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 16-2, 108. 



337 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Table 8. Medical Facilities by Region 
and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian Calendar Years 
1975/76 and 1983/84 1 



Region 


Hospitals 


Hospital Beds 2 


Clinics 


Health Centers 


1975/76 


1 QQQ IQA 


1 Q7R/7A 


1 QQQ IQA 


1975/76 


1 QQQ IQA 


1975/76 


1 QQQ IQA 


Arsi 


o 


4 


1 O 1 
ill 


1 Id 
I/O 




yo 


A 


c 



Bale 




1 


95 


140 


34 


79 


4 


5 


Eritrea 3 


17 


16 


2,324 


2,895 


121 


163 


3 


5 


Gamo Gofa . . . 


3 


3 


137 


151 


49 


75 


4 


7 


Gojam 


3 


3 


242 


285 


47 


104 


7 


8 


Gonder 


10 


3 


191 


438 


51 


112 


12 


13 


Harerge 


2 


10 


828 


887 


111 


150 


10 


13 


Ilubabor 


2 


2 


163 


140 


51 


79 


5 


7 


Kefa 


3 


3 


230 


226 


61 


102 


6 


9 


Shewa 


11 


10 


590 


882 


122 


265 


15 


18 


Sidamo 


5 


5 


419 


469 


89 


145 


8 


10 


Tigray 


4 


4 


298 


570 


64 


102 


9 


9 




4 


4 


297 


337 


78 


164 


7 


10 


Welo 


4 


5 


189 


454 


70 


144 


12 


14 


Addis Ababa 4 . 


. 13 


14 


2,499 


3,257 


16 


129 


n.a. 


7 


TOTAL 


84 


8 


8,623 


11,307 


1,009 


1,909 


106 


141 



n.a. — not available. 

1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. Table does not include police and armed 
forces facilities. 

2 Does not include number of beds in three hospitals. 

3 Includes Aseb Administration, which was carved out of southern Eritrea and made into a separate 
administrative division in 1981. 

4 Addis Ababa was part of Shewa in 1975/76 but is listed separately for comparative purposes. By 1981 
Addis Ababa had become an administrative division of its own. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 17-1, 110. 



338 



Appendix 



Table 9. Medical Personnel by Region and Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopian Calendar Years 
1974/75 and 1983/84 1 





Phy 


sici3.ns 


N 




Health Assistants 


Region 


1974/75 


1983/84 


1974/75 


1983/84 


1974/75 


1983/84 


Arsi 


5 


12 


24 


40 


149 


269 


B a ] e 


7 


13 


74 


6 


34 


158 




30 


50 


1 9Q 


199 


486 


654 




4 


4 


18 


46 


107 


200 


Gojam 


10 


15 


38 


81 


173 


337 




8 


30 


36 


87 


172 


367 


T— J o y~ f^r it f 


25 


38 


63 


109 


314 


470 


Ilubabor 


6 


8 


22 


34 


101 


190 


Kefa 


17 


15 


31 


81 


120 


341 




20 


35 


95 


196 


562 


985 




9 


23 


47 


112 


247 


522 


Tigray 


7 


13 


42 


65 


212 


286 




10 


20 


54 


101 


210 


495 


Welo 


5 


22 


31 


78 


193 


426 


Aseb Administration 2 . 


. 22 


4 


44 


16 


111 


66 




165 


244 


523 


652 


1,083 


1,114 


TOTAL 


350 


546 


1,271 


1,903 


4,274 


6,880 



1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. Table does not include police and armed 
forces personnel. 

2 Aseb Administration was carved out of southern Eritrea and made into a separate administrative division 
in 1981. 

3 Addis Ababa was part of Shewa in 1974/75 but is listed separately for comparative purposes. By 1981 
Addis Ababa had become an administrative division of its own. 

Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Facts and Figures, 
Addis Ababa, 1987, Table 17-4, 114-15. 



339 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



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340 



Appendix 



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341 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Table 11. Average Annual Income, Retail Price Index, 
and Real Income, Selected Ethiopian Calendar 
Years, 1970/71 to 1987/88 1 







Retail Price Index 


Real Income 




Average 




Percentage 




Percent 3.^c 




Annual 




Change over 




Change over 


Year 


Income 2 


Index 3 


Previous Year 


Income 


Previous Year 


1970/71 


1,125 


143.7 


n.a. 


783 


n.a. 


1974/75 


1,577 


170.1 


18.4 


927 


18.4 


1980/81 


2,298 


375.2 


120.6 


612 


-34.0 


1981/82 


2,352 


396.1 


5.6 


594 


-2.9 


1982/83 


2,530 


394.5 


-0.4 


641 


7.9 


1983/84 


2,540 


427.8 


8.4 


594 


-7.3 


1984/85 


2,745 


509.4 


19.1 


537 


-9.3 


1985/86 


2,793 


459.4 


-9.8 


608 


12.8 


1986/87 


2,990 


448.3 


-2.4 


667 


8.8 


1987/88 


3,107 


480.0 


7.1 


647 


-3.0 



1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary. 

2 Wages and salaries of industrial workers; in birr (for value of the birr — see Glossary). 

3 1963 = 100. 



Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Ethiopia: Statistical 
Abstract, Addis Ababa, various issues; and Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, 
Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries, Addis Ababa, various issues. 



Table 12. Retail Price Index for Addis Ababa, 
Selected Ethiopian Calendar Years, 
1970/71 to 1987/88 1 



Year 


General 
Index 2 


Food 


Household 
Items 


Clothing 


Transportation 


1970/71 


143.7 


155.4 


133.5 


141.3 


100.0 


1974/75 


170.1 


175.1 


179.8 


190.6 


104.8 


1980/81 


375.2 


441.2 


366.1 


281.3 


140.6 


1981/82 


396.1 


467.6 


379.3 


279.3 


153.5 


1982/83 


394.5 


470.7 


352.6 


273.5 


156.4 


1983/84 


427.8 


522.8 


376.1 


272.8 


154.9 


1984/85 


509.4 


654.7 


406.8 


268.2 


156.4 


1985/86 


459.4 


553.1 


436.9 


273.2 


156.9 


1986/87 


448.3 


521.3 


479.4 


271.4 


162.7 


1987/88 


480.0 


562.4 


506.9 


275.1 


164.8 



1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calendar year — see Glossary 

2 1963 = 100. 



Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Ethiopia: Statistical 
Abstract, Addis Ababa, various issues. 



342 



Appendix 



Table 13. Production of Major Crops, Selected Ethiopian Calendar Years, 
1974/75 to 1988/89 1 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 


1974/75 


1980/81 


1984/85 


1985/86 


1986/87 


1987/88 


1988/89 


Cereals 
















Barley 


624.9 


1,075.2 


842.1 


913.9 


993.2 


995.3 


1,075.0 


Corn 


840.8 


948.2 


1,087.8 


1,037.0 


1,715.4 


1,819.5 


2,001.5 


Millet 


156.7 


204.4 


187.4 


189.9 


119.8 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Oats 


n.a. 


46.4 


27.4 


31.5 


36.4 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Sorghum 


630.5 


1,410.8 


507.2 


904.5 


963.2 


993.3 


1,112.6 


Teff 2 


847.9 


1,312.1 


912.2 


968.7 


1,033.2 


1,049.6 


1,182.0 


Wheat 


698.9 


613.2 


675.6 


774.4 


'775.3 


835.8 


'894.3 


Total cereals 3 . 


3,799.7 


5,610.4 


4,239.8 


4,820.0 


5,636.4 


5,949.5 


6,544.5 


Pulses 
















Broad beans .... 


282.1 


469.3 


265.9 


233.3 


293.5 


259.2 


n.a. 


Chick-peas 


93.4 


118.3 


92.3 


84.4 


72.2 


n.a. 


n.a. 




44.7 


147.7 


84.4 


69.3 


83.5 


n.a. 


n.a. 




32.8 


19.7 


26.9 


23.3 


33.3 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Lentils 


46.6 


59.9 


18.9 


25.9 


26.9 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Soybeans 


n.a. 


1.9 


0.5 


0.3 


0.6 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Vetch 


12.6 


31.3 


41.7 


30.9 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Total pulses 3 . 


512.2 


848.0 


530.6 


467.4 


540.8 


562.9 


619.2 


Other 
















Fenugreek 


n.a. 


2.5 


4.7 


0.1 


2.4 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Flaxseed 


18.9 


27.2 


33.9 


38.3 


31.1 


27.2 


n.a. 


Groundnuts 
















(peanuts) 


n.a. 


n.a. 


0.2 


0.4 


0.6 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Niger seed (neug) . 


26.6 


64.1 


61.8 


59.5 


45.5 


43.9 


n.a. 


Rapeseed 


n.a. 


1.5 


1.6 


2.0 


4.1 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Sesame 


n.a. 


6.5 


0.1 


0.2 


0.1 


0.4 


n.a. 


Sunflower seed . . 


n.a. 


0.2 


1.3 


0.9 


0.6 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Total other 3 . . 


58.1 


102.1 


102.6 


101.4 


84.5 


87.3 


96.0 


Total 3 


4,370.0 


6,560.6 


4,873.0 


5,388.8 


6,261.7 


6,599.7 


7,259.7 



n.a. — not available. 

1 For explanation of the Ethiopian calender year — see Glossary. 

2 For definition of teff — see Glossary. 

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, Area, Produc- 
tion, and Yield of Major Crops: Estimates, Addis Ababa, various issues. 



343 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Table 14. Value of Principal Exports, 
Selected Ethiopian Fiscal Years, 
1974/75 to 1988/89 1 
(in millions of birr) 2 



Product 


1974/75 


1980/81 


1984/85 


1985/86 


1986/87 


1987/88 


1988/89 3 




117^ 


^94 3 

J ATT. J 


tOO.J 


fifi4- ft 

DOT. O 




9 

TJJ. A 


^9^ A 


Oilseeds 


89.1 


28.4 


15.6 


7.9 


9.8 


22.0 


12.8 




73.5 


23.7 


16.9 


12.6 


8.5 


16.1 


17.0 




37 2 


92.7 


95.4 


1 19.5 


108.3 


133.0 


140 




16.9 


9.8 


19.7 


18.2 


15.6 


32.4 


30.0 


Meat, canned and 


















9.9 


6.3 


3.9 


3.9 


5.4 


5.1 


5.4 


Fruits and vegetables . 


9.8 


3.6 


5.9 


6.0 


12.8 


11.8 


15.6 


Raw cotton 


8.0 


28.2 


1.8 


0.0 


1.6 


1.1 


1.0 


Petroleum products . . 


7.4 


76.1 


67.3 


44.2 


27.3 


36.0 


30.6 




7.2 


8.8 


1.0 


2.0 


1.7 


1.1 


1.0 




6.8 


9.8 


9.3 


10.4 


12.6 


16.4 


16.5 


Other 5 


62.0 


39.4 


40.2 


33.8 


66.9 


59.4 


106.8 


Reexports 


30.9 


0.4 


0.0 


0.5 


0.0 


0.0 


n.a. 


TOTAL 


. 476.2 


851.5 


743.3 


923.8 


794.8 


773.6 


902.1 



n.a. — not available. 

1 For explanation of the Ethiopian fiscal year — see Glossary. 

2 For value of the birr — see Glossary. 

3 Estimated. 

4 Primarily molasses. 

5 Includes 26.7 million birr of nonmonetary gold in 1979/80. 

Source: Based on information from National Bank of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, various pub- 
lications. 



344 



Appendix 



Table 15. Balance of Payments, Selected Ethiopian 
Fiscal Years, 1980/81 to 1988/89 1 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1980/81 


1984/85 


1985/86 


1986/87 


1987/88 


1988/89 




JJt. 1 


^48 Q 




616 1 


fi9Q 9 


735 


Imports 


770.5 


962.2 


1,192.0 


1,217.0 


1,259.0 


1,345.5 




-216.4 


-413.3 


-529.8 


-600.9 


-629.8 


-610.5 


_ / \ 


-7 1 


33 . \J 


-9ft ft 

AO . O 


3 1 .\J 




_QA O 




24.7 


144 9 


209.4 


162.5 


182.6 


195.6 


Official transfers (net) 2 . . . . 


59.8 


298.3 


293.2 


211.8 


121.7 


132.0 


Current account balance . . 


-139.0 


-3.1 


-56.0 


-263.6 


-388.5 


-377.1 


Private loans (net) 3 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


Public loans (net) 3 


161.6 


162.3 


277.2 


181.3 


260.4 


280.7 


Short-term capital (net) 


-6.0 


42.3 


-12.8 


9.7 


9.7 


0.0 


Capital account balance . . 


16.6 


201.5 


208.4 


-72.6 


-118.4 


-96.4 


Errors and omissions 


108.9 


153.9 


43.3 


-52.7 


71.3 


-123.6 


Overall balance 


125.5 


355.4 


251.7 


-125.3 


-47.1 


-220.0 


Change in net reserves 














(- means increase) 


59.2 


-47.6 


-165.2 


19.9 


189.7 


-27.2 



1 For explanation of the Ethiopian fiscal year — see Glossary. 

2 Excludes technical assistance and similar transfers recorded in government budget. 

3 Includes medium- and long-term loans. 



Source: Based on information from National Bank of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, various pub- 
lications. 



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Chapter 5 

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375 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



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376 



Glossary 



age-set system — A system comprising several named sets (or groups) 
of men, each of which consists of those initiated in a given pe- 
riod. Each set passes through a series of age-grades, taking on 
the rights, duties, and activities specific to the grade. In Ethiopia 
such a system coexists with a generation-set system in some 
ethnic groups, e.g., the gada system (q. v.) among the Oromo. 

balabat — An Amharic term originally referring to any person with 
a claim to rist (q.v.) land by virtue of membership in a cognatic 
descent group (q.v.). Commonly used since the establishment 
of present-day Ethiopia by Menelik II in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury for those local chiefs and other non-Amhara who were as- 
signed low-level administrative positions among their own people 
and who were allocated substantial landholdings. 

birr (pi., birr; no symbol used) — The Ethiopian monetary unit, com- 
posed of 100 cents. Introduced officially in 1976, replacing the 
Ethiopian dollar at par. Through mid-1991, US$1 equaled 2.07 
birr, or 1 birr was worth about US$0.48. 

clan — A group whose members are descended in the male line from 
a putative common male ancestor (patrician) or in the female 
line from a putative common female ancestor (matriclan — not 
reported in Ethiopia). Clans may be divided into subclans or- 
ganized on the same principle or into lineages (q.v.) believed 
to be linked by descent from a remote common ancestor. 

clan-family — Among the Somali, a group of clans (q.v.) believed 
to be linked by descent from a remote common ancestor. 

cognatic descent group — A group comprising those persons tracing 
descent from a common ancestor through both males and fe- 
males, thereby differing from unilineal descent groups (q.v.), 
such as clans (q.v.) and lineages (q.v.). This entity is important 
among the Amhara and the Tigray as the one holding the block 
of land in which its members claim rist (q.v.) rights. The group 
has no other function. 

Derg — Formed in June 1974 and composed of a substantial body 
of young military officers, none above the rank of major, drawn 
from the main units of the army, air force, navy, and police. 
The Derg's membership ranged from perhaps 106 to 120 or 
more. New officers were never admitted, whereas original mem- 
bers were continuously eliminated, especially during the Derg's 
early years. Its inner workings were almost never disclosed. 
Known at first as the Coordinating Committee of the Armed 



377 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, after September 1974 
it was known as the Provisional Military Administrative Council 
(PMAC), or simply as the Derg (Amharic for "committee" 
or "council"), a term derived from Gi'iz and little used be- 
fore the 1974 revolution. The Derg lasted officially from June 
1974 to September 1987, when the People's Democratic Repub- 
lic of Ethiopia came into being, 
descent group — A group having political, economic, or social func- 
tions. Formation of the group is based on actual or putative 
descent through persons of one sex from a common ancestor 
of the same sex, and therefore called unilineal descent groups 
(clans or lineages — q. v. ), or through persons of both sexes from 
a common ancestor of either sex (cognatic descent groups — 
q.v.). 

Ethiopian calendar year — The Ethiopian year consists of 365 days, 
divided into twelve months of thirty days each plus one addi- 
tional month of five days (six in leap years). Ethiopian New 
Year's falls on September 11 and ends the following Septem- 
ber 10, according to the Gregorian (Western) calendar. From 
September 11 to December 31, the Ethiopian year runs seven 
years behind the Gregorian year; thereafter, the difference is 
eight years. Hence, the Ethiopian year 1983 began on Septem- 
ber 1 1 , 1990, according to the Gregorian calendar, and ended 
on September 10, 1991. This discrepancy results from differ- 
ences between the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Roman 
Catholic Church as to the date of the creation of the world. 

Ethiopian fiscal year (EFY) — Based on the Ethiopian calendar year 
(q.v.). Corresponds to July 8 to July 7, seven years behind the 
Gregorian (Western) calendar through December 3 1 , and eight 
years behind thereafter. 

gada system — An Oromo term used to refer to a system that groups 
persons (invariably males) of the same generation (rather than 
age) into sets. The sets are ordered hierarchically and assigned 
a range of social, military, political, and ritual rights and respon- 
sibilities. Generation-set systems are found in varying forms 
among the Oromo and other groups, e.g., the Konso and 
Sidama. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by a domestic national economy 
during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding 
the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form 
of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (con- 
sumption of capital). Only domestic production is included, 
not income arising from investments and possessions owned 



378 



Glossary 



abroad, hence the use of the word "domestic" to distinguish 
GDP from the gross national product (GNP — q. v.). Real GDP 
is the value of GDP when inflation has been taken into account. 
In this book, subsistence production is included and consists of 
the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own 
use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. 
In countries lacking sophisticated data-gathering techniques, such 
as Ethiopia, the total value of GDP is often estimated, 
gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all final 
goods and services produced by an economy during a year. 
Obtained by adding the gross domestic product (GDP — q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents and then 
subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real 
GNP is the value of GNP when inflation has been taken into 
account. 

gait — A principle of land tenure among the Amhara, Tigray, and, 
with modifications, elsewhere. Abolished by the military 
government in 1975. Gult rights were rights granted by the em- 
peror or his designated representative either to members of the 
ruling group as a reward for service or to Ethiopian Orthodox 
churches or monasteries as endowments. The holder of gult 
rights, often but not always an official, was entitled to collect 
tribute and demand labor from those on the land over which 
he held rights. Some of the tribute was kept, and the remainder 
was passed upward. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

kebele — Popular term used to describe a cooperative urban neigh- 
borhood association. Kebeles were formed after the nationali- 
zation of all urban land and rentable dwellings in July 1975. 
These cooperatives became the counterpart of the peasant as- 
sociations developed under the military government's Land Re- 
form Proclamation of March 1975. After their introduction, 
kebeles became the basic unit of urban government and served 
as instruments of sociopolitical control in urban areas. 



379 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 

lineage — A group whose members are descended through males 
from a common male ancestor (patrilineage) or through females 
from a common female ancestor (matrilineage — not reported 
in Ethiopia). Such descent can in principle be traced. Line- 
ages vary in genealogical depth from the ancestor to living 
generations; the more extensive ones often are internally seg- 
mented. 

Lome Convention — A series of agreements between the European 
Community (EC) and a group of African, Caribbean, and Pa- 
cific (ACP) states, mainly former European colonies, that pro- 
vide duty-free or preferential access to the EC market for almost 
all ACP exports. The Stabilization of Export Earnings (Sta- 
bex) scheme, a mechanism set up by the Lome Convention, 
provides for compensation for ACP export earnings lost through 
fluctuations in the world prices of agricultural commodities. 
The Lome Convention also provides for limited EC develop- 
ment aid and investment funds to be disbursed to ACP 
recipients through the European Development Fund and the 
European Investment Bank. The Lome Convention is updated 
every five years. Lome I took effect on April 1, 1976; Lome 
II, on January 1, 1981; Lome III, on March 1, 1985; and Lome 
IV, on December 15, 1989. 

Red Terror — The campaign of terror unleashed by the Derg (q. v. ) 
in response to the urban guerrilla warfare — the so-called White 
Terror — of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party and 
later of other leftist civilian opponents of the Derg, such as the 
All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement. Beginning in February 1977, 
untold thousands of mostly young people were jailed, tortured, 
and killed before the Red Terror had run its course by early 
1978. 

rist — A principle of land tenure among the Amhara and, with some 
variations, among the Tigray. Rist rights are land-use rights 
that any Amhara or Tigray, peasant or noble, can claim by 
virtue of descent through males and females from the original 
holder of such rights. Claims must be recognized by the cog- 
natic descent group (q.v.). Once held, such rights cannot be 
withdrawn except in favor of one who presumably holds a bet- 
ter claim or, in extreme cases, by the emperor. 

sublineage — A segment of a lineage (q.v.) and organized on the 
same principles. 

teff (eragrostis abyssinicd) — A cereal indigenous to Ethiopia, to which 
its consumption is almost entirely confined. It is the most widely 
grown grain in the highlands, where its flour is preferred in 



380 



Glossary 



the making of the unleavened bread injera, the traditional form 
of cereal intake. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions that provide advice and as- 
sistance on long-term finance and policy issues to developing 
countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment (IBRD), the International Development Associa- 
tion (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The 
IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the pro- 
vision of loans at market-related rates of interest to develop- 
ing countries at more advanced stages of development. The 
IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff 
of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest 
developing countries on much easier terms than those of con- 
ventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements 
the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed 
specifically to encourage the growth of productive private en- 
terprises in the less developed countries. The president and cer- 
tain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the 
IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in June 1988, insures 
private foreign investment in developing countries against such 
noncommercial risks as expropriation, civil strife, and incon- 
vertibility of currency. The four institutions are owned by the 
governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To 
participate in the World Bank Group, member states must first 
belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 

zemecha — Amharic for "campaign," in the military sense; popu- 
lar term used to denote the military government's Develop- 
ment Through Cooperation Campaign, which was launched 
as part of the initial land reform in 1975. Early implementa- 
tion included forced mobilization of university and secondary 
school students to explain the socialist revolution, including land 
reform, to peasants and to improve their traditionally low liter- 
acy rate. The term "green" zemecha was used to describe the 
agricultural aspects of the National Revolutionary Development 
Campaign in 1979. 



381 



Contributors 



LaVerle Berry is a Research Analyst in African Affairs with the 
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. 

Edmond J. Keller is Professor of Political Science and Director 
of the James S. Coleman African Studies Center at the Univer- 
sity of California at Los Angeles. 

Mulatu Wubneh is Associate Professor of Planning at East Caro- 
lina University. 

Thomas P. Ofcansky is a Senior African Analyst with the Depart- 
ment of Defense. 

John W. Turner is an African Analyst with the Department of 
Defense. 

Yohannis Abate is a Geographer and African Analyst with the 
Department of Defense. 



383 



Index 



AAPO. See All- Amhara People's Organi- 
zation 

Aba Samuel: electric plant, 190-91 
Abay River (Blue Nile), 32, 73; as poten- 
tial source of hydroelectric power, 190 
Abiye Abebe, 56 
Abu Bakr, 122 

abun (Ethiopian Orthodox patriarch): sup- 
plied by Coptic Church of Egypt, 11,13 

Abyot Seded (Revolutionary Flame), 237, 
238 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 138 

Ada: development projects in, 163 

Adal sultanate: conquered by Zara Yakob, 
15; effect ofOromo migrations on, 20; 
Oromo in, 26; revival of, 18 

Addis Ababa: airport, 198; electric plant, 
191; established as capital, 29-30; ety- 
mology of, 29, 73; health care in, 136; 
labor union in, 161; migration to, 83; 
percentage of population in, 82; popu- 
lation growth in, 82; schools established 
in, 35, 130, 131; in World War II, 37, 
39, 40 

Addis Ababa administrative division, 222 
Addis Ababa- Aseb highway, 197; attacks 

on, 197 
Addis Ababa Bank, 155 
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad, xxxii, 32; 

under British military administration, 

40; construction of, 30, 32 
Addis Ababa University, xxxi, 130; closed 

by Derg, 58; College of Agriculture, 

133; faculty of, 133; medical schools, 

140; pharmacy school, 140 
Addis Zemen (newspaper), 253 
Adefa, 12 
73, 259 

administrative divisions: insurgencies in, 
60; revised, 43, 222, 223, 243; in Tran- 
sitional Government, xxviii-xxix 

Administrative Line (Ethiopia-Somalia), 

Adola gold mine, 192 

Adulis, 7, 8, 11 

AEPA. See All-Ethiopia Peasants' Asso- 
ciation 

Afabet, battle of, 305-6,308 



AETU. See All-Ethiopia Trade Union 
AEUDA. See All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' 

Association 
Afar language, 6, 103 
Afar Liberation Front (ALF), xxxii, 62, 

239, 248 

Afar people, xxxii, 17, 18, 28-29, 95; de- 
mands for self-determination, 235; land 
distribution by, 168; and land reform, 
169; number of, 96, 248; religious af- 
filiation of, 116; tribes of, 96 

Afar Plain, 76 

Afar Sultanate Liberation Front, 248 
AFCC. See Armed Forces Coordinating 

Committee 
African Development Bank, 181, 194 
Afro-Asiatic super-language family, 6, 91; 

dispersion of, 6-7; languages of, 91 
Agew districts: Amhara expansion into, 

15 

Agew language, 6, 97; speakers of, 97 

Agew people, 11, 25, 97 

Agricultural and Industrial Development 
Bank, 155, 183 

agricultural cooperatives (see also state 
farms), 85, 145, 172-74, 235; develop- 
ment of, 172-73; dismantling of, xxx; 
incentives for, 173, 233; reaction to, 
173; service, 172 

agriculturalists, 165; Agew as, 97; Am- 
hara as, 92; compensation to, after na- 
tionalization, 189; Omotic speakers as, 
98; rivalry of, with pastoralists, 3; sub- 
sistence, 165 

Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), 
185 

agricultural products: cash crops, 146, 
176- 78; coffee, 146, 176; cotton, 178; 
ensete, 7, 179-80; fruit, 180; grain, 
7, 178, 180; oilseeds, 177-78, 179; 
pulses, 177-79; staple crops, 178-80; 
vegetables, 180; under villagization, 
85 

agriculture, 162-85; ancient, 7; commer- 
cial, 36, 164, 168-69, 173, 179; credit 
for, 156; decline in, 150; development, 
163, 170; electricity for, 191; export 
crops, 162, 179, 180, 200-201; extension 



385 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



services, 86; government spending on, 
155; growth in, 148, 186; improve- 
ments, 36; investment in, 153, 173-74, 
188; irrigation, 168, 178; under Italian 
rule, 36; labor force in, 157, 162; labor 
union in, 161; nationalization in, 149; 
as occupation, 104; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 162; perfor- 
mance of, 162-63; prices, 145; privati- 
zation in, xxx; subsidies for, 174, 177; 
production, xxxiv, 150, 162-63, 164, 
165, 169, 187, 201; traditional, 147 

Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi ("Gran"), 
18, 22; jihad of, 18-20; killed, 19, 22 

Ahmad Nasir, 304 

Ahmar Mountains, 76 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

AIDS Control and Prevention Office, 138 
air force, 279-80, 303; aircraft of, 279; 
commander, 279; competence of, 280; 
in coup attempt of 1989, 280; morale, 
286; number of personnel, 276, 279; or- 
ganization of, 279-80; origins of, 279; 
purge of, 280; training of, 279, 284 
Air Force Training Center, 283, 284 
Akaki Prison (Central Prison), 322-23, 
324; conditions in, 325; population 
growth in, 82 
Akilu Habte Wold, 51; executed, 56; res- 
ignation of, 52 
Akordat-Mitsiwa railroad, 194, 197 
Aksum, 7, 8; abandoned, 12; cathedral, 
22 

Aksumite state, xxv, 7-10, 73; architec- 
ture in, 9; area of, 8; Christianity in, 
3; coins of, 9; decline of, 8, 10; emer- 
gence of, 7; exempted from Islamic ji- 
had, 10; expansion of, 8, 11-12; extent 
of, 9; highlands colonized by, 11-12; 
impact of Islam on, 10-11; influence of, 
12; influences on, 3; language of, 8; 
Meroe conquered by, 9; relations of, 
with Arabs, 11; relations of, with By- 
zantine Empire, 10-11; traditions in, 
8-9; written records of, 9 

Al Amin Muhammad Sayyid, 250 

Alem Zewd Tessema, 53; executed, 56; 
exiled, 54 

ALF. See Afar Liberation Front 

Ali, Ras, 26 



Ali ibn Abu Talib, 122, 123 
Ali Mirah (sultan of Aussa), 62, 169, 248 
All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), 
xxx 

All-Ethiopia Peasants' Association (AEPA), 

172, 211, 224-26 
All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON), 

56, 249; debate with Ethiopian People's 

Revolutionary Party, 236; influence of, 

237; proscribed, xxvii, 59 
All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU), 113, 

278; founded, 160, 211, 229; members 

of, 161; organization of, 161; origins 

of, 58; restructured, 161 
All-Ethiopia Urban Dwellers' Association 

(AEUDA), 226 
Alula (ras), 29 
Alvarez, Francisco, 21-22 
Aman Mikael Andom, 54; background 

of, 55; conflict of, with Derg, 55; killed, 

56, 60 

AMC. See Agricultural Marketing Cor- 
poration 
Amda Siyon, 15 

American United Presbyterian Church, 
126 

Amhara, ascendancy of, 15-17; domina- 
tion, 90, 91, 101; emperor, power of, 
15-17; in Eritrea, 47; judiciary under, 
17; land tenure among, 106; military 
under, 15-16 

Amhara, district of, 14; Aksumite in- 
fluence in, 12; control of Ifat sultanate, 
14 

Amhara domination, 90, 91, 101 
Amhara nobility: conflict of, with com- 
moners, 101; elevation to, 107; under 
Haile Selassie, 43; land rights of, 107, 
108 

Amhara people, 4, 12, 13, 25, 26, 71, 91; 
conquered in Islamic jihad, 19; educa- 
tion of, 126; geographic distribution of, 
91, 100; influences on, 4; Italian at- 
tempts to isolate, 39; land held by, 71, 
110; military ethos of, 270; mixing of 
Oromo with, 20; Muslim attack on, 4; 
political power of, 214; reaction to, 101; 
religion of, 72, 92, 115, 116; as ruling 
class, 71; slaves held by, 34; social or- 
ganization of, 93 

Amharic language: as language of broad- 
casting, 200; as language of education, 
101, 103, 125, 127; as language of 



386 



Index 



government, 101, 103; literacy train- 
ing in, 134; number of speakers of, 91; 
as official language, 47, 103, 217; 
speakers of, 97 
Amnesty International, 322, 324, 325, 
327, 329 

Anglo-Ethiopian agreement (1950), 73 
Angola, 60 

Angot, 8; Aksumite influence in, 12 
Anuak people, 99 

Arabia, Southwest: migrants from, 3 

Arabic language, 47, 91; as language of 
broadcasting, 200; teaching of, dis- 
couraged, 115 

Arabs, xxv; aggressiveness of, 17; Aksu- 
mite relations with, 11; occupation by, 
of Dahlak Islands, 11; occupation by, 
of Sawakin, 11; support by, for insur- 
gencies, 103; as traders, 146 

Arab states, 46; support by, for Eritrean 
insurgents, 248 

Aranna Mountains, 76 

Arba Minch: cotton plantations in, 178; 
population growth in, 82 

Argobba people, 13, 94; religious affilia- 
tion of, 116 

armed forces, 276-91; under Amhara, 15; 
attitudes toward, 272, 275, 276, 285; 
campaigns against insurgents, 87; chain 
of command, 277; command and force 
structure, 277-78; commander in chief, 
220, 277; conditions in, 289; conscrip- 
tion, 276-77; under constitution of 1987, 
276-77; control of, 16-17; defections 
from, 262-63; demonstrations by, 112; 
under Derg, 275-76; desertion from, 
285; discipline of, 285-88; disintegration 
of, 310; dismantled, xxxi, xxxv; eco- 
nomic burden of, 150; factions in, 51, 
53; hierarchy, 272; imperial, 271-73; in- 
competence in, 285-86; Italian sur- 
render to, 40; massacres by, 327; mem- 
bers of, arrested by Derg, 54, 112; mis- 
sions of, 276; modernization of, 104; 
morale of, 285-88; number of per- 
sonnel in, 276; pay and benefits in, 
52, 285; professionalization of, 275; 
purged, 288, 292; recruitment for, 271; 
reforms of, 275; revolution by, 51; 
training, 273; women in, 271, 285 

Armed Forces Coordinating Committee 
(AFCC), 53 

Armed Forces Staff Academy, 283 



Armenians: as traders, 146 

Arms Traffic Act (1930), 34-35 

army, 278-79; attack formation, 272; 
battlefield practices, 272; brigandage, 
272; cavalry, 272; command structure, 
271; conditions in, 52; under constitu- 
tion of 1987, 217; desertion, 286; en- 
gineers, 286; expansion, 286; ground 
order of battle, 278; infantry, 272; 
maintenance, 279; materiel, 278; 
modernization of, 26, 273-74; muti- 
nies, 286, 287-88; number of troops in, 
276, 278; organization of, 278; pay and 
benefits, 286; as percentage of armed 
forces, 278; police commandos in, 317; 
police functions of, 316; ranks, 272; role 
of, 217; tension of, with People's 
Militia, 286; training of, 40, 279, 285 

Arsi: insurgency in, 60; land distribution 
by, 168; population density in, 79; 
religion in, 103; schools in, 131; villagi- 
zation in, 175, 234 

artisans: fate of, 112-13; role of, 112-13; 
social status of, 104, 112 

Aseb, 82; electric plant, 191; free-trade 
zone in, xxvii, 34; granted autonomy, 
65, 102, 223, 242-43; naval base, 280; 
port of, 29, 197, 198 

Aseb administrative division, 222 

Asefa Ayene, 279 

Ashagre Yigletu, 250, 251 

Asmera: airport, 198; electric plant, 191; 
health care in, 136; under Italian rule, 
36; percentage of population in, 82 

Asrate Kasa (ras), 47 

Atnafu Abate (major), 53, 57, 294; as sec- 
ond vice chairman of Provisional Mili- 
tary Administrative Council, 56 

Aussa, 169 

Australopithecus afarensis, 6 

Awash: People's Militia in, 281; popula- 
tion growth in, 82 

Awash electric plants, 190 

Awash River, 77; as potential source of 
hydroelectric power, 190 

Awash River valley, 6; cotton plantations 
in, 178; and land reform, 169 

Awi people: number of, 97 

Awngi language, 97 

Azebo people (Oromo), 48 

Azebo-Raya revolt (1928-30), 247 

Azezo: air base, 280; People's Militia in, 
281 



387 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Badoglio, Pietro, 38 

Bahir Dar: electric plant, 190, 191; popu- 
lation growth in, 82; veterinary station 
in, 181 

balance of payments, 145, 202-3; deficit, 
149 

balance of trade, 148, 200; deficit, 149, 
200 

Bale: insurgency in, 60, 247; land distri- 
bution in, 168; Muslims in, 103; popu- 
lation density in, 79; schools in, 131; 
villagization in, 87, 233 

Banco di Napoli, 155 

Banco di Roma, 155 

BandAid, 230 

Bani Shangul people, 100 

banking, 155-56; nationalized, 57, 145, 
152, 155 

Bank of Ethiopia: currency issued by, 36; 

established, 34, 35 
Baro River, 77, 198; as potential source 

of hydroelectric power, 190 
Basilios (abuna), 43 
Battle of Adwa (1896), 32 
Battle of Dogali (1887), 29 
Battle of Keren (1941), 40, 239 
Battle of Lepanto (1571), 21 
Battle of Metema (1889), 29 
Battle of Shimbra Kure (1529), 19 
Bauer, Dan Franz, 92 
Baxter, P.T.W., 94 
Begemdir: loyal ruler established in, 35 
Begemdir and Simen: land tenure in, 167 
Beja language, 93, 98 
Beja people, 98; converted to Islam, 11; 

number of, 98 
Belgium: military mission of, 34, 273, 282 
Beni Amir people, 93 
Berber language, 6 
Berta language family, 91 
Berta people, 99 

Beta Israel people: emigration of, 97, 262, 
300; number of, 262 

Bethel Evangelical Church, 126 

Bilate: cotton plantations in, 178 

Bilen people: number of, 97 

birth control, 79 

Bloody Saturday, 56, 60, 255 

Blue Nile, 32, 73, 77 

Bole International Airport, 198 

Borana people (Oromo), 94; land distri- 
bution by, 168; religious affiliation of, 
103, 116 



border disputes, 258; with Somalia, 
49-50, 258, 259; with Sudan, 258, 261 

borders, 72, 73; Administrative Line 
(Ethiopia-Somalia), 73 

border security, 258-61 

Britain: advisers from, 40, 282-83; aid 
from, 27; Arms Traffic Act signed by, 
34; attempts by, to colonize Eritrea, 4; 
attempts by, to gain influence in Ethio- 
pia, 32; compensation to, after nation- 
alization, 189; Italian surrender to, 40; 
military cooperation with, 32; military 
training provided by, 40, 280; recog- 
nition by, of Italian occupation, 38; 
relief from, 230; Tripartite Treaty 
signed by, 32 

British military administration, 40, 274; 
areas administered by, 40; economic 
control by, 41; end of, 46, 49 

Bruce, James, 24 

budget deficit, 149; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 150, 156 

budget preparation, 153-54 

Bulgaria: advisers from, 257 

bureaucracy (see also civil service): con- 
sumption expenditures, 228-29; em- 
ployment in, 112; growth of, 228; 
modernization of, 104; rehabilitation 
of, 41 

bureaucrats: fate of, 112-13; role of, 
112-13 

Byzantine Empire, xxv, 10; Christian 
contact with, 21 ; relations of, with Ak- 
sumite state, 10-11 

CADU. See Chilalo Agricultural Develop- 
ment Unit 

Canada, 192; relief from, 230 

Capital Development Fund, 183 

Carter, Jimmy: arms sales curtailed by, 
238, 255; as peace negotiator, 250, 306 

Carter Presidential Center, 250, 306 

Castro Ruz, Fidel, 297 

Catholicism, Roman: introduction of, 4; 
missionaries, 22; number of, 125; per- 
centage of followers in population, 125; 
Portuguese attempts to convert to, 17, 
22 

cattle, 97, 99, 181-82 

CELU. See Confederation of Ethiopian 

Labor Unions 
censorship, 47, 329 



388 



Index 



census of 1984, 78, 156 
Central Cushitic speakers, 97 
Central Personnel Agency, 161 
Central Planning Supreme Council, 227 
Central Prison. See Akaki Prison 
Central Statistical Authority (CSA), 81, 
148 

Chercher Mountains, 76 

Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit 
(CADU), 163 

China, 10; assistance from, 43, 255, 257 

Christianity (see also under individual denomi- 
nations), xxv; conversion to, 26; effect 
of Oromo migrations on, 20; introduc- 
tion of, 10; spread of, 10, 12 

Christians: in Eritrean Assembly, 46; eth- 
nicity of, 71; parity of, with Muslims, 
47; rivalry of, with Muslims, 3, 17, 18, 
47 

churches (see also Lalibela): carved stone, 
3, 12 

church-state relations, 43, 217 

civil servants: reeducation of, 227 

civil service (see also bureaucracy), 227-29; 
conflict within, 227; control by, 228; 
patronage in, 228; recruitment for, 227; 
reform of, 227 

clergy: categories of, 118; duties of, 118; 
education of, 118; marriage of, 118; as 
occupation, 104; origins of, 118; per- 
centage of population in, 118; ritual pu- 
rity of, 118 

climate, 77-78; cool zone, 77, 79; hot 
zone, 77-78, 79; precipitation, 77, 78; 
seasons, 78; temperate zone, 77, 79; 
temperature, 77, 78 

Coast Guard, 280 

coastline, 72 

coffee: as cash crop, 146, 176; cultivation 
of, 97, 146, 176, 177; domestic con- 
sumption of, 176; exports of, 176, 
200-201, 203, 295; foreign-exchange 
earnings from, 177; price of, 177, 204; 
revenues from, 176, 177; taxes on, 154 
Cohen, Herman, 251, 263, 264, 306 
College of Teacher Education, 133 
commerce: electricity for, 191; as occu- 
pation, 104 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, 155 
Commission for Higher Education: created, 
132 

Commission for the Rehabilitation of Ex- 
Soldiers and War Veterans, xxxi 



Commission to Organize the Party of the 
Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE): 
bureaucracy of, 212; Central Commit- 
tee, 212, 213; congresses of, 212; Derg 
members in, 212, 213; distribution of 
power in, 212-13; Executive Commit- 
tee, 213; formed, 62, 211, 227; mem- 
bership of, 211-12; military personnel 
in, 212; People's Protection Brigades 
under, 319; Secretariat, 212 

Committee of Unity and Collaboration, 
39 

communications, 199-200; growth in, 
148 

Compagnia Nazionale Impresse Elet- 
triche, 191 

Compagnie Imperiale des Chemins de 
Fers Ethiopiens, 194 

Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions 
(CELU), 51, 236; abolished, 58, 113, 
160, 229; recognized, 160 

Conference of African States on the De- 
velopment of Education, 127 

Congo (former Belgian): troops commit- 
ted to, 254, 274 

conscription, 232, 263, 276-77, 288-91; 
eligibility for, 288; orders, 289, 309; 
press gangs for, 289; problems caused 
by, 164; resistance to, 289, 309 

Constitutional Commission (to set up 
PDRE), 216; formed, 214; members 
of, 214 

constitution of 1 93 1 , 35 ; emperor under, 

35 

constitution of 1955, 44-45; labor under, 
160; personal freedoms under, 45; rati- 
fied, 46; religion under, 115; revised, 
52; sincerity of, 44 

constitution of 1987, 214-22; amend- 
ments to, 215; approved, 62-63; armed 
forces under, 276-77; citizenship 
under, 217-18; contents of, 216; Coun- 
cil of Ministers under, 220-21; Coun- 
cil of State under, 218-19; discussion 
of, 215; draft of, 214-15; economic 
planning under, 152, 220; executive 
under, 219-20; foreign relations under, 
220; human rights under, 326; judici- 
ary under, 221-22; legislature under, 
218; model for, 63, 216; promulgated, 
65, 216, 235; referendum on, 215-16; 
regional administration under, 223, 
242; religion under, 103; rights and 



389 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



duties under, 217; scientific socialism 
under, 214; social order under, 216-17; 
Workers' Party of Ethiopia under, 214 

construction: investment in, 153, 188; 
labor union in, 161; lumber in, 183 

consumer goods: imports of, 202; short- 
ages of, 173 

Coordinating Committee of the Armed 
Forces, Police, and Territorial Army. 
See Derg 

Coptic Church of Egypt, 4; contact with, 
12, 21; patriarch supplied by, 11, 13, 
21, 117 

COPWE. See Commission to Organize 
the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia 
cotton, 178 

Council of Chalcedon (451), 10 
Council of Florence (1441), 21 
Council of Ministers, xxviii, 152, 153, 
220-21, 277, 278; under constitution of 
1987, 216, 217, 219; members of, 220; 
reorganized, 220; responsibilities of, 
220; terms of, 220 
Council of Representatives, xxviii, xxxi 
Council of State, 218-19, 250, 277; under 
constitution of 1987, 216, 217; mem- 
bers of, 218 
counterinsurgency operations, 276, 282, 
302-3 

coups d'etat: attempted, of 1960, xxvi, 45; 
attempted, of 1989, 210, 246, 249-50, 
262, 276, 280, 288, 306, 308, 239 

courts, xxxiii, 320; military, 221; peo- 
ple's, 222; sharia, 115, 123-24; special, 
322; special appeal, 322; special mili- 
tary, 322; tribal, 319 

crime, xxxiii, 317, 319-26; economic, 
322; political, 315, 320; punishment 
for, 319-26 

criminal procedures code of 1961, 320 

CSA. See Central Statistical Authority 

Cuba: education in, 135, 227, 237; med- 
ical assistance from, 140; military ad- 
visers from, 278, 279, 282, 284, 285, 
297; military aid from, 238, 313, 314; 
prisons constructed by, 324; relations 
of, with Somalia, 256; support by, for 
insurgents, 248; troops from, 5, 60, 
257, 259, 269, 270, 297, 298 

currency: British control of, 41; devalued, 
xxx; issued, 36 

current account: deficit, 149, 150 

current expenditures, 155 



Cushitic languages, 6, 18, 91, 94-98 
Czechoslovakia: advisers from, 257; mili- 
tary agreements with, canceled, 270 

Dahlak Islands, 76; Arab occupation of, 
11; Soviet naval facilities in, 281 

Damot (district): Amhara expansion into, 
15 

Davidson, Basil, 305 

Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 230-31 

death: causes of, 80, 136-37, 163 

Debre Birhan Selassie church, 23 

Debre Markos: population growth in, 83 

Debre Tabor: burned, 27 

Debre Zeyit: air base, 280; population 

growth in, 83; veterinary station in, 181 
debt: external, 203; long-term, 203-4; 

service ratio, 150 
debteras: duties of, 118, 120; education of, 

118 

Defense Council, 277 

defense spending, 204, 291, 309; budget, 
149, 274; under Haile Selassie, 154; in 
Ogaden War, 155; as percentage of 
government spending, 150, 291 

democratic centralism, 217 

Denakil Depression, 76; climate in, 77; 
precipitation in, 78 

Deresa speakers, 96 

Derg, 71; administration, 222; agenda of, 
54, 236; agriculture under, 164; armed 
forces under, 275; attacks on, 55, 236, 
256; and Commission to Organize the 
Party of the Workers of Ethiopia, 212, 
213; dissidents arrested by, 55; domes- 
tic policy of, 257; Eritrean question dis- 
cussed in, 60, 240; establishment of, 
51-54; foreign policy of, 254-57; goals 
of, 229; labor under, 160; land reform 
under, 169, 229; members of, 53, 212, 
213; officers in, 290; opposition to, 239; 
Politburo, 236-37; powers of, 53, 54; 
power struggle in, 56-57; relations of, 
with Somalia, 258-60; relations of, with 
Soviet Union, 211, 256-57; relations 
of, with Sudan, 260-61; relations of, 
with West, 258; reorganization of, 57; 
Standing Committee of, 213; talks of, 
with Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front, 62, 250-51; talks of, with Tigray 
People's Liberation Front, 251-52; taxes 
under, 154 



390 



Index 



Dese: population growth in, 83 

development: armed forces in, 275; in- 
vestment in, 153; politics of, 229-35; 
regional, 222-23; resources for, 223; 
strategy, 170 

Development Bank of Ethiopia, 188 

Development Through Cooperation Cam- 
paign (zemecha), 134, 236; economic im- 
pact of, 149; goals of, 129-30, 224; 
health care under, 138; industry under, 
186-87; land reform under, 169, 172; 
students in, 58, 129-30, 224 

Directorate of Police, 317; Criminal In- 
vestigation Branch, 317 

Dire Dawa: air base, 280; airport, 198; 
electric plant, 191; granted autonomy, 
65, 102, 223; health care in, 136; popu- 
lation growth in, 82 

disease, 136-37; as cause of death, 80 

Djibouti, 49; border with, 72; Ethiopian 
refugees in, 87, 89, 90; port of, 197 

Djibouti, port of, 197 

Doctors without Borders, 84 

Dornier company, 284 

Dorze people, 98 

drainage, 73-77 

drought, xxx, xxxiv, 5, 52, 71, 83, 145, 
200, 201, 204, 210; as cause of death, 
80; demonstrations against, 160; im- 
pact of, 87, 150, 162, 164, 177; of 1969, 
87; of 1972-74, 163; of 1978, 88; of 
1984-86, 83, 90, 232; of 1987, 89; pol- 
itics of, 230-32; refugees from, 88; 
relief, 180 



EAL. See Ethiopian Air Lines 
earthquakes, 77 
East African Rift Plateau, 73 
East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic 

East Sudanic language family, 91; lan- 
guages of, 91 

ECHAAT. See Revolutionary Struggle of 
the Ethiopian Masses 

economic: base, 162; growth, 148; pol- 
icy, 147; reform, 209, 262 

economic development, 147, 148; based 
on scientific socialism, 210; components 
of, 209-10 

economic plans (see also under five-year 
plans), 138, 145, 147-48; under consti- 



tution of 1987, 217, 220; under Derg, 
152; diversification under, 185; ten- 
year perspective plan, 145 
economy: collapse of, xxx, 63-64; un- 
der constitution of 1987, 217; diver- 
sification of, 149, 185; feudal, 151, 163, 
170, 222; growth, 148; under impe- 
rial regime, 146-49; Marxist, 145- 
46, 149-50, 152; mixed, 146, 152-53, 
165, 187, 189-90, 263; policy, 147; 
under Provisional Government of Eri- 
trea, xxxiv-xxxv; reform, 209, 262; 
role of government in, 151-56; tradi- 
tional, 146; under Transitional Govern- 
ment of Ethiopia, xxx; underground, 
154 

EDU. See Ethiopian Democratic Union 
education (see also schools), 126-35; 
changes in, 53; under constitution of 
1987, 217; deficiencies in, 127; foreign 
assistance for, 135; government spend- 
ing on, 129, 155; under imperial rule, 
126-29; lack of, 130; of middle class, 
104; by missionaries, 126; opportunity 
for, 126; policy, 127, 130; primary, 72; 
progress in, 229; public, 127; in rural 
areas, 72; secular, 127; under Tafari 
Mekonnen, 34; taxes for, 128-29; voca- 
tional, 132-34 
education, higher, 132-34; admission 
criteria, 133; enrollment in, 133; ex- 
pansion of, 133; objectives of, 132-33; 
women in, 133 
Education Sector Review (ESR), 129 
education system: changes in, 53, 128; ex- 
panded, 72; inadequacies of, 128; re- 
forms of, 130; responsiveness of, to 
national needs, 126 
EC. See European Community 
EFAP. See Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan 
Egypt, xxv, 256; attacks by, 28; contact 
of, with highlanders, 13; defeat of, 
28-29; relations with, 262 
Egyptian language, 6 
elections: of 1952, 46; of 1987, 65; of 

1992, xxix-xxx; of 1993, xxxiii 
electric power: distribution of, 191; ex- 
panded, 35; geothermal, 190-91, 192; 
hydroelectric, 73, 190; production, 190; 
use of, 191; under villagization, 85, 86 
ELF. See Eritrean Liberation Front 
elite: background of, 44; killed in Red 
Terror, 88; political power of, 44-45; 
reform desired by, 44, 51 



391 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



ELM. See Eritrean Liberation Movement 
ELPA. See Ethiopian Light and Power 
Authority 

EMALEDEH. See Union of Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Organizations 

emigration: of educated people, 88 

emperor(s): armed forces under, 271; bat- 
tle under, 271-72; court, 272 

Endalkatchew Mekonnen, 52, 54; exe- 
cuted, 56 

energy resources, 190-92; imports of, 

202; potential, 190; traditional, 192 
English: as language of broadcasting, 200 
ensete (false banana), 93; cultivation of, 
97, 98 

environment: damage to, 86 

EPDM. See Ethiopian People's Demo- 
cratic Movement 

EPLA. See Eritrean People's Liberation 
Army 

EPLF. See Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front 

EPRA. See Ethiopian People's Revolu- 
tionary Army 

EPRDF. See Ethiopian People's Revolu- 
tionary Democratic Front 

EPRP. See Ethiopian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party 

Era of the Princes. See Zemene Mesafint 

ERESA. See Eritrean Region Electricity 
Supply Agency 

Eritrea, 8, 38, 45, 86; administrative 
subregions in, 242; annexed by Ethio- 
pia, 5; attempts to secede, 90; con- 
stitution referendum in (1987), 216; 
demands for self-determination, 235, 
255; drought in, 89; earthquakes in, 77; 
etymology of, 36; European attempts to 
colonize, 4; famine relief in, 230; gov- 
ernment defeated in, 64-65; granted 
autonomy, 65, 102, 223, 242; indepen- 
dence of, xxxiii-xxxiv, 264, 307; as 
Italian colony, 31, 36, 273; labor union 
in, 161; land tenure in, 167, 168; mar- 
tial law in, 240; membership of, in 
Lome Convention, xxxiv; membership 
of, in Organization of African Unity, 
xxxiv; membership of, in United Na- 
tions, xxxiv; Muslims in, 103; popula- 
tion of, xxxvi; postwar disposition of, 
46; as province of Ethiopia, 47; requests 
to annex, 41, 44; schools in, xxxiii, 130, 
131; soil erosion in, 166; state of emer- 



gency declared in, 242; United Nations 
plan to join with Ethiopia, 46 

Eritrea, Government of, xxxiv 

Eritrean Assembly, 46, 47 

Eritrean insurgency, xxvi, 5, 46-48, 
60-62, 87, 90, 101, 239-44, 269, 297, 
301-7; Arab support for, 103; disagree- 
ments within, 241; government defeats 
in, 302-3, 304, 305-6, 307; govern- 
ment victories in, 302, 303; under Haile 
Selassie, 240; under Mengistu, 240-44; 
military campaign against, 87, 88, 276; 
Sudanese support for, 261 

Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 60, 
241, 300; attempts to co-opt, 240; 
founded, 47, 239-40, 302; goals of, 
239; growth of, 47; guerrilla activities 
of, 240; internal disputes, 240; split 
of, with Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front, 243-44, 302; support for, 47, 
240; troop strength of, 302 

Eritrean Liberation Front-Central Com- 
mand, 242 

Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liber- 
ation Front, 48, 241 

Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary 
Council 302, 304 

Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), 
241; founded, 239 

Eritrean People's Liberation Army 
(EPLA), 241 

Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), 

xxvi, 60, 210, 233, 239, 241-44, 280, 

301, 302, 307; call by, for recognition 
of independence, 304; Central Com- 
mittee, xxxiv, 241; congresses of, 241, 
242; cooperation of, with Tigray Peo- 
ple's Liberation Front, 60; defeats of, 

302, 303; image of, 48; members of, 47, 
48, 239; materiel captured by, 303, 
306; military assistance by, to Tigray 
People's Liberation Front, 245, 306; 
military campaigns against, 302-4; 
military campaigns of, 238; military 
training of, 300; organization of, 241; 
peace talks, 250-52, 263; Political 
Bureau, 241 ; relief services attacked by, 
89; rift of, with Eritrean Liberation 
Front groups, 243-44, 302; successes of, 

xxvii, 89, 197-98, 242, 303, 304, 305-6, 
307; support for, 239, 241; territory con- 
trolled by, 216; troop strength of, 302, 
305 



392 



Index 



Eritrean Region Electricity Supply Agency 
(ERESA), 191 

Eritrean Relief Association, 89; food con- 
voys of, 89 

ESR. See Education Sector Review 

Ethio-Nippon Mining Share Company, 
193 

Ethiopia: etymology of, 9 

Ethiopia, People's Democratic Republic 
of (PDRE) {see also Derg): 209, 214, 
216; collapse of, 263; constitution of, 
214, 216-18; Council of Ministers, 
220-21; Council of State, 218-19; for- 
eign policy toward Israel, 292; judicial 
system, 221-22; National Shengo (Na- 
tional Assembly), 218; presidency, 
219-20; proclaimed, 65, 216; referen- 
dum for, 215-16 

Ethiopia-Kenya Border Administration 
Commission, 259-60 

Ethiopian Air Lines (EAL), 198-99, 204; 
aircraft of, 199; plans to expand, 199; 
reputation of, 198-99; service to, 198 

Ethiopian Democratic Officers' Revolu- 
tionary Movement, 308 

Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), 
238-39, 244, 245 

Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane 
Yesus, 125-26 

Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan (EFAP), 
184-85 

Ethiopian Herald (newspaper), 253 
Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, 155-56 
Ethiopian Investment Corporation, 188 
Ethiopian Light and Power Authority 

(ELPA), 191 
Ethiopian News Agency, 329 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 1 16-20; at- 
tempts to reform, 27-28; bishoprics 
created in, 42-43; Church Council of, 
117; community in Jerusalem, 21; con- 
version of, 93, 94; disestablished, 103, 
115-16, 217; doctrinal quarrel of, with 
Jesuits, 23, 24; doctrine of, 119; edu- 
cation by, 126; emphasis on Judaic 
roots, 13; Episcopal Synod of, 117; es- 
tablished, 3, 9-10; ethnic groups in, 
116; faith and practice, 119-20; fast 
days, 119, 179; under Haile Selassie, 
43, 103; headquarters of, 117; holy 
days, 119; isolation of, 11, 12; land held 
by, 31, 108, 167, 168; land tax on, 43; 
Lij Iyasu excommunicated by, 33; 



members of, 96, 98; monastic orders of, 
23; organization of, 117-19, 120; patri- 
arch of, 11, 21, 42, 56, 117; percentage 
of population practicing, 72, 116; re- 
form in, 42; reorganized, 15, 22; ritu- 
als of, 119; saint's days, 119; spirits in, 
119-20; as state religion, 72, 103, 115, 
124 

Ethiopian People's Democratic Move- 
ment (EPDM), 234, 282, 308; alliance 
of, with Tigray People's Liberation 
Front, 246, 252; members of, 246 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army 

(EPRA), 238 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Dem- 
ocratic Front (EPRDF), 210, 282; 
formed, 308; goals of, 246; members 
of, 308; military actions of, 246, 252- 
53; peace talks with, 263; relations of, 
with Oromo Liberation Front, 311; role 
in National Conference, xxvii 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP), xxxii-xxxiii, 56, 239, 245, 
249; agitation by, 58, 236, 238; debate 
with MEISON, 236; members of, 236; 
victims of Red Terror, 58-59, 237 
Ethiopian Plateau. See highlands 
Ethiopian Police College, 315, 318 
Ethiopian Pulses and Oilseeds Corpora- 
tion, 177 
Ethiopian Road Authority, 194 
Ethiopian Workers Commission, 161 
Ethiopia Soldiers' Movement, 287 
Ethiopia Tikdem, 54, 236 
Ethiopia Trade Union (ETU), 161 
Ethio-Semitic language family, 91-94 
ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups): diversity in, 105; geographic 
distribution of, 100-101; marriage be- 
tween, 100; relations among, 100-105; 
and religion, 71; in Transitional Gov- 
ernment, xxviii: in Workers' Party of 
Ethiopia, 214 
ETU. See Ethiopia Trade Union 
Europe, Eastern: medical assistance from, 

140; military aid from, 238 
European Development Fund, 258 
European Community (EC): agricultural 
assistance from, 183; educational as- 
sistance from, 135; financial assistance 
from, xxx, 203, 258; technical as- 
sistance from, 194 
European Investment Bank, 198 



393 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



evil eye, 120 

exports {see also under individual products), 
200-201, 204; agricultural, 162, 177- 
78, 200; British control of, 41; of coffee, 
146, 176, 200, 203; growth in, 148; to 
Japan, 201; of oilseeds, 179, 201, 203; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 201; of pulses, 201, 203; to Soviet 
Union, 201; taxes on, 154; to United 
States, 201; value of, 200-201, 202; to 
West Germany, 201 

Ezana (king), 9; converted to Christian- 
ity, 10 



Falasha people. See Beta Israel people 
famine, xxvi, 5, 71, 83, 137, 201, 204, 
210, 265; as cause of death, 80, 163, 
230; demonstrations against, 160; pol- 
itics of, 230-32; refugees from, 88; 
relief, 150, 230-32; victims, 150, 230 
famine of 1973-74, 51, 52, 83, 87; casual- 
ties of, 87, 163; demands for relief 
from, 52; government refusal to pro- 
vide relief for, 163 

famine of 1984-85, 200, 327; inability to 
provide relief for, 63-64, 194; refugees 
from, 88-89, 90; resettlement during, 
232, 324; spread of, 63 

famine of 1989, 328 

FAO. See United Nations, Food and Agri- 
culture Organization of the 

Fasiladas (emperor), 22 

Fellowship of Evangelical Believers, 125 

FER. See Franco-Ethiopian Railroad 

Fetha Nagast (Law of Kings), 17, 320 

feudalism, 42, 71, 106-7, 163; disman- 
tled, 129, 170, 222 

Fiche: People's Militia in, 281 

Fikre-Selassie Wogderes: as prime 
minister, 65, 220, 262 

Fincha River electric plant, 190, 191 

fishermen's cooperatives, 183 

fishery associations, 183 

fishing, 182-83; commercial, 183; domes- 
tic market for, 182; exports, 183; labor 
union in, 161; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 182; production, 
182, 183 

Fish Production and Marketing Corpo- 
ration (FPMC), 183 
Fisseha Desta: as vice president, 65 
Five-year Plan, First (1957-61), 147, 148 



Five-Year Plan, Second (1962-67), 147, 
148, 188 

Five-Year Plan, Third (1968-73), 147-48 
food: aid, xxxiv, 180; demand for, 180; 
import of, 180, 200; production, 180; 
shortages, 185 
food for work programs, 166, 235 
foreign assistance, 149, 202-3, 269; agri- 
cultural, 174; from Britain, 27; from 
Canada, xxx; dependence on, 145, 156; 
from East Germany, 135, 298; for edu- 
cation, 135; from European Commu- 
nity, xxx, 135, 183, 203, 258, 298; from 
Japan, xxx; per capita, 203; from 
Soviet Union, 43, 253, 255, 296; from 
Sweden, 43, 135; from United States, 
xxx, 253; from World Bank, xxx, 193, 
194, 203, 258 
foreign exchange, 187; British control of, 

41; earnings, 177; lack of, 150 
foreign policy, of modern Ethiopia (see also 
Derg; Ethiopia, People's Democratic Re- 
public of), 253-54; under constitution 
of 1987, 217, 220; factors determining, 
257; under imperial governments, 47, 
253 

forestry, 183-85; labor union in, 161; 
peasant involvement in, 172; as percent- 
age of gross domestic product, 184; 
products, 184 

forests, 165; area, 183; fuel from, 184; 
lumber from, 183; nationalized, 184 

Four Power Inquiry Commission, 46 

FPMC . See Fish Production and Market- 
ing Corporation 

France: Arms Traffic Act signed by, 34; 
attempts by, to colonize Eritrea, 4; at- 
tempts by, to gain influence in Ethio- 
pia, 32; interests of, 31-32; invasion of 
Sudan by, 32; military assistance from, 
279; recognition by, of Italian occupa- 
tion, 38; Tripartite Treaty signed by, 32 

frankincense, 184 

Franco-Ethiopian Railroad (FER), 194, 
197 

Free Ethiopia Soldiers' Movement, 249, 
250 

French language: as language of broad- 
casting, 200 

French Somaliland, 49; under British 
military administration, 40 

French Territory of the Afars and Issas, 
49 



394 



Index 



Gafat people, 12 

Galawdewos (emperor), 19; Portuguese 

military assistance to, 19 
Galla. See Oromo people 
Gambela: resettlement to, 174 
Gambela People's Liberation Front, xxxiii 
gas, natural, 191; exploration for, 191; 

import of, 191 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
Gedara, 8 

Ge'ez. See Gi'iz language 
Gemu-Gofa language, 7 
Gemu people, 98 

Genale River, 77; as potential source of 

hydroelectric power, 190 
Genet Military School {see also Holeta 

Military Training Center), 282, 284, 

285 

German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many): advisers from, 257, 284; edu- 
cation assistance from, 135; education 
in, 237; materiel from, 279, 299; mili- 
tary agreements with, canceled, 270, 
299; military assistance, 298; military 
training by, 298, 299, 319; peace talks 
in, 298; relations with, 298; security ad- 
visers from, 228, 298 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West Ger- 
many): assistance from, 43; exports to, 
201; imports from, 202; materiel from, 
316 

Gideo People's Democratic Organization, 

XXX 

Gi'iz language, 8, 9; literature in, 15 
Girmame Neway, 45 
glasnost, 210 

GNP. See gross national product 
Goba: air base, 280; population growth 
in, 82 

Gojam: Amhara expansion into, 15; eth- 
nic groups in, 91, 100; land tenure in, 
167; loyal ruler established in, 35; no- 
bles of, refusal to pay land tax, 42; op- 
position to land reform in, 58; People's 
Militia in, 281; resettlement to, 174, 
232; revolt in, 39; schools in, 131; vil- 
lagization in, 234 

gold, 146, 192 

Gonder city: founding and capital, 22; 
population growth in, 83 

Gonder region: ethnic groups in, 91, 100; 
insurgency in, 65; resetdement to, 174, 
232; schools in, 131; soil erosion in, 



166; villagization in, 86 

Gonder state, 22-24 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 66, 210, 257, 296 

government: agriculture under, 181; 
Haile Selassie's control over local, 43; 
labor force in, 157; marketing opera- 
tions, 185; media controlled by, 253; 
as occupation, 104; repression, 160, 
288; repression, refugees from, 88 

government revenue: coffee as percentage 
of, 176, 177 

government spending: on agriculture, 
155, 163; on education, 129, 155; on 
government services, 155; on health, 
155 

Gran. See Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi 
Grand (Menelik's) Palace, 323; shootout 

at, 57, 310 
Graziani, Rodolfo, 38; assassination at- 
tempt against, 38 
Greater Ethiopia, 214, 240 
Greater Somalia, 41, 247, 248, 301 
Great Rift Valley, 6, 72, 76; geothermal 
energy in, 192; landholdings in, 168; 
origins of humankind in, 6; population 
density in, 79; precipitation in, 78 
Greek language, 9 

Greeks: investment by, 188; as traders, 
146 

gross domestic product (GDP): agricul- 
ture, 162; decline in, xxx, 165, 204; of 
exports, 201; fishing, 182; forestry, 
184; growth in, 148, 149, 150; livestock 
sector, 180; manufacturing, 186; min- 
ing, 192; per capita, 149; taxes, 154; 
trade, 200 

gross national product (GNP), 145; edu- 
cation budget as percentage of, 129; 
under five-year plans, 148 

gultegna, 107 

gult rights, 31, 35, 107, 167; holders of, 42 

gum arabic, 184 

Gumuz people, 99-100 

Gurage people, 12; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 93; languages of, 93; occupa- 
tions of, 93; religion of, 93, 103, 116; 
social organization of, 93 

Habte Giorgis, 33, 34 

Hadya: Amhara campaigns against, 15 

Hadya-Libido speakers, 96 

Haile Fida, 56 



395 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Haile Giorgis Habte Mariam, 249, 288 
Haile Selassie (emperor, 1930-74) (see also 
Tafari Mekonnen), xxv, xxvi, 4-5, 91, 
129, 261; armed forces under, 269, 273, 
275; cabinet under, 40; concessions of, 
to Derg, 54; control by, over local gov- 
ernment, 43; crowned, 35; death of, 56; 
deposed, 54, 83; economic policy of, 
147, 152; Eritrean insurgency under, 
240; Ethiopian Orthodox Church under, 
42-43; exiled, xxvi, 37, 39; land tenure 
under, 35, 107; missionaries under, 
124; modernization under, 35, 147, 
209; Ogaden claimed by, 49; return 
from exile, 40; schools established by, 
35; speech by, to League of Nations, 
37-38 

Haile Selassie I Military Training Center 
(see also Holeta Military Training Cen- 
ter), 282, 283 

Haile Selassie I University (see also Addis 
Ababa University), 126, 128; closed, 
129 

Hailu Balaw of Gojam (ras): revolt led by, 

35 

Harer, 17, 94; conquest of, by Menelik, 
49; Egyptian occupation of, 28; garri- 
son, 273; health care in, 136 

Harerge: land distribution in, 168; Mus- 
lims in, 103; population growth rate in, 
81; villagization in, 86, 87, 88, 175, 233 

Hareri people, 12, 94; religious affiliation 
of, 116 

Harer Military Academy, 274; Cuban in- 
structors in, 298; graduates of, 51 

Hassan, Muhammad Abdullah, 32, 33 

Haud, 49-50; under British military ad- 
ministration, 40; insurgency in, 248 

health, 135-40; assistance, foreign, 140; 
government spending on, 140, 155; in- 
surance, 217; public, 36, 140; of refu- 
gees, 88 

health care: administration, 72, 138; com- 
munity, 139; decentralization of, 72, 
138; distribution of, 136, 229-30; im- 
provements in, 229; under Italian rule, 
36; modern, 136; provided by mission- 
aries, 136; in rural areas, 72; tradi- 
tional, 136; vaccination, 137-38 

health care personnel, 139; community, 
139; physician-patient ratio, 136, 140; 
shortage of, 136, 140; training of, 136 

health facilities, 136, 138-40; construction 



of, 138; distribution of, 136, 139-40; 
organization of, 139; in rural areas, 
136; under villagization, 85, 86 

health perspective plan, 138 

health policy, 72, 138 

Hibret (newspaper), 253 

Highland East Cushitic languages, 96-97 

highlanders: contact of, with Egypt, 13; 
gult holders in, 42; influences on, 26; 
languages spoken by, 91; origins of, 6; 
rivalry of, with lowlanders, 3 

highlands, 72, 73-76; agriculture in, 165; 
colonized by Aksumites, 11-12; isola- 
tion of, 3, 17, 102; Italian establishment 
in, 29; jihad in, 19; languages in, 6; life- 
styles in, 79; livestock in, 181; soil types 
in, 165, 166 

highlands, central: ethnic groups in, 71; 
languages in, 6 

highlands, northern, 73; ethnic groups in, 
71; forests in, 183; landholdings in, 
168; land reform in, 111, 169; land 
rights system in, 106, 167; languages 
in, 6; social system in, 71 

highlands, southern, 49, 73; forests in, 
183; landholdings in, 108, 168; land re- 
form in, 111, 169; land tenure in, 167; 
languages in, 6; northern settlers in, 
108; social stratification in, 110 

HIV. See human immunodeficiency virus 

Hoben, Allan, 106 

Holeta Military Training Center (see also 
Genet Military School), 273, 283; grad- 
uates of, 51 
Holy Land, 12; pilgrims to, 21 
housing: under resettlement program, 84; 

shortages, 83; in urban areas, 83 
Housing and Savings Bank, 156 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
138 

human rights abuses, xxxi, 218, 233, 235, 
237, 255, 293, 324, 326-29 

Humera: cotton plantations in, 178; de- 
velopment projects in, 163 

Hungary: advisers from, 257 

HVA company, 168 

IDA. See International Development As- 
sociation 

Ifat sultanate, 17; Amhara campaigns 
against, 14, 15; defeated, 17-18; estab- 
lished, 11; Oromo in, 26; support for, 18 



396 



Index 



IGLF. See Isa and Gurgura Liberation 
Front 

Ilubabor: oil discovered in, 192; resettle- 
ment to, 174, 232; villagization in, 86, 
234 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
Imperial Bodyguard, xxvi, 45, 51; com- 
mander of, arrested by Derg, 54; as fac- 
tion, 53; formed, 273; in 1960 coup, 45; 
number of personnel in, 274; trained 
by Belgian military mission, 34, 282 
Imperial Ethiopian Police, 315-16 
imperial family: land rights of, 107, 108 
imperial government, 48; agriculture 
under, 163; Amhara dominance under, 
101; budget process under, 153; defense 
budget under, 154; economy under, 
151-52, 204; foreign investment under, 
187-88; foreign policy of, 254; land re- 
form under, 163; land tenure under, 
35, 166; language policy of, 103; mem- 
bers of, arrested by Derg, 54, 112; 
modernization by, 35, 147, 209; mu- 
nicipal guard, 315; opposition to, 48, 
244; role of, 46-47; social status under, 
104; social system under, 105-6; wages 
under, 162 
Imperial Highway Authority, 194 
imports, 200, 202; British control of, 41; 
of food, 180, 200; growth in, 148, 203; 
taxes on, 154; value of, 202 
income: per capita, 145 
India: military assistance from, 274, 283 
industrial development policy, 187-90 
industry: cottage and handicraft, 185; 
credit for, 156; electricity for, 191; im- 
pact of social unrest on, 186; invest- 
ment in, 153, 186, 188; labor force in, 
157; under mixed economy, 190; na- 
tionalization of, 145, 186, 188, 189 
inflation, 51, 145; rate of, 156, 204 
Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Na- 
tionalities, 102, 214, 220 
insurance sector: nationalized, 57, 152, 
155 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

internal security, 276, 315-19; budget for, 
274; conditions, 150 

International Committee of the Red Cross, 
231, 326 

International Development Association (IDA), 
81; education assistance from, 135 



International Monetary Fund (IMF), 258 
International Petroleum Corporation, 191- 
92 

International Reading Association Liter- 
acy Prize (1980), 135 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 199 

investment, 189-90; domestic, 188; for- 
eign, 187-88, 189; policy, 257; private, 
153, 186, 189; private, ceiling on, 152 

Investment Code (1988), 145 

Iraq: relations with, 262; support by, for 
Eritrean Liberation Front, 47, 239 

Isa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF), 
xxxii 

Isa people: land distribution by, 168 

Islam, 95, 120-24; basic teachings of, 
120-23; conversions to, 11, 26, 93, 94; 
distribution of, 123; effect of Oromo 
migrations on, 20; establishment of, 
10-11, 120; Ethiopian, 123-24; impact 
of, on Aksumite state, 10; observance 
of, 123; pillars of, 121; prayers in, 121; 
scripture of, 121; spread of, 3 , 11, 115; 
worship of saints in, 123 

Islam, Shia, 123 

Islam, Sufi, 123, 124 

Islam, Sunni, 123 

Islamic schools, 127 

Israel: diplomatic relations with, 300-301; 
emigration of Beta Israel to, 97, 262; 
maintenance agreement, 300; materiel 
from, 301; military advisers from, 274, 
300; military aid from, 257, 262, 270, 
300-301; military training by, 300, 
301, 316; relations with, 262 

Issaias Afwerki, xxvii, 264, 296, 306, 307; 
as president of Eritrea, xxxiv 

Italian occupation (1936-41), 36-39, 254, 
273; attempt to eliminate, 39, 40-41; 
British campaign strategy against, 39- 
40; education under, 127; end of, 146; 
executions under, 38-39; infrastructure 
improved by, 146, 194; under Musso- 
lini, 36-39; resistance to, 38; urban 
areas under, 36, 82 

Italian Somaliland, 38, 41, 49, 273 

Italo-Ethiopian war (1935-36), xxvi, 39- 
40 

Italy {see also Italian occupation), 46; Arms 
Traffic Act signed by, 34; assistance 
from, 43; attacks of, on Ethiopia, 4-5, 
29, 37, 273; attempts by, to colonize 



397 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Eritrea, 4, 273; attempts by, to gain in- 
fluence in Ethiopia, 32; chemical weap- 
ons used by, 37, 273; compensation to, 
after nationalization, 189; defeated at 
Adwa, 32; defeated at Dogali, 29; es- 
tablishment of foothold in highlands, 
29; Ethiopia annexed by, 37; expansion 
by, 36-37; imports from, 202; invasion 
of Tigray by, 32, 244; investment by, 
188; medical assistance from, 140; mili- 
tary training in, 284; occupation of 
Eritrea by, 31; as peace talks mediator, 
252; relations of, with Menelik, 29, 31, 
32; relief from, 230; surrender of, 40; 
Tripartite Treaty signed by, 32 
Iyasu I (king, 1682-1706), 23 
Iyasu II (king, 1730-55), 23-24 
Iyasu, Lij, 33; conversion to Islam, 33; 
excommunicated, 33; revolt in support 
of (1932), 35 
Iyoas (king, 1755-69), 24; murdered, 24 



Japan: compensation to, after nationali- 
zation, 189; exports to, 201; imports 
from, 202; investment by, 188 

Jerusalem: Ethiopian Orthodox commu- 
nity in, 21 

Jesuits, 4; doctrinal quarrel of, with Ethio- 
pian Orthodox Church, 23, 24; ex- 
pelled, 22 

Jews, Ethiopian. See Beta Israel people 
jihad, xxv; of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al 

Ghazi, 18-20; Aksum exempted from, 

10; as Muslim duty, 122 
Jijiga, 49; air base, 280; in Ogaden War 

(1977-78) 59-60, 313; population 

growth in, 82 
Jima: population growth in, 83 
Joint Venture Proclamation, 189 
judiciary, 221-22, 321; under Amhara, 

17; under Haile Selassie, 44 
Junior College of Commerce, 133 



Kagnew Battalion, 274 
Kagnew station, 255, 256, 291-92, 293 
Karamarda Pass (Marda Pass), 313 
Kasa Haylu (see also Tewodros II), 26-27; 

as negus, 27 
Kasa Mercha (see also Yohannis IV), 28; 

as negusa nagast, 28 
Kayla people. See Beta Israel people 



kebeles, 57, 145, 185, 226-27, 237, 319; 
brutality in, 114, 226; conscription by, 
288; constitution of 1987 publicized by, 
63, 215; defense squads, 315, 318, 328; 
disreputability of, 113; health care 
under, 138; members of, 113, 226; or- 
ganized, 59, 71, 226, 318; power of, 65; 
public schools administered by, 130; 
roles of, 212, 226; state security mis- 
sion of, 63; structure of, 226; tribunals 
of, 222, 318, 321 

Kefa: loyal ruler established in, 35; popu- 
lation growth rate in, 81; religion of, 
98; resettlement to, 174, 232; schools 
in, 131; villagization in, 234 

Kefa-Mocha language, 98 

Kefa people, 31, 98 

Kembata region: invaded by Menelik, 31 

Kembata-Timbaro-Alaba speakers, 96 

Kenya, 256; border with, 72; Ethiopian 
refugees in, 87; as peace talks media- 
tor, 252; as peace talks observer, 251 

Kereyu people: land distribution by, 168 

King's African Rifles, 282 

Koman language family, 91 

Konso people, 95 

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 
(North Korea): materiel from, 279, 
299; military aid from, 270, 299 

Korean War: troops committed to, 254, 
274 

Kunema language family, 91 
Kunema people, 99, 101 
Kunfel people, 97 

labor force, 156-57; in agriculture, 85, 
162; demonstrations by, 112, 113; pro- 
tests by, 160; size of, 157; unskilled, 
112, 112 

Labor Relations Decree (1962), 160 
labor unions, 160-61; organization of, 51; 

restrictions on, 51; strikes by, 113, 129, 

160 

Lake Abaya, 198 
Lake Chamo, 198 
Lake Langano, 192 
lakes, 76, 77 
Lake Tana, 32, 82, 198 
Labibela, 12; stone churches in, 12 
Lamberz, Werner, 298 
land: arable, 165; area, 165; conserva- 
tion, 172; grazing, 168; nationalization 



398 



Index 



of, 104, 152, 169, 229; use, 165-66 
landholdings: by Amhara, 71, 110; by 
cognatic descent group, 106; distribu- 
tion, 107, 108; by Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church, 31, 108, 167, 168; individual, 
170; by kin group, 106; as marker of 
social status, 104, 110; redistribution, 
111, 168, 170; by state, 106; taxes, 42, 

50. 128: tenancy, 71, 168 
landlord class, 104; eliminated, 111 
land reform, 145, 163, 166-70; desire for, 

51, 110; impact of, 111, 169, 170; op- 
position to, 58, 169; proposals, 57; 
reactions to, 31; women under, 114 

Land Reform Proclamation (1975), 57, 
170, 224; implementation of, 57; reset- 
tlement under, 174; villagization under, 
233 

land rights system [see also gult rights; rist 
rights), 124; consequences of, 107-8; 
established, 31; under imperial govern- 
ment, 106; in south, 107-8; usufruct 
rights, 167 

land tenure: of Amhara, 106; under im- 
perial government, 35, 166; security of, 
170; types of, 167 

language policy, 103 

languages (see also under individual lan- 
guages), 6-7, 91; distribution of, 91, 
103; of radiobroadcasts, 200 

Lasta, 8; Aksumite influence in, 12; eth- 
nic groups in, 100; and Zagwe kings, 
12-13 

law: customary, 123-24, 315, 319; mar- 
tial, 320; sharia, 122, 319 

League of Nations, 5, 37; arms embargo 
by, 37; Haile Selassie's speech to, 
37-38; membership in, 34, 254 

Lebna Dengel, 19, 28; Portuguese mili- 
tary assistance to, 19 

legal system, 319-22 

Lege Dimbi gold mine, 192 

Lencho Letta, 264 

Libya, 256; aid from, 294; relations with, 
262 

literacy, 134-35; classes, 135; among 

women, 115 
literacy campaign, 72, 134, 229; books 

for, 135; languages of, 134; women in, 

134 

literacy rate, 44, 126, 134 
livestock, 7, 98, 146, 147, 165, 180-82, 
201; cattle, 7, 181-82; distribution of, 



181; economic potential of, 181; 
equines, 7, 182; goats, 7, 182; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 180; 
population, 181; poultry, 182; produc- 
tion, 181; role of, 181; sheep, 182 
living standards, 107; in agriculture, 147, 
149; urban, 162; under villagization, 85 
Lome Convention, xxxiv, 203 
London peace talks, 251, 264 
Lowland East Cushitic languages, 95 
lowlanders: languages spoken by, 91; 

rivalry of, with highlanders, 3 
lowlands, 72, 76, 102; climate in, 77; land 
reform in, 169; land tenure in, 168; life- 
styles in, 79; population density in, 79; 
soil types in, 165-66 

MAAG. See United States Military As- 
sistance Advisory Group 
maderia rights, 167-68 
Mahdi, Sadiq al, 261 
Mahdists, 29 
malaria, 165, 168 

MALERED. See Marxist- Leninist Revo- 
lutionary Organization 

manufacturing, 111-12, 185-87; capac- 
ity utilization of, 186-87; decline in, 
150; government involvement in, 188- 
89; growth in, 148, 150, 186; of handi- 
crafts, 185; investment in, 188; labor 
union in, 161; nationalization in, 149; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 186; production, 186; productivi- 
ty, 187 

Marda Pass. See Karamarda Pass 
maritime trade: ancient, 8, 10; effect of 

Islam on, 11 
Markakis, John, 106, 113-14, 116 
Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, 145 
Marxist- Leninist Revolutionary Organi- 
zation (MALERED), 238 
Mecha-Tulema, 247 
media, 253; censorship of, 329 
MEISON. All-Ethiopia Socialist Move- 
ment 

Mekele: airport, 89; fall of, 48 
Mekonnen (ras), 32 

Meles Zenawi, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, 251, 264 

Mendebo Mountains, 76 

Menelik II (king, 1889-1913), xxv-xxvi, 
4, 25, 27, 28, 91, 101, 194; accession 
of, 29, 71; conquest of Harer by, 49; 



399 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Council of Ministers under, 32; death 
of, 33; education under, 127; expansion 
by, 30-31; foreign policy of, 254; in- 
vasion of Sudan by, 32; land held by, 
in south, 108; land rights under, 31, 
107; lineage of, 28; military coopera- 
tion of, with Britain, 32; as negus, 28; 
opposition to, 244; reign of, 29-33; re- 
lations of, with Italy, 29, 31, 32; rela- 
tions of, with Yohannis IV, 28; social 
system under, 71; stroke of, 32, 33 

Mengesha Seyoum (ras), 244 

Mengesha Yohannis of Tigray (ras), 29, 
32 

mengist rights, 167 

Mengistu government, xxvi: armed forces 
under, 269; control by, of population, 
86; economy under, 152-56, 187, 262; 
Eritrean insurgency under, 240-44; fall 
of, 153, 262-65, 309; language policy 
of, 91, 103; opposition to, 72, 244, 256; 
political struggles within, 58-59; rela- 
tions of, with Soviet Union, 211, 253; 
religion under, 103, 115; reorganiza- 
tion of, 263; resettiement under, 71; so- 
cial hierarchy under, 104; villagization 
under, 71 

Mengistu Haile Mariam, xxv, 5, 56, 145, 
278, 290; consolidation of power by, 
58; as Derg chairman, 53, 57; fall of, 
153, 262-65, 309; as first vice chairman 
of Provisional Military Administrative 
Council, 56; as president, 65, 220; 
resignation of, 263; as Workers' Party 
of Ethiopia general secretary, 213 

Mengistu Mihret, 138 

Mengistu Neway, 45 

Menz: ethnic groups in, 101 

Mereb River: as potential source of hydro- 
electric power, 190 

Meroe, 9; conquered by Aksumites, 9 

Meskerem (journal), 253 

Metu: population growth in, 82 

middle class: creation of, 104-5; educa- 
tion of, 104; intermarriage by, 105; 
under Mengistu, 113; occupations of, 
105; position of, 113 

Middle East: relations with, 262 

Mikael Imru, 54 

Mikael of Welo (ras and negus), 33 
Mikael Sehul, Ras, 24; politcial power of, 
24 

military assistance, 269, 291-301; from 



Belgium, 34, 273, 282, 291; from Brit- 
ain, 40, 280, 282-83, 291; from China, 
43, 255, 257; from Cuba, 5, 60, 238, 
257, 259, 269, 270, 278, 279, 282, 284, 
285, 291, 296-98; from East Germany, 
228, 257, 284, 291, 298-99; from 
France, 279, 291; from Israel, 257, 262, 
270, 274, 291, 300-301; from North 
Korea, 270, 279, 291, 299; from Nor- 
way, 274, 280, 291; from Portugal, 4, 
19, 21, 291; from Soviet Union, 5, 
59-60, 62, 238, 256-57, 260, 269-70, 
278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 291, 
294-96; from Sweden, 274, 279, 282, 
283, 291; from United States, 43, 269, 
274, 291-94 

military convention of 1942, 40 

military justice system, 221 

military officers: benefits, 289; ethnic 
composition, 290-91; as faction, 53; 
generational rift among, 289; in gov- 
ernment, 290; land grants to, 50; 
purged, 250; recruitment, 290; train- 
ing, 284-85, 289-90 

military personnel, 269; in Commission 
to Organize the Party of the Workers 
of Ethiopia, 212, 213; enlistment of, 
290; ethnic composition, 290-91; pay, 
290; ratio of officers to enlisted, 289; 
training of, 285 

military tradition, 270-76 

military training, 269, 282-85; basic, 285; 
begun, 282; foreign, 273, 274, 282-83, 
284; in-service, 284-85; technical, 285 

military tribunals, 320, 321 

Minimum Package Program (MPP), 163 

mining, 192-93; growth in, 148; invest- 
ment in, 153; labor union in, 161; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
192 

Ministry in Charge of the General Plan, 
220 

Ministry of Agriculture, 134, 163, 183, 
220; Extension and Project Implemen- 
tation Department, 163; Fisheries 
Resources Development Department, 
183; food for work programs under, 
166; reforestation programs under, 
184; resettlement under, 174 

Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development, 
177, 220 

Ministry of Communications and Trans- 
port, 220 



400 



Index 



Ministry of Construction, 220 
Ministry of Culture and Sports Affairs, 
220 

Ministry of Domestic Trade, 220 
Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, 127, 
135, 220 

Ministry of Finance, 153, 155, 220 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 220 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 220 
Ministry of Health, 220; health education 

under, 140; nursing schools of, 140 
Ministry of Industry, 220 
Ministry of Information and National Guid- 
ance, 220, 253 
Ministry of Interior, 277, 315-16 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 220, 289 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 220 
Ministry of Law and Justice, 220, 221, 
222 

Ministry of Mines, Energy, and Water 
Resources, 220 

Ministry of National Defense, 220, 277 

Ministry of National Resource Develop- 
ment, 227 

Ministry of Planning, 148; role of, 151 

Ministry of State Farms, 220 

Ministry of Urban Development and Hous- 
ing, 220 

missionaries, 124-26; activities of, 125; 
education under, 125, 127, 140; health 
care by, 136, 140; restrictions on, 124 

Mitchell Cotts company, 168 

Mitsiwa: bombed, 89; captured by Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front, 89; under 
Italian rule, 36; naval station, 198, 280; 
port of, 89, 197 

Mobile Emergency Police Force, 269, 315, 
317; number of personnel in, 276, 316 

Mocha people, 98 

MPP. See Minimum Package Program 
Muhammad (the Prophet): background 

of, 120-21; death of, 10; teachings of, 

121, 122 

Municipal Technical College, 133 
Muslims (see also Islam), 98, 125; duties 
of, 121; in Eritrean Assembly, 46; eth- 
nicity of, 71, 98; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 103; Italian favoritism toward, 
39; occupation of, 103; official tolera- 
tion of, 115; parity of, with Christians, 
47; as percentage of population, 72, 
116; pilgrimage of, 121, 122; rivalry of, 
with Christians, 3, 17, 18, 47 



Muslim courts. See courts, sharia 
Muslim League, 47 

Mussolini, Benito, 273; invasion by, 
36-39; Italian occupation under, 36 
myrrh, 184 

Nairobi peace talks, 250, 306 
Nara people, 99 

National Assembly. See National Shengo 
National Assembly (Eritrea, 1993), xxxiv 
National Bank of Ethiopia, 155, 189, 221; 

lending strategies of, 156; operations 

controlled by, 156 
National Charter, xxvii, xxviii 
National Conference, xxvii, xxviii 
National Defense and Security Council, 

278 

National Economic Council: created, 147 

nationalization, 149; of banks, 57, 152, 
155; of businesses, 152; compensation 
for, 189; of forestland, 184; of indus- 
try, 145, 186, 189; of insurance firms, 
57, 152, 155; of land, 104, 145, 152, 
229; reaction to, 189; of schools, 130 

national literacy campaign, 134-35; award 
for achievement, 135; languages used 
in, 134; and women, 134 

National Military Service Proclamation 
(1983), 282, 288 

National Revolutionary Development Cam- 
paign, 224 

National Revolutionary Operations Com- 
mand (NROC), 277; powers of, 277- 
78 

national security, 277; under constitution 
of 1987, 217; under Haile Selassie, 47; 
under Mengistu, 277 

national service: in Eritrea, xxxiii, xxxv; 
in Ethiopia, 128 

National Shengo (National Assembly), 
65, 218, 242, 250, 263; defense policy 
of, 277; members of, 218 

National Villagization Coordination Com- 
mittee, 234 

National Workers' Control Committee, 
218, 219 

Naval College, 283, 284 

navy, 280-81 ; advisers, 280; bases, 280; 
marine contingent, 276; Norwegian or- 
ganization of, 274; number of person- 
nel in, 276; training, 280 

Nega Ayele, 113-14 



401 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



negus (king), 27 

negusa nagast (king of kings), 9, 25; power 
of, 15-17 

Netherlands: compensation to, after na- 
tionalization, 189; investment by, 188 

Nilo-Saharan super-language family, 91, 
99-100, 101 

Nilotic peoples: religion among, 103 

Nimeiri, Jaafar an, 261 

nobility: ascendancy of, 22-24; elimi- 
nated, 110; land held by, 110; mem- 
bers of, arrested by Derg, 54; political 
power of, 44; refusal of, to pay land tax, 
42, 50 

nomads, 79, 86, 87, 105, 147, 165, 169 
Northern Cushitic languages, 98 
North Korea. See Korea, Democratic Peo- 
ple's Republic of 
Norway: military assistance from, 274, 
280 

NROC. See National Revolutionary 

Operations Command 
Nuer people, 99 
Nyerere, Julius K., 250 

occupational castes, 100 

Office of the National Council for Cen- 
tral Planning (ONCCP), 220; powers 
of, 152; role of, 152, 153 

Office of the Prosecutor General, 218, 222 

Ogaden, 37, 45; attempts to secede, 90; 
under British military administration, 
40; captured by Western Somali Liber- 
ation Front, 59; claimed by Haile Selas- 
sie, 49; climate in, 77; dispute over, 73, 
258; exploration for petroleum in, 191; 
granted autonomy, 65, 102, 223; insur- 
gency in, 248; invaded by Somalia, 
256, 313; land distribution in, 168; 
population density in, 79; precipitation 
in, 78; rebellion in (1904), 32; revolt 
of 1943 in, 41; Somali claim to, 102, 
259 

Ogaden insurgency, 62, 87, 101, 102 
Ogaden National Liberation Front 

(ONLF), 249, 311 
Ogaden War (1977-78), 5, 59-60, 88, 
150, 249, 256, 259-60, 286, 313-15; 
agreement to end, 314-15; air force in, 
280; defense spending under, 155, 276; 
end of, 260; military assistance in, 5, 
269, 297; refugees from, 90, 260, 315; 



terrorist acts in, 197 
oil, 191; discovered, 192; exploration for, 

191-92; imported, 191, 202 
Old Epigraphic South Arabic script, 7 
OLF. See Oromo Liberation Front 
Omo River, 77; as potential source of 

hydroelectric power, 190 
Omotic languages, 6, 91, 98-99 
ONCCP. See Office of the National Coun- 
cil for Central Planning 
ONLF. See Ogaden National Liberation 
Front 

OPDO. See Oromo People's Democratic 
Organization 

Operation Bright Star, 261 

Operation Dula Billisuma Welkita, 309 

Operation Moses, 262, 300 

Operation Solomon, 262 

Operation Tewodros, 309 

Operation Wallelign, 309 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
304, 314; Eritrea in, xxxiv; member- 
ship in, 43, 254; as peace talks observer, 
251 

Oromo Independence Movement (1936), 
247 

Oromo insurgency, 246-48; assistance to, 
247 

Oromo language, 6, 103; literacy train- 
ing in, 134 

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), xxxii, 
60, 94, 233, 239; attempts to suppress, 
87; congresses of, 248, 311; creation of, 
310; goals of, 247; military campaigns 
of, 238, 311; 1992 elections, role in, 
xxx; personnel of, 247, 310; relations 
of, with Ethiopian People's Revolution- 
ary Democratic Front, 311; successes 
of, 248; support of, 310; weaknesses in, 
310 

Oromo migrations, 17, 20-21, 26, 94; im- 
pact of, 20-21 

Oromo people, xxv, 4, 25, 71, 91, 260; 
adaptation of, 20; 94; conflicts among, 
95; demands for self-determination, 
235, 247; diversity among, 26; expan- 
sions of, 20-21; gada (age-set) system 
of social organization, 20; geographic 
distribution of, 94, 246; influences on, 
4; intermarriage of, 26; Italian favor- 
itism toward, 39; landholdings of, 110; 
military ethos of, 270; military role of, 
23-24; mixing of, with Amhara, 20; 



402 



Index 



number of, 94; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 246; political role of, 24, 26; 
religion of, 72, 103, 116, 124; as rul- 
ing class, 71; social system of, 94-95 

Oromo People's Democratic Organiza- 
tion (OPDO), 308, 311 

Orthodox Church. See Ethiopian Ortho- 
dox Church 

Osman Salah Sabbe, 47, 48, 241 

Ottoman Empire: attempts by, to gain in- 
fluence in Ethiopia, 32; relations with, 
33 



pastoralists, 95, 98; effect of Oromo mi- 
grations on, 20; land distribution by, 
168; livestock of, 181; rivalry of, with 
agriculturalists, 3; support by, for Ifat 
sultanate, 18 

PDRE. See Ethiopia, People's Democratic 
Republic of 

Peace and Stability Committees (PSCs), 
xxxi 

peace negotiations, 249; demands in, 250, 
251-52; Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front and government, 250-51, 263; 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front and government, 
263; mediators in, 250; observers in, 
251; team leaders, 250; venues for, 250, 
251 

peasant associations, 57, 71, 145, 223-26, 
237, 319; conscription by, 288; consti- 
tution of 1987 publicized by, 63, 215; 
defense squads, 315, 318; economic 
powers of, 111; government control of, 
224; health care under, 138; land redis- 
tribution by, 111, 170; membership of, 
172; number of, 224; organized, 59, 
172, 224, 318; power of, 65; public 
schools administered by, 130; reforesta- 
tion by, 184; responsibilities of, 172, 
212, 224; and rural development, 170- 
72; self-government of, 111; soil con- 
servation by, 166; state security mission 
of, 63; tax collection by, 154; tribunals, 
222, 318, 321 

Peasant Associations Organization and 
Consolidation Proclamation (1975), 
111 

peasants, 24, 87, 107; coffee produced by, 
177; death of, from famine, 87; demon- 
strations by, 51; expectations of, 229; 



farms of, 84; impact of villagization on, 
86; land held by, 110; living standards 
of, 147, 149; pressured to form collec- 
tives, 233; resettlement of, 64; taxes on, 
42, 106, 128; as tenants, 71, 107, 108- 
110; Tigrayan, 48 

penal code: amended special (1981), 322; 
of 1930, 35, 319-20; of 1958, 320; of 
1976, 321, 322, 328 

People's Militia, 277, 281-82; conscrip- 
tion, 281; established, 281; materiel of, 
281; mission of, 281, 282; number of 
personnel in, 281, 282; organization of, 
282; pay and benefits, 282, 286; ten- 
sion of, with army, 286; training for, 
281 

People's Protection Brigades, 269, 299, 

315, 316, 317, 318-19, 321; created, 
319; role of, 319 

Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, 8 
PGE. See Provisional Government of 
Eritrea 

Planning Commission: incompetence in, 
148; role of, 151 

platinum, 146, 192 

PLF. See Popular Liberation Forces 

PMAC . See Provisional Military Adminis- 
trative Council 

PNDR. See Program for the National 
Democratic Revolution 

Poland: advisers from, 257 

police, national, 315-18; British training 
for, 40, 315; under Derg, 316; Eri- 
treans in, 36; under Haile Selassie, 47; 
local control over, 316; mission of, 317; 
number of, 316, 317; pay, 317; recruit- 
ed, 316, 317, 318; reorganized, 316; 
special units of, 316, 317; training of, 

316, 317, 318; transportation, 318; 
weapons of, 316, 317-18 

political parties (see also under individual par- 
ties): outlawed, 47, 236 

polytechnic institute, 134 

POMOA. See Provisional Office for Mass 
Organization Affairs 

Popular Liberation Forces (PLF): formed, 
47 

population (see also census of 1984), 78-82; 
age distribution in, 79-80, 157; chil- 
dren as percentage of, 157; Christians 
as percentage of, 72; density, 79; dis- 
tribution of, 71, 79, 82-83; government 
control of, 86; Muslims as percentage 



403 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



of, 72; in 1984, 77, 156; in 1990, 71, 
78; Oromo as percentage of, 246; per- 
centage of, in rural areas, 71, 78-79; 
percentage of, in urban areas, 82; per- 
centage of, using electricity, 191; popu- 
lation policy, lack of, 81; projected, 71, 
81, 156; rural, 71, 78-79, 102, 105; 
Tigray as percentage of, 92; urban, 105 
population statistics: birth rate, 79, 81; 
child mortality, 80; death rate, 80, 81; 
fertility rate, 79; growth rate, 81-83, 
163, 164; infant mortality rate, 80, 81; 
life expectancy, 81; male-female ratio, 
83 

ports, 197-98 

Portugal: attempts to convert to Catholi- 
cism by, 17; diplomatic relations with, 
21; military assistance by, xxv, 4, 19, 
21 

president of Government of Eritrea, xxxiv 

president of PDRE: 219-20; appoint- 
ments by, 219; as commander in chief, 
220, 277; election of, 219; powers of, 
219; term of office, 219 

president of Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia, xxvii, xxviii 

Presidential Guard, 249, 301 

Prester John, 21 

Prester John of the Indies, The (Alvarez), 22 
prices, 51, 53, 161-62; controls on, 156, 
173; of imports, 203; increases in, 162; 
retail, index, 162; systems of, 185 
prisons, 322-26; conditions in, 322, 324, 
325, 327; farms,. 323; guards, 326; in- 
dustries, 325-26; juvenile, 323-24; 
regional, 325 
prisoners: death of, 56, 324; political, 56, 
323, 324, 329; torture of, 218, 324, 326, 
327, 328 
privatization, xxx 
Proclamation No. 11 (1989), 187 
Proclamation No. 25 (1981), 226 
Proclamation No. 51 (1963), 188 
Proclamation No. 71 (1975), 224 
Proclamation No. 76 (1975), 152 
Proclamation No. 109 (1977), 132 
Proclamation No. 235 (1983), 189 
Proclamation No. 242 (1966), 188 
Program for the National Democratic 
Revolution (PNDR), 56, 210; Eritrea 
under, 241; promulgated, 102, 216, 
235, 236 

Protestantism: number of followers in 



population, 125; percentage of follow- 
ers in population, 125 

Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE), 
xxvii, xxxiii 

Provisional Military Administrative Coun- 
cil (PMAC) {see also Derg), 53, 54, 71, 
102, 278; abolished, 65, 216; armed 
forces under, 269-70; cooperatives under, 
172; economic objectives of, 145, 209; 
education system under, 72; land re- 
form under, 169; nationalization un- 
der, 186, 188; popular rejection of, 210; 
religion under, 116 

Provisional Office for Mass Organization 
Affairs (POMOA), 56, 236, 278 

PSCs. See Peace and Stability Committees 

public administration, 147; Eritreans in, 
36 



qat, xxxii 
Qimant people, 97 
Quran, 121, 123 
Qwara, 26 



radio, 200; censorship of, 329 
railroads, 194-97 
Ramadan, 121-22 

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 256, 

261 
ras, 25, 28 
ras-bitwoded, 25 
Ras Dashen Terara, 73 
Raya people (Oromo), 48 
RDF. See Rapid Deployment Force 
Recovery and Rehabilitation Project for 

Eritrea, xxxv 
Red Sea: exploration for petroleum in, 

191 

Red Sea Fishery Resources Development 

Project, 183 
Red Star campaigns, 286-87, 295-96, 

299 

Red Terror (1977-78), 58-59, 88, 226, 

237-38, 245, 249, 318, 326-27 
reforestation, 184 

refugees, 327; causes of, 88-89, 232, 235; 
in Djibouti, 87, 89, 90; Eritrean, xxxv; 
health problems of, 88; in Kenya, 87; 
number of, 88, 89, 90; Somali, 88, 89; 
in Somalia, 87, 88, 89; in Sudan, 87, 



404 



Index 



89, 90; Sudanese, xxxiii, 88, 90; urban 
migration by, 83 

regional administration: under Haile Selas- 
sie, 43-44; after 1974, 222-23; after 
1987, 223; traditional, 15-17; under 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 
xxviii-xxix 

Regional Health Department, 139 

relief agencies, 230, 328; evacuation of, 
305; in 1990 famine, 89; permanent 
offices of, 231 

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
(RRC), 174, 221, 230, 305 

Relief Society of Tigray, 89; food convoys 
of, 89 

religion (see also under individual sects), 93, 
115-26; under constitution of 1987, 
217; distribution of, in population, 
71-72, 116; equality of, 72, 116; and 
ethnicity, 71, 72; importance of, 103 

religion, indigenous, 72, 97, 98, 115, 116, 
124; distribution of, 103 

resettlement, xxvi, 71, 84, 174-76, 224, 
327; deaths caused by, 328; failure of, 
232; international reaction to, 71, 84, 
218, 233; interrupted, 174; motivation 
for, 84, 173, 175, 232; politics of, 
232-33; problems caused by, 84, 164; 
refugees from, 88, 232; resistance to, 
64, 175 

Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Associ- 
ation (REWA), 115, 211 

Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Associa- 
tion, 211 

Revolutionary Flame. See Abyot Seded 

Revolutionary Operations Coordinating 
Committee, 317, 321 

Revolutionary Struggle of the Ethiopian 
Masses (EC HA AT), 237 

revolution of 1974, xxvi, 5, 51, 52, 54-55; 
impact of, on social structure, 111; sup- 
port for, 52 

REWA. See Revolutionary Ethiopia 
Women's Association 

ristegna, 106 

rist gult rights, 107, 108; abolished, 110 
rist land, 106 

rist rights, 31, 106, 110, 167, 169; litiga- 
tion over, 106 

roads: access to, 194; construction of, 34, 
39, 146, 194; maintenance of, 194 

Romania: military agreements with, can- 
celed, 270 



Rome peace talks, 251-52 
RRC. See Relief and Rehabilitation Com- 
mission 

Rubattino Shipping Company, 29 
rural areas: birth rate in, 79; development 
in, 163; education in, 72; health care 
in, 72, 136, 139; labor force in, 157; 
life expectancy in, 81; nationalization 
of land in, 104, 145, 152, 169, 229; 
police in, 317; population in, 71, 78-79, 
102, 105; social system in, 106-11; 
underemployment in, 160; unemploy- 
ment in, 157, 160; women in, 114 
Rural Roads Task Force, 194 



Sabaean language, 7 
Saho language, 6 

Saho people, 95; religion of, 96, 116; so- 
cial system of, 96 

Saint-Cyr military academy, 273, 282 

SALF. See Somali Abo Liberation Front 

salt, 192-93; export, 193; production, 192 

samon rights, 167 

Sassanian Persians, 10, 11 

Saudi Arabia: relations with, 262 

Save the Children Fund, 327 

Savings and Mortgage Corporation of 
Ethiopia, 155 

schools: closed by Derg, 58, 129; closed 
by Italian occupation, 127; construction 
of, 130; crowding of, 132; curricula of, 
72; destruction of, 132; distribution of, 
130, 131; dropouts from, 129; estab- 
lished by Haile Selassie, 35; number of, 
130; under villagization, 85, 86 

schools, primary: enrollment, 131, 132; 
girls in, 115; number of, 130 

schools, public: curriculum, 127, 130; en- 
rollment, 127, 128, 132; expanded, 
128; number of, 128 

schools, secondary, 128; enrollment, 132; 
girls in, 115, 131; number of, 131; 
teachers in, 132 

schools, vocational, 128, 133-34; number 
of, 134 

Semitic languages, 6, 91 

Serto Ader (periodical), 253 

service sector: growth in, 186; labor force 
in, 157; labor union in, 161; women in, 
114 

Seventh-Day Adventists, 126 
Seyoum Mekonnen, 250 



405 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



Shack, William A., 93 

Shashemene: People's Militia in, 281; 
population growth in, 82 

Sheba, Queen of, 14, 17 

Shebele River, 77; as potential source of 
hydroelectric power, 190 

Shekatcho people, 98 

shengos, regional, 223 

Shewa: Amhara expansion into, 15; con- 
quered in Islamic jihad, 19; ethnic 
groups in, 91, 100; insurgency in, 65; 
labor union in, 161; land tenure in, 
167; livestock in, 182; loyal ruler estab- 
lished in, 35; People's Militia in, 281; 
population density in, 79; population 
growth rate in, 81; resettlement from, 
232; resettlement to, 174; schools in, 
131; villagization in, 175, 234 

Shewa people, 48; culture of, 101 

Siad Barre, Mahammad, 59, 102, 247, 
248, 297 

Sidama people, 12, 26, 96-97; effect of 
Oromo migrations on, 20; religion of, 
97, 103, 116; resistance by, against 
Oromo, 21 

Sidamo: insurgency in, 60; land distribu- 
tion in, 168; loyal ruler established in, 
35; population growth rate in, 81; vil- 
lagization in, 234 

slavery, 34, 100 

SMSC. See Supreme Military Strategic 

Committee 
SNA. See Somali National Army 
SNM. See Somali National Movement 
socialism, constitution based on, 214; de- 
velopment based on, 210; socialist pro- 
gram, 56-58, 62 
social order: under constitution of 1987, 
216-17 

social services, 217; shortages of, 83 
social system, 105-6; in northern high- 
lands, 71 

Societa Elettrica del' Africa Orientale, 191 

soil: conditions, 166; conservation of, 166; 
erosion of, 166; types, 165-66 

Solomon (king), 14, 17 

Solomonic dynasty, xxv, 3-4, 22, 27; im- 
prisonment of nonruling members of, 
14-15, 22; internecine conflict in, 14; 
origins of, 14, 17; restoration of, 13-15; 
succession problems, 18 

Somalia, 256; border with, 72; border dis- 
pute with, 49-50, 73, 259; Ethiopian 



refugees in, 87, 88, 89; irredentist pol- 
icy of, 49, 50, 59, 94, 102, 103, 256, 
259; land demands of, 5; military as- 
sistance of, to insurgents, 247; refugees 
from, 88, 89; relations of, with Cuba, 
256; relations of, with Soviet Union, 60, 
256; religious affiliation of, 116; support 
by, for insurgents, 248; unification of, 49 
Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF), 60, 
248 

Somali insurgency, 248-49, 311-15 
Somali language, 6, 103; as language of 

broadcasting, 200; literacy training in, 

134 

Somali National Army (SNA), 256, 260; 

supporting Western Somali Liberation 

Front, 59, 313, 314 
Somali National Movement (SNM), 88, 

260 

Somali people, 17, 18, 91, 95-96; de- 
mands for self-determination, 235; 
Italian favoritism toward, 39; land dis- 
tribution by, 168; number of, 95; so- 
cial organization of, 95-96 

Somali Youth League (SYL), 49; demon- 
stration led by, 49; outiawed, 49 

South Yemen. See Yemen, People's Dem- 
ocratic Republic of 

Soviet Union: aid from, 43, 253, 255, 
296; constitution of 1977, 63, 216; debt 
to, 295; democratic reform in, 5; edu- 
cation in, 227, 237; exports to, 201, 
202; imports from, 202; influence of, 
on armed forces, 277; materiel acquired 
from, 59, 238, 256-57, 260, 278-79, 
293; medical assistance from, 140; mili- 
tary assistance from, xxvi, 5, 59-60, 62, 
238, 256-57, 260, 269, 278, 279, 280, 
285, 291, 294-96, 313, 314; military 
faculty, 283, 284; military training in, 
284; naval cooperation, 280-81; refusal 
by, to recognize Italian occupation, 38; 
relations of, with Somalia, 60, 256; re- 
lations with, 65-66, 253; scholarships 
from, 135; security advisers from, 228; 
treaty with, 294; withdrawal of support 
by, xxvi, 210, 257, 262, 263, 270, 296 

SPLA. See Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army 

State Council (Eritrea, 1993), xxxiv 
state farms, 172-74; conversion to, 173; 

investment in, 173-74; motives for, 

173; production, 174 



406 



Index 



students: attack by, on Derg, 55, 58; 
demonstrations by, 51, 52, 112, 129; 
in Development Through Cooperation 
Campaign, 58, 129-30, 172, 224; killed 
in Red Terror, 88; kinds of, 130; land 
reform movement led by, 169; number 
of, 130; recruited for civil service, 227; 
study abroad by, 35, 127 

Sudan, 256; border with, 72; civil war in, 
261; Ethiopian refugees in, 87, 88, 89, 
90; gross domestic product, 149; as 
peace talks observer, 251, 252; refugees 
from, xxxiii, 88, 90; relations with, 
260-61; slave raids by, 100 

Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA), 88, 90, 260 

Sudan Interior Mission, 125 

Supreme Court, 218; appointment of 
judges to, 219; responsibilities of, 221; 
restructured, 221 

Supreme Court Council, 221 

Supreme Military Strategic Committee 
(SMSC), 278 

Susenyos (emperor), 22 

Sweden: assistance from, 43; medical as- 
sistance from, 140; military training by, 
274, 279, 282, 283, 318; relief from, 
230 

Swedish International Development 
Authority, 258; education assistance 
from, 135 
SYL. See Somali Youth League 
Syria: relations with, 262; support by, for 
Eritrean Liberation Front, 47, 239 



Taddesse Tamrat, 19 

Tafari Banti: as chairman of Provisional 

Military Administrative Council, 56; 

killed, 57 

Tafari Mekonnen {see also Haile Selassie), 
33; crowned emperor, 35; crowned 
negus, 34; education under, 34, 273; 
modernization under, 34, 282 
Tatek: People's Militia in, 281 
taxes: under Amhara, 17; on coffee, 154; 
collection of, 154, 172; under Derg, 
154; direct, 154; for education, 128-29; 
export, 154; under Haile Selassie, 47, 
50, 154; import, 154; indirect, 154; on 
land, 42, 50, 106, 128; on peasants, 42, 
106, 107, 128; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 154; revenues from, 
154; structure of, 154 



Taytu (empress), 33 

teachers: attack by, on Derg, 58; demon- 
strations by, 52; Ethiopian, 133; forced 
into Development Through Coopera- 
tion Campaign, 129-30; number of, 
128, 132, 133; shortage of, 127, 128, 
132 

technical assistance: from United Nations, 
147; from United States, 147; from 
Yugoslavia, 147 

Tedla Bairu, 47 

teff, 7, 173 

Tekeze River, 77, 77; as potential source 

of hydroelectric power, 190 
Tekla Giorgis, 28 
Tekla Haimanot II (king), 24, 117 
television, 199; censorship of, 329 
tenants, 106; peasants as, 71, 107, 108- 

10; social characteristics of, 104 
Tendaho Cotton Plantation, 168, 178 
Territorial Army, 51, 274, 316; mutiny 

in, 52 

Tesfaye Dinka, 263, 264 
Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, 263 
Teshome G. Wagaw, 126 
Tessema (ras), 33 

Tewodros II (king, 1855-68), xxv, 4, 
24-25, 27; accomplishments of, 27-28; 
goals of, 27; foreign policy of, 254; ori- 
gins of, 27; suicide of, 27 

Tewoflos, Abuna, 56, 117 

TGE. See Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia 

Tigre language, 93, 97 

Tigray, 8, 24, 86; conquered in Islamic 
jihad, 19; constitution referendum in, 
216; death in, from famine, 87; drought 
in, 89; famine in, 51; famine relief in, 
230; government defeated in, 64-65; 
granted autonomy, 65, 102, 223; Italian 
invasion of, 32, 244; labor unions in, 
161; land tenure in, 167; livestock in, 
182; military ethos of, 270; nobles of, 
42, 48; opposition to land reform in, 58; 
opposition to Mengistu by, 244; popu- 
lation growth rate in, 81, 82; resettle- 
ment from, 232; revolt of 1943 in, 41, 
244; schools in, 130; soil erosion in, 
166; state of emergency declared in, 242 

Tigray insurgency, xxvi, 5, 48, 60-62, 87, 
101, 244-46, 269, 301, 307-10; expense 
of, 276; origins of, 244; support for, 48 

Tigray Liberation Organization (TLO): 



407 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



members of, killed, 245; organized, 244 
Tigray people, 4, 25, 71, 91, 101; edu- 
cation of, 126; influences on, 4; land- 
holdings of, 110; Muslim attack on, 4; 
political power of, 214; religion of, 72, 
92, 115, 116; as ruling class, 71; semi- 
pastoralists, 48; slaves held by, 34; so- 
cial organization of, 93 
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 
xxvi, 60, 84, 210, 233, 234, 239, 244- 
45, 280, 282, 301, 307-10; administra- 
tion, 245; alliance with Ethiopian Peo- 
ple's Democratic Movement, 246; 
Central Committee, 307; congresses of, 
307, 308; efforts to form Ethiopian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Democratic Front, 
245-46; formed, 307; goals of, 244; 
materiel captured by, 309; military as- 
sistance by Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front to, 60, 245, 306, 308; military 
campaigns of, 238, 252-53, 308; peace 
talks, 251-52, 308; relief services at- 
tacked by, 89; successes of, xxvii, 245; 
support for, 245; territory controlled 
by, 216; terrorism by, 308 
Tigrinyalanguage, 47, 92, 103; literacy 

training in, 134 
TLO. See Tigray Liberation Organization 
TPLF. See Tigray People's Liberation 
Front 

trade {see also balance of trade; exports; 
imports): ancient, 146; attempts to im- 
prove, 200; by barter, 201; deficit, 202; 
under Derg, 58; growth in, 148; under 
Haile Selassie, 47; impact of, 26; in- 
vestment in, 153; as occupation, 104, 
111, 112; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 200; routes, 146 

traders, 1 12, 146; fate of, 1 12-13; role of, 
112-13 

Trade Unions' Organization Proclama- 
tion (1982), 161 

Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(TGE), xxv; established, xxvii, 264; 
problems faced by, xxvii, xxxvi, 265 

transportation, 193-99; airports, 193, 
198-99; development of, 193; growth 
in, 148; under Haile Selassie, 47; im- 
ports of, 202; labor union in, 161; loans 
for, 193; railroads, 193, 194-97; roads, 
34, 39, 146, 193-94, 197; under villagi- 
zation, 86 



Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile 

(Bruce), 24 
Treaty of Wuchale (1889), 31; annuled, 

32 

Tripartite Treaty, 32, 256, 261 

UNDP. See United Nations Development 

Programme 
unemployment, 83, 145, 157-60 
UNFPA. See United Nations Population 

Fund 

UNHCR. See United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees 

UNICEF. See United Nations Children's 
Fund 

Union of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Or- 
ganizations (EMALEDEH), 59, 238 

United Nations, 46, 73, 89, 304; Eritrea 
in, xxxiv; membership in, 43, 254; 
peacekeeping forces, 274; plan to as- 
sociate Eritrea and Ethiopia, 46 

United Nations, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the (FAO): agricultural 
assistance from, 183; technical as- 
sistance from, 147 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF): medical assistance from, 
136, 140 

United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 192; agricultural assistance 
from, 183 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 89; repatriation 
program, 90 

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): 
medical assistance from, 140 

United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, xxviii 

United States, 305; aid from, 253; com- 
pensation to, after nationalization, 189; 
economic assistance from, 43 ; economic 
mission, 40; exports to, 201; imports 
from, 202; Kagnew station leased by, 
255, 256, 291-92; materiel acquired 
from, 238, 279, 292-93; military as- 
sistance from, 43, 274, 292; military 
training in, 274, 292; refusal by, to 
recognize Italian occupation, 38; rela- 
tions with, 238, 253, 254, 256, 293-94; 
relief from, 230; technical assistance 
from, 147, 194 

United States Agency for International 



408 



Index 



Development (AID), 136, 258 
United States Department of State, xxxi, 
293 

United States-Ethiopian Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement (1953), 255, 279, 
292 

United States Foreign Military Sales 
credit agreement, 293 

United States Military Assistance Advis- 
ory Group (MAAG), 283, 292, 293 

United States Peace Corps, 128 

University of Asmera, 128 

urban areas: birth rate in, 79, 81 ; discon- 
tent in, 51; diversity in, 102-3; growth 
of, 82-83; under Italian rule, 36, 82; 
labor force in, 157, 162; life expectancy 
in, 81; nationalization of land in, 104, 
145, 229; percentage of population in, 
82; police in, 317; population growth 
in, 83; population in, 105; school en- 
rollment in, 131; social system in, 
111-14; underemployment in, 160; un- 
employment in, 160; women in, 114 

urban dwellers' associations. See kebeles 

urbanization, 82-83, 102, 111 

urban migration, 83; impact of, on 
schools, 132; by refugees, 83; by 
women, 83 

utilities sector, 190-91; labor union in, 
161 



veterinary stations, 181 

villagization, xxvi, 71, 84-87, 174-76, 
224; abandoned, 175; begun, 84; goals 
of, 85, 86-87, 175, 233, 234, 235; 
guidelines for, 234; international reac- 
tion to, 71, 175; motivation for, 85, 
173; number of people in, 86, 87, 233; 
number of villages in, 233, 234; poli- 
tics of, 233-35; problems with, 64, 86, 
164, 175, 234; refugees from, 88, 
234-35; resistance to, 64, 86, 234, 309 

Voice of Ethiopia (radiobroadcast), 200 

volcanoes, 76-77 



Wag: Aksumite influence in, 12; ethnic 
groups in, 100 

wages, 161-62; freeze on, 156, 162; mini- 
mum, 162; policies on, 161; real, 162; 
for women, 114-15 

Washington peace talks, 251 



water: conservation, 172; under resettle- 
ment program, 84; shortages, 83; 
under villagization, 85, 86 

Waz (Labor) League, 237, 238 

Welamo language, 6, 103; literacy train- 
ing in, 134 

Welamo people, 98 

Welamo region: development projects in, 
163; invaded by Menelik, 31 

Welega: resettlement to, 174, 232; schools 
in, 131; villagization in, 234 

welfare, 135-40 

Welo: death in, from famine, 87; ethnic 
groups in, 91, 100; famine in, 51; fam- 
ine relief in, 230; insurgency in, 65; 
land tenure in, 166-67, 168; livestock 
in, 182; Muslims in, 103; opposition to 
land reform in, 58; People's Militia in, 
281; population growth rate in, 82; 
resettlement from, 232; schools in, 131; 
soil erosion in, 166; villagization in, 86 

Welwel incident (1934), 37 

Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF), 50, 59, 62, 248, 249, 311; 
military campaigns of, 238, 314; 
Ogaden captured by, 59, 260; troop 
strength of, 313 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 
Republic of 

Weyane, 48, 101, 244 

White Terror, 58, 237-38 

WHO. See World Health Organization 

Wingate, Orde, 39 

Wolayta language. See Welamo language 
Wolayta people. See Welamo people 
women: in armed forces, 271, 285; dis- 
crimination against, 114; education of, 
115, 133; employment of, 114; under 
land reform, 114; in literacy campaign, 
134; physical hardship suffered by, 114; 
in police force, 317; roles of, 114-15; 
rural, 114; urban, 114; urban migra- 
tion by, 83; wages of, 114-14 
Wonji Sugar Plantation, 168 
Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), 71, 
111, 152, 211-14, 226-27, 263; cadres 
of, 224; Central Committee, 213, 216; 
congresses of, 213; in constitution of 
1987, 214; ethnic groups in, 214; 
founded, 62, 170, 213, 228, 235; insta- 
bility in, 250; insurgencies under, 243; 
peasants in, 111; policy direction un- 
der, 214; Political Bureau, 213; relief 



409 



Ethiopia: A Country Study 



forbidden by, 231; Soviet encourage- 
ment of, 211; villagization under, 234; 
women in, 115 

Working People's Control Committee, 
211, 228 

World Bank, 156, 165, 181, 185; aid 

from, 193, 194, 203, 258 
World Health Organization (WHO): 

medical assistance from, 136, 140 
World War I, 33 
World War II, 39-41 
WPE. See Workers' Party of Ethiopia 
WSLF. See Western Somali Liberation 

Front 

Xamtanga people, 97 

Yagba Siyon, 14 
Yekatit Quarterly (periodical), 253 
Yekatit '66 Ideological School, 227 
Yekuno Amlak, 14 

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 
(South Yemen), 256 



Yohannis I (king, 1667-82), 22-23 
Yohannis II (king): murdered, 24 
Yohannis IV (king, 1872-89), xxv, 4, 25, 
28, 101; foreign policy of, 254; relations 
of, with Menelik, 28 
Yugoslavia: assistance from, 43; techni- 
cal assistance from, 147 
Yukalov, Yuri, 296, 306 



Zagwe dynasty, xxv, 3, 11-13; carved 
stone churches by, 3, 12; Christianity 
of, 12 

Zaire, 274-75 

Zara Yakob, 15 

Zawditu (empress), xxv, xxvi, 28, 33; 

death of, 34, 35 
Zeila, port of, 18 
Zela Anbesa militia camp, 281 
zemecha. See Development Through 

Cooperation Campaign 
Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes), 24, 

27; emperors during, 24; Oromo in, 

26; warlords during, 24 
Zoskales (king), 8 



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